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Abstract
This study makes a case for theorizing contract farming as institutions that operate over a domain,
rather than as mere technical arrangements for risk sharing between two economic actors. It
advocates using the contract farming system as a unit of analysis and dismantling the composite
principal-agent problem into its constituent stages, of contracting, of honoring agreed contracts
and of contract enforcement. Each of these stages contains elements of friction that define the
substantive features of the arrangement. Contract farming then emerges and sustains as frictional
equilibria over the domain, where in the face of uncertainty and imperfect information, firm and
farmers develop and update robust subjective assessments regarding the other’s behavior and use
these to make decisions on whether to contract and whether or not to honor the contract. This
approach admits the possibility of incorporating the heterogeneity of contracting experiences, of
incorporating the social aspects of transactions and acknowledging explicitly the dynamic elements
of these arrangements. Theorizing contract farming as institutions allows a framework that can
potentially resolve many apparent contradictions regarding the normative implications of contract
farming. The empirical part of this study takes this theoretical apparatus to investigate five
contract farming schemes in southern India, broiler, cotton, gherkins, marigold and papaya, using
a unique data for 822 contract and non-contract farmers collected between 2007 and 2009. The
empirical analysis focuses first on the contracting stage, where firms and farmers match up to
contract, examining the role mutual perceptions of risks and a firm’s considerations of geographies
in determining contract participation. The study then assesses the welfare gains from participating
in contracting, suggesting that there is considerable variation in outcomes, both across schemes and
farmers within a scheme, providing the ingredients for churning in participation, or dynamics in a
firm’s portfolio of contract farmers over time. The study also looks at enforcement problems in these
schemes. In the context of weak public enforcement of contracts through courts, firms typically
leverage relationship-based incentives along with price-based incentives to improve contractual
compliance. Overall, the empirical analysis suggests that despite many positive welfare implications
of contract farming arrangements, several frictional elements in the contracting domain seriously
limit the instrumentality of contract farming for poverty alleviation in developing countries.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Two Views of Contract Farming
Contract farming - described broadly as an institutional arrangement between farmers and busi-
nesses to produce and transact agricultural commodities at predetermined prices and conditions -
is not a recent phenomenon. Yet, a recent wave of agricultural industrialization and the emergence
of large-scale food retailing in developing countries may be precipitating a renewed shift in favor of
contract farming on a scale that is probably unprecedented. Changing tastes of consumers, higher
demand for processed foods, and the globalization of agro-industry have, each in their own way,
contributed to this redefining of producer-processor relationship in these countries (Reardon et al.,
2009; Reardon and Timmer, 2005; Reardon et al., 2003; Ruben et al., 2006; Swinnen, 2007; Timmer,
2009; Birthal et al., 2005).
There is little disagreement today about what contract farming means or indeed, why it emerges
in the first place. In stark contrast, there is deep disagreement on whether contract farming is a
‘good thing’. At one end of the spectrum, contract farming is seen as a vehicle for smallholders in
developing countries to take advantage of opportunities that a globalizing trade system has to offer,
notably, in non-traditional high value crops.1 Against a background of persistent agrarian distress in
resource-poor regions, advocates enthuse, perhaps rightly, over the changes such firm-farm linkages
could bring. In particular, contract farming could solve a number of pressing problems at once
- providing market access, inputs, technology, insurance and even specific entrepreneurial skills
(Glover, 1984; Goldsmith, 1985; Morrissy, 1974; Williams and Karen, 1985). It is thus presented as
1The term smallholder, like peasant, has no universally accepted definition. It is usually taken to mean farmers
who own less than one hectare of cultivable land, who have limited resources and tend to depend on family labor
(Narayanan and Gulati, 2002).
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a win-win situation, with both farmer and agribusiness standing to prosper (Eaton and Shepherd,
2001). At the opposite end, many claim that it supplants traditional structures of production and
exchange in a way that produces more iniquitous power relations, exacerbating social differentiation
and even proletarianizing the independent farmer (Glover and Kusterer, 1990; Little and Watts,
1994; Singh, 2002). There are also relevant questions about corporate commitment, or rather the
lack of it, to the long term ecological and social consequences of these arrangements.
While the debate is far more varied and textured than is conveyed here, it is illustrative of
the schism that prevails with respect to normative aspects of contract farming. It is not entirely
coincidental that this divide reflects the preferred points of departures of economists on the one
hand, and anthropologists, sociologists, geographers and political scientists on the other. The latter
have looked at contract farming systems in the context of larger social, political and economic
forces in a post-Fordist global economy and consequently invest the discussion with the idea of a
systemic agrarian transformation that ‘flexible specialization’ engineers. The economists’ discussion
of contract farming has tended to abstract from the context of a system, let alone the larger socio-
political landscape, to a more atomistic and static approach where the farmer is the relevant unit of
analysis. This enables the view that as an institutional arrangement, contract farming functions as
an effective and efficient risk-sharing mechanism between two agents while solving missing market
problems.
Indeed, this divide might be the single most important reason that despite the extraordinarily
rich empirical evidence we have inherited on contract farming across disciplines, a coherent canvas
has failed to emerge. The debate, if anything, has only gained momentum, as empirical accounts
of both ‘successes’ and ‘failures’, across a range of welfare metrics, are put forth with equal and
impressive regularity.
This rift has important repercussions for policy making, often translating into opposing
conceptions of the role of the state. If, on the one hand, contract farming is indeed a good thing,
advocates are concerned about how this can be scaled up and replicated to have the broadest
reach possible. Some would argue that governments ought to be proactive in providing a legal
and institutional framework that supports businesses taking up contract farming. On the other
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hand, some believe that the state should disallow it altogether, terming it a kind of ‘forced agrarian
change’. Recognizing this polarity, still others would assign to the state the enigmatic role of having
to neither support nor oppose contract farming (Asokan and Singh, 2003). A middle road suggests
that if contract farming entails its own set of problems, policy interventions could be put in place
to calibrate its functioning. At the very least, the government ought to act to protect the interests
of the farmer by fixing terms of the contract, preventing monopsony and instituting formal dispute
resolution mechanisms (Minot, 2008; Singh, 2002).
The issue of policy is critical, since the state can and does exert a strong influence on the
instrumentality of contract farming in poverty alleviation (Grosh, 1994; Raynolds et al., 1993).
Also, given that most developing country governments are resource-constrained, the optimal way
of distributing scarce state resources and capacity over a potentially large number of agricultural
interventions demands serious attention. It is hence important to determine clearly how states can
fashion the particular exogenous institutional context so as to influence (or not) the outcomes of
such schemes.
1.2 Bridging the Divide
1.2.1 Motivation, Objectives and Scope of the Study
My thesis foregrounds this deep disagreement regarding the transformative promise of contract
farming. The central premise of this work is that methodological differences, especially across
disciplines, have generated a false binary in discussions of contract farming, whereas a more
integrated theoretical perspective can reconcile these apparently conflicting positions. In particular,
this thesis is motivated by a recognition that the analytical apparatus used to analyze contract
farming within the discipline of economics tends to view parts rather than the whole. The story
of contract farming in developing countries is one with many intricate sub-plots. Economists have
developed some of them with much enthusiasm and some others not at all. Consequently there are
significant lacunae which prevent the articulation of a comprehensive theory of contract farming. I
focus on three of them.
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First, the social aspects of contracting arrangements poses a serious challenge to theoretical
analysis.2 In the absence of effective formal enforcement mechanisms, especially in the context of
transition and developing economies, and the essentially incomplete nature of agricultural contracts,
firms have had to be inventive in putting these arrangements in place, involving structures of social
relations and interlinkages with social institutions to support economic exchange (Aoki and Hayami,
2001; Fafchamps, 2004; Kirsten et al., 2009). Whereas in developed countries, issues such as trust
might influence outcomes, and coexist with or complement formal mechanisms of enforcement,
in developing countries these are often preconditions (Fafchamps and Minten, 2001). Because
they are preconditions, relationship-building becomes an instrument, so that firms might cultivate
a relationship alongside establishing contracts. This puts the issue of contract farming firmly
within the realm of relational contracts. In fact, a business consultant in India exclaimed to me
“We don’t do contract farming, we do relationship farming!”3 So, rather than contract farming
being a technical transactional arrangement as development economists tend to believe, it is the
representation of a complex, socio-techno-economic relationship. While the literature documents
the relational nature of contract farming, it is not apparent that this has informed the theoretical
foundations of empirical analysis to the extent it should.
Second, most theoretical work has seemed content using a farmer as the unit of analysis. This
enables detailed theoretical development of partial equilibrium aspects such as bargaining between
farm and firm, welfare distribution across parties, the idea of interlinkage and so forth. Interpreters
of this stream of theory, focusing as they do on contractee benefits, tend to unwittingly extrapolate
this to the farm population as a whole.
Yet, it is evident that there is an important general equilibrium dimension. Theoretical work
that uses the notion of a representative farmer neglects the fact that heterogeneity among farmers
partitions them into those who participate and those who do not or might be systematically
excluded, leading to important distributional consequences across the actors in the larger domain.
That firms use various selection criteria and screening mechanisms is well known and these
2For example, Granovetter (1985) discusses the notion of ‘embededness’, referring broadly to the idea that economic
relations between individuals or firms are located in actual social networks and do not exist in an abstract, idealized
market. This is not however the only lens through which the social aspects of farm-firm relationships can be analyzed.
3Agribusiness Survey, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, 2007.
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exclusionary devices can engender different kinds of distributional impacts in different systems.
Even among those who participate the welfare outcomes could vary substantially. Further, a firm’s
contractual relationship with one farmer could have spillover effects for others in a given region.
Thus, like the ‘technology treadmill’, contract farming might well have partial equilibrium effects
that may be ‘desirable’, while generating system or domain equilibrium effects that are not, or vice
versa (Cochrane, 1958).
Last but not least, existing theoretical analysis of contract farming have not ventured to explain
historical changes and institutional evolution in contract farming schemes that we see so often at a
systemic level. Notably, the question of sustainability of these systems is only marginally addressed,
and the evolution of contract terms or the farm-firm relationship, rarely. This is important since,
given the same starting point, even in the presence of gains to contracting, the selection process
deployed by agribusinesses can engineer very different pathways at a systemic level, leading to very
different kinds of agrarian transformation that we see empirically.
It is not as if these aspects remain unrecognized. Empirical accounts of contract farming
documents each of these quite well.4 Yet, the absence of an integrated theoretical perspective has
led to difficulties in reconciling the apparent contradictions of empirical evidence across countries.
A goal of this thesis is therefore to develop an analytical framework that can arbitrate and
mediate these positions. In particular, in the context of the above critiques, this thesis argues
for and attempts to build an analytical apparatus to study contract farming that (1) shifts across
geographical scales to capture phenomena both at the farmer level and at the level of a contract
farming ‘domain’, (2) incorporates substantively the heterogeneity of farmer types and farmer
experiences with contract farming, and (3) incorporates dynamic elements of contract farming
relationships, acknowledging the impact that continuity of these relationships into the future can
have on economic decisions in the present.
Drawing on insights from modern institutional economics and standard neo-classical tools, I
frame the issue of contract farming within Aoki’s thesis on Comparative Institutional Analysis
(CIA) (Aoki, 2001). Accordingly, contract farming arrangements are institutions defined by a
4These are reviewed in Chapter 2.
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collection of robust subjective assessments or beliefs agents hold about one another, that have
evolved over time through learning, are stable/stationary and are used as a basis for procedurally
rational decisions. This thesis suggest that the substantive characteristics of a contract farming
scheme represent frictional equilibria over a ‘domain’ and are systemic, temporal equiilibria. The
theoretical effort in this thesis accommodates the Aokian view of institutions by reconstructing the
CIA view within a composite neoclassical model of contract farming.
Essentially, the theoretical project involves unpacking a contract farming arrangement into
its constituent parts and modeling these separately. Contract farming is then modeled as three
distinct component processes that take place sequentially at any given finite time period or interval
denoted as t (Figure 1.1). At the beginning of time t, the time of sowing, all agents, farmers
and the contract firm make their contracting decisions. The firms decide who to pick as suppliers
and farmers make assessments of anticipated welfare gains from contracting over the alternative
opportunities available to them before they contract. At this time, farmers hold subjective beliefs
about the firm’s reliability and firm has its own expectations of how reliable each farmer is likely to
be. All agents also hold certain beliefs about market conditions and expected yields for the season.
This study assumes that farmers are somewhat myopic so that they factor in only the contracting
party’s actions within time period t. Following the contracting stage, supplier farmers are matched
up with the firm in a temporary equilibrium. Nature then reveals yields and market prices. At
the end of the season, after yields and prices have been revealed, comes the stage when the firm
and contracting farmers make decisions on whether to honor the contract or not. While honoring
the contract, agents are assumed to take into account possible repercussions of their actions (or
contractual performance) on opportunities to contract in the subsequent time period, factoring
in any cost of the partner’s attempt to enforce the terms of the contract. In the context of this
study, firms also make a decision on whether to enforce the contract, either through legal channels
or by terminating the relationship with the farmer. This option is assumed to be unavailable to
the farmer, broadly reflecting the realities of the empirical context of the work. The enforcement
decision coincides with the firm’s and farmer’s profits being determined. This is the welfare outcome
that is typically the focus of studies of contract farming. Following the enforcement stage, agents
6
Figure 1.1: Approach to Modeling Contract Farming
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now have a chance to update their subjective beliefs regarding nature and regarding one another’s
reliability through a learning rule, based on the revealed decisions made at time t with regard to
honoring and enforcement. They then move into the subsequent time period carrying these new
updated beliefs that now form the basis for contracting decisions in time period t+1. This sequence
of processes repeats itself, mapping the trajectory of a contract farming system over a domain and
across time.
The approach, hitherto, to modeling contractual relationships typically collapses this problem
into a one-shot principal agent model. The theoretical model elaborated in this work dismantles this
to recover the component processes which are sources of friction and emerge in practice as important
arena for action. The theoretical model is thus a composite one, with different component processes
fitted into a whole. Notably, this approach explicitly takes into account the entire domain of farmers
the firm could potentially contract with and factors in the implications that recurring contractual
relationships have for decisions at any given point of time. Such an approach offers an opportunity
demonstrate that the apparently conflicting views on normative aspects are not necessarily mutually
inconsistent emphasizing the heterogeneity and temporal nature of the contracting experience across
farmers.
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Given that my effort would be to build an overarching analytical apparatus that can accommo-
date the range of outcomes that we see in empirical literature, it entails, perhaps inevitably, sacrifice
of minimalist elegance for a more cluttered abstraction of reality. However, the potential of such a
theory lies in its ability to offer a generic framework for context-specific modeling of contract farming
arrangements. This would help understand the diversity of farming experiences across various socio-
political and agro-economic contexts and achieve a productive cross-fertilization of perspectives in
understanding, even anticipating, the distributional consequences of contract farming. I hope to
demonstrate that this lens for viewing contract farming offers the possibility of generating several
well-known insights into the practice of contract farming in developing countries.
I then use this framework to examine contract farming arrangements across five commodities
in southern India, applying it to answer select empirical questions. The first aspect investigates
the twin issues of farmer participation and a firm’s selection of contract farmers over a particular
contracting ‘domain’, capturing processes that constitute the contracting stage. The second aspect
assesses the welfare implications of contracting in terms of net profits. The third aspect trains
attention on the enforcement stage, exploring farmer decisions to honor and a firm’s decision to
enforce contracts. In dealing with these three aspects, this work departs from most of current
literature in seeking to embed the individual agent within the larger domain, capturing different
scales of resolution, and in accounting for the recurring nature of contracting relationships. This
study makes a conscious effort to draw on information and data from both farmers and firms,
weaving together different perspectives in order to validate the theoretical viewpoints. The
empirical analysis is based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative data from three sources:
a survey of 822 contracting and non-contracting farmers (henceforth, Farmer Survey), interviews
with 42 agribusinesses that use contract farming for procurement (henceforth, Agribusiness Survey),
and contractual documents from 23 different schemes to create a composite empirical mapping of
contract farming practice in India.5
While one goal of this thesis is to make the case for a particular theoretical approach to studying
5The Farmer Survey initially included 840 farmers, but eighteen were dropped and not used in the analysis due to
either incomplete or inconsistent data or due to misidentification or misclassification of farmer type. Details of the
survey are presented in the Appendix A.
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contract farming, the other goal is to study empirical aspects of contract farming in India, through
that theoretical lens, to be able to clarify the normative implications of its practice to illuminate
the potential role of the state. This thesis is therefore as much an effort to generate evidence-based
policy prescriptions vis-a`-vis contract farming, as it is an application of the essential logic of a CIA
view of contract farming.
1.2.2 Plan of the Study
The thesis is organized in two parts. Part 1, comprising chapters 2 through 4, is a theoretical
effort to build a unifying analytical apparatus to examine contract farming in developing countries.
Chapter 2 reviews empirical literature and current theoretical approaches. Chapter 3 sets up the
larger framework of Aokian CIA and motivates the formal model. Chapter 4 formalizes the notion
of contract farming as frictional equilibria, with the particular objective of establishing a framework
for empirical analysis.
Part 2 assesses, empirically, select components of the theoretical framework. Chapter 5 provides
a backdrop on contract farming in India, with a descriptive analysis of the institutional environment
of agribusiness in India. It also draws attention to the appropriateness of India as a site for study.
Chapter 6 introduces the study area in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, outlining the five
contract farming schemes that form the basis of empirical work. Chapters 7 through 11 zoom in
to investigate various parts of the the framework suggested in Figure 1.1 as distinct but related
aspects of contract farming in India. Chapter 7 examines farmers’ perceptions of the risks and
benefits associated with contracting over other alternatives, while Chapter 8 investigates the a
firm’s selection of farmers over a domain. Chapter 9 assesses welfare outcomes from participation
in contracting arrangements. Chapter 10 focuses on the problem of enforcement and the role of
social relations in implementing and maintaining contractual relations. Chapter 11 maps dynamic
elements in these schemes, identifying the ingredients of institutional evolution. Chapter 12
summarizes the results of the thesis, theoretical and empirical, concluding with a discussion of
implications for contract farming policy in India.
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Part I
A Theoretical Framework
for Contract Farming
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Contract farming has been a focus of academic interest for several decades. The result is a large body
of empirical work straddling disciplines and ideological perspectives, exploring different aspects of
schemes across geographical regions. This has occasioned periodic reviews of literature, typically
with a dual focus. On the one hand, these reviews are motivated by the need to draw lessons from or
assess the ‘success’ of existing contract farming schemes. On the other hand, these reviews address
contract farming from a methodological or epistemological perspective in an effort to identify an
appropriate analytical lens to evaluate the outcomes of such arrangements. Often, these objectives
mingle, so that it is difficult to separate works that are exclusively ‘theoretical’ from those that are
empirical. These reviews have contributed to a deep understanding of the issue. At the same time,
they represent an ongoing struggle to uncover the underlying drivers that determine and anticipate
the exact nature and consequences of particular contract farming arrangements.
A comprehensive review of works on contract farming, copious as it is, would be a daunting
challenge and given the purpose of this study, might not be particularly useful.1 Instead, this
chapter reviews literature on contract farming to identify the interstices between theoretical and
empirical perspectives in order to justify the central preoccupations of this study. In particular,
this review lays out empirical work to (1) highlight the heterogeneity in contract farming practice
or the static diversity of schemes, (2) assess the extent to which studies track dynamic diversity or
the life-cycle of a contract farming arrangement, and (3) document the impacts of contract farming
at different scales of resolution, at the level of the farmer and the larger ‘domain’. The review also
pays particular attention to social aspects of contract farming practice, as documented by empirical
studies. While reviewing the empirical literature on contract farming, this chapter also attempts a
1Extensive reviews of contract farming schemes are available in Bijman (2008); Eaton and Shepherd (2001); Key
and Runsten (1999); Minot (2008, 1986); de Treville (1986), to name a few.
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critical analysis of the ability of extant methodological frameworks to accommodate these empirical
realities. Thus, while a goal is to map what we already know about aspects of contract farming as
it prevails, another goal is to revisit the analytical foundations that frame these works.
Following definitions put forth by earlier writers,2 contract farming can be defined as an
agreement, oral or written, between farmer or farmer groups and processing and/or marketing
firms, commercial or otherwise, for the production and supply of agricultural products under pre-
specified conditions, frequently at predetermined prices. The arrangement could also also involve
the purchaser providing a degree of production support through, for example, the supply of inputs
and the provision of technical advice. The basis of such arrangements is thus a commitment on the
part of the farmer to provide a specific commodity in quantities and at quality standards determined
by the purchaser and a commitment on the part of the company to support the farmer’s production
and to purchase the commodity.
Like Minot (1986), this review focuses predominantly, but not exclusively, on commercial
undertakings that take up contract farming and is confined to schemes in developing countries.3
This review is organized in three parts, the first maps empirical work and the second, methodological
frameworks. The third part is a broad articulation of the proposed framework that meshes aspects
of current theoretical perspectives, laying the foundation for the theoretical effort Chapters 3 and
4.
2.1 Mapping Empirical Work: The Canvas and the Detail
The most telling feature of contract farming schemes is its polymorphism. Several typologies have
been developed to categorize them and to organize their diversity.
One classification is based on the extent of control over processes, due to Mighell and Jones
(1963) and propagated by Minot (1986). This is presently the most popular way of thinking about
contract farming. Accordingly, market provision contracts refer to those where the grower and
2I draw on definitions proposed by Dorward (2001); Eaton and Shepherd (2001); Glover and Kusterer (1990);
Mighell and Jones (1963); Roy Ewell (1972); Simmons (2005).
3There is a rich active literature on contract farming in developed countries, for example, hog, poultry in the
United States and dairy and horticulture in Europe. This is left out of the purview, not because they are any less
complex or interesting but because contract farming, in these contexts, is not foisted with the role of furthering rural
development and poverty alleviation.
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buyer agree to terms and conditions for the future sale and purchase of a crop or livestock product.
Resource provision contracts are market provision contracts that have, in addition, commitments
by the buyer to supply selected inputs, including, sometimes, advice on land preparation and
technology. The third category with the maximum intensity of control is the management
specification contracts, with the grower agreeing to follow recommended production methods, input
regimes, and cultivation and harvesting specifications.
Another classification makes distinctions on the basis of actors (private sector firms, public
sector firms and parastatals, international aid agencies), presumably on account of their different
motivations. These are outgrower schemes (private players), satellite schemes and nucleus estate-
outgrower schemes. Outgrower schemes provide production and marketing services to farmers on
their own lands.4 Nucleus Estate-Outgrower Schemes are those where a core estate and factory
is established by the firm and farmers in the surrounding area grow crops on part of their own
land, which they sell to the factory for processing. Multipartite Arrangements is a term used to
emphasize the participation of several actors, each being responsible for a particular aspect of the
contracting arrangement (Ellman, 1986; Glover and Kusterer, 1990).
These categories were incorporated into a more detailed scheme by Eaton and Shepherd (2001),
who then propose a five-fold classification: (1) Centralized model, (2) Nucleus estate model, (3)
Multipartite model, (4) Informal model, and (5) Intermediary model. The centralized model involves
a centralized processor and/or packer buying from a large number of small farmers, often used for
tree crops, annual crops, poultry and dairy. Products often require a high degree of processing,
such as tea or vegetables for canning or freezing. Vertical coordination is through quota allocation
and tight quality control and the sponsors involvement in production varies from minimal input
provision to the opposite extreme, where the sponsor takes control of most production aspects.
The nucleus estate model is a variation of the centralized model, where the sponsor also manages
a central estate or plantation. The central estate is usually used to guarantee throughput for
the processing plant but is sometimes used only for research or breeding purposes. It is often
4For Glover and Kusterer (1990), however, these generally connote a government scheme with a public enterprise,
purchasing crops from farmers, either on its own or as a joint venture with a private firm, or private firms operating
exclusively.
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used with resettlement or transmigration schemes and involves a significant provision of material
and managerial inputs. The multipartite model may involve a variety of organizations, frequently
including statutory bodies. These can develop from the centralized or nucleus estate models, for
example, through the organization of farmers into cooperatives or the involvement of a financial
institution. The informal model is characterized by individual entrepreneurs or small companies
and involves the informal production contracts, usually on a seasonal basis and often requires
government support services such as research and extension and involves greater risk of extra-
contractual marketing. The intermediary model involves a sponsoring form that subcontracts
linkages with farmers to intermediaries. Consequently, there is a danger that the sponsor loses
control of production. It turns out that these are often overlapping categories and schemes could
combine aspects of these different types.
The number of such characterizations and approaches for typologizing contract farming ar-
rangements illustrates the challenge of organizing diversity in meaningful ways. Despite shared
features that define these organizing principles, there could be significant differences both in what
constitutes the ‘terms of the contract’ (like price, quantity and so on) and in the exact nature of
arrangements. There could be differentiated contracts (different contracts for different growers)
or uniform contracts, where all contractees accept the same parameters, for example, the contract
price.5 Contracts could be oral or written. Both are prevalent in developing countries. The
contractual price itself could be fixed or formulaic. For instance, in the case of the latter, it could
be linked to a reference market price, e.g., a mark-up on it, or a moving average or to technical
norms of cost of production and so forth.6 Different pricing arrangements have different implications
for which of the contracting parties bears a greater part of the price risk. In terms of the quantities
too, quotas could be rigid, but this could also be notional. In the latter, there could be a minimum
that the farmer has to commit to. In a few cases, there is no commitment at all so that farmers
are actually free to sell elsewhere, if they choose.
5Differentiated contracts were used, for instance, by Campbells in Mexico; they were later pressured by other
firms in the region to give it up (Key and Runsten, 1999). Theoretically, this can be seen as separating or pooling
equilibria in a principal agent framework or could be characterized as a collection of bilateral bargaining islands where
transactions take place.
6A wide variety was observed and documented in the 1970s by Kirsch (cited in Glover and Kusterer (1990)).
14
As far as operationalization of contracts is concerned, contracts could be with individuals or
with groups, sometime with the male head in the household, and in rarer cases, with a woman within
the household. They could be ‘take it or leave it’ contracts or actors could bargain bilaterally over
it. In general, when there are a large number of farmers willing to contract, firms have the luxury of
selection, which is then based on a pool of farmers identified (by the firm) or self-identified. These
could be done formally by the firm’s employees, appointed agents or by informal intermediaries such
as village leader, progressive farmer, former trader-middleman, and so on. Where smaller number
of farmers are involved there could be some bargaining over contract terms. Often contracts are
rationed, especially with group contracts, with no more than one contracting group per village.
There are other techno-economic aspects across which contracts differ. For instance, the
duration of the contract varies a great deal. It might involve a long lock-in period, even ten years,
especially for tree crops and other perennial crops or this could be as short as a single season for
field crops. Contracting could be volumetric or in terms of acreage. In other words, contracts can
imply farmers committing to a particular quantity to be exchanged or it could involve the farmer
committing to a certain acreage for sowing the contract crop. In the former, the farmer is more
likely to bear yield risk, whereas in the latter, it is the firm that assumes yield risk. Further, the
contract could be with people already growing the required crop, while in others, it could involve
introducing a new crop, so that contract farming embodies, implicitly, a new technology and effects
a new cropping pattern. The nature of crops varies as well; some are highly perishable, high value
(like horticulture, sugarcane and so on) whereas others are low value storables like staples. These
contract crops could be processed further or sold with minimal value addition, like packaging and
grading. The destination for these could be export markets, which would entail, typically, stringent
quality and health standards, or for the local market. In developing countries, the latter would
make fewer demands on quality and traceability, although this may be changing with the coming
of big food retailers. Arrangements can be multi-party or solo efforts, and these could be propped
up with implicit and explicit state subsidy or with no support at all.
While it is suggested that each of these elements influences the nature of vertical coordination
arrangements and their welfare outcomes (variously defined), it is useful to think of these elements,
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a subset of them at least, as themselves being determined simultaneously. Depending on the
particular goals of the firm involved and the exogenous context, various aspects of the contracting
arrangement share a complex endogeneity so that they are jointly determined.7
Clearly, contract farming arrangements manifest in a bewildering variety of combinations. In
fact, it has been pointed out that, as an analytical category, perhaps the only thing that binds all
contract schemes together is the contract (Baumann, 2000).
Yet, even the notion of a contract is contested. It is well recognized in empirical work, that not
only are contracts complex and incomplete, as agricultural contracts usually are, but they are often
implicit and relational.8 Often the contract is a very broad representation of the relationship, where
agreements on particular aspects are no more than notional. Relatedly, alongside the technical fixity
of the contract, there is a fluid ‘moral economy’ of the contract (Clapp, 1994; Scott, 1976; ?), where
the farm-firm relationship plays itself out. These make it hard to define precisely the very nature
of contract.
Given this diversity in contractual form, it is only expected that the consequences are similarly
wide-ranging. These differ across a host of particular aspects, such as power relations within the
household, labor market, efficiency, technology adoption, diversification, environmental impacts,
integration into a supply chain, social differentiation, farmer groups and horizontal coordination
and so on.
For the particular purpose of this thesis, I organize select empirical work on contract farming
across two dimensions: first, across partial (questions of the individual farmer) and domain level
effects (questions of agrarian society) and second, based on static (short term, synchronic) and
7While taxonomies help organize diversity of contract farming schemes, they are often inadequate tools to explain
and predict the nature of arrangements especially when the organizing principles themselves are endogenously
determined. For instance, too often, the intensity of the relationship between farmer and sponsor is used to typologize
contract farming schemes. Yet, it is possible that the intensity of the relationship itself is a function of the contract
commodity and the broader agro-economic or social context.
8Contracts are incomplete when arrangements cannot be made for all possible contingencies. A relational contract
is described in different ways. It is a contract that specifies only the general terms and objectives of a relationship and
specifies mechanisms for decision making and dispute resolution(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Another description
considers a relational contract to be one that do(es) not try to take account of all future contingencies but are
nevertheless long-term arrangements in which past, present and expected future personal relations among the
contractual parties matter (Furubotn and Richter, 2005). A third common characterization of relational contracts is
simply as (i)nformal agreements and unwritten codes of conduct that powerfully affect the behavior of individuals
(Baker et al., 2002).
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dynamic (long term/evolutionary, diachronic) ramifications of a contract farming system over an
observed time period (Table 2.1). The social aspects of these arrangements appears as a leitmotif.
I focus on a subset of questions that have been addressed at different levels. Perhaps the most
pressing questions today, from the point of view of economists are (1) whether contract farmers do
better in terms of income and efficiency than farmers who do not contract and (2) whether contract
farming systems are biased against certain categories of farmers. Recent reviews of these issues
include Minot (2008); Reardon et al. (2009); Reardon and Timmer (2005); Swinnen and Vandeplas
(2007); Ruben et al. (2006).
Table 2.1: Scheme for Literature Review
Partial Effect General Effect
Static or Synchronic Diversity Does a particular farmer contract?
Why?
Portfolio of farmers: Which groups
are included and which ones are
not?
Nature of contract and contractual
relations?
Geographic poverty traps: Are
some regions systematically ex-
cluded?
What is the effect on income?
What are the implications for effi-
ciency?
Dynamic or Diachronic Diver-
sity
Does the farmer cease to contract? Does the contract farming scheme
survive?
How do the terms of contract
change?
Impact on agrarian transformation,
social stratification, etc.
Are income gains sustained over
time?
(e.g., agribusiness normalization,
indebtedness, peasant capitalist)
Are these efficiency implications
long term?
(e.g., environmental degradation)
The general findings on the question of income suggests that contracting farmers do earn higher
incomes. Minot (1986) offers one of the earliest systematic reviews of contract farming schemes
and finds that most studies report higher income of participants. Little (1994) concludes that
incomes from contract farming increased for a moderate (30-40 percent) to a high (50-60 percent)
proportion of participants. In a review of Africa’s experience with contract farming in the early
1990s, Porter and Phillips-Howard (1997) conclude that farmers were generally better off as a result
of their participation in contract farming. Later studies suggest that when farmers participate in
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modern food industry channels, compared to those only in the traditional channels, have higher
net earnings per hectare or per kilogram marketed (Gulati et al., 2008; Reardon et al., 2009; Singh,
2007).9
In general, the selection of farmers into contract schemes could be associated with the same
underlying attributes that put some farmers on a higher level of welfare. If this were the case, the
impact of contract farming on welfare outcomes of participating farmers would be overestimated.
More recent studies typically correct for the possibility that certain unobservable characteristics
that are associated with participation. While the results seem to suggest that contract participation
tends to increase incomes (Bellemare, 2010), in some cases, the effects were reported to be
ambiguous (Escobal et al., 2000).
Apart from direct pecuniary benefits in terms of income, there is some evidence of reduction
of price risk for the farmers, although only a few studies document this with any rigor. Knoeber
and Thurman (1995) find that close to 97% of the price risk in broilers faced by the farmer is
transferred to the firm. Ramaswami et al. (2005) find a similar situation in the case of broiler
contract farmers in southern India, as does Michelson (2010) for suppliers to Walmart in Nicaragua.
Bellemare (2010) reports that the volatility of the total income of the average household fell by 16
percent, implying that that participation in contract farming has indirect expected utility impacts
on household welfare. Benefits could also be in terms of reduced market risk of transaction due
to implicit or explicit contracting via informal prefereed supplier relationships (as Hernandez et al.
(2007)show in Guatemala) or as simply better access to quality inputs (Minten et al., 2009).
Such findings extend to efficiency as well. A number of recent studies find positive overall
impacts of contract farming on productivity or efficiency. In a study covering livestock farms in
the Philippines, India, Thailand, and Brazil, Delgado et al. (2008) found evidence that contract
farming tends to improve the relative profit efficiency of small farmers. Key and McBride (2001)
found evidence that hog farming under contracts in the United States tends to have higher factor
productivity than independent hog farmers. In a study on poultry production in India,Ramaswami
9These are just few examples and is by no means a complete review.
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et al. (2005) found evidence that contract farming helped reduce farmers’ production costs through
improved technology and management practices as did Kumar (2007) for tomatoes in India.
While contract farmers do record impressive benefits in terms of income and access to technology,
studies suggest that often alongside these benefits, there may be significant problems as well. Even
if small farmers participated, they were invariably caught in a weak bargaining position vis-a`-vis
the firm; economists engaged in micro studies rarely focus on the texture of the relationship. Other
social scientists emphasize that what matters is not whether or not a farmer is included, but the
manner in which they are included and the exact nature of the farmer-firm relationship. Often
these discontents coexist with farmer satisfaction over the contracting arrangement (as reported by
Singh (2001, 2000), for instance, in contract vegetable production in Punjab state in India). Several
studies identify problems such as asymmetric power between farmers and companies, violation of
the terms of the agreements (Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1997; Singh, 2001), and so on. The real
question, according to some, is with regard to the contract farmer’s power of bargaining (Swinnen,
2007). Little and Watts (1994) compile a set of seven case studies of contract farming in sub-Saharan
Africa, focusing on conflicts between farmers and the contracting firms and the imbalance of power
between the two parties, again, despite rising incomes (Brannstrom, 2000; Collins, 1993). Gender
inequities and intra-household tensions over the allocation of new revenues frequently emerge as a
problem (Carney, 1988; Collins, 1993; Dolan, 2005; Dolan et al., 2002; Watts, 1994a). Similarly,
the loss of autonomy and independence for the growers who enter into contracts, is significant.
This is frequently deemed to be a chief problem in the transnational capitalist transformation of
agriculture. (Clapp, 1994; Collins, 1993; Gwynne, 1999; Watts, 1994b; Key, 2005; Watts, 1994a)
While the benefits (or costs) to contracting is essentially a partial effect, the question of who is
included and who is not is a domain level or systemic phenomenon.
Farmer selection is important for obvious reasons. If contract farmers indeed do better, it is
contingent on their being ‘selected’ into systems in the first place. Therefore, if contract farming
is advocated as a way to involve small farmers in markets, they would need to be inclusive. This
aspect has now come to be called social performance (Warning and Key, 2002), indicating a certain
notion of ’equity’ in selection.
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Evidence on inclusion is equivocal at best. In general, while there is evidence that small farmers
are particularly challenged to meet the volume, cost, quality, and consistency requirements of
downstream players, increasingly dominated by supermarket chains and large -scale agro-processors
this does not necessarily mean that there is widespread exclusion and thus upstream consolidation
in the food system. (Reardon et al., 2009; Reardon and Timmer, 2005)
A number of studies show that small farmers do indeed participate in these schemes. Some
suggest they they participate overwhelmingly in these schemes. There are also examples of firms
contracting exclusively with smallholders (Glover and Kusterer, 1990; Von Braun et al., 1989; Wang
et al., 2009). In several other schemes, however, larger farms (Dileep et al., 2002; Kumar, 2007;
Carter and Mesbah, 1993) seem the likely participants in contract farming arrangements. This is
often despite the high labor intensity of contract crops, where small farmers might be able to draw
on family unpaid labor.
As far as contracting for large-scale retail markets is concerned, some studies find that retailers
tend to source from large-scale processors in order to reduce transaction costs, because those
processors possess adequate logistics and transportation capacity and are able to meet the private
standards of the retailer. Small farmers who do not have the capital to meet the requirements of
retailers tend to be excluded, as illustrated in studies of potatoes in Ecuador (Zamora, 2004) and
vegetable producers in Thailand (Boselie et al., 2003). Neven et al. (2009) find that a threshold
capital vector for entrance in the supermarket channel hinders small, rainfed farms in Kenya. Most
of the growers participating as direct suppliers to that channel are a new group of medium-sized,
fast-growing commercial farms managed by well-educated farmers. In such cases, it is not clear if
contract farming does solve missing market problems for large farmers or whether these firms may
be leveraging ’an advantage’ and replacing existing institutions.
In still others, firms contract simultaneously with both large and small landholders (Bivings
and Runsten, 1992)). In general, it has been observed that smallholders are included when there
is a homogeneous landholding pattern involving predominantly smallholders (e.g, ? in Senegal).
In a similar vein, more recent studies point out that when there is scale dualism,(Berdegue et al.,
2005, 2007; Henson and Reardon, 2005) for Mexico show that leading supermarket chains source
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mainly from large-growers when they face a sector that is scale dual and from small farmers when
they face a sector dominated by small farmers. Stated another way, wealth or land-size, defined
variously, do not seem to be the factor distinguishing contract farmers from non-contract farmers
(Miyata et al., 2009; Ramaswami et al., 2005; Warning and Key, 2002).
While the debate on small farmer inclusion persists, it has been observed by many that land
size may not be a key driving factor at all. Often, younger, less experienced farmers get selected
into these systems, as do farmers who may have non-land assets or even specific skills or attributes
such as commitment to quality (Runsten and Key, 1996a,b). The ability to make fixed investments
(Berdegue et al., 2005, 2007, 2006), quality certification, irrigation and access to roads is important
(Hernandez et al., 2007; Miyata et al., 2009; Stringer et al., 2009). Further, the actual process of
farmer selection is usually intertwined with social relations. Sometimes a lead farmer or village head
is asked to identify potential contractees, sometimes, middlemen (on occasions, former traders).
There are instances too of the firm asking villagers chose on the basis of reputation of the potential
contractee amongst the villagers (Dev and Rao, 2005; Glover and Ghee Lim, 1992; Miyata et al.,
2009; Warning and Key, 2002; Aoki and Hayami, 2001). This underscores the importance of issues
such as social networks, reputation, trust and perhaps even ethnicity in the selection process, rather
than the size of landholding.
Interestingly, there is no fixity in who is selected. Over time, those farmers who were contracting
may be dropped and others, who were not, included. Runsten and Key (1996b) find that
multinational tomato processors in Mexico first contracted with large growers but then eventually
involved also the small growers because side-selling was a problem with their larger growers. An
exporter in Thailand that started producing its own horticultural products on company land and
later shifted to smallholder contract production (World Bank, 2006). Herath and Weersink (2009)
note that the Sri Lankan tea sector has changed from one dominated by vertically integrated
plantations to one where processors source from from small, independent growers. Minot and Ngigi
(2004) describe the evolution of several contract farming schemes in Kenya, including one (Del
Monte pineapple) that gave up on contract production and others than have shifted from large
scale to small scale production.
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The reverse, i.e., movement from small to large-scale suppliers could happen as well. For
example, the Xiaobaiyang chain in Beijing is known to have shifted from 1000 to 300 processed
food suppliers in two years as it centralized its procurement system (Hu et al., 2004). Dolan et al.
(1999) observe consolidation in the export sector in Kenya with a sharp reduction in sourcing from
small farmers. In the case of processing, Farina et al. (2005) find a similar trend among dairies
in Argentina and Brazil. Similarly, leading Russian chains focus only on a handful of foreign and
domestic suppliers for dairy products (Dries and Reardon, 2005). In Senegal, green bean exporters
switched from small-scale contract production to large-scale production (Swinnen and Maertens,
2008).
While selection into contract farming systems is important, there are other general domain level
or systemic effects as well. Reardon and Timmer (2005) observe that in the context of food retailing,
actors in the traditional food industry often make investments in procurement and retailing aimed
at improving quality and efficiency to keep up with organized food industry. This spillover or ripple
effect could generate gains for the economy as a whole.
There is also an effect on employment. Often, when smallholders are excluded, they may
nevertheless have employment opportunities on contract farms and outside through ancillary or
related activities. For example, the impact of the Chilean fruit boom (Jarvis and Vera-Toscano,
2004), or the growth of vegetable export zones in Guatemala (Von Braun et al., 1989) and in Senegal
(Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). Large-scale contract farmers often hire in seasonal laborers, who
are themselves smallholders (Runsten and Key, 1996a). In fact, Key and Runsten (1999) show
that contract farming can have important multiplier effects on employment, infrastructure and the
development of local markets in Latin America. Neven et al. (2009) documents positive employment
effects generated by supermarket suppliers in Kenya. However, these authors emphasize that the
impact of such labor arrangements on rural development depends mainly on the type of grower that
is involved. Singh (2001) points out that in the case of India, most of those employed on contract
farms were paid below legal minimum wages and worked in poor conditions. A majority of them
were women and children. In the context of the tomato agro-industry in Mexico, Barron and Rello
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(2000) point out similarly difficult circumstances for these farmer-laborers, as does Selwyn (2007)
in the case of sugar contracts in Brazil.
Clearly, this has the effect in the longer run of stratifying agrarian societies and possibly
exacerbating economic inequalities if it puts the two groups on different income growth trajectories
(Key and Runsten, 1999; Korovkin, 1992). Little and Watts (1994) point out increasing rural
inequality in their studies as contract farmers grow wealthy enough to hire farm laborers. Social
differentiation too can emerge across the domain. For instance, Raynolds (2002, 2000) discusses
studies that point to the modification of class relations among agents who intervene at different
points in the commodity chain, where contract farming has resulted in new forms of control over
agricultural production by food processing companies, banks and supermarkets.
Only a few studies have tracked contract farming systems over time. Korovkin (1992) and
Vellema (2009) are interesting exceptions. The paucity of studies on evolution of systems is
especially unfortunate, since these qualitative studies often produce a different hue to the findings
of static and partial equilibrium studies. For instance, firms might often be able to squeeze farmer
margins over time if farmers have limited alternatives. Within a region, firms’ repeated selection
of a subset of farmers accentuates or aggravates social differentiation in the long run.
In fact, anecdotal accounts suggest that dynamic of contract farming arrangements is probably
far more critical than we currently recognize, particularly with respect to social stratification.
Korovkin (1992) observes that contract farming contributes to the ‘differentiation and disinte-
gration of the peasantry’, offering rich peasants opportunity to incorporate modern technologies,
augment assets and increase their reliance on wage labor, while at the same time accelerating the
transformation of poor peasants into a ‘rural semi-sub proletariat’. (Korovkin, 1992). This has
been documented by others such as Collins (1993); Gwynne (1999); Storey and Murray (2001);
Watts (1994b). Some have noted increased concentration of land ownership (Gwynne, 2003) in the
region. Sometimes, the poor sell their land, while the going is good ,i.e., when they get employed
as farmhands on contract farms. This puts them in vulnerable positions vis-a-vis exogenous shocks
that destabilize these schemes (Korovkin, 1992), and these ‘new labor’ choose to migrate to the
cities.
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Studies also suggest that when food retailers in developed countries switch suppliers, it is often
without warning, and this could have sudden but costly impacts through destabilizing contract
farming arrangements (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Mannon, 2005). Fold and Gough (2008) study
how changing consumer preferences in the European Union affected contract pineapple production
in Ghana. More recent work discusses similar issues wherein a constraint from the demand dislodges
the supply chain arrangements upstream at the farm level (Ashraf et al., 2009; Mehta and Nambiar,
2007; Mehta et al., 2002). Ashraf et al. (2009) point out in the case of DrumNet, that the services
provided increased production of export crops and lowered marketing costs, leading to a 32%
income gain for new adopters. The services however collapsed one year later when the exporter
stopped buying from DrumNet because farmers could not meet new EU production requirements.
Farmers sold to other middlemen and defaulted on their loans from DrumNet. Such experiences
may explain why farmers are less likely to adopt export crops. Mehta et al. (2002) discusses the
collapse of layer contracting in India following the European Union ban on eggs on account of
Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary issues.
Even for those who are included, erosion of alternatives (other institutions) undermines their
position by creating dependency, and therefore vulnerability over time. It is also often the case,
that initially, firms set attractive terms to start off with, to get farmers into the fold, and then
subsequently tighten them - a practice called ‘agribusiness normalization’ (Glover and Ghee Lim,
1992; Glover and Kusterer, 1990). Also, when external market conditions become unfavorable for
firms, they may alter their relations with producers by imposing higher quality standards and
enforcing tougher contracts. This was seen at the end of the 1980s in the case of small-scale
fruit production in Chile, for example. The tough conditions written into some of the contract
clauses forced some producers to sell their land to the fruit-exporting firms because of high levels
of indebtedness (Gwynne, 1999).
In other cases, there have been documented instances of inappropriate technology recommended
to farmers by the firms (Rehber, 2004) that entailed either crop loss or deterioration in soil and
environmental conditions over time. In Costa Rica, for example, contracting resulted in farmers
using their land more intensively, with higher use of agrochemicals and water exhaustion. All these
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environmental costs were borne by the farmers in the long-run (Pomareda, 2006). This is especially
true if the firm is not tied locationally to an area (via say, a processing unit or factory), making it
easy to shift to another region to source produce.
Importantly, the survival of a contract farming scheme cannot be taken for granted. As Minot
(1986) points out, failure rates of contract farming are high, but failures are rarely documented. In
many cases, contract farming is abandoned altogether, often with dramatic suddenness.
Studies suggest that contextual issues play a large role in the sustainability of systems. A classic
‘macro-example’ is that of Thailand, where the failure was systemic (Glover and Ghee Lim, 1992).
With Thailand’s economic growth in the 1980s, options for farmers became more diverse; several
took to investing in real estate and left contract farming. As (Glover and Ghee Lim, 1992) point
out, contract farming became the victim of Thailand’s economic success. They emphasize that its
passing, if it comes about in such ways, should not necessarily be resisted.
The evolution of commodity market structure could also be significant. It has been suggested
that for survival of contract farming, an ‘essential pre-condition’ is ‘quasi-monopsony’ (Sivaramkr-
ishna and Jyotishi, 2008). Others have observed that price commodity fluctuations tend to put
grower-firm relations under great strain (Glover and Ghee Lim, 1992; Gulati et al., 2008). It is
now apparent that where there is competition in contracting so that there is no monopsony for
the farmer, it may be hard for firms to maintain contracting relationships unless the firms collude
(Swinnen, 2007).
Sustainability of a contract farming scheme is also predicated on contract enforcement that
reduces uncertainty. In that sense, it also reflects sustainability of a relationship and therefore of
continued trust and so forth. Swinnen (2007) review studies of contract farming schemes that relied
on private enforcement, as do Gow et al. (2000) and Ruben et al. (2006).
None of these problems is ever likely to emerge from snapshot studies. Actors in the particular
domain might not even be able to anticipate these dynamic changes. From the point of view of
policy making, it is important to have information on the dynamic outcomes, to stave off potential
catastrophic risks for intended beneficiaries.
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2.2 Contract Farming as Theoretical Subject
It is evident that empirical literature emphasizes time and again that contract farming schemes are
incredibly diverse, often representing intricately interlocked relationships between agents. Not only
are contracts themselves polymorphic, the broader practice of contract farming varies both over time
and place. Further, this is true both in terms of partial effects (impact on an individual agent) and
general effects (impact over the entire domain). This complexity poses particular methodological
challenges.
The diversity of contract farming arrangements has sometimes led to a general skepticism of
universalistic models. It is believed, for instance that the “heterogeneity of contract production -
a diversity embracing crops, actors, production relations and institutional links - strongly suggest
that any effort to outline a general “theory” of contracting would be foolhardy and ultimately
unproductive” (Watts, 1994b, page 5). Yet, at the same time, in a conversation, an economist
asked: have we not modeled this (contract farming) already?10 This suggests, in contrast, that
there is an essential unchanging ‘sameness’ that can be and in fact has been explained within
existing paradigms.
This disagreement itself makes it important to ask how far existing methodological frameworks
to examine contract farming have succeeded in addressing these aspects, and whether they have
sought to do this at all.
2.2.1 An Overview
Theoretical efforts at explaining contract farming as a governance structure is currently dominated,
overwhelmingly, by neoinstitutionalism or New Institutional Economics, especially the transactions
cost approach Williamson (1975).11
Within this framework, contract farming is seen to emerge as the optimal choice from options
ranging from spot-market transactions to complete vertical integration. The appropriateness of
10July 10, 2006. Personal communication.
11I focus on the most common frameworks used currently. The SCP (Structure Conduct Performance) approach,
the French Institutional school, the filie`re approach, etc. have also been used at different points of time to discuss
contract farming. I do not dwell on these here.
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transactions cost approach to explaining agricultural transactions has been discussed widely (Grosh
(1994); Jaffee (1987); Key and Runsten (1999); Masten (2000); Minot (1986); Warning et al.
(2002); Allen and Lueck (2003) and many others). According to this view, the economic world
is characterized by frequency of transactions, bounded rationality and asset specificity in a context
of uncertainty and opportunistic behavior. The greater the intensity of each of these, the more
likely a firm is to vertically integrate.
Allied to the transactions cost approach, is the so-called property rights approach, that suggests
that the owner of a nonhuman asset possesses residual control rights over that asset and that there
is an optimal allocation of these rights (Grossman and Hart, 1983; Hart and Moore, 1990). Here,
the firm is seen to emerge to allocate residual rights of control over property, and it could well
be the case that this optimal allocation is such that not all activities take place within the firm.
Reimer (2006) develops such a model to explain vertical integration of the pork industry in the
United States, allowing for bargaining power. Whinston (2003) offers a more general framework for
explaining the role of transactions costs in vertical integration within the property rights framework.
The third active stream draws on New Development Economics comprising economics of
information, agency theory and the traditional tools of neo-classical analysis. Contract farming
in this perspective emerges as an institution to address issues of missing markets in an environment
of pervasive risks, incomplete markets and information asymmetry. Because it serves to redress
the problem of missing markets, it leads to a Pareto improvement, and is hence efficient. Many
authors thus see contract farming as an extension of the share contracting problem, with slight
modifications so that here the ‘agent’ owns land and labor and the ‘principal’ owns perhaps some
asset specific investment (like a plant) and capital, inputs and access to markets. Contracting is
then, among other things, a way of solving missing market problems and allocating risk between
producer and contractor; the former takes the risk of production and the latter the risk of marketing
(Baumann, 2000). From this perspective, several scholars have modeled contract farming within
the principal-agent framework. Within this, most focus on the terms of contract itself. Knoeber
and Thurman (1994), for instance, study broiler contracts that use tournaments and Bogetoft and
Olesen (2003); Olesen (2001) are able to explain the existence and welfare consequences of two-
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part pricing and differentiated contracts in the Danish pea industry, as an outcome of the need to
balance risks and incentives.
Some scholars situate the discussion of vertical coordination in the larger context of market
structure and industrial organization theory. Royer and Rogers (1998) and Holloway (1998) analyze
contract terms and vertical integration in the context of different market structures. Knoeber and
Thurman (1994, 1995) and Goodhue et al. (2000) suggest a core motivation for broiler industry
integration is sharing of input and output price risk and production risk. Hennessy (1996) attributes
vertical integration in the food industry generally to information asymmetry regarding product
quality. Hueth et al. (1999), Levy and Vukina (2004) and others suggest similar motivations for
integration of the pork industry.
Some others, while ascribing to the transactions costs explanation for the emergence of contract
farming, have focused on the distribution of efficiency gains across actors using a bargaining
theoretical framework as in Bell and Zussman (1980). Swinnen (2007) use this as a lens to assess
the effect of competition on rent distribution, efficiency and equity in firm-farm relations.
Most of these studies acknowledge that contractual incompleteness exposes practices to risks
and recognize that in in an environment of non-enforceability of contracts, this could be immensely
costly. Additional costs of contracting emerge in the form of failure to adapt, what Williamson
(1991) calls ‘maladaptation costs’, the hold-up problem being an example.12
Apart from this, there is a distinct body of works that has sought to retrieve the notion of
social embeddedness or its inverse in contract farming schemes, using the relational nature of
contracts as the fulcrum. Aoki and Hayami (2001)for instance argues for according a preeminent
place to community and social relations in economic analysis, just as Fafchamps (2004) proposes
analytical frameworks to analyze rural economic relations as social relations. The theoretical work
on relational contracts suggesting that relational contracts can achieve stable outcomes that are
efficient and mutually beneficial is only just finding its way into empirical work on contract farming
(Levin, 2003). Gow et al. (2000),Swinnen (2007), and Kirsten et al. (2009) all underline the
centrality of private enforcement of contract mechanisms to stable and sustainable engagement.
12See Klein et al. (1978); Grossman and Hart (1986).
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2.2.2 An Assessment
It is now recognized widely that the issue of contract farming, complex as it is, straddles all of
these sub-fields. While each of these sub-fields have provided a lens to view certain aspects, from
the perspective of the key concerns of this work, many of them seem to throw away the baby with
the bathwater.
Agricultural economists have focused sharply on identifying organizing principles by which we
can understand how these systems work, drawing on a collective of these theoretical perspectives
to identify features of the successful schemes that lead to particular outcomes of interest. This
taxonomic approach has been widely used and has helped integrate a range of theoretical perspec-
tives into empirical work. This approach is exemplified by Key and Runsten (1999); Warning et al.
(2002), for instance. Others try and identify conditions under which contract farming ‘makes sense’
(Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Minot, 2008; da Silva, 2005; Simmons, 2005).
Despite this, there are significant gaps between what the analytical frameworks can explain or
have explained or sought to explain, and those that remain unexplained. While there is a hint
of correlates of diversity there is hardly any explanation of its emergence or existence. Similarly,
although these approaches mention evolution in contract farming experiences (e.g., case studies of
Key and Runsten (1999)) there is rarely an explicit articulation of how or why such changes do,
in fact, take place. This is partly because of a taxonomic approach to explain variation, which
allows only as many possibilities as the combinations of taxonomic categories would allow. So, the
diversity itself is limited, emanating from a set of organizing principles. Sometimes, changes occur
over time from within the system as agents learn about each other and not just exogenously. It
has been pointed out that as an institutional mechanism, contract farming requires a continuous
adjustment process, according to the characteristics of the agents and the exogenous conditions
they are facing (Dorward, 2001; Saenz Segura, 2006). Yet, taxonomic frameworks don’t go far
enough to explain these.
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2.3 A Question of Methodology
The complexity and diversity of contract farming experience in developing countries has prompted
researchers to question the relevance of generic analysis. Echoing Watts (1994b), Little and Watts
(1994) concludes that the “diversity is so great that it is better to focus on the motives and power
relationships of the contracting parties than on the generic institution”.
Consequently, several authors direct criticism at neoclassical economic analysis, contesting
its view of contracting as a purely technical arrangement, something that grossly undermines
the diversity that we see in reality. Yet, parallel to this wrestling with diversity, there is
recognition of a certain universality of firm-farm arrangements. Indeed, the frequent claim that
contract farming is nothing more than a version of the putting out system underscores the generic
aspect of such arrangements. Not only is this form common across sectors, it has also been an
enduring historical feature of economic organization.13 Other social scientists too subscribe to a
certain contextual universality, placing contracting within a neo-Marxist framework in which social
relations of production and control of the labor process become the central defining features.14.
Thus, contracting is seen as being subsumed within a broader phenomenon of global restructuring
of agrarian production relations.
Clearly, irrespective of ideological orientation, there is broad agreement that contract farming
in practice manifests, at the same time, both diversity and a certain universality. The question
then is perhaps not whether or not we should try to formulate a general theory but rather explore
how we can develop such a theory that captures the universal aspects of contract farming as a
phenomenon without negating its essential complexity or diversity. Also, (how) can this theory
account for dynamics over time while including both partial and general effects? To the extent that
such a theory accommodates this diversity and does not privilege universality over differences, it
13For interesting parallels between modern day contract farming and proto-industries, see Parthasarathi (2001)
writing about weavers in colonial India and mills in imperial Britain in the 19th century.
14To Watts (1994b), “contracting signifies both the advance of the industrial appropriation of rural production
processes in the shift from agricultural production to agro-industrial production and of the social integration of
agriculture associated with transnationalization” and again as “a form of industrial appropriation of discrete activities
within the agrarian production process” (page 24).
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could provide a space for a more coherent organization of empirical experience, and provide useful
insights into policy making.
2.4 Imagining a Framework
As suggested by this review, existing frameworks, each on its own, might not be adequate to address
all these aspects. They can be best described as imperfectly perceived parts of a whole phenomenon.
Overall, while different approaches capture very relevant and important aspects of contract farming
arrangements, in choosing to work with only a subset of them, they necessarily do not capture all
the action. Those that focus on aspects such as global structural transformation tend to neglect
the complexity of arrangements at the micro-level while those focusing on the micro-aspects of
behavior tend to miss the drivers of transformation in agro-food systems at the macro-level. In
reality, contract farming, at least in the developing countries, has emerged as an outcome of an
interaction of macro and micro motives and behavior.
In this context, the scheme offered by Williamson (1991) and Delorme (1996) before him,
suggest in fact that the economics of institutions is best understood as a layered concept, in
particular operating at four different levels. According to Delorme (1996) and thereafter Kirsten
et al. (2009), economic space can be organized according to logical levels so that an encompassing
scheme, would comprise four levels of analysis organized in a logical order: agency, organizational
forms, institutional forms and the level of the nature of interactions. It is then suggested that each
theoretical sub-field in economics has a relative advantage over the others in explaining a particular
level (Table 2.2).
Thus, while the study of embededness falls within the realm of social theory, property rights
and political theory would be useful to examine the realm of institutional environment, comprising
formal rules of the game, property rights and so forth. Williamson terms this layer first order
economizing. The third level which involves the alignment of governances structures to transactions
costs can be termed second order economizing, and transactions cost economics offers a useful tool
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Table 2.2: Institutions as Layered Concepts
Level Purpose Theory
Embeddedness or Social Environment Protect, preserve, empower Social theory
(for example, informal institutions, traditions,
norms,religion,culture, sociopolitical imperatives)
Institutional environment First-order economizing Economics of property
rights
(for example, formal rules of the game,property rights,
laws, and constitutions)
create appropriate institu-
tional environment
Positive Political Theory
Governance: play of the game Second-order economizing Transaction-cost economics
(aligning governance structure with transactions) create appropriate gover-
nance structures
Neoclassical analysis:performance Third-order economizing Neoclassical economics
(for example, optimality, prices, quantities, and incen-
tives)
create appropriate marginal
conditions
(agency theory)
Source: Kirsten(2009). Adapted from Williamson (1991).
to do this. Finally, the analysis of third order economizing, that is, getting the marginal conditions
right, is best served by neoclassical tools and agency theory.15.
+ In this architecture, we have an encompassing framework, that provides the basis of thinking
about a unified analytical framework for contract farming. It illustrates, in particular, how
existing theoretical perspectives of contract farming shine a light on different ‘levels’ of institutions
rather than on the whole. This thesis contends that if one has to understand the debate on the
normative aspects of contract farming we need a theoretical framework that transcends these levels,
accommodating all the levels. A theory of contract farming requires this reach. Recent reflections
have, in principal, argued for precisely such frameworks (Dorward, 2001; Kirsten et al., 2009).16
They argue for a coherent theory of contract farming that is more than the sum of these parts.
Unfortunately, this has been developed only marginally further and there has been no serious effort
at formalization.
15See Kirsten et al. (2009) for a detailed treatment of the economic study of institutions. Interestingly, early
Williamson’s treatise on transactions cost approach did not explicitly address the issue of embededness, notions of
trust and so forth and drew criticism for this neglect. A later Williamson (1991) expands the reach of transactions
cost approach by admitting different ‘levels’ of institutions.
16This framework has been applied innovatively by Saenz Segura (2006). In a related vein, Echanove and Steffen
(2005) argue for a place-based analysis following Bebbington (2003) and Gwynne (2003),Gwynne (1999) and Gwynne
and Kay (2000). Bebbington stresses the need to relate existing local level processes with decisions taken at completely
different levels and which largely define what will happen locally while for Gwynne, the different scales of geographical
resolution goes from the global to the local, via national and regional scales.
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Thus, several questions remain. How can we restore what has slipped through the interstices
of existing frameworks in a unified, eclectic, analytical framework? Is such arbitration even
conceivable? In the next chapter, I explore this possibility and lay out the contours of such a
theory.
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Chapter 3
Towards a Unifying Theory of Contract Farming
The challenge of developing a unifying theory of contract farming that captures both static
and dynamic diversity, and partial and general effects, requires a framework of institutional
order but also a theory of change. In this chapter, I make a case for conceptualizing contract
farming arrangements as institutions and for analyzing these contract farming systems within
the comparative institutional analysis (CIA) framework as proposed by Aoki and Hayami (2001).
While the core of this proposed ‘theory’ of contract farming is essentially neoinstitutionalist and
centered on transactions costs, weaving it into the Aokian framework helps accommodate farmer-
level processes and domain-level processes, and contextual specificities as well as changes exogenous
to the system, implied, for instance, by macro-structural shifts in agrifood systems. In essence, this
is to examine contract farming as institution within a specific framework of capitalist transformation
and global integration. The goal is to achieve an ‘additive’ framework that accommodates aspects of
behavior and motives at the micro and macro levels, in the fashion of the layered scheme presented
by Williamson (Chapter 2). I suggest that this theory and the analytical framework it offers for
empirical work helps us understand, more holistically, the emergence, evolution, sustenance (or
not) of contract farming arrangements and also their remarkable diversity.
3.1 Contract Farming Systems as Institution
Contract farming was previously characterized as an arrangement involving an agribusiness firm
coordinating backwards with farmers, through written or verbal contracts, providing farm inputs,
credit and extension in return for guaranteed delivery of produce of specified quality often at a
predetermined price.
While retaining this ‘definition’ of contract farming itself, it is possible to conceptualize a
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contract farming system in broader terms.1 A contract farming system as an institution is then
not merely a technical arrangement between two or more economic agents. Rather, it is a set of
rules and covenants, even outside of what is expressly agreed as part of a contract, that prevails
over transactions in a particular domain. This domain admits an ‘expanded’ unit of analysis,
for instance, an agro-economic system, cropping system, geographical or political region, or some
sub-sector of the economy.
This characterization of contract farming as institution is admittedly a theoretical preference,
rather than a prescriptive definition. The underlying motivation is to accommodate the idea that a
contract in a contract farming system, far from being a mere economic transactional relationship,
is a manifestation or representation of a relationship (Clapp, 1988; ?). It is socially constructed,
contested and negotiated in a way that the actual practice of contract farming connotes a broader
socio-economic phenomenon. Its implementation then takes place in specific social and political
contexts (White, 1997). An example of this distinction is when firms tolerate side selling of output
or diversion of contracted inputs to non-contract crops; the farmer is, in return, accepting of the
firm’s control over aspects of production decisions.2 This is a practice that has been incorporated
tacitly into the larger scheme of things even though not strictly part of the contract itself (oral
or written). In this case, it is a practice that enabled the particular contract farming system to
maintain itself. Another example is where firms recruit middlemen to identify farmers to contract
with (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Glover and Ghee Lim, 1992). This too has little to do with the
actual contract itself. Neither is this a part of the exogenous environment even though it might be
produced partly by it. However, it does fashion the substantive features of the contract farming
system as a whole. A broader conceptualization of contract farming systems as institution aims
to accommodate these features, especially acknowledging the fuzzy and crenulated boundaries of
what is contractual and what is not. Needless to say, whatever the conceptualization, this has to
be in reference to the specific context studied.
1The notion of a contract farming ‘system’ is regarded somewhat differently in early literature, as being
disarticulated from the local polity and economy (de Treville, 1986). The word ‘system’ is used here precisely
to incorporate these very things.
2Clapp (1994) interprets this arrangement in the Scottsian sense of such practice on the part of farmers being the
weapons of the weak.
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I now attempt to locate the discussion of agribusiness-farmer contracts, conceptualized as
institution, within the analytical framework proposed by Aoki and Hayami (2001). I first offer
a general, recitative overview of this framework, for the most part as exposited by Aoki (2000,
2007); Aoki and Hayami (2001); Aoki (1998).3 Subsequently, I explore the way in which we can
write discussions of contract farming into this framework.
3.2 The Conceptual Framework: Institutions as “Punctuated”
Equilibria
The Aokian framework is part of a larger body of theory that constitutes modern institutional
economics or neoinstitutional economics.4 In general, if the economic process is analogous to a
game, economists have regarded institutions variously as players of a game, as rules of a game or as
an outcome of the game. Of these viewpoints, the latter two that have come to characterize much
of the recent work in neoinstitutional economics.
The ‘rules-of-the-game’ view of institution, pioneered by North (1990), views institutions as
exogenous and influencing individual agents’ behavior.5 The game here is a relevant economic
process and the rules may be formal or informal. Formal rules are, in some sense, given prior to the
playing of the game and are exogenous in the sense that it cannot be determined or fashioned by
the players of the game. Existing rules then shape the incentives of the players and drive effective
demands for new rules in response to changing relative prices. Accordingly, “polity” defines and
enforces the economic rules of the game (North, 1995, page 23). Informal norms originate, on
the other hand, in the social domain and constitute part of the “cultural heritage”. The tension
and interplay between the politically determined formal rules and persistent informal constraints
influence the way economies change. The salient idea here is that institutions determine an agent’s
behavior.
The “equilibrium-of-the game” view endogenizes institutions and, in the tradition of method-
ological individualists, regards all institutions as outcomes of interaction of individual, maximizing
agents (Greif, 1998). The core idea of the equilibrium-of-the-game view, which is antecedent to
Aoki’s CIA framework, is that rules are not all exogenously given, conditioned by polity or by
3This chapter draws extensively on these sources to reproduce Aoki’s framework.
4There is a large and growing body of work on this area. Menard and Shirley (2008) offer a comprehensive review
of perspectives.
5Hurwicz (1977) formalizes this notion.
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culture but are endogenously created through interaction of the agents in a relevant domain and
are thus self-enforcing (Greif, 1998). Institutions thus emerge as equilibria from an objective game,
played by agents who are perfectly informed of the structure and outcomes, and make strategic
choices with regard to their action. The strategy profile that emerges as the equilibrium is the
institution. This idea is found in Schotter (1981) and is developed by Greif (1998); Greif et al.
(1994), Milgrom et al. (1990), Weingast (1997) and Young (1998).
Aoki’s framework synthesizes these two views, while aligning itself closer to the latter. Although
adopting the view that institutions are the equilibrium outcome of a game, Aoki tempers this view
by incorporating the idea that institutions ‘embody’ rules of the game. He proposes, therefore,
what he terms the “endogenous-rules-of-the-game view”. An institution is then “a compressed
representation of the salient, invariant features of an equilibrium path, perceived by almost all the
agents in the domain as relevant to their own strategic choices. As such it governs the strategic
interactions of the agents in a self-enforcing manner and in turn is reproduced by their actual
choices in a continually changing environment” (Aoki, 2001, pages 26 and 185).
Aoki’s expository tool, the COASE Box, is worth reproducing here. Briefly, the objective game
represented by Figure 3.1 is the one relevant to an individual agent and is defined over a domain.
Belonging to this domain is a set of finite number of agents, its players. The entry, (A), is assumed
to represent the set of all technologically feasible actions of agents in the domain, while entry
(CO) is a consequence function that maps technologically feasible outcomes, contingent on some
technologically feasible choice profiles, to observable consequences. These two sets of elements
pertain to the environment that is not under the control of the agents (natural, technological,
and external institutional, i.e., institutions in other domains), but affects the physical outcome of
agents’ choices. The set of agents, the set of technologically feasible strategies for each agent and
the outcome function are the exogenous rules of the game.
Classical game theory then goes on to suggest that given the rules of the game (CO and A)
and given expectations about other agents’ strategic choices (E), the individual agent is assumed
to make a strategic choice (S) to maximize own payoffs. The domain is in Nash equilibrium
when the agents’ expectations about other’s strategic choices and their own actual choices are
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Figure 3.1: COASE Box Representation of the Generic Structure of the Game
 Parametric Data 
 (exogenous rules of the game) 
Endogenous Variables 
Internal to Agent 
(Micro) 
(A) set of feasible actions (S) strategic choice of an 
action (plan) 
External Constraints 
(Macro) 
(CO)consequence function (E) expectation of others’ 
strategic choices 
 
mutually consistent. This equilibrium action profile constitutes the institution in a static setting.
The equilibrium theoretic approach to institutions then suggests that an institution is a socially
constructed state from which agents are not motivated to depart as long as others do not do so, and
is in the nature of subgame perfect equilibria (Figure 3.2). The notion of evolution of institutions
in this framework derives from either evolutionary game approaches that employs concepts of
evolutionary equilibrium (Figure 3.3) or repeated game approaches that use concepts of perfect
equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium or some variant of sequential equilibrium.
Aoki’s endogenous-rules-of-the-game view departs from this in some fundamental ways. Impor-
tantly, Aoki dispenses with the objective game (that is at the core of the institutions as equilibrium
outcome of the game view) and replaces it with a subjective game from the perspective of individual
agents (Figure 3.4). The key assumption here is that the individual agent cannot have full knowledge
of the technologically determined rules of the game nor can (s)he make perfect inferences about
other agents’ strategic choices. Instead, each agent’s perception of the structure of the game is
represented by a “subjective” game form.
In contrast to the objective game, rather than a technologically determined feasible set of
actions, agents work with an “activated set of choices” (A), the agents’ common perceptual
representation of a strategy profile believed to prevail over the domain at a particular time.6 Each
agent then has a subjective outcome function. This serves as the agent’s environment inference rule
(CO). Both of these are in the nature of parametric data. Further, each agent plays the respective
subjective game simultaneously. At any point of time, agents playing as they do, a subjective game,
6Note that Aoki does not view this as a strategy profile, per se, of agents playing the game, in the way it is in the
equilibrium outcome of the game view.
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Figure 3.2: COASE Box Representation of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
 Parametric Data 
(exogenous rules of 
the game) 
Endogenous Variables 
Internal to Agent 
 (Micro) 
(A) complete 
knowledge of feasible 
(future) actions 
(S) comprehensive strategic 
plan of contingent future action 
choices 
External Constraints 
(Macro) 
(CO) complete 
knowledge of the 
consequence function 
(E) common beliefs regarding 
others’ action on and off the 
paths of play. 
 
Figure 3.3: COASE Box Representation of the Evolutionary Game
 Parametric Data 
(exogenous rules of 
the game) 
Endogenous Variables 
Internal to Agent  
(Micro) 
 
(A) fixed sets of actions (S) inertial imitation and 
mutation 
External Constraints 
(Macro) 
(CO) knowledge of 
“fitness” of strategies 
constructed from 
observations 
(E) inference from limited 
memory (static expectation) 
 
Figure 3.4: COASE Box Representation of the Subjective Game Model of an Individual Agent
 Parametric Data  
(exogenous rules of the game) 
Endogenous Variables 
Internal to Agent (Micro) (A) activated subsets of choices (S) best-response choice rule 
External Constraints 
(Macro) 
(CO) inference rule (E) private beliefs 
  (I) Institutions (shared beliefs) 
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activate small subsets of possible actions, and choose a strategy from the activated set of strategies
that, given a particular phenomenon of the institutions (or their reading of it) and their private
beliefs (E), is predicted to maximize utility; this is the best response choice rule (S).7
When the agent repeatedly uses the same rules for environmental inference, payoff prediction,
and choice, as well as the same phenomenal perception of institutions, we say that his/her subjective
game is reproduced at the individual level (or in cognitive equilibrium).8. When agents perceive the
phenomenon of the institution generated by the equilibrium as a relevant constraint, this equilibrium
is sustained. Aoki then characterizes institutions as “substantive characteristics of self-enforcing
rules for action choices by agents that are universally believed to be relevant in a repeated game
situation”(Aoki, 2000, page 14).
The institution as a summary representation of an equilibrium path, according to Aoki, must
possess the following attributes. First, institutions are endogenously created. Second, institutions
summarily represent salient features of the internal working of the domain and thereby reduce
the uncertainty regarding others’ action-choice rules, so that an agent need not have knowledge
or expectations about every aspect of other agents in the domain. The third attribute refers to
the durability or robustness of an institution. An institution should be identified with something
invariant within a certain bound or threshold of environmental and internal changes. This is
associated with a robustness to minor mistakes experiments and deviance of the agents from
institution’s implied rules. Fourth, an institution is universally relevant in the sense that there
is a common understanding and shared cognition amongst agents in the domain even though they
may attach different meanings or interpretations to it. Fifth, institutions are humanly made orders,
not technologically determined and there must be multiple ways of institutions being established
under the same technological and ecological environment. The notion of multiple equilibria is
7Subjective games in this sense roughly correspond to the notion of ‘mental models’ adopted in the induction
theory of Holland et al. (1989, page 12) i.e. as “models of the problem space” that cognitive systems construct, and
then “mentally ’run’ or manipulate to produce expectations about the environment.”. Here, not only are interactions
of such models with external environments, but also with those of other agents who act in similar ways. Denzau and
North (1994) discuss the concept of mental models in some detail.
8More generally and realistically, it may be considered that the agent possesses multiple rules of inference and
prediction at one time. These could be mutually competitive in some respects, complementary in others. Then, given
a continually changing institution, the agent may experiment with each of them and choose the one that he or she
considers appropriate under a given circumstance. However, when the sets of multiple rules remain to be stored as
useful tools by the agents, we may still say that their subjective games are reproduced.
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an essential aspect of institution that this framework seeks to capture. There could be different
pathways to attain the same institution just as there can be different institutions themselves. The
“endogenous-rules-of-the-game” view of institutions is consistent with these requirements. This
describes the emergence of institutions and provides a framework of order for institutions.
The subjective game model then sets the basis for a discussion of institutional change or
evolution. When an institution emerges from the subjective game, its reproducibility does not
imply rigidity or stasis, in terms of how the subjective game is played. It is, in fact, consistent
with and robust to agents’ marginally changing the set of rules or random experimentation. When
there is a gap between aspiration and prediction, then there is from the individual agent’s view a
subjective (cognitive) disequilibrium. Given agents’ aspirations, they may start revising/refining
the existing set of rules more substantially, in particular generating new choice rules involving the
expansion of the activated set of choices. However, not all changes can actually generate a new
institution. In other words, a change, at the margin, might alter an individual’s subject game and
outcomes, but need not necessarily alter the institution itself.
New institutions can evolve when the agents are then ‘induced’ to reassess and substantially
revise ‘subjective’ sets of actions and rules for choices in a coordinated manner, consciously
or unconsciously. This is what eventually leads to a new profile of moving equilibria and
their substantive representations - new institutions. Figure 3.5 summarizes the mechanism of
institutional evolution. From the left it deals with the choice of endogenous variables in the “old”
subjective game, its feedback to the data of the old subjective game and its redefinition, and the
emergence of the “new” institution. For institutional change to occur, however, a critical mass
is required. This critical mass, can come either from external impetus that ruﬄes the exogenous
rules of the game or parametric data, or it could be a internal cumulative effects relating to agents
perceptions and cognition. This is taken up in greater detail in Section 3.3. Depending on the
domain in focus, the process of institutional transition can be long or short, radical or gradual.
Thus, the essential idea of institutional evolution in the Aokian framework is that agents try
to discover a new way of doing things, and through their interactions new institutions become self-
organized. Once a particular institutional system is established, it tends to sustain itself. Change
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Figure 3.5: The Mechanism of Institutional Evolution
Sustenance of 
an old 
institution 
 Feedback to, and redefinition of the 
subjective game 
 Evolution of ‘new’ 
institutions 
(S) action choice 
constrained by 
the activated 
subset of choice, 
the accumulation 
of neutral or sub-
optimal 
mutations 
(A) cognitive 
disequilibrium  
(perception of 
inadequacy of the 
existing repertory 
of action choices)  
(S) experiment, 
learning, 
emulation of 
new choice 
 (A) 
redefinition 
of a new 
activated 
subset of 
choices 
(S) novel 
action choice 
         
(E) existing 
institution  
(a system of 
shared beliefs) 
→ 
(CO) 
environmental 
changes  
(technological 
change, external 
shocks, exposure 
to outside markets, 
change in 
complementary 
institutions in 
neighbouring 
domains) 
→
(E) crisis of 
shared beliefs, 
competing 
systems of 
predictive and 
normative 
beliefs 
 (CO) 
redefined, 
stable 
inference 
rules 
(E) a new 
shared system 
of beliefs (a 
new 
institution) 
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in the system may be more likely to be initiated by ‘sudden’, discrete shocks rather than one that
is slow and gradual, typical of evolutionary game theory. Characteristics selected during one point
in time impose constraints on future possibilities (path dependence). The central thesis is therefore
that institutions emerge as outcomes of a game, even while themselves influencing new rules of
the game thereon. Institutional evolution is then analogous to the biological evolutionary process
conceptualized as ‘punctuated’ equilibria,9 rather than by a steady gradual Darwinian selection
process. Institutional change is thus triggered on an episodic basis. A turbulent change with
critical mass that causes institutional crisis, followed by a sub-period where choices are placed under
evolutionary pressure of selection or vice versa, when minor experiments cumulate and beyond a
threshold causes a flip in institutions. If the focus is the former, change seems radical and short,
built around the point of punctuation. If not, the institutional change appears to be gradual.
3.3 Contract Farming as Frictional Equilibria
The Aokian apparatus of Comparative Institutional Analysis is particularly appropriate to frame
the study of contract farming. To do this, I make use of the prevalent insights from transactions
costs approach to institutions, the dominant analytical lens used by economists to view contract
farming, along with key aspects of procedural rationality and learning processes.10 I formalize
aspects of this model in the next chapter. Here, my goal is to outline the rationale for this exercise,
linking it in a limited way, to the empirical literature (discussed in Chapter 2). This offers, in a
sense, a preview of the relevance of the Aokian CIA framework to the subject of this study.
I propose that at any given point of time, the snapshot view of a farm-firm relationship
mediated by contracts represents “punctuated” equilibria in a sense to be elaborated. As firm
and farm work to establish transactional relationships in a context of uncertainty and imperfect
and incomplete information, the choices made by firms and farmers are produced as best responses
9This is due to Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge (1977).
10Procedural rationality entails the selection of information when more is available than an agent can process,
but the agent chooses a mechanism constituting rationality of procedures used to achieve certain goals, resulting in
satisficing behavior rather than a maximizing one. This is different from the conceptualization of bounded rationality,
which is the notion that in decision making, rationality of individuals is limited by the information they have, the
cognitive limitations of their minds, and the finite amount of time they have to make decisions. Aoki’s thesis is
framed within the context of bounded rationality. I adopt instead the concept of procedural rationality for this study.
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to agents’ subjective games. The firms’ decisions would include, for instance, decisions on (1)
whether to contract (2) how much to contract and (3) who to contract with or where and (4) how
to operationalize the arrangement. Farmers’ decisions would be with respect to his/her livelihood
strategy in its entirety, including production and marketing decisions across a range of crops. In this
setting, features and practices extraneous to the contract itself emerge to maintain (or destabilize,
as the case may be) contract farming arrangements as institution. These choices then define and
support substantive characteristics of a particular contract farming system, which then becomes
an institutional feature. The attributes of a particular system are, as Aoki suggests, contingent on
institutions in other domains as well, as also contextual specificities.
Working with the notion of the contract farming system as institution, the domain can be
defined variously depending on the specific context. In a simple, illustrative setting, the agents
are a contracting firm and farmers. In envisaging the farmers and firm as players, the firm has a
particular interaction with each farmer. This is different from the way farmers relate to one another.
Within the framework of the economics of information, this is akin to having one principal and
many (and non-adversarial) agents. There may be other latent or passive agents in the system,
who affect perceptions and thus agents’ behavior.
Agribusinesses (or firms) would like to ensure a long term stable source of supply of produce.
Typically these involve decisions regarding which source to use. In the Williamsonian frictional
world of transactions costs, it is a question of whether the “make or buy” for the firm . In the
context of agriculture, the issue is whether to (1) buy in the spot market, (2) vertically integrate
and auto-source, or (3) choose some form of vertical coordination , typically through contractual
agreements. Significantly, even the choice of vertical coordination is not unique i.e., a simplistic
make versus buy or contract and firms could adopt plural structures.11 This is true also of the
firm’s portfolio of contract farmers.
When relationships are mediated through contracts, oral or written, they are either ‘take it or
11Much of the Williamson inspired literature on contract farming imagines a single continuum, parenthesized by
corporate farming and spot market transactions at each end, but seem to neglect the possibility of plural choices
by the firm. In fact, across a large number of case studies it is evident that firms often adopt multiple channels,
contracting some part, auto-sourcing some other part and sourcing through spot markets simultaneously. Empirical
examples are discussed in Reardon et al. (2009) and is addressed in some detail in Narayanan (2008).
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leave it’ contracts or could involve some bargaining and negotiation. The subjective game surrounds
choices not only with respect to channels used but also regarding who to coordinate with if it is a
contracting arrangement. Having decided to contract, and how much to contract, the companies
need to decide who they would offer the contracts to and how they would operationalize and enforce
the agreement. These could be sequential decisions, but are always interdependent.
However, the firm, like every other agent, operates in a world of uncertainty due to incomplete
and imperfect information. For the firm, there is always a risk that the contractees may not honor
the contract.12 This moral hazard can come from lack of effort, diversion of inputs in case of
production contracts, or selling elsewhere after harvest and once price is discovered in alternate
channels. The firm then needs to accomplish two things: set the terms of the contracts to mitigate
this risk and choose a set of farmers who are low risk. The firm’s problem is then how to achieve
a least risk arrangement at the lowest cost.13 However, because of constraints on rationality and
asymmetric information along with the uncertainties of agricultural production, the firm has only
its own conception of the game that is played.
From the point of view of the farmer, the moral hazard arises, primarily, from the fact that the
firm could reject their delivery on grounds of poor quality, timing, etc., attributes that are typically
left unspecified in the contract or arbitrarily enforced. This is particularly the case when the firm,
which needs a minimum procurement (say, to run the processing plant to the desired capacity)
might also contract more quantity than they need, as a buffer, to guard against production risk for
instance. This rejection at the factory gate has been cited as one of the most contentious aspects of
the farm-firm relationship (Echanove and Steffen, 2005; Glover, 1987; Mannon, 2005). There have
been documented instances of firms setting quality standards arbitrarily, becoming inexplicably
stringent, if spot market prices collapsed. Sometimes, farmers have also had to bear the brunt of
poor technical assistance, even plain cheating and deliberate default (Glover, 1987; Ramaswami
et al., 2005). While not the rule, this is well within the realm of possibility.
Thus, while contracting provides farmers a way to mitigate price risks, it also entails a new
12This issue has been dealt with extensively in the literature. See ??, for instance.
13Some of the transactions costs literature lumps costs of risk with other costs. In the context of contract farming
relationships, a useful separation is to treat costs of risk from say, moral hazard, as different from other ‘direct costs’
of contracting. The tradeoff drives selection in interesting ways. This is taken up in detail in Chapter 4.
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risk, the risk of rejection (Mannon, 2005; da Silva, 2005). This risk is subjectively evaluated by the
farmer before contracting. Additionally the farmer might also evaluate the risk that the firm might
not return the next season to contract. This is important, for instance, when the farmer would not
want to sever the long-term relationship (s)he has with the village broker or trader.14 Quite apart
from this, for farmers, contract farming is part of a larger set of decisions that are made as part
of the farmer’s livelihood strategy. This involves making complex choices such as how to deploy
family labor and land, and so forth.15
Given the context of uncertainty and constraints on rationality, and in the presence of what
Williamson refers to as “opportunism”,16 the theory of incomplete contracts emerges as an
inevitable development. The incompleteness of the contract thus gives companies, as it does farmers,
some latitude in keeping their terms of the contract.17 Thus, the agents in this stylized setting
play a subjective game, given the exogenously determined context-specific constraints. The choices
both have to make are multidimensional. This scenario is specifically one of double moral hazard
which are factored into decisions via subjective assessments by both parties. Their choices then
jointly determine the larger form and nature of the contract farming system that emerges, including
relational elements to maintain the system.
The risk of rejection faced by the farmer and the risk of defection faced by the firm are, in fact,
mutually dependent and this produces a space where the firm-farmer relationship is contested,
negotiated and refashioned. I contend that, at any given point of time, a snapshot view of a
contract farming system captures this tension or friction and hence represents frictional equilibria.
It is frictional in that the leads to ‘inefficiencies’ relative to the first best case Leibenstein (1966).
It is frictional too because it is an outcome of best responses or procedurally rational decisions in
a frictional world, with uncertainty and transactions costs (Furubotn and Richter, 2005).18
14There could be other risks as well, such as risk of wrong advice, ecological damage, and so forth (da Silva, 2005).
15Echanove Huacuja (2003); Echanove and Steffen (2005), for instance, provides instances where farmers in Mexico
try to minimize their risks by planting vegetables for two different companies and, on occasion, cultivating produce
for the national fresh market .
16Opportunism is defined as self-interest seeking with guile. This is distinct both from mere self-interest seeking,
which is consistent with satisficing behavior and from self-interest seeking with force.
17As Gow et al. (2000) observed, many firms actually prefer the incomplete contracts since it gives them greater
flexibility.
18In this context, the ‘nirvana fallacy’ is relevant to empirical applications.The nirvana fallacy was given its name
by economist Demsetz (1969, page 1), who said:The view that now pervades much public policy economics implicitly
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To illustrate the mechanism of institutional evolution in this setting, I pick one aspect of the
firm’s decision, alluding to other aspects only peripherally. This is the selection, by the firm, of a
set of farmers to contract with.
I suggest that in the first instance, the firms to adopt a portfolio approach, one that balances
the need to minimize the transactions cost of contracting with many farmers and the need to
choose a portfolio of farmers that minimizes moral hazard.19 The portfolio is based on the firm’s
assessments, given known costs of transacting, as to who might be low risk suppliers, or this may be
assumed to be revealed through proxy characteristics. For instance, in a study of Senegal peanut
contracting, ? found that companies used reputation (“social collateral”), making inquiries from
villagers as to which ones were reliable. In others, eligibility conditions may be laid out somewhat
more explicitly in terms of land holding, being debt free, experience with contracting, irrigation
facility and so forth. This often involves a tradeoff, i.e., for example, large wealthy farmers might
be low transactions cost but high moral hazard, small farmers may be low moral hazard but high
transactions costs. This is likely why firms often contract with very different kinds of farmers
(large, medium and small), even though there may seem to be more efficient ways of doing so, or
even when there are known or recognized technical advantages for the firm in contracting with one
rather than the other.
Thereafter, experience provides the information needed, so there is a learning process and a
path of adjustment. From the firm’s perspective, it is able to identify a ‘stable’ set of farmers
to contract with. There could, in general, be considerable churning of the farmers selected for
contracting, if the firm is trying to learn about the attributes of individual farmers (say, regarding
quality of produce, repayment of credit, if relevant, and so on).20
From the farmer’s perspective, the story is similar. Initially, the farmer takes a decision on
whether to contract and may respond by a portfolio of options, e.g., part contracting, part spot-
presents the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing ’imperfect’ institutional arrangement. This
nirvana approach differs considerably from a comparative institution approach in which the relevant choice is between
alternative real institutional arrangements. In the context of uncertainty and bounded rationality, it is relevant to
note, and has been argued as such, that outcomes of agents who are meliorizing or adopt procedural rationality
cannot be regarded as inefficient.
19This is developed in Chapter 4.
20The issue of selection is addressed in Chapter 8.
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market, or maintain more complex portfolios across crops, and in a broader sense, allocate labor
across farm and off-farm activities. Over time, (s)he has the opportunity to learn about the
trustworthiness of the firm or learning from others’ experiences, and adjust choices.
The portfolio then changes over time until a stable equilibrium is attained. With a learning
process, the best way to characterize these are as “moving equilibria”. The stability of these
equilibria is then contingent on several factors. As with the characterization of institutional
evolution by Aoki, a change in institutions is predicated on the existence a critical mass that
perceives subjective disequilibrium. It could happen in two ways (1) a drastic change in the
environment, as a result of cumulative impacts of equilibrium sequences on the environment and
pay-off distributions, or possibly by both (2) internal cumulative impacts.
As external triggering conditions, Aoki lists the following:
• New technological innovation occurs so that new choices become feasible. This could be a
new seed technology for farmers, for example.
• External shocks, such as war, perceived productivity and innovation gaps with foreign
competitors, prolonged depression, compel the agents to perceive a need for rapid improve-
ment in productivity and other performance characteristics; This kind of change triggering
institutional change is common enough. The case of Kenya’s exports of fresh fruits and
vegetables to UK retailers is an example. Dolan (2005); Dolan and Humphrey (2000); Dolan
et al. (1999) suggest that the UK retailer deciding to procure produce from a cheaper source
had the effect of practically dismantling livelihoods.
• A large scale institutional change occurs in a neighboring domain with which strong in-
stitutional complementarity exists. Glover and Ghee Lim (1992) describe the emergence of
contract farming in Southeast Asia. In Malaysia, the implementation of vertical coordination,
i.e., outgrower projects in rubber, accompanied resettling of laborers on land, an institutional
change in another related domain. This enabled the emergence of stable contract farming in
rubber.
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• A large change in policy-determined parameters of the outcome function occurs. For example,
if land ceilings for corporate farming are relaxed or subsidies for large scale corporate farming
are put in place, it alters the relative costs of “make or buy” internal and external exchange.
This is currently underway in both India and Pakistan, for instance. Also, the current policy
in India strategy of Agri-Export Zone follows a cluster model that provides institutions and
infrastructure and special regulations.
Alternatively, internal cumulative impacts might be one of the following
• Experiments with new choice rules that do not follow customs, have occurred in a cluster.
• Cumulative outcomes of repeated games have generated disparity in the distribution of assets,
power and social roles, that are conceived of as ‘unjust’ and ‘unfair’ by a critical mass of
agents in the domain. For instance, in early 2000, a group of farmers in Punjab got together
and boycotted the firm that was contracting with them in response to perceived injustice.
Contract farming was consequently abandoned in the area.21
• Repeated play of games according to certain external and endogenous rules of the game has
induced the accumulation of competence and the capacities of agents that cannot effectively
be employed anymore in the framework by those rules. A business executive recently said
(translated) “we want to get out of contract farming, the farmers get better at it and want to
pursue other options and then don’t return”.22 Similarly, in Thailand, (Glover and Ghee Lim,
1992) observe that the success of the contract farming scheme is the very cause of failure.
Farmers who became wealthier started investing in more lucrative avenues such as real estate.
In a different case, degradation of soil quality consequent to recommended nutrient and
pest management led to the firm abandoning contracting altogether in Mexico (Glover and
Kusterer, 1990; Mannon, 2005) and in India.23 This was endogenous environment degradation
caused by the firm providing the inputs and technical advice.
21Personal communication with an agribusiness executive, Ludhiana, Punjab, India, March 2007.
22Personal communication with agribusiness executive, Madhya Pradesh, India, March 2007.
23Personal communication with an executive of a gherkins processing firm, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu, March 2007.
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The mechanism of institutional change in this Aokian framework is quite inclusive. Changes
don’t happen only at the margin, hinging exclusively on individual agents’ choices, or micromotives.
It recognizes different sources of change exogenous to the system, or macromotives, in other
institutional domains, for example. In fact, anything that can alter the subjective game is a
potential catalyst. Shocks, represented by any of these, can thus destabilize the system and set in
motion a new vector of moving equilibria, possibly in perpetuity. It is conceivable however that such
a system evolve into a new stable institutional setting. This comes from the nature and magnitude
of impetus, and how this interacts with other domains, given the specific context.
The importance of the ‘critical mass’ that leads to punctuation cannot be overemphasized.
Nowhere is this more powerfully demonstrated than in Visconti’s 1948 film La Terra Trema. In this
story of impoverished Sicilian fishermen in Aci Trezza, wholesalers control the market, suppressing
prices, unfairly. Toni who wants to organize his fellow-fishermen into a cooperative, fails to persuade
them to stop fishing for the wholesaler. He chooses to follow his own path and invests in equipment
and opts to free his family from the hold of the wholesaler. He succeeds, until a storm destroys
everything they have. Ultimately, in a poignant scene, he returns to the fold, choosing to give up
his autonomy and pride, to fish for the wholesaler again.
In the Aokian setting, the individual agent changed his choices, but this failed to alter
the subjective game, in this case because of catastrophic but idiosyncratic exogenous factors.
Altogether, the substantive features of the institution did not change. As Aoki elaborates “A search
for the re-definition of the subjective game can be initiated by an individual agent who perceives
new opportunities even under a fairly stable environment. If proven successful, such a redefinition
may be emulated by other agents and eventually become self-organizing as a spontaneous order.
But, when the performance characteristics of the domain are satisfactory and no significant gap is
perceived by the agents, the impact of such an entrepreneurial mutation may be limited” (Aoki,
1998, page 18). It explains why some systems are resilient to changes.
Equally, it also allows the possibility that in stable systems, actors change without subjective
game changing, for example, a state organization transferring ownership and operation to a private
firm. Or in other instances, the same institution could merely develop new or different roles.
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On the other hand, sometimes, agents can take action precisely to sustain a particular institution
and to avoid altering the nature of the subjective game. Clapp’s (1994) example again of firm and
farm willing to tolerate deviation from contract the contract terms to a limited extent, in the interest
of a lasting relationship is illustrative of this. There have been instances too where in the face of
a huge collapse in spot market prices, firms still honored the contracts as a trust-building measure
taking a huge loss, although it would have been more (immediately) profitable to renege. In some
cases, firms bear losses, just to honor contracts to maintain farmer trust. This is reminiscent of the
Folk Theorem result in a repeated game setting. The existence of such a ‘moral’ economy of the
contract is elaborated in Chapter 11.
The chief merit to this approach to studying contract farming is that it offers different organizing
principles. Within economics, so far, much attention has been paid to taxonomic approaches,
identifying sets of conditions under which one kind of contracting emerges over another. This
framework is also encompassing in the sense that it can address multiple levels of institutions (as
suggested by Dorward (2001) and Williamson (1991)in one coherent framework.
The Aokian Comparative Institutional Analysis framework enlarges the scope of theory to
include admit substantial static (in Aoki’s words, “synchronic”) and dynamic (“diachronic”)
diversity that marks contract farming systems. Institutional equilibria are characterized by both
path dependence and novelty since, at the critical juncture of the change, the choice rules of agents
imposing constraints on future possibilities. By showing the possibility of multiple equilibria in
specific models the endogenous-rules-of-the-game approach is able to shed light on the ‘humanly
devised’ nature of institutions within specific contexts, rather than institutions that are products
of technological, ecological or cultural determinism. It is capable of explaining why not all contract
farming schemes are sustainable. In the extreme, it can lead to the firm abandoning contract
farming altogether or to complete vertical integration on the other.24 In particular, it is now
possible to analyze how even from the same starting point, a contract farming system can evolve
along different trajectories, based on the adjustment or learning path. This is evident in the contract
farming literature. Similarly, this framework, also enables us to track agrarian transformation as
24As Minot (1986) points out, unsuccessful examples in contract farming are rarely documented.
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manifest is social differentiation. As an example, the composition of the portfolio farmers selected
into contract farming systems might influence the kind of system that has evolved. It can lead to
peasant differentiation or polarization or homogenization.
The Aokian framework also accommodates a theory of change that is hinged on history and
contextual specificity. It illustrates the importance, and indispensability, of combining historical and
socio-political contexts in the reading of why, say, in Aci Trezza, an institutional transformation did
not occur, while it did occur in the Punjab village. In fact, by addressing the interdependencies of
institutions, this theoretical approach challenges ideas of institutional transplant, recognizing that
social and political contexts that can have unintended or unanticipated consequences (for example
how contract farming in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia all had different outcomes). Whether
a new institution is mutually consistent with the broader context determines its viability in the
original intended form. This is conceptualized by institutional linkages and complementarities. The
Aokian framework enables a more rigorous analysis of all these issues, emphasizing “conditional
robustness and the multiplicity of such arrangements”.
The Aokian perspective of institutional change suggests that when agents operate in a constantly
changing environment marked by uncertainty, frictional forces operating within an economic system
imply that an equilibrium end-state is not reached instantly, and there is search for additional
information that enable agents to improve upon the choices they make at a particular point of
time. Thus “actors are seen to meliorize rather than maximize” (Brinton and Nee, 1998, page 10)
and in Simon’s framing, agents are procedurally rational, but not substantively rational (Simon,
1961). The fact that individuals experiment and learn is far closer to human behavior than an agent
capable of working through the complex objective game structures to choose an optimal strategy.
Learning and experimentation thus have an important role to play. In the context of this CIA
framework, Aoki does not explicitly discuss learning rules. Like the framework itself however the
learning process ought be general enough and realistic, at the same time be tailored to the context.
An institution is thus “the product of a long term experiences of a society of boundedly rational
and retrospective individuals”(Kreps, 1990, page 183). Furthermore, rather than a unique path,
branching out along multiple paths may be possible (Aoki, 1998). Therefore, for an understanding
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of the mechanism of institutional change, Aoki maintains that careful empirical studies based on
historical and comparative information are necessary to sort out what major factors are influencing
the selection of a particular trajectory instead of other possible ones.
While solving some of the perceived problems of existing neo-institutionalist analytics, the
Aokian framework raises a few problems of its own, the main one being the degree to which it
allows formalism. Aoki’s framework is however sufficiently flexible to serve as material for context-
specific modeling. As Aoki suggests, the choice of methods depends on the purpose and goal
of the analysis itself.If nothing else, it captures the spirit of empirical work on contract farming
better than alternative frameworks do. The next chapter sketches a theoretical model, but one
that captures the essential flavor of the Aokian framework. The model represents a reworking of
standard neoclassical models to accommodate the notion of contract farming as frictional equilibria,
and constitutes an elementary analytical model useful for empirical analysis.
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Chapter 4
Formalizing the Notion of Contract Farming as
Frictional Equilibria
This chapter presents an effort to formalize the notion of contract farming as frictional equilibria
over a domain, with a view to providing a basis for the empirical work in this study.1 It has modest
goals. The first is to demonstrate the manner in which the constituent parts of the composite
one-shot principal-agent model can be addressed separately in a way that is useful for empirical
analysis. The second is to indicate how these pieces fit together, commenting on the nature of
friction in the system, at each stage of the contracting process. The purpose is therefore not to
present a theoretical model for how contractual terms are established, nor to derive specific testable
hypotheses to take to data. Rather, the goal is to provide the underlying analytics of the empirical
work that informs the econometric approaches used in this study as well as in the interpretation of
key results. In that sense, this chapter offers a structure that highlights key features of a contracting
scheme as systemic or domain equilibria, by mapping the different stages of the contracting process
as described in Figure 1.1.
4.1 The Contracting Stage
In the contracting stage, firm and farmers are assumed to arrive at an acreage to contract, based on
what each considers to be an optimal allocation.2 This vector of contract acreage over the domain,
or the acreage contracted by the firm from N farmers at time t, can be represented by a set {a′it}i∈N
where a′it for each farmer is the lesser of two quantities: what the firm is willing to offer a farmer
(aˆit) and what the farmer is willing to commit under a contract (a
∗
it). If a¯it is the endowment of
1One of the weaknesses of neoinstitutional approaches to studying economic phenomena has been the relative
neglect of formalization of its core ideas and its applications.
2Contracting can be based both on volumes and on the basis of acreage. I assume acreage is contracted, given the
practice in India, the site of empirical work in this study. I also assume that these are for field crops.
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land for farmer i so that this is the feasible maximum contract acreage, the vector of contracted
acreage over the contracting domain can be given as
a′it = Min{a∗it, aˆit} ∈ [0, a¯it] for i =1 to N (4.1)
a∗it and aˆit are the optimal allocations, respectively, from the farmer’s contract allocation
problem and the firm’s problem of determining acreage allocations across N farmers, which are
developed in the chapter. Some elements in the set could be zero, for farmers who do not want to
contract at all and for farmers who might have wished to contract but the firm has not selected.
This contracting decision, of how much to allocate to the contract crop, involves agents optimizing
over a set of choices available, based on the beliefs they hold about the reliability of the contracting
partner(s) as well as on general market conditions.
4.1.1 The Farmer’s Problem
A farmer’s decision to contract involves deciding on the acreage (s)he is prepared to allocated to the
contract commodity. Given that the returns at the end of the season is variable and assuming that
a farmer is a risk averse, expected utility maximizer, the farmer i selects an acreage a∗it ∈ [0, a¯it]
such that it maximizes expected returns at the end of the season. Given that a¯it is the total land
available to the farmer, the land a farmer can devote to non-contract crops is a¯it − a∗it. This can
be either the contract crop itself grown for the spot market or some other crop altogether. Let the
quantities produced under contract and otherwise be denoted by random variables ˜qict and ˜qimt,
respectively. Assume that the production function associated with contracting and not contracting
are given by standard concave functions, f and g and are common to all producers, though this
latter assumption is not critical.
˜qict = f(ait, zit, litφi, i)
˜qimt = g(a¯it − ait, z′it, l¯it − lit, φ′i, ′i)
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where, zi and z
′
i are the inputs allocated, li and l¯i − li are the labor allocations on the contract
and non-contract plot, φi, φ
′
i refer to random variables representing idiosyncratic shocks in the
production of the contract and non-contract crop, and i, 
′
i refer to those representing covariate
shocks associated with the contract and non-contract crop. For the sake of simplicity, I assume
that the farmer only makes a land allocation choice assuming away the problem of input choice.3
Let Pct be the unit contract price announced by the firm and Pmt the random spot market or
alternate price for the contract commodity (or the price of the closest alternative to the contract
commodity, from the farmer’s perspective). The returns at the end of the season for the farmer is
the sum of the net revenue from contract acreage and the sum of the net revenue from the non-
contract acreage. Suppose, in addition, the farmer holds some beliefs about the firm’s reliability,
denoted by a parameter αit ∈ [0, 1]. In other words, the farmer believes that firms might take
actions that potentially reduce contract revenue, by discounting the price, rejecting produce, etc.
and αit represents the proportion of the total potential contract revenue that the farmer is left
with. Note that if the farmer completely trusts the firm, αit = 1, and the farmer expects to earn
the entire anticipated potential revenue. Incorporating costs of cultivation (now, as unit costs of
production, given that the input allocation problem is assumed away) and transaction costs and
denoting these by Cct for contract cultivation and Cmt for non-contract cultivation, the farmer now
solves the following problem4:
Max
ait
EtUi
[
αit(Pct − Cct) ˜qict + (Pmt − Cmt) ˜qimt
]
subject to
˜qict = f(ait, zit, litφi, i)
˜qimt = g(a¯it − ait, z′it, l¯it − lit, φ′i, ′i)
ait ∈ [0, a¯it]
lit ∈ [0, l¯it]
3The level of inputs is usually codetermined alongside acreage under contract and typically, most non-labor inputs
are supplied by the firm. These are not modeled here.
4These costs are assumed net of any cost of inputs that is borne by the firm, denoted by Cizt. This is not explicitly
mentioned here to keep the notation simple.
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where Et is the expectations operator. This is a standard portfolio allocation problem between
uncertain alternatives, represented by the random returns to contracting and not contracting.
Assuming this to be a concave utility function, that comes from risk aversion of the farmer, the
first order conditions are necessary and sufficient.
Making the simplifying assumptions, that broadly reflect most developing country contexts,
that the farmer will never allocate all of his/her land or family labor to contract cultivation, the
solutions that are considered are ai = 0 and ai ∈ (0, a¯i). We get the conditions that whenever a∗i
at the optimum is in the interior, it must be true that
Et
∂Ui
∂(.)
[
αi(Pct − Cct) ∂f
∂ai
− (Pmt − Cmt) ∂g
∂ai
]
= 0 (4.2)
This condition implies that the farmer devotes as much acreage to contract cultivation as to equate
marginal net returns from contracting to that from not contracting.
When a farmer does not devote any acreage to the contract crop so that a∗i = 0, the first order
condition consistent with this case implies5
Et
∂Ui
∂(.)
[
αi(Pct − Cct) ∂f
∂ai
− (Pmt − Cmt) ∂g
∂ai
]
< 0 (4.3)
In general, the optimal contract acreage allocation a∗i which solves these problems, assuming that
the associated functions are well-behaved, can be expressed as
a∗i = a(a¯i, l¯i, αi, Pct, Pmt, Cct, Cmt, φi, φ
′
i, i, 
′
i) (4.4)
This represents the intensity of farmer participation or the quantity of land allocated to the
contract commodity. It is easy to see from the first order conditions, that the acreage allocated
to contracting would be positively related to the contract price, the productivity associated with
contract production and the perception of the reliability of the firm. In many empirical contexts,
contract production is often associated with productivity increases, given that inputs and advice are
5In presenting these conditions, I use strict inequalities assuming that the Lagrangian multipliers associated with
the relevant constraints are strictly positive.
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provided by the firm. Similarly, a farmer’s perception of whether the potential profits will accrue
fully or not are important factors in acreage allocation. The first order conditions also suggest that
the higher the expected net returns to the alternative relative to that for the contract crop, the
lower the acreage allocated to contract crops. From the perspective of mapping correlates of farmer
decisions on contract acreage, Equation 4.4 presents a reduced form for econometric estimation of
intensity of farmer participation. Further, depending on whether the optimal allocation is non-zero
or zero, in the context of empirical work, this can be recast as a binary variable that conveys
extensive participation.
Within the expected utility framework, it is possible to represent this choice as a function of
higher-order moments of the random returns, by Taylor expanding around the mean. Very often,
farmers compare distributions rather than just the means of the distributions. Chapter 7 probes
this aspect further and conducts an analysis, comparing entire net returns distributions associated
with contracting and not contracting, as perceived by the farmer and the perceptions of the multiple
components of risk that are encapsulated in the term αit.
4.1.2 The Firm’s Problem of Choosing a Portfolio of Farmers
While farmers work out the calculus of optimal contract allocation,contract firm independently
assesses the best way to build a portfolio of contract suppliers who represent the least risk of non-
delivery at minimum cost. The firm decides on the acreage to allocate to select farmers from among
N farmers.
Let vit = Prt − Pct − Cizt be the revenue earned per unit from processing and selling the
contracted produce downstream. This is represented as the price obtained by the firm for the final
product Prt minus the contract price Pct paid for the produce and any costs that the firm incurs
on providing inputs to the firm Cizt.
The production function f of individual farmers is assumed to be known by all, and is therefore
the same as in the farmer’s problem. For notational ease, it is expressed as a function of only
ait rather than all the relevant variables. The firm might have expectations regarding yields and
expect a certain quantity to be produced from a given acreage alloted to farmers. In addition,
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it holds beliefs about the reliability of farmers, on whether the contracting farmer would deliver
at harvest time all the produce from the contracted acreage. Let θit ∈ [0, 1] denote a subjective
parameter of farmer reliability that the firm holds. It is the proportion of total contract produce
that the firm expects farmer i to deliver in reality. In a sense, the firm anticipates that a certain
proportion might either not meet quality standards or that the farmer might side-sell after harvest.
The firm would factor this into consideration while choosing farmers.
Further, the firm also expects to incur transactions costs, a major portion of which in
transportation costs, for evacuating contracted produce at harvest time. This remains unknown at
the time of contracting and enters as expected costs. It could also include costs of negotiating and
entering into contract, as also supervision and monitoring costs. One part of this cost is denoted
as t(θitf(ai)) which increases in the volume evacuated from farmer i and is summed over all those
with a non-zero contract acreage, i.e., n ⊆ N . The other component is a function of the scale
of operation. To account for the possibility that it is often less expensive to contract with fewer
number of farmers, a part of the cost is regarded a function of n ⊆ N where n refers to number of
farmers who contract a positive quantity and N denotes all the farmers in the contracting domain.
The number of farmers n with whom the firm contracts (representing the scale of operation) is
endogenously determined and is a function of the {θitf(ait)}i∈N such that the higher the perceived
reliability of farmers, the lower the number of farmers with whom the firm needs to contract, or
larger the scale of production, the fewer the number of contract farmers a firm needs. The expected
transaction costs can then be expressed as,
Et
[
h (n(θ1tf(a1t), . . . θNtf(aNt))) +
N∑
i=1
t(θitf(ai))
]
(4.5)
where,
∂h
∂n
> 0
∂n
∂θit
< 0,
∂n
∂f(ait)
< 0∀i
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Further, the firm requires expected evacuated volumes (
∑N
1 θitf(ait)) to meet a capacity condition,
that there is enough to run the plant Q but not exceed the maxiumum capacity Q¯.
The firm thus chooses a portfolio of farmers, allocating aˆit to a subset of n farmers among the
N farmers in the contracting domain, by solving the following problem.
Max
ait
N∑
i=1
viθitf(ait)− Et[h(n) +
N∑
i=1
t(θitf(ait))] (4.6)
subject to
N∑
i=1
θitf(ait) ∈ [Q, Q¯] (4.7)
ait ≤ a∗it∀i ∈ N (4.8)
The last constraint comes from the farmer’s optimization exercise for contract acreage allocation.
From the farmer’s problem, we know that
a∗it = a(a¯it, l¯it, αit, Pct, Pmt, Cct, Cmt, φi, φ
′
i, i, 
′
i)
These variables that drive farmer’s allocation of contract thus enter the firm’s problem of
choosing farmers via the farmer level constraint. There are N such constraints for the firm. The
solution to this problem is the optimal portfolio of the firm and is denoted as {aˆ1, . . . , aˆn}.6
For the purpose of this work, I highlight a few key results. Assuming solutions are in the interior
so that the total expected volume the firm procures lies in the interior of the capacity condition,
the first order condition associated with a firm allotting at least some contract acreage to a farmer
i i.e., aˆit ∈ (0, a∗it), it must be the case that
net revenue︷ ︸︸ ︷
viθit
∂f(ait)
∂ait
−θitEt∂f(ait)
∂ait

(−)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂h
∂n
∂n
∂θitf(ait)
+
(+)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂t
∂θitf(ait)
 = 0 (4.9)
The first order conditions imply that the marginal net benefit from increasing contract acreage
6When this constraint explicitly enters the firm’s problem the optimal contracting volume represented in Equation
4.1 is in fact {aˆ1, . . . , aˆn}.
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to a farmer is weighted by the reliability parameter, as are the expected incremental transactions
costs of doing so. The marginal net benefit from increasing contract acreage accrues through two
channels. First is the unit return to the expected produce from farmer i net of input costs and price
for the produce. This is the first term. The second channel is through expected savings on account
of higher intensity of procurement through a contract farmer rather than from an additional farmer
in the firm’s portfolio, so that the expected costs of evacuation is spread over fewer farmers. This
is represented by the term in the middle. The third term reflects the marginal expected costs
on evacuating produce from the additional acreage contracted. In reality, this dynamic between
expanding on the extensive margin and the intensive margin is quite important when firm choose
their portfolio of farmers. There two opposing factors. On the one hand, contracting a higher
acreage from a particular farmer entails an increase in expected costs of procurement, but also an
opposite effect in terms savings in cost since the firm does not deal with the costs of transacting
with an additional farmer, an equivalent volume.
Supposing at the optimum, constraint on an individual farmer’s acreage is binding, so that
aˆi = a
∗
i for this to be optimal, it must be the case that
viθit
∂f(ai)
∂ai
− θitEt ∂f
∂ai
[
∂h
∂n
∂n
∂θitf(ait)
+
∂t
∂θitf(ai)
]
> 0 (4.10)
The firm could do better by contracting more acreage from the farmer, but is rationed on the
intensive margin by the farmer.
Rearranging terms from the first order conditions associated with an interior solution, for any
two farmers, say, i and j, from whom the firm procures, we get
θit
∂f(ai)
∂ai
θjt
∂f(aj)
∂aj
=
vj −
[
∂h
∂n
∂n
∂θjtf(ajt)
+ ∂t∂θjtf(aj)
]
vi −
[
∂h
∂n
∂n
∂θitf(ait)
+ ∂t∂θitf(ai)
] (4.11)
This is the core result of the model in its simplest form. The firm faces a tradeoff between risk
of reneging that it associates with a farmer and the transactions costs associated with contracting
with the particular farmer, given levels of productivity. When there is an interior solution, it would
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balance the risks of reneging with the transactions cost in a way that the ratio of the two is equated
across the farmers with whom the firm chooses to contract. If the firm has to contract at least some
non-zero output from both i and j, it is necessarily true that if one is more costly to transact with
(implying a lower marginal net revenue), the other is more risky to procure from, given comparable
productivity. This is the tradeoff between higher transaction cost and risk.
When a farmer j is excluded, and a farmer i is not, the first order conditions imply,
θit
∂f(ai)
∂ai
θjt
∂f(aj)
∂aj
>
vj −
[
∂h
∂n
∂n
∂θjtf(ajt)
+ ∂t∂θjtf(aj)
]
vi −
[
∂h
∂n
∂n
∂θitf(ait)
+ ∂t∂θitf(ai)
] (4.12)
This condition, evaluated at ajt = 0 implies that at the optimum, the advantage the i has over
j in terms of greater reliability or productivity or both outweighs the relative advantage j might
have over i in terms of lower transactions cost or marginal expected benefit.
The firm’s choice of a portfolio of contract suppliers is thus interdependent and selection is
on comparative terms. The separation of participants from non-participants happens not in the
absolute sense but in a relative sense. This is particularly important since much of the empirical
work on farmer participation does not explicitly lay out this interdependence.
This analytical model has non-trivial implications for empirical analysis. First, if this is the
underpinning process by which farmer participation in contracting is determined, i.e., as a matching
problem, then an econometric specification would necessarily have to account for the individual
farmer’s optimization exercise that enters as a constraint in the firm’s model for choosing contract
farmers. This would include the incorporation of not just farmer’s land and labor endowments but
importantly, their perception of the firm’s reliability and risks associated with contracting as well as
the next best alternative. Second, the set of first order conditions from the above model of farmer
selection suggests interdependence of farmer selection, that firms equate the relative reliability
and costs of contracting with the selected farmers across the domain. In econometric terms, this
implies that a model of farmer participation must account for such interdependence, represented by
potential correlation of errors across observations. Chapter 8 that deals with extensive participation
in contracting schemes is based on this analytical model.
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This model provides a basic structure that can be modified for specific contexts. For example,
This model allows for the possibility of the phenomenon of “strategic overcontracting” (Barrett
et al., 2010) To see this consider the case where the Capacity Condition is binding at the upper
bound Q¯ so that
∑
θitf(aˆit) = Q¯. If it is the case that all farmers are able to deliver a proportion,
say, θ∗t ≥ θt with this condition holding with strict inequality for at least one farmer, at the
honoring stage, the firm would have contracted a volume greater than the capacity they are capable
of processing.7 It can also extended to several other settings as well, on how firms might choose
regions to procure from rather than farmers. It could also be applied to the firm’s choice of farmer
groups or lead farmers or intermediary-consolidators to contract with. It could also be applied to
decisions further downstream players, that is a supermarket’s choice of suppliers. In that sense,
this is a fairly general framework that can be used for context-specific modeling.
4.1.3 Contract farming as frictional equilibria
Over the contracting domain, the equilibrium is characterized by a set of subjective beliefs
{αit, θit}i∈N on the mutual reliability of contracting partners and beliefs held about the state
of nature, and a vector {a′1, . . . a′N} that represent the minimum of each element of two vectors,
{aˆ1, . . . aˆN} that is the optimal contracting portfolio for the firm and {a∗1, . . . a∗N} that each represent
the optimal allocation of the farmers in the domain. The farmer’s choice vector is redundant if it
is folded into the firm’s problem as a constraint on the maximum that the firm can contract from
farmers, so that {aˆ1, . . . aˆN} is the contracting acreage vector over the domain of N farmers. The
friction comes from the fact that this equilibrium, based on subjective beliefs, does not necessarily
clear markets in the traditional sense.
4.2 The Honoring Stage
The honoring stage marks the time when nature has resolved the uncertainties, so that the output
of each farmer is now revealed, as are the spot market prices or alternative prices for the contract
7This could lead to rejection of produce by the firm expost at the honoring stage. This is discussed in the Section
2 of this chapter.
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commodity. Farmers now decide how much of the harvested crop they would want to deliver to the
contracting firm. In theory, contracts bind farmers to deliver all of it. In practice, sideselling on
account of weak public enforcement or insufficient incentives to honor, is an important source of
friction. Firms too need to decide how much of the contracted volume they will evacuate. When
contracting, firms typically estimate total volumes likely to be delivered. If it is relatively good
harvest and/or market prices are low (the two are often related), the firm ends up with contractual
deliveries that are potentially larger than the capacity they can handle. This was raised earlier as
the problem of strategic overcontracting. Under these circumstances, firms often end up rejecting
deliveries or failing to show up to evacuate produce from the farmgate. Here, again, as with
contracting decisions, friction is introduced on account of actions by both the farmer and the firm.
4.2.1 Farmer’s decision to honor
Let θ∗it ∈ [0, 1] be the proportion of contracted produce that the farmer delivers. At the end of the
season, upon harvest at time t, when the uncertainty regarding the market price and yields have
been resolved, the farmer chooses to deliver contractual volumes to the firm based on the utility in
the current period and the current value of continued contractual relationship in the next period.
θ∗it = 0 implies perfect non-compliance wherein the farmer sidesells all of the contracted volume and
θ∗it = 1 implies perfect compliance. This proportion emerges as a solution to the farmer’s honoring
problem. Simply,
θ∗it = arg max
θit
Et {Ut(θit) + βVt+1(θi,t+1)} (4.13)
Given that at time period t, uncertainties regarding prices are resolved, assuming that the utility
function is separable over time, θ∗it is the solution to the problem
Max
θit∈[0,1]
Ut(θit) + β {EtVt+1(θi,t+1)} (4.14)
θi,t+1 is the expectation the firm has about the farmer’s reliability at time period t + 1. Recall
that when the firm contracted with the farmer i, the firm presumed a certain level of reliability θit
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associated with the farmer, denoting the subjective expectation of the firm as to the proportion of
the produce from the contracted acreage the farmer would deliver. Supposing now, the firm uses the
farmer’s choice at t, θ∗it, as a basis to revise and update its belief about the farmer’s reliability before
contracting for the next period, then θi,t+1 is a non-decreasing function of θ
∗
it, ceteris paribus.
8 This
implies that when a farmer is seen to deliver a higher proportion of produce from the contracted
acreage, the more likely the firm is to consider the farmer a reliable supplier in the future time
period. Rewriting θit+1 as a function of θit, for an interior solution, where θ
∗
it ∈ (0, 1), the first
order condition implies, that at the optimum θ∗it, the following holds.
∂Ut(θit)
∂θit
+ βEt
∂Vt+1(θi,t+1)
∂θi,t+1
∂θi,t+1
∂θit
= 0 (4.15)
Similarly, full compliance, i.e., when θ∗it = 1, it must be true that at the optimum,
∂Ut(θit)
∂θit
+ βEt
∂Vt+1(θi,t+1)
∂θi,t+1
∂θi,t+1
∂θit
> 0 (4.16)
If the farmer decides to honor the contract in full, it must be true that there are positive benefits
to complying with the contract. Further, whenever, there is non-compliance so that θ∗it = 0, the
first order conditions imply that at the optimum,
∂Ut(θit)
∂θit
+ βEt
∂Vt+1(θi,t+1)
∂θi,t+1
∂θi,t+1
∂θit
< 0 (4.17)
This basically suggests that the sum of the marginal benefit from an increase in the proportion
of produce delivered on contract and the consequent value of expected future benefit is negative,
so that the farmer is left worse off by the decision to improve his or her contractual performance.
There are specific cases that are of interest depending on the signs the two component terms
of the above conditions can take. To see this, suppose, the utility in the current period is simply
the combined revenue earned selling on contract and sidesale to another buyer. Assuming that
this is net of any anticipated penalty for default. The penalty is cast as a negative function of
8The assumption is that the costs and subjective beliefs that the firm hold about the reliability of the other farmers
during time t+ 1 are constant.
65
compliance, so that as compliance increases, the expected penalties are lower. These penalties can
be both literal in the sense of damages that farmers have to pay through public enforcement as
well as monetized representation of costs associated with guilt, loss of reputation, etc.
The utility in the current period is denoted by the price obtained for sale of a proportion (θit)
commodity to the contracting firm (Pct) plus the returns earned from diverting a part of the contract
commodity (1− θit) to the spot market or an alternate market at price Pmt, both of which are now
known. Assume that there are no transactions costs, for illustrative purposes. Further, assuming
that the anticipated penalty or cost incurred by virtue of defaulting is an increasing function of the
proportion diverted, so that we have κ(θit) with a negative first derivative, and 0 when the farmer
complies fully, we can write out the current utility is
U(θ) = [(Pct − Pmt)θit + Pmt]q¯t − κ(θit) (4.18)
Denoting the proportionate price differential between the contract price and spot market or price
in the alternate market as Dit =
Pct−Pmt
Pct
and rescaling to adjust for level of price, it is possible to
rewrite Equation 4.18
U(θ) = Ditθitq¯t − κ(θit)
Using this, the first order conditions for full or partial compliance, Equation 4.16 can be
rewritten as
Ditq¯t − κ′(θit) + βEt∂Vt+1(θi,t+1)
∂θi,t+1
∂θi,t+1
∂θit
> 0 (4.19)
There are specific cases that are interesting in the context of this study. Other cases do not
hold as much interpretive appeal and are hence not discussed.
It goes without saying that as long as Dit is positive, i.e., the spot market price reigns lower
than the contract price, and if the present value of continued relationship is also positive, the above
condition would hold. In this case, there is a positive reinforcement of price-related incentives and
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relationship-based incentives. Supposing Dit > 0, given a positive price differential, the higher the
value of future relationship, the greater the possibility of this condition being met. So too, given
the value of a relationship, the higher the price differential more likely that the condition is met.
Consider, however, the case where the spot market or alternate price is much higher than the
contract price. This is often the most powerful incentive for breach by contract farmers. This
implies that Dit < 0. Are there instances when the farmer would comply with the contract even
when he or she is likely to increase profits by diverting contracted produce to the spot market? It is
easy to see that in a one-shot interaction, the present value of expected future relationship is 0. In
this case, without penalties, the farmer would certainly have an incentive to pick θ∗it = 0 However,
if there are penalties, then the farmer would only divert such a proportion that would equate the
marginal gain from side-selling to the marginal cost of penalties for doing so. The interesting case
however is when the farmer associates a positive value to a continued relationship. In this situation,
even if there were no penalties for breach, as the condition above illustrates, as long as the current
value of expected future relationship is positive and higher in absolute value that Ditq¯t, this is
consistent with the farmer complying with the contract. In the additional presence of penalties for
non-compliance, is enough that the following condition holds.
−Ditq¯t ≤ βEt∂Vt+1(θi,t+1)
∂θi,t+1
∂θi,t+1
∂θit
− κ′(θit) (4.20)
The first order condition that is consistent with partial or full compliance could hold if the
present value of future relationship is positive and large enough to match the negative returns in
time period t. With full compliance, the above equation holds with strict inequality so that the
farmer is better off foregoing the return to diverting even a small proportion to sidesale, given
the combination of penalties and the value of continued relationship with the firm. Thus, farmers
might be willing to tolerate a loss in the current period and comply with the contract if they
perceive adequately large benefits from continued relationship with the firm. This is akin to the
Folk theorem result and in many empirical contexts, it captures the value of social relations and
inter-temporality of relationships in supporting transactions.
When Dit < 0, assuming that there is no penalty on default, if the relationship with the firm
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is not valued enough, it could lead the firm to breach fully, and the farmer ends up selling nothing
to the firm.
This model allows defining a latent variable y˜i such that
y˜i = Ditq¯t − κ′(θit) + βEt∂Vt+1(θi,t+1)
∂θi,t+1
∂θi,t+1
∂θit
(4.21)
If P (H)i denotes the probability of a farmer i honoring the contract in full (=1) or not (=0),
P (H)i =
 1 iff y˜i > 0,0 iff y˜i ≤ 0 (4.22)
This provides the foundation for the empirical model estimated in Chapter 11, to test if a
higher price differential is associated with a higher probability of self-declared full compliance, if
the prospect of punishment acts as a deterrent and if the potential for future relationship has a
positive association with probability of self-declared full compliance.
4.2.2 Firm’s decision to honor
A contracting firm’s decision to honor the contract involves determining the proportion of contracted
produce, α∗it, a firm evacuates from each contracting farmer i’s field after harvest. The firm’s
optimal vector of proportions that it will evacuate over the domain is the value that maximizes
the current benefits from evacuating a contract farmers’s produce combined with value of future
benefits, summed over all the contract farmers.
Assuming that q¯it is a farmer’s output and that this is common knowledge and αit ∈ [0, 1]
denotes the proportion the firm can evacuate from i’s farm, paying contract price Pc per unit. Let
the price of the downstream at which the firm sells this produce be Prt. In addition, there are
transactions cost of evacuation, mainly costs of transport, but also of weighing, quality checking,
loading, etc. These transactions costs depend both on the volume evacuated from each farmer,
which can be written as t(αiq¯it) and is increasing in the volume evacuated. There is another
cost component that firms typically factor in, and this has to do with the extent of procurement
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represented by the number of farmers. While in this model it is treated as a headcount, it can be
interpreted as a proxy capturing a spatial aspect, wherein more farmers covered represent covering
a larger area or more villages. This is denoted by the function h(n(α1tq¯1t, . . . αNtq¯Nt)). This an
appropriate way of thinking about firms’ evacuation decisions, given that firms bear the cost of
sending out their vehicles to pick up produce over large areas and a large number of farmers.
Further, assume that the present value of expected benefit to the firm of a continued relationship
with the farmers is represented by βEtVt [α1t+1(α1t), . . . , αNt+1(αNt)]. This is a simple relation
that suggests that the value of continued future relationship is a function of the firm’s current
contractual performance. From the farmer’s contracting problem presented earlier, it was suggested
that farmers hold beliefs about the reliability of the firm denoted by the parameter α. Here,
αit+1(αit) suggests that farmer i’s perception of the firm’s reliability when the former makes a
contracting decision in period t + 1 is a function of the firm’s current contractual performance
αit, assuming in particular that it is an increasing function, so that the greater the proportion of
contracted produce evacuated from farmer i, farmer i would likely view the firm as being more
reliable in the context of making future contracting decisions. In other words, the assumption is
that farmers use the firm’s optimal choice, α∗it, is used to update their beliefs about the reliability of
the firm αit+1 in the next time period, in turn influencing their optimal contract acreage allocation.
The value of future relationship with a farmer i is therefore a function of the proportion the firm
chooses to evacuate from each farmer at time period t.
The firm faces an additional constraint on capacity, so that the total procurement
∑
αiq¯it
should fall between Q and Q¯, the former denotes the minimum capacity to run a processing plant,
for instance, and the latter denoting the maximum capacity.
The firm’s problem is to maximize expected profits from evacuation of produce, and is equivalent
to maximizing expected return net of procurement costs and the present value of continued
relationship with the farmer(s).
Max
αit∈[0,1]
[
N∑
1
(Pr − Pc)αitq¯it −
N∑
1
t(αiq¯i)− h(n(α1tq¯1t, . . . αNtq¯Nt))
]
+ βEtVt+1
[
α1t+1(α1t), . . . , αNt+1(αNt)
]
subject to
N∑
1
αiq¯it ∈ [Q, Q¯]
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The firm chooses a vector {α∗it}Ni=1 such that it solves the problem above.
For an interior solution, so that the total procurement is in the interior of the capacity constraint
and proportion of evacuated produce lies between 0 and 1 for each farmer i, the set of first order
conditions, i.e., for each i is given by
−Pr + Pc + t′(αitq¯it) +
(−)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂h
∂n
∂n
∂αitq¯it
 q¯it = βEt∂Vt+1∂αit (4.23)
Whenever at the optimum the firm chooses to evacuate at least some contracted produce, but
not all, from any two farmers i and j i.e. αit, αjt ∈ (0, 1), this implies that
βEt
∂Vt+1
∂αit[
−Pr + Pc + t′(αitq¯it) + ∂h∂n ∂n∂αitq¯it
]
q¯it
=
βEt
∂Vt+1
∂αjt[
−Pr + Pc + t′(αjtq¯jt) + ∂h∂n ∂n∂αjtq¯jt
]
q¯jt
(4.24)
In essence, this implies that the firm chooses to evacuate volumes from contracted farmers such
that the ratio of the marginal costs of doing so are equated to the ratio of the expected marginal
value of future relationship with each of them from doing so.
If this set of conditions represents the optimum, it must also satisfy the capacity constraint,
that the firm never procures more than Q¯ and never less than Q.This essentially implies that for
any produce the firm procures beyond capacity and cannot process, the downstream returns are
nil, and the firm bears a cost without corresponding returns. The case where the firm procures
nothing from anyone is ruled out by the Capacity Constraint in this model, although it can renege
fully on the contract for some farmers while evacuating produce from some others.
If, at the optimum, a firm chooses not to evacuate volumes from, say, farmer i but does collect
produce from farmer j, i.e., αi = 0 and αj > 0, it must be the case that
βEt
∂Vt+1
∂αit[
−Pr + Pc + t′(αitq¯it) + ∂h∂n ∂n∂αitq¯it
]
q¯it
<
βEt
∂Vt+1
∂αjt[
−Pr + Pc + t′(αjtq¯jt) + ∂h∂n ∂n∂αjtq¯jt
]
q¯jt
(4.25)
This simple condition suggests many relationships that have empirical relevance. With respect to
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large farmers, i.e., when individual farmers produce a large quantity, a marginal increase in the
proportion of produce procured from such a farmer is consistent with the firm procuring from fewer
farmers leading to a savings in cost. So, q¯i could be an important factor. However if the firm
perceives that reducing the proportion procured from other farmers in the process is associated
with a lower expected value of continued relationship with those farmers, the firm would choose
not to do so. This need to maintain balance between current benefits and the value of future
relationships is fairly typical of firms’ decisions to honor the contract with farmers.
It is important to note that the firm will undertake full compliance and evacuate the entire
harvest from every contract farmer if and only if
∑
q¯it ≤ Q¯. If this is not the case, the firm
necessarily does not comply fully and there exist at least some αis that are strictly less than 1,
implying that there must exist some i for whom,
[
−Pr + Pc + t′(αitq¯it) + ∂h
∂n
∂n
∂αitq¯it
]
q¯it > βEt
∂Vt+1
∂αit
(4.26)
In this formulation, the possibility of firms accepting produce in order to preserve the value
of future relationships is ruled out because of the capacity constraint. However, if this capacity
constraint did not exist, and the firms could procure as much as they want, than it could well be
the case that the firm takes on losses to preserve the value of future relationships, just as was the
corresponding case in the farmer’s honoring decision problem.
This way of modeling a firm’s contractual performance can be developed further to illustrate
a number of other possibilities, which are beyond the scope of this work. This section is merely a
first step towards such formalization.
4.2.3 Contractual performance over the domain
If the firm and farmers optimize their contractual performance decisions, the equilibrium quantities
exchanged as part of the contracting arrangements is now defined by
Min {θ∗it, α∗it} q¯i∀i ∈ n ⊆ N (4.27)
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Whenever for any farmer i, θ∗it > α
∗
it, this implies that the firm is evacuating less than the farmer
is willing to deliver to the firm. On the other hand, when θ∗it < α
∗
it then the farmers are delivering
less, whereas the firm is prepared to evacuate larger volumes from the farmer. When they are
exactly equal to each other, this implies absence of rationing out from either side, and hence the
farmers and the firm exchange volumes that are mutually optimal.
4.3 Updating beliefs
Whenever there is some friction in the honoring of contractual commitments so that θ∗it 6= α∗it, it
indicates one partner in the contractual relationship does not achieve the optimum. This prompts
agents to reassess the beliefs under which they made the contracting decisions, updating their
beliefs using the revealed contractual performance from the honoring stage.
θit+1 = f(θ
∗
it, θit) (4.28)
αit+1 = f(α
∗
it, αit) (4.29)
This is used as the basis for contracting decisions at time t + 1. The evolution of beliefs is
key to understanding the trajectory of contract farming arrangements over their life cycle, while
exogenous shocks operate on the variables that are assumed to be determined by nature.
The framework presented above thus takes the entire contracting domain as a unit of analysis
and allows for heterogeneity across agents. Further, it suggests that at each stage the mutual
perceptions of reliability form the basis of decisions, along with the uncertainties associated with
stochastic outcomes in the future. The structure allows for agents to update their beliefs based
on observed action of contracting partners, suggesting an underlying dynamic and possibilities for
evolution.
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Part II
Empirical Work
In Part I, this thesis developed a case for treating the ‘domain’ of a contract farming scheme as
the relevant unit of analysis rather than the contract or an individual farmer. Further, implicit
in the notion that contract farming systems are frictional equilibria is that enduring transactional
relationships between a farmer and a contracting firm are far more textured by mutual perceptions
of risks and the costs of transacting than is usually acknowledged. This, in turn, guides selection of
farmers by firms and the farmer’s willingness to contract with the firm. The conceptual framework
underpinning this study also suggested that the microanalytics of contract farming arrangements
represents but one level of institutions, amenable to neoclassical and transactions costs analysis.
This is couched in a larger scale institutional environment that embodies formal rules and legal
frameworks, for which a different mode of analysis might be more appropriate.
Part II of this study shifts focus to take up an empirical analysis of the farm-firm interface of
five contract farming schemes in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, for gherkins, cotton,
marigold, papaya and broiler. Following the theoretical framework, presented in Chapters 3 and
4, that treats institutions as a layered concept, the empirical analysis traverses these different
scales of resolution: first, examining the macro institutional environment and the formal rules of
the game that have enabled the emergence of contract farming on a large scale in India and in
Tamil Nadu before zooming in to get a higher resolution view of the contract farming schemes
themselves. The particular goal of this empirical exercise is to use the theoretical lens elaborated in
Part I to investigate select aspects of contract farming practice: farmer perceptions of the risks and
associated with contracting, selection of and churning in a contracting firm’s portfolio of farmers,
sources of gains to contracting and the nature of contract enforcement mechanisms. These are
interconnected elements of the theoretical viewpoint presented earlier, but each of them is also
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of significant individual importance. The empirical analysis thus traces the contours of contract
farming practice in India as an institutional phenomenon at different levels.
Chapter 5 offers a descriptive analysis of the institutional environment, the first level of
institutions, where first-order economizing is relevant (Williamson, 1991). It outlines forces that
have shaped the broader institutional environment for agribusiness in India. Chapter 6 then lays
out the empirical setting for the survey, introducing the study area, crop sectors and the firms
selected for the study. Chapters 5 and 6 serve as a prelude to empirical analysis and flag themes
that recur in subsequent discussions. Following Chapter 6, four chapters address, in turn, each of
the core selected aspects of contract farming practice. Chapter 7 elaborates on the the farmers’
subjective perceptions of and tradeoffs between risks and gains associated with contracting and its
association with contracting status. Chapter 8 deals with who participates. It investigates farmer
selection by the firm and exclusion of different types. Chapter 9 assesses welfare gains from contract
participation, assessing treatment effects on both participants and non-participants. Chapter 10
takes a closer look at enforcement issues in the firm-farm relationship, as mediated through a
contract or some notion of it. Chapter 11 serves as an epilogue documenting the intertemporal
variation in the portfolio of farmers the firm procures from. These empirical aspects address in
detail the other levels of institutions examining the play of the game and the performance, or second
and third-order economizing. Together, these constitute Part II of this thesis.
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Chapter 5
Contract Farming in India: A Contemporary History
In recent years, Indian agriculture has been popularly characterized as being in a ‘crisis’, lagging
behind other sectors in an era of rapid economic growth.1 Indian agriculture today faces a
perplexing array of issues. Despite the declining contribution of agriculture to Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), constituting 17.8% in 2007-08, it is still the source of livelihood for 52% of the
total workforce (Government of India, 2009). Farming continues to be dominated by smallholder,
rainfed agriculture, often for subsistence, with farms getting smaller. In 2001, the average size
of a farm was only 1.33 hectares. An overwhelming majority are small and marginal farmers; in
2001, 81.3% of the operational holdings were less than two hectares (Government of India, 2008).
Persistent low yields, environmental stress and gradual erosion of the natural resource base present
grave difficulties for the farmer. Only a fraction of the farmers use modern agriculture practices
and many who do, often pursue unsustainable practices. Further impediments exist in the form
of infrastructural and institutional constraints with regard to input supply, credit, post-harvest
management and marketing, raising transactions costs significantly for small farmers. Together,
these undermine the ability of a large section of farmers to earn a decent livelihood.
Yet, at the same time, there is immense potential for the agricultural sector to reinvent itself
against a backdrop of a rapid structural shift in the economy that has contributed to growing urban
and middle-class incomes. Indications are that such a reconfiguration of institutions within the
agricultural sector has already begun. Contract farming is often seen as an important constituent
element in this transition (Government of India, 2009, 2000).
To understand the ingredients of this transformation and the place of contract farming practice
1For a detailed discussion, see Expert Group on Agricultural Indebtedness (2007).The compound growth rate of
the agricultural GDP during the Ninth Plan (1997-2002) and Tenth Plan (2002-07) was 2% and 2.1% respectively
compared with an overall GDP growth rate of 5.5% and 7.6% respectively (Government of India, 2008)
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in this larger institutional context, it is useful to step back to look at the recent history of
agricultural policy in India.2
5.1 Contract Farming in India: History and Policy
Ever since Independence in 1947, transactions in farm commodities have been regulated heavily,
notably through the Essential Commodities Act (ECA) and the Agricultural Produce Marketing
Committees Act (APMC Act). The ECA imposes restrictions on storage and movement of certain
“essential” commodities by private parties, mainly to protect consumers. The APMC Act, on the
other hand, mandated that purchases of certain agricultural commodities be through government
regulated markets (mandis) with the payment of designated commissions and marketing fees.
Furthermore, the Land Ceiling Act proscribed firms from owning and operating large-scale factory-
farms. Together, these severely circumscribed private sector participation in agriculture.
Though the APMC Act was designed to protect farmers’ interests, it perversely rendered farmers
dependent on middlemen,who were financiers, information brokers and traders, all rolled into one.
This dependency often turned exploitative; farmers received but a fraction of the price paid by
the final consumer, with middlemen cornering a large part of the rest. Over time, critics felt
that APMC Act and the ECA had perhaps overextended their reach, compromising farmers and
consumers in favor of trader-middlemen.
Since 1991, with economy-wide reforms, three broad trends began to put severe pressure on these
policies that were perceived to be anachronistic, inefficient and iniquitous. First, with the growth
of private sector participation and export orientation in processing industries following delicensing,
control over the source of feedstock to ensure quality and traceability became desirable. Given the
restrictions on ownership of lands and weak titling of land that makes land lease arrangements
difficult, agribusinesses have sought reform of laws to permit contract farming as a means of
procurement. In particular, they have sought legal frameworks that enable what in business jargon
is referred to as “disintermediation” in agricultural transactions, i.e., removing the long chain of
intermediaries.
2This part draws on Narayanan (2010a).
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Second, growing middle and upper class incomes especially in urban India have been a source
of a new kind of demand. Changes in the consumption basket reflecting both a westernization of
diets (Pingali, 2007; Pingali and Khwaja, 2004) and the dietary transition from foodgrains to higher
value commodities such as meats, dairy, fruits and vegetables, and more processed forms of basic
foods, exert a novel influence on cropping patterns. For instance, per capita monthly consumption
of cereals has come down from 14.9 kg. in 1983 to 12.2 kg. in 2004-05 in rural areas, while urban
areas have witnessed a decline from 11.6 kg. to 9.9 kg. during the same period (National Sample
Survey Organization, 2006).
At the same time, a greater regard for food safety and quality with the emergence of supermar-
kets and modern retail chains has necessitated a steady supply of fresh produce of consistently good
quality (Gulati, 2007). The organized Indian food and grocery retail market is expanding at an
annual rate of 16 to 50 % and the top ten organized food and grocery retailers in India grew at an
average annual rate of about 72% during 2002-07 (Gulati et al., 2008; Reardon et al.; Gulati, 2007).
Thus, from a largely supply-driven or ‘farm-to-fork’, rice-wheat based system, Indian agriculture is
transitioning rapidly to a more diverse, demand-driven or ‘plate to plough’ system (Joshi and Gulati,
2003). This transition challenges traditional modes of transactions and preexisting institutions,
especially in the case of high-value perishables that require strong backward linkages with farms.3
Third, against a background of a silent collapse of state extension systems and rising input
subsidies to agriculture, the state began to disengage from traditional forms of policy intervention
seeking to create spaces for the private sector within agriculture. Contract farming began to
feature prominently in this effort. In 2000, as part of what was termed a “Rainbow Revolution”, the
National Agricultural Policy stated: “private sector participation will be promoted through contract
farming and land leasing arrangements to allow accelerated technology transfer, capital inflow, and
assured market for crop production”. Soon after, in 2003, a Model Act (The State Agricultural
Produce Marketing Development and Regulation Act) outlined a framework for contract farming
3Gulati et al. (2008) point out that given rising incomes and higher expenditure elasticity for these commodities,
future growth is likely to come from the high value sector. Although more than 60% of gross cropped area is under
cereals and pulses; their share of the value of total agricultural output is now less than 25% (Triennium Ending (T.E.)
2006-07). The share of high value commodities, including horticulture, livestock, and fisheries, in the total value of
agricultural output has already increased from 37.2% in T.E. 1982-83 to 47.5% in T.E. 2006-07.
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operations that would safeguard the interests of both firms and farmers equitably. It also paved
the way for private market yards, direct buying and selling, among other things. This was later
complemented by the creation of Agri-Export Zones (AEZ) across the country, where firms involved
in agroprocessing for exports would benefit from tax breaks and specific infrastructural facilities.
Contract farming in high value crops also became part of a larger strategy for diversification,
weaning farmers away from the rice-wheat system that so dominated Indian agriculture.
The emergence of contract farming and the debates surrounding it is best understood within
this broader and evolving institutional context.
5.2 Extent and Spread
In India, agriculture is a state subject so that substantive policy levers in the country work within
individual states. Some states, like Tamil Nadu, had always permitted contract farming. Others
were already providing space for such arrangements in select sectors such as horticulture. It was
however Punjab that led the way, when it permitted PepsiCo take up tomato contracting for its
processing plant 1989. Soon after, contracting in high value commodities, such as basmati, spices,
chillies, flowers and fruits began in many states. By the late 1990s, the basket of contract crops
already included “exotic” commodities like baby corn, cut flowers, etc. Several states followed suit.
According to the Economic Survey of 2009, barring a few states, most have reformed the APMC
Act, albeit to different degrees. Some states have however desisted from deep reform.4 For example,
in 2008 Metro Cash and Carry’s APMC license was renewed in West Bengal only under condition
that it would not pursue contract farming.
While the precise implications of these reforms for private marketing remains unclear, overall,
it has provided firms a broader space for operations than ever before. Contract farming schemes
now embrace a wider range of crops and new geographies.
The true extent of contract farming in India is largely unknown since there is no formal recording
system. It is clear however that a rich mosaic of corporate, civil society and state actors have entered
4For a status of reforms see Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of
India at http://agricoop.nic.inPolicyIncentivesprogress.pdf, accessed November, 2008.
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the fray, across the country (though less in the east and north-east), seeking to source produce for
processing and retail. With state effort to promote private sector participation in agriculture and an
eager private sector eyeing the “fortune at the bottom of the pyramid” (Prahalad, 2009), contract
farming schemes have mushroomed since the mid-1990s. These arrangements, like elsewhere in the
world, are polymorphic, differing greatly in the nature of actors, relationship intensity, and degree
of formality, specific terms and scale of operation. Some contract with as few as fifty farmers,
others contract with so many farmers that they contract with agents or intermediaries, who then
contract with farmers. The development of contract farming in India is still in flux. Mortality of
contract schemes is high but rarely recorded and it is unclear how many initiatives survive beyond
a few seasons.
In general, it is apparent that contract farming has endured best in high-value, niche commodi-
ties, especially for the export market, and where a well-functioning, competing, domestic market
does not exist. Gherkins offer the best example. Introduced into peninsular India in the early 1990s
by pickling plants in the region, gherkins are almost entirely sourced through contracts. By the
triennium ending (T.E.) 2008, India accounted for as much as 15% of the world’s exports of pickled
gherkins. Similarly, large swathes of land, especially in Karnataka, are now under high-value
medicinal plants and herbs, ashwagandha, aloe vera, coleus, stevia and so on, for nutraceutical
firms. Certified organic supply chains have emerged too for which a whole range of spices and
horticultural produce are now contracted (e.g., in Uttaranchal).5
Contract farming has found least traction when it emerges against a strong alternate domestic
market or when too many partners hold the arrangement together. Many rice and wheat contract
farming efforts by private sector banks and firms folded up after initial experiments. Cotton
contract farming, in states such as Tamil Nadu, are fast fading into Corporate Social Responsibility
initiatives. In other instances, state-supported schemes for jatropha and oil palm did not take off.
In many of these cases, production risks were high and disagreements over pricing led to disgruntled
farmers shifting out of the crop.
Despite some commonalities, the relative success of a scheme depends ultimately on the
5As far as possible figures are presented for triennia or an average for three years. This is typical for agricultural
commodities, where annual fluctuations are large enough that the figure for a particular year could be misleading.
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particular relationship between firm and the farmers and factors in the external environment.
There are numerous examples of successful schemes that have stabilized and are now over a decade
old, despite having competing markets and competitors,wheat and soy contracts for flour making
in Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, sunflower and saﬄower for oil in western and central India,
marigold and papaya for extracts in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu.
The broiler industry in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu is
today almost entirely integrated through contract farming, led by Godrej Agrovet, Suguna, and
Ventakeshwara Hatcheries. In fact, the industry’s embrace of contract farming virtually rescued the
poultry sector in Tamil Nadu, at a time when price volatility and poultry disease had dismantled
the livelihoods of small poultry farmers. More recently, a few firms have successfully acted as
back-end integrators for retailers based in Europe and the United States of America, contracting
for fresh produce in north-western India.
Apart from retailers and processors, many contract farming schemes have been initiated by
input manufacturers, especially of fertilizers and pesticides (e.g., Rallis), along with partners who
take responsibility for buy-back. Banks, like ICICI and the State Bank of India, have partnered
contracting firms in multi-partite arrangements to provide crop loans and working capital, with
the contract itself as collateral. Some state governments too have been proactive, engaging
hands-on in tri-partite contract farming ventures with agribusinesses and banks, acting sometimes
as guarantors, sometimes as relationship-managers. For example, the Punjab Agro-Industries
Corporation founded in 1996 has partnered a number of agribusinesses in implementing projects.
Tamil Nadu adopted a public-private tripartite model for cotton contract farming in 2004-05.
Karnataka actively promoted gherkins and grape clusters in the state with great success. States
such as Andhra Pradesh and Mizoram have attempted to replicate the sugarcane model for oil
palm contract farming, mandating farmers to supply fresh fruit bunches to privately owned mills
at administered prices.
Non-governmental organizations have been involved as well, mediating contractual relationships
between groups of small farmers and agribusinesses as with BASIX (for chipping potato contracts
with Frito Lays India Ltd. in Jharkhand) and PRADAN (also in Jharkhand). Sometimes
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contracting is just one element of a broader and deeper relationship with the farmer. This
model, now called “open-source intermediation” involves establishing rural business hubs, where
a multiplicity of farmers’ needs is addressed under a single roof. ITC’s Choupal Fresh and DCM
Shriram’s Hariyali Kisan Bazaar are two such ventures, which offer to buy back produce from
farmers without obligations to do so.
As is evident from this account, the past two decades have seen the beginnings of a potentially
dramatic change in the institutional landscape of Indian agriculture and could well signify a
watershed. A combination of pressures endogenous to the system (for instance, changing diets
and growing incomes) and exogenous efforts to alter the legal and institutional setting for agrarian
markets and trade have contributed to establishing, at the macro and meso levels, an environment
conducive to the emergence of contract farming on an unprecedented scale.
5.3 The Debates on Contract Farming
Opinions on the normative implications of this new dynamic represented by emerging, modern
supply chains, both in terms of welfare consequences of individual smallholders and changes at
the community level, continue to be divided. In particular, the wisdom of a retreating state in
the context of pervasive resource-constrained smallholder agriculture and the reliance on private
sector-driven growth has been called into serious question.
On the one hand, a majority of studies on income gains from contracting in India suggest that
contract farmers earn substantially higher profits than non-contract farmers (anywhere between 1.2
to 4 times depending on the commodity and scheme).6 These gains come partly from savings in
transactions costs (estimated at 60-90% for dairy, vegetables and poultry) and sometimes through
productivity gains. Often contracting firms introduce new methods of cultivation or technologies
(drip irrigation, new cultivars, etc.) which reduce unit production costs contributing to improved
relative profit efficiency. There is some documented evidence of this for livestock and tomato
contract farmers. Contract farming is also known to reduce certain risks. In poultry contracting,
6Singh (2007) and Gulati et al. (2008) review studies of contract farming in India. These studies are discussed in
greater detail in Chapter 9 and are not elaborated on here.
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for instance, farmers transferred 88% of production and marketing risks to the firm, implying that
contracting reduces the volatility growers would have faced if they had produced for alternate
markets (Birthal et al., 2005).
On the other hand, despite these observed benefits, contract farming often brings other
attendant risks. A main problem stems from enforcement issues. It is often difficult to tell apart
firms with a genuine business proposition from fly by night operators who seek to exploit loopholes in
laws to landgrab. For both the farmer and the firm, owing to weak public enforcement mechanisms,
it is difficult to redress loss owing to contract breach by the other party. The farmer, however is
typically less able to seek redressal when the firm breaches its contract. Equally importantly,
the difficulty in scaling up and sustaining contractual farming arrangements in India casts a deep
shadow of doubt on the potential of contract farming to serve as an instrument for rural poverty
alleviation. In India, as elsewhere, contract farming schemes have been fragile. Only a fraction of
contract farming initiatives have survived beyond a few years. The geography of contract farming
in India suggests too that schemes are concentrated spatially, dense in some areas and quite sparse
in others, even within areas with comparable agro-ecological attributes. To what extent does this
reflect a spatial diffusion process which will eventually envelope more regions and to what extent
does it reflect systematic firm preferences for particular geographies, with less favored areas destined
for exclusion, representing geographic poverty traps? As Gulati et al. (2008) point out, so far, not
much attention has been given to measures of risk mitigation against production and price failures,
which are important for sustainability and scalability of contracting ventures.
These particular sets of concerns regarding the implications of contract farming practice in India
correspond closely to the theoretical and empirical concerns raised in Part 1 of this study, making
India an eminently appropriate site for studying contract farming from the CIA viewpoint. At the
same time, viewing these concerns through the CIA lens might generate empirical evidence and
insights into these debates in a way that can inform policy.
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Chapter 6
The Empirical Setting: Introducing the Survey Area
and the Crops
The empirical exercise for this thesis focuses on the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, mainly
for its comparatively long history of contract farming and the presence of contracting in multiple
crops in a fairly small region. The study area offers diversity in geographic and socioeconomic
characteristics, so that in studying contract farming across multiple commodities in this region, it
is possible to reach for something beyond a case study and understand both the commonality and
heterogeneity of contract farming practice.
Tamil Nadu, located in the south-eastern corner of peninsular India, is among the more forward
and industrialized states in India, faring better than the All-India average across a broad range
of indicators. While it is ranked fifth among the states of India in terms of per capita income,1
its Human Development Index puts it in the third spot (0.531 versus All-India figure of 0.472 in
2001).2
A distinguishing feature of Tamil Nadu is its relatively high degree of urbanization. Around
44% of the population, according to Census 2001, reside in urban centres, relative to 27.8% All-
India Table 6.1. This is despite its importance as an agricultural state, contributing around 5% of
India’s agricultural Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Tamil Nadu possesses too approximately 6%
of India’s population and 4.5% of its arable land (Government of India, 2008).3
Its reputation as a progressive state in the arena of social development and its pockets of
industrial strength have, however, not prevented an ongoing struggle to maintain economic growth
1According to the Economic Survey Government of India (2009), the per capita State Domestic Product at current
prices for Tamil Nadu is Rs. 38573 per capita per annum, against the country average of Rs.33283 in 2007-08.
2See Government of India (2007b),Table 1.6, http://socialjustice.nic.in/pdf/tab16.pdf, accessed January 2010.
3The population figure pertains to census 2001 and the arable land is for 2007-08. Given that the birth rate in
Tamil Nadu is among the lowest in India, its share in total population is likely to be lower than the figure cited here.
In general, it is difficult to find estimates for the same years, given that timing of the surveys.
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and reduce the incidence of poverty, which stood at 22.5% overall in 2004-05, in rural and urban
areas alike.
In many respects, the 1990s have been something of a rough ride for the agricultural sector.
The Net Sown Area as proportion of all cultivable land has shrunk from 68.34% in 1990-91 to
just 58.5% in Triennium Ending (T.E.) 2002-03 before recovering to 63.09% in T.E. 2007-08. The
cropping intensity has declined from 1.19 to 1.16 before settling at 1.15 during the above spans of
time.4 This suggests that the last decade has seen a shrinking of the extent of use of cultivable land
but also that the proportion of land that is cultivated more than once has declined. In the latter
part of 1990s, 1995-96 to 1999-2000, the rate of growth of agriculture declined sharply to 1.23 per
cent annually, while that of industry and services sector increased considerably and stood at 4.97
per cent and 10.20 per cent, respectively.
The share of agriculture declined from 24.57% of the State Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in
the 1980s to 21.85% in 1990s before declining to only 11% in T.E. 2008-09. While this is often
associated with a maturing economy, in the case of Tamil Nadu, the proportion of the workforce
in the agricultural sector has not declined at a similar pace, leaving about half the workforce still
dependent directly or indirectly on agriculture. Productivity in agriculture seems to be levelling
off, speculation in real estate by urban investors is bidding land away from agriculture, and often
left fallow. Coupled with the falling groundwater table in the early 2000s, failed monsoons and the
uncertainty associated with disputes over the shared Cauvery river waters,these have collectively
rendered agriculture a distinctly unattractive proposition. Agricultural labor too appears to find
newer avenues of employment with the small-scale and informal sectors in urban areas and the
consequent bidding up of wages has posed a problem for cultivators hiring farmhands. Holdings
have gotten smaller over time and the proportion of smallholders among all cultivators has increased
consistently over the decades since Independence. In 1995-96, 90% of the landholding was less than
two hectares (75% were less than a hectare); small and marginal farmers accounted for 54% land
cultivated. By 2005-06, 91.3% of landholdings was less than two hectares and accounted for 58.72%
of cultivated land Government of India (2009).
4Cropping intensity is the average number of times per year a unit Net Sown Area is utilized.
84
Against this background, the Government of Tamil Nadu has tried, in the past decade, to evolve
ways to enable agriculture to recover and cope. For instance, the Government of Tamil Nadu has
been pushing for a shift to less water-intensive high-value crops (floriculture and horticulture) apart
from experiments with precision farming and organic agriculture.
While the entire menu of policies is not relevant to this analysis, it is worth noting that in
the years starting in 2002, there is an explicit and officially stated objective of promoting contract
farming across a range of crops, in different ways: cotton, through the private sector spinning
mills backed by a state-owned enterprise (known now as a “Tripartite Model”), maize and oilseeds,
exclusively through state-owned National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India,
Limited (NAFED), oil palm, through designated (‘licensed’) private sector firms, and later on,
in 2005, jatropha and sweet sorghum along similar lines. While some are linked to the Central
Government’s interventions in particular crop sub-sectors, others like maize and cotton are, by
and large, initiatives at the state level. Among other things, providing an institutional space for
agribusinesses within crop sectors was expected to contribute to ensuring better returns for and ‘de-
risking’ the farmer. These trends in Tamil Nadu’s agriculture and state policy form the backdrop
of contract farming practice in the study area.
6.1 The Study Area
The geographical area of this study includes eight of the thirty two administrative districts of Tamil
Nadu, namely, Coimbatore, Nilgiris, Salem, Erode, Karur, Dindigul, Tiruppur and Madurai (Figure
6.1).5
These contiguous districts lie in the north-western interior of the State, sharing borders with
Kerala and Karnataka, and marking a rain-shadow region where the Western Ghats roll out into
plains eastward. The domain has heterogeneous geographic or agro-ecological characteristics,
straddling three of the five officially designated agro-ecological zones within Tamil Nadu; there
5Of these, Tiruppur was formed as recently as in October 2008, merging 13 contiguous blocks that originally
belonged to Coimbatore and Erode. This study, however, follows the Census 2001 classification of districts assigning
Tiruppur’s blocks to its former districts. Since the designation of the new district coincides with the period of field
research, this study avoids using the district as a unit of analysis.
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Figure 6.1: Study Area
 
Source: Census Maps, 2001, Governmentof India.
are parts that are mid-elevation as well as lowlands. Being in the rain shadow region, the area does
not receive rainfall from the South-west monsoon. Most of the region is dry; Coimbatore district
is, for instance, among the driest in the state. Availability of surface irrigation is confined to parts
of Erode, Salem and a sliver of Coimbatore, due to the Bhavani Sagar and Stanley reservoirs. In
the south, Madurai benefits from riverine systems.
Given the predominance of rainfed conditions, much of the agriculture here is the product of
application of arduous human labor on lands difficult to work, with open wells for irrigation or
electric pumps that draw on groundwater. Some of these districts have had highly commercialized
agricultural sectors for over a century. The region comprising Coimbatore, Tiruppur, Erode and
Salem (called Kongunad in Tamil history) has always been known for the entrepreneur-farmer.
In the late 1950s, Coimbatore distinguished itself as a forerunner in agricultural modernization in
Tamil Nadu, well ahead of the green revolution in the rest of India (Harriss-White, 1996; Heyer,
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2001, 2000). None of the other districts selected for the study have been exceptional examples of
agrarian enterprise as in Kongunad.
In the 1980s and the 1990s, however, it was the high degree of urbanization and industrialization
for which Coimbatore was celebrated (Heyer, 2001). Coimbatore agriculture was based on thottam
land (land irrigated by large open wells), dry land farming, and livestock. The kavalai system,
powered by bullocks, was used to lift water until the 1960s when electrified pumpsets took over.
The water table which had been falling since the early decades of the 20th century fell much more
rapidly after electrification. The level of purchased inputs was very high in the 1960s and the 1970s
(Sivanappan and Aiyasamy, 1978; Harriss-White, 1996)). Agriculture remained relatively labor
intensive, however, as the degree of mechanisation of field operations remained low. Landholding
size declined. In the 1980s, water shortages became acute and there was competition for labor from
the industrial economy. This led to a fall in agricultural employment and a fall in the cultivated
area (Heyer, 2001).
Industrialization in Coimbatore has been based on medium to small scale enterprises rather
than large ones. This is less true of the southern fringe of the study area, which has not seen as
significant a shift as its northern neighbors. In the 1980s and the 1990s, throughout the study
region, especially in the northern districts, many of the medium scale enterprises closed down,
making way for smaller scale enterprises. Small scale industry has been the basis of high rates of
growth since the 1980s (Heyer, 2001; Damodaran, 2008).
Indeed, in all of the districts in the study area the decadal growth rate of rural population
has been negative, more negative than the average for Tamil Nadu as a whole, signifying rapid
urbanization (Table 6.2).6 On the demand side, the growth of urbanization and the region’s
proximity to thriving urban centers such as Coimbatore and Bangalore, and its proximity to a
net food importing Kerala has meant strong demand-led forces that influence agriculture and
cropping patterns in the region. Horticultural crops have made definite inroads here, as have a few
non-traditional export crops.
While there is a sense that agriculture is a sunset sector, popularly characterized as being in
6This signifies a sectoral shift in the workforce, but the pace is not commensurate with the decline in the relative
importance of agriculture.
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a ‘crisis’, it is apparently not stripped of its dynamism. The decades of the 1990s and the 2000s
suggest that the sector might be trying to adapt to the demands of a new dynamic. The emergence
of commercial agriculture on a significant scale, with hubs of crop complexes tied to agribusiness
suggests strongly such a search for adaptation. Salem, for instance, has emerged as a focal point for
the seed cotton industry and more recently, along with Namakkal a niche zone for medicinal plants.
Dindigul is now home to the gherkins complex that has evolved in the 1990s, and has seen a distinct
shift to high value horticulture and floriculture, aided by the establishment of Agriculture Economic
Zones that provide infrastructure to agricultural processing firms. Erode has now pioneered organic
agriculture within the state. Namakkal is the poultry hub of the region, and is the district in India
that has the largest production of eggs and broiler. Coimbatore hosts some of the largest poultry
integrators in the country, driving an expansion in maize for its feeder units, a trend of the past
decade.
The development of specific sets of crop and livestock complexes with strong links to business
enterprises stands out as a feature of agriculture in the decades since the 1990s. It is too early
to tell what these imply for the agricultural economy of this region and whether these shifts in
cropping pattern and emergence of crop complexes will gain enough traction to sustain over the
longer term.
6.2 The Contract Commodities, in India and in Tamil Nadu
The five commodities chosen for study have very different histories in the region, yet share a recent
past in terms of their roles in shaping the trajectory of contemporary agriculture. Three of the
crops, gherkins, papaya and marigold, were introduced into the area recently, in the early 1990s,
while cotton and broiler have long occupied a prominent place in the agrifood system of the region.
Gherkins is a non-traditional export crop with no domestic market. The crop is procured from
farmers, and processed at small scale plants, by washing, rinsing and preserving in brine, acetic
acid or vinegar. These are either bottled and labeled for international clients or shipped out in
barrels for bottling. Cotton is a traditional cash crop in parts of the study area with established
local markets and networks. Recent years have seen mills integrating along the garment chain,
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Table 6.1: Tamil Nadu: Select Socio-economic Characteristics
Characteristic Tamil Nadu India
Human Development Index, 2001 0.531 0.412
Per capita Income, 20070-08 (in Indian rupees) 38573 33280
Literacy Rate, Total 2001 (%) 73.5 65.4
Literacy Rate,Male 2001 (%) 82.3 75.9
Literacy Rate,Female 2001 (%) 64.4 54.2
Rate of Urbanization 2001 (%) 44.0 27.8
Density (persons/sq.km.) 480 324
Sex Ratio (per 1000 males) 987 933
Rural Poverty (%) 2004-05 22.8 28.3
Urban Poverty (%) 2004-05 22.2 25.7
Combined Poverty (%) 2004-05 22.5 27.5
Agriculture’s share in Gross Domestic Product(%) 11 % 17%
Proportion of workforce engaged in agriculture(%) 50% 60%
Source:
1 http://www.tn.gov.in/dear/tab06/a1.pdf Table 1.1.
Population Census : Salient Features,At a Glance : Tamil Nadu and All-India
2 http://www.tn.gov.in/dear/tab06/a124.pdf 20.1.
Trend in Incidence of Poverty in Tamil Nadu Vis-a`-vis All-India
3 Economic Survey 2008-09, Government of India (2009)
4 Agricultural Statistics at a Glance, 2008
Table 6.2: The Survey Districts: Some Statistics for Rural Areas
District Coimbatore Dindigul Erode Karur Madurai Nilgiris Salem
Decadal growth Rate in Rural Population,1991-
2001(%)
-13.73 -9.87 -20.74 -8.86 -6.21 -13.21 -7.69
Human Development Index 2004 0.775 0.705 0.721 0.737 0.759 0.745 0.717
-Rank among 32 Tamil Nadu districts 4 23 15 12 7 8 17
Sex Ratio (females per 1000 males) 976 987 967 1008 979 1025 908
Scheduled Castes and Tribes (% of total popula-
tion)
22.8 21.9 20.8 23.3 19.9 34.2 23.8
Male Literacy (%) 58.4 56.8 52.4 55.4 59.4 65.9 50.4
Female Literacy (%) 49.3 46.5 42 44.3 49.3 57.1 40.5
Cultivators (% of workforce) 19.8 25.3 27.9 26.8 20.7 6.2 30.3
Agricultural Laborers (% of workforce) 38.8 49.1 41.6 44.2 51.3 19.9 35.9
Percentage of cultivated area under irrigation 34.8 43.2 46.8 41.1 58.7 0.3 32.7
1 Computed from the Primary Census Abstract, Census of India, 2001.
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and extending backward to contract with farmers for good quality, long staple cotton for milling.
Papaya was introduced in the region in the 1990s for extracting papain, which has wide-ranging
industrial uses. The variety is appropriate, but not ideal, for table consumption, and the fruit is a
by-product that is used to make candied fruit or for pureeing. Marigold contracting was initiated
by firms for oleoresin extraction for export, mainly as coloring agent for poultry feed. Marigold
has a thriving local market, however, for fresh cut flowers that are used for a number of occasions,
religious and otherwise. The broiler industry in the study region is almost completely vertically
coordinated, a process that began in the mid-1990s. Here, day-old chicks are provided by the firm
and bought back by the contracting firm. The firm acts as an aggregrator-intermediary, but also
has its own brand of chicken in various processed forms.
These contract commodities have significantly different attributes, contributing to diversity in
contract farming arrangements. At the same time, they all symbolize new aspects of agricultural
development in the region, represented by strong links downstream to not only to industry but
beyond, to regional, national and global markets.
6.2.1 Cotton
Cotton is a relatively old crop, believed to have been introduced by migrant communities from
northern Karnataka a few centuries ago when they settled in what is now Tamil Nadu. It figured
prominently when the English East India Company first started trading in India. In fact, cotton
provided the link between the trading company and local economy and continued to do so when
India came under formal British rule (Parthasarathi, 2001). Early attention was bestowed upon
cotton technology by the English East India Company, which attempted, apparently with little
success, to improve yields of the three local varieties, tinni, salem and karunganni, to serve the
colonial economy. In 1904, however, when the American variety grown in Cambodia was introduced
into Tamil Nadu, it established the basis for the emergence of ‘modern’ industry and trade around
cotton. A coincidence of circumstances such as the Great Depression and the decline of Bombay’s
textile industry served to provide enabling conditions for the growth of the cotton textile industry
around Coimbatore (Chari, 2004; Damodaran, 2008).
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Ever since, cotton has been a prominent part of the cropping pattern in the region around
Coimbatore, a piece that fitted into the larger ecology of downstream users of cotton in the form
of the textile industry (later on, the garment and hosiery industry as well) and the availability of
black cotton soils of the region. Tamil Nadu is, today, part of one of three major cotton growing
zones in India. Cotton is cultivated throughout the year in Tamil Nadu in four seasons, namely
irrigated winter, irrigated summer, rainfed and following rice in the wetlands. Of these, winter
irrigated is the most important.
The link between industry and agriculture has always been strong in the cotton sector and much
has been written about the agrarian origins of capital that fueled growth in other sectors in the
region (Chari, 2004; Harriss-White, 1996). There is huge demand for cotton within Tamil Nadu. In
2004, more than half the mills in operation in India were located in Tamil Nadu, consuming around
44% of total consumption by all mills in the country (East India Cotton Association, various years).
Its production of cotton (all varieties) was, however, only around 7% of total production within
India, implying that Tamil Nadu is a net-importer of cotton. The predominant variety that cotton
farmers grow in the state are Superior Long (27 mm and above) and Superior Medium (22 mm to
24 mm), with the traditional Medium karunganni dominating. The major varieties cultivated in
Tamil Nadu are MCU5, RCH and LRA-5166.
Industry sources and government estimates suggest that about 6-10% (and no more than 15%)
of the Tamil Nadu’s mills’ varietal requirements are met from within the state. Perhaps this
ensured cotton’s viability, so that growth in cotton production was robust, initially during the
decades spanning the 1970s and 1980s, and subsequently, during the latter half of the 1980s, when
the garments and hosiery industry in Tiruppur burgeoned. This was also the period when yield
growth became the main driver of increased cotton production, not just in Tamil Nadu but in other
states as well (Figure 6.2). However, the cotton economy in Tamil Nadu began to splutter around
the mid-1990s. Cotton lost appeal as a viable crop, and the area under cotton declined gradually,
mirroring the national trend (Figure 6.2).
At the All-India level, it was not until 2003-04 that there was reversal in the trend of acreage
under cotton. Two policy measures appear to have played a role. In 2001 and 2002, exports
91
and imports were placed under the Open General List (OGL), implying that they were freed
from licensing requirements. As a miller put it “Cotton, like coffee, suddenly became linked to
international markets, more than ever before, and price setting no longer happened within India”.7
With the incentive for exports of raw cotton, the higher annual price, and the increasing minimum
support price for kapas (seed cotton), cotton reclaimed its place as a profitable cash crop (Figure
6.2). Trade data suggests that cotton now became an exportable commodity in several years. The
year 2002 also marks the introduction of Bt Cotton, officially approved in March, 2002. This
combination appears to have spearheaded a resurgence of area under cotton at the All-India level,
led by Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh.
In Tamil Nadu, these forces have been far more muted and it has not seen a cotton revival
of a comparable magnitude. The trend in Tamil Nadu has been an increase in yield rather than
in acreage under cotton. The recovery of cotton production is attributed, among other things, to
“better prices” and “better yields”8. Interestingly, there is a perception that, unlike much of the
resurgence of cotton in the northern and western states, while the accelerating uptake of Bt cotton
might be playing a role as well, Bt cotton has received a guarded nod in Tamil Nadu, and has never
been seen as a sensible alternative in rainfed tracts. 9 Figures suggest that Bt adoption in Tamil
Nadu is around 33% of cotton acreage (Net Sown Area) in the state, less than half the proportion
of Andhra Pradesh, for instance. 10
A bit of the apparent cotton revivalism, however, is possibly due to the Technology Mission on
Cotton, an initiative of the Government of India aimed at improving the productivity of cotton and
the Cotton Corporation of India Ltd.’s Integrated Cotton Cultivation Programme, a euphemism
for the promotion of contract farming by mills.
The scheme provided a nurturing umbrella for contract farming relationships between spinning
mills and cotton farmers. The Tamil Nadu Government in its Agricultural Policy throughout
7Interview with a consultant for the cotton mills, Coimbatore, November 2007.
8Interviews with farmer groups, Coimbatore, September 2007.
9See, for instance,“Performance of Bt. Cotton Cultivation in Tamil Nadu”, Report of State Department of
Agriculture, Government of Tamil Nadu, http://www.envfor.nic.in/divisions/csurv/geac/srtn.pdf, Accessed January
2009.
10The source for this is “Performance of Bt. Cotton Cultivation in Tamil Nadu”, Report of State Department of
Agriculture, Government of Tamil Nadu, http://www.envfor.nic.in/divisions/csurv/geac/srtn.pdf, Accessed January
2009.
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the early 2000s elaborated on a vision of welfare for cotton growers that gave contract farming
a central role. In what has come to be known as a Tripartite Model for contract farming, the
Government of Tamil Nadu brought together three cotton mills, the Cotton Corporation of India
for contracting with the farmer. Further, the Integrated Cotton Cultivation Programme and the
Tamil Nadu Agricultural University would render the research and development (R & D) support
with the Commissioner of Agriculture providing extension support as well as training to the farmers.
Commercial Banks would step in to provide credit facilities to the identified farmers with Insurance
coverage and Dispute settlement, if any, shall be looked after by Central Institute of Cotton Research
(CICR) (Government of Tamil Nadu, various years).
This carved out an institutional space for three mills to adopt contract farming. The mills of
Tamil Nadu had already begun integrating vertically in the 1990s, covering operations starting with
ginning to finishing garments for export(Damodaran 2008). Partly because of varietal issues and on
account of the local supply deficit, most Tamil Nadu mills source cotton from other regions. Most
mills, however, spin a wide range of cloth qualities and there is always demand for local cotton
that is of good quality and free from contamination. Contract farming as a strategy was expected
to serve this need substantially.
In the study region, at least three large cotton mills began to engage in contract farming around
2002; they are Appachi Cotton, Royal Classic Mills and Super Spinning Mills. Appachi Cotton
was a pioneer of sorts and their scheme has often been considered a ‘model’ for others to mimic.
The stated official estimate of area under cotton contract farming in Tamil Nadu for 2005-06 was
45000 acres (Government of Tamil Nadu, various years); a closer look reveals that this figure is
an expression of intention rather than of accomplishment. Based on personal interviews with the
firms, it appears that the actual extent of contract farming in cotton in Tamil Nadu fell well short
of what was originally proposed, at no more than a few thousand acres.
In the years since, contract farming in conventional cotton appears to have waned and then
retreated; the most recent document of the Government of Tamil Nadu articulating its agricultural
policy has no reference at all to contract farming in cotton! By the end of 2008, while some mills
viewed contract farming as a vehicle to source raw material, for others, it was a Corporate Social
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Responsibility initiative. In the latter case, the responsibility of contract farming operations lay
with divisions within the firms that had little to do with its main procurement operations. At
the time of the survey, there was a concerted effort by some mills to promote contract farming of
organic cotton, rather than conventional (or Bt cotton), which they felt was much too risky, and
not worth the effort. It was organic cotton that they felt would differentiate adequately from the
traditional cottons to enable contractual relationships.
6.2.2 Gherkins
Unlike cotton, gherkin (a race of the species cucumis sativus) is as new to the study region, as it is
to India itself. Inserted into the cropping pattern of the region in as recently as 1992, the emergence
of the gherkins processing industry in India is emblematic of global shifts in agricultural sourcing.
Until well into the 1990s, India occupied only the penumbral margins of world gherkins production.
Towards the late 1990s, as gherkins cultivation declined in parts of Europe11, it anchored itself in
peninsular India, in the states of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, likely owing to their
access to ports. Within less than a decade, India had established itself as a prominent exporter
of gherkins to the rest of the world (Figure 6.3), accounting for as much as 15% of world exports
during the Triennium Ending 2006-07. The major destinations are Russia, the European Union
and the US (Figure 6.3).
While the extent of gherkins cultivation is not recorded explicitly, a rough estimate, derived
from trade data suggests that it could be as high as 10.4 million hectares annually.12 Almost all
the gherkins cultivated are processed, and all are sourced by processing plants through some form
of contract farming. These plants typically clean the gherkins and preserve them in acetic acid,
brine or vinegar, with spices. While most ship them out in large drums to importing countries
where the commodity is processed further, a few plants bottle and brand or label them for retail
sale by clients. The unit value of exports is naturally higher for the latter and at the time of this
study, several plants were contemplating greater value addition through bottling and branding. In
11Industry observers indicate that owing to rising costs of production in southern Europe and Germany, the
traditional areas for gherkins cultivation, international clients began to look for alternative sources of supply.
12This is computed as the volume of exports for 2007-08 divided by a benchmark yield of 5 tons per acre.
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Figure 6.2: Cotton: Production and Trade, in India and Tamil Nadu
Cotton Production in India
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fact, trends for export of raw gherkins suggest that since 2005, fewer gherkins are being exported
in the raw form, reflecting greater volumes being processed and preserved for exports (Figure 6.3)
indicating that gherkins export from India is moving up the value chain. The price paid to the
farmer is linked to the size of the gherkin itself, a higher price for smaller gherkins. The five size
categories based on size fetch the farmer prices ranging from approximately Rs.2/kg. to Rs.15/kg
(Figure 6.3). The unit value of exports suggests that it is about twice the farmgate price. Further,
the farm-gate price constitutes about 3% of the retail consumer price in 2008-09.13
Until recently, raw materials used in processing, including barrels and vinegar were imported,
but by the late 2000s, barrels began to be manufactured in India, so that the gherkins processing
industry now uses, by and large, domestically produced inputs. The study area was one of the first
to induct gherkins into annual cropping patterns emerging as the procurement sheds for pickling
plants in Tamil Nadu. Over time, Karnataka, a later entrant into the gherkins complex, overtook
Tamil Nadu, thanks largely to an organized and focused state government support to gherkins
export industries. Nevertheless, Tamil Nadu now stands next only to Karnataka; industry observers
suggest that Tamil Nadu might account for as much as 35-40% of India’s gherkins exports.14
The epicenter for gherkins in Tamil Nadu is, as it was in its infancy, the town of Dindigul,
located at the heart of the study region, and, to a lesser extent, Tuticorin. At the time of this
study, in 2007-08, there were about seven gherkins plants clustered around Dindigul town, with
easy access to both the hinterland that constitutes the procurement shed and to the Tuticorin
port, from where export shipments leave. Almost all of them are 100% Export Oriented Units
(EOUs), a Government of India nomenclature that extends benefits of export promotion policies,
like subsidized electricity, a five year tax holiday and exemption of excise duty, to name a few. The
formation of AEZs (Agriculture Economic Zones) offers similar incentives for processing plants,
although it is not clear if gherkins plants had taken advantage of this. The gherkins plants in
Dindigul district have varying degrees of technological sophistication and conversely labor intensity,
13This is computed as the simple weighted average contract price (for various grades) of the sample firm divided
by the unit export value multiplied by hundred. The farmgate price divided by the retail price of gherkins in a retail
store in the EU, obtained through personal communication with a gherkins importer, multiplied by 100. This is
therefore merely indicative. Gherkins exporters and importers tend to be somewhat reluctant to disclose margins but
five to ten percent is the figure cited by most Indian industry observers.
14Interview with bureaucrat, Bangalore, March 2007.
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with between 70 to 150 employees on the rolls. Additional labor is hired on a contractual basis for
the season, if necessary. Women appear to form the bulk of the employees.
Over the years, the ambit of sourcing gherkins has expanded to include regions as far east as
Thanjavur, as far south as Tuticorin, Pudukottai and making inroads west into Coimbatore. In the
study region, gherkins can be grown in up to two seasons every year. Being a three month crop,
it is possible to get three crops a year in regions such as Thanjavur, enabling the plants to run
throughout the year. Such geographical expansion does have its limits though, since gherkins are
highly perishable and ideally need to be processed within eight hours of harvesting.
The gherkins processing plants often have the same markets, so that the rivalry in sourcing
mirrors a similar rivalry in securing orders internationally. Beyond this rivalry, however, the
gherkins firms coordinate their actions and come together to assist each other in meeting their
respective obligations to exporters, or to represent a united front to lobby with the government.
The best expression of this is the Gherkins Exporter Association of India (GEA), founded in 1999
and headquartered in Bangalore. While not all firms have implicit faith in the Association, the
potentially deleterious effect of competing to source gherkins and the need to maintain a reputation
in the eyes of international clientele necessitate such a forum.
The gherkins complex in southern India has now attained maturity, but faces continuous
challenges. The main difficulties pertain to their predicament as an intermediary between Indian
farmers and international clients. Competition upstream for sourcing from farmers means that
they need to offer prices to match the others in the industry, especially in a context where the
collusion on prices or coordination within the GEA is not reliable. Also, there is pressure on firms
to compensate farmers better to keep pace with rising prices and wages in southern India, even as
the firms compete for cheaper sources of produce. At the other end, the international market for
gherkins is sensitive to general economic conditions and is itself searching for the cheapest source
of produce across countries. This downward pressure on the selling price of gherkins leaves a few
of the gherkins processors with wafer-thin margins, so that without state support for EOUs, some
might not survive at all. Indeed, recent years have seen some firms close shop. There has been
some consolidation as well, with the larger gherkins processors acquiring the smaller ones. There
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is a general feeling among industry observers that the gherkins complex in southern India will
last another decade or so before moving to lower cost areas, perhaps elsewhere in India, or even
other parts of South and Southeast Asia. At the time of the study, some firms were contemplating
procuring in Sri Lanka, for instance. For now, it seems that gherkins has grown strong roots in
Tamil Nadu.
6.2.3 Broiler
The broiler industry in India is touted universally as a success story.15 In the last decades,
the livestock sector has been one of the fastest growing sectors in Indian agriculture, currently
accounting for about 25% of agricultural GDP, compared to less than 14% in 1980 (Government
of India, 2008). Within the livestock sector, poultry has been an especially noteworthy performer.
The growth of poultry has outstripped both overall agricultural growth, and the broiler industry
has grown faster than other meat sectors in India (Figure 6.4).16
This expansion in broiler and egg production is attributed, on the one hand, to rapid growth
in urban incomes and dietary diversification, and on the other, to changing market structure,
from traditional spot markets to highly vertically coordinated contracting systems, that enables
exploitation of economies of scale. Unlike gherkins, the poultry sector in India is buoyed by the
domestic market rather than the export market. This is despite the fact that India’s exports of
egg powder, live poultry in the form of day-old chicks (DOCs), etc. have been on the rise since the
1990s. Egg and egg-based products account for about 90% of India’s poultry exports. According
to Mehta and Nambiar (2007) Indian poultry is not only self-sufficient, but being supported by a
broad and strong genetic base, productivity levels (as represented by the Feed Conversion Ration)
of broilers and layers are equal to those achieved elsewhere (e.g., in the United States of America
and the European Union). India is also one of a few countries worldwide that has put into place
and a sustained specific pathogen free (SPF) egg production project.
15For detailed discussions of the poultry sector, see Asokan and Singh (2003); Dolberg (2004); Landes et al. (2004);
Mehta and Nambiar (2007); Mehta et al. (2002); Pica-Ciamarra (2005). This section draws heavily on their accounts
of the development of these sectors.
16The poultry sector in India refers to both the broiler and layer sectors, and unlike in other countries, where
poultry refers to diverse breeds of birds, in India it is overwhlemingly chicken and a small portion of duck and fowl.
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Figure 6.3: Gherkins: India’s Production and Exports
Notes:Computed from DGCIS data for HS 20011000 Cucumbers and Gherkins (Prepared and Preserved) 
Source: http://apeda.com/TradeJunction/ProductSearch/… Accessed March 3, 2009
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Figure 6.4: India’s Poultry Sector
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The poultry revolution was started in southern India by Dr B.R. Rao, who is commonly known
as the Father of the Poultry Sector in India. The integration process was started by Venkateshwar
Hatcheries in the mid-1980s in the south and the north, but it failed miserably in most areas
when large numbers of small and medium farmers stopped producing chicken products. The layer
industry too took a hit from the ban on egg and egg products from India by the European Union.
The firm started contract growing again in the mid-1990s, drawing on the services of some of these
experienced farmers, utilizing preexisting infrastructure such as sheds, drinkers and feeders, etc.
In southern and western parts of India (Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Maha-
rashtra), large-scale vertical coordination has been occurring at a brisk pace ever since, especially in
broiler production. Pune (in Maharashtra) is a major poultry rearing hub, for example, about 6000
poultry farmers are on contract with Venkateshwara Hatcheries, popularly known as Venkys, or with
the Godrej Group. In the West, about three-quarters of the broiler market is vertically coordinated.
Similarly, in the south, particularly in around Palladam area of Tamil Nadu, which is part of the
study area, integrators now reportedly account for over 80% of production and consumption, the
major players being Vekateswara Hatcheries, Suguna and Swathi. Some observers claim that about
96% of the layer industry is vertically coordinated and the figure might be close to 90% for broiler.
Andhra Pradesh is the largest egg producing state, accounting for nearly 40 % of egg production
in the country, followed by Tamil Nadu, whose share in the All-India average increased from 11.21%
in 1997-1998 to 13.46% in 2005-2006. Today, eight states account for bulk of egg production in
India Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and West
Bengal. As for broiler, it is similarly concentrated. In fact, one district of Tamil Nadu, Namakkal,
alone accounts for more than 30% of total broiler production. Although, a major portion of poultry
production is in several clusters, this is one of the most concentrated districts in India. The study
area itself does not include Namakkal itself, but does include the adjoining areas including, Salem,
Erode, Tiruppur and Dindigul that have emerged as broiler hubs. Per capita egg and chicken meat
availability is also highest in the southern states, followed by the northern and western states, and
least in the eastern and central states.
In contrast to southern India, in other regions, particularly in the north, traditional wholesalers
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still dominate the markets and marketing margins and retail prices are considerably higher than
in the south. Integration has moved rather slowly in the northern and eastern parts of India, with
contracting accounting for less that half the market share in the East, and only 10% in the North.
Initial efforts at large scale vertical coordination failed to take off in the north for various reasons.
There was high seasonal variation in costs of production and contract enforcement turned out to
be a problem. However, there are two or three integrators operating exclusively in the north along
with some countrywide integrators.
In general, integrators have tended to establish wholesale and retail price leadership in the
markets where they operate by reducing the number of intermediaries or by selling directly through
their own retail outlets (e.g., in Coimbatore). In the broiler sector, there is no national organization
that looks after the producers’ interests. Barring a few regional organizations, broiler marketing is
largely in the hands of big traders and commission agents in mandis (wholesale markets). In the
study area, the Broiler Coordination Committee based out of Palladam is a strong organization
of broiler integrators who set the price of broilers and control the volume of supply to maintain
prices in their favor. There is no comparable farmers’ organization. In the study area, currently,
apart from the three big integrators, several small and medium scale firms operate to contract for
broilers. While most of the country’s large integrators operate here, there have been a few instances
of broiler contracting firms going bankrupt in the late 2000s. There is much homogeneity in the
details of contract farming arrangements.
While the transformative impact of this change is ongoing, backyard poultry and traditional
channels continue to be a significant feature of the poultry sector in India. Only 2-3% of broiler
is processed and the market in India continues to be dominated by that for live birds, owing to
a strong consumer preference. According to the 2006 National Sample Survey (NSS) Report on
Livestock Ownership (Government of India, 2006), landless, marginal and small scale farmers, who
account for about 90% of the 107 million agricultural households in India, keep about 85% of the
poultry stock of the country. These farmers keep poultry to serve their own needs and participate
only marginally in local markets. In general, those who are commercially integrated with the broiler
industry tend to be large scale growers who form a small proportion of poultry owning farmers.
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Thus, while the Government of India acknowledges the promise of the poultry sector, with the
Eleventh Five Year Plan 2007-2012 setting a target growth rate for the sector at 10% per year,
which is above the envisaged 9% annual growth rate for total GDP (Government of India, 2007a),
it also recognizes that “the poultry production model in vogue (high input-high output, using
commercially developed strains of birds) is successful mainly in largescale units (more than 1000
units of birds)” (Government of India, 2002, page 568) and bypasses the landless, marginal and
small scale farmers (i.e., those with less than two hectares of land), who raise the largest share of
the countrys poultry stock (Government of India, 2006).
6.2.4 Papaya
India has seen spectacular growth in papaya cultivation, beginning in the 1980s and gathering
momentum in the 1990s (Figure 6.5). It has also become an exporter of the fruit since the
1990s (Figure 6.5). In T.E. 2007-08, India accounted for 3.4% and 1.2% of world exports of
papaya in terms of volume and value, respectively. This is consonant with the general trend in
many other horticultural crops in India, attributable to the rapid growth of urban middle class
incomes, changing demand patterns and increasing integration of India with the world economy (as
elaborated in Chapter 5).
Much of the growth in papaya production during the 1990s has come from yield improvements,
attributable to the introduction of Taiwan Red Lady, a table variety that has been adopted widely.
The growth of papaya as fruit has been accompanied by a growth in papaya for extracting papain,
which was nonexistent, by all accounts, until the late 1980s. There is no official record of the
latter, but observers suggest that this is a minuscule proportion of total papaya production in the
country. Papaya for papain production, in India and elsewhere in Asia, has emerged in response to
the growing market for papain in the US, EU and Japan. The enzyme has wideranging industrial
uses and is exported, chiefly to the United States and the European Union. In India, Co2 and Co6
are varieties of papaya are recommended for papain production for the higher enzyme activity in
the latex from these fruits.17
17Co2 is a selection purified from a local type at Agricultural College and Research Institute, Coimbatore.
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The sample firm makes papain enzyme that is extracted from the latex drawn from the skin of
the immature papaya fruit and as a subsidiary product, fruit pulp and jam. The main clients for
pulp for the sample firm comprise a few big juicing plants within India. A small proportion of the
fruit is also converted to candied dry fruit and sold to confectioneries and bakeries in the study
region.
Within India, Tamil Nadu has never figured on the list of papaya producing states throughout
the 1980s and 1990s. It was neither cultivated nor consumed widely in the region. As recently as
T.E. 2008-09, Tamil Nadu accounted for only 0.43% of the India’s area under papaya and 2.2% of
the total production. Yet, papaya cultivation for papain extraction is almost exclusive to Tamil
Nadu.
Papaya, like gherkins, is new to the study region. Traditionally, papaya was rarely grown as a
full-fledged crop, and was common more as a backyard tree or as an intercrop. Red Lady was the
dominant variety, appropriate for table consumption. It was in this setting that the contracting
firm in the study established a papain extraction plant, and persuaded farmers to take up papaya
(the Co2 variety) as a contract crop. The owner of the plant started his own professional life as
a struggling dryland farmer in the region, who then worked his way to setting up a modest sized
plant in the late 1980s. He started trials in 1989, establishing operations on a commercial scale in
1994.
The number of firms worldwide involved in primary purchase of papain is very small and all have
their traditional sources of supply. Most exporting countries are in Africa, with the Democratic
Republic of Congo being the largest supplier. Australia and India are only just establishing
themselves as exporters of papain. Many importing countries further process their papain imports
and reexport to one another or reprocess it for further sale to fit end user specifications.
The international papain market is thin, with a very small number of players. Partly on account
of this, most international trade in papain is based on contracts. Most exporters of papain first
obtain contracts for supply for the following year, before organizing supply or undertaking planting
on farmers’ fields. Contracts also carry specification of the quality of papain, which is related to
the level of papain enzyme activity, measured in Thyrosine units (TU). Industry observers note
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Figure 6.5: India’s Papaya Production and Papain Exports
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Source: Compiled from various sources. Papaya Production and trade data from FAOSTAT. Accessed July 30, 2010. Papain exports data
compiled from DGCIS. Papain, as of 2010, refers to “Papain, Pure of Pharmaceutical Grade” with HS-8 digit code 35079071. The 8-digit ITC-HS
is with effect from January 2, 2003. For years before that, the figure corresponds to same commodity group under the older HS. For years before
2002-03, the figure corresponds to the same commodity description under the older classification system.
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that the price is proportionately cheaper for higher graders of papain. Further, the thin papain
market renders international papain prices highly volatile, depending on the supply conditions in
exporting countries, especially those in Africa. Figure 6.5 shows the trend in exports and unit value
of exports since 1997-98. It is evident that although the papain exports have been growing, there is
also some volatility in the volume of exports, which in turn have impact upstream on procurement
volumes from farmers.18
At the time of field research for this study (2007-09), the contracting firm was the only firm in
the area involved in papain extraction. Others attempted to enter this industry in the study region
and failed. There were few other firms in India that export papain during 2008-09, although this
is probably changing fast.
6.2.5 Marigold
Marigold was introduced into the study area from Mexico in the early 1990s on a commercial
scale, mainly to support the establishment of three plants in the region that extracted oleoresin
for export. Oleoresin has three main uses- as coloring agent in food and additive in poultry feed
and neutraceuticals. The potential for its increased use in the latter segment is high as studies
in recent years have recommended use of lutein in food as it would help protect against cataracts
and macular degeneration, two common age-related eye disorders. Most of the oleoresin produced
by the three plants is exported to the United States, European Union and to Mexico. Industry
executives suggest that India accounts for about 25% of the world marigold oleoresin exports, with
China accounting for about 50%. Peru is the other important exporter.
Marigold demands very specific agro-climatic conditions, requiring cooler climates for optimal
yields. In Tamil Nadu, it is confined to elevated, hilly regions or cooler foothills. Within the study
region, this comprises the northern edge.
Until marigold’s introduction into the area it was never a popular flower for cultivation. In
Tamil Nadu, its ceremonial uses were restricted to funerals and it was considered inauspicious to
18As described already, this implication follows from the practice on that part of papain exporters of securing
international orders before making procurement decisions. Export of papain is a coarse indicator for international
orders secured by plants within India, given that firms treat this latter information as proprietary information.
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use these for other purposes. This has changed somewhat over the years and the distinction between
various uses has become less important. Also, with greater connectivity to regional and national
markets, such as Hyderabad, Bangalore and distant Mumbai, where there are no such taboos for
marigold use, it became an attractive crop. Marigold from the study area now serves more markets,
where flowers have wider daily uses. There is thus a thriving market for marigold that serves as a
credible alternative for the farmer and constantly puts pressure on the firms.
Industry observers suggest that the market for oleoresin is similar to that of papain. A small
number of importing and exporting companies working with traditional suppliers make for very
thin oleoresin markets. Oleoresin prices tend to be volatile. Similarly, the volume of international
orders that the oleoresin extracting plant gets can also vary substantially from year to year, as
reflected in Figure 6.6.
The firms have faced fluctuating fortunes. The three firms, Synthite, AVT and Kancor, are
family-owned businesses, who have a long presence in multiple sectors. Kancor is the youngest of
them all and was established in 1999. In the years 2004-06, firms expanded marigold procurement
considerably and all three were contracting for produce across extensive swathes of land in the
northern fringe of the study area.19 Since this time, the firms have had difficulties managing the
scale of operations, mainly on account of fewer international orders. In fact, two of the three firms
had temporarily stopped operations until 2009. At the time of the field survey, only one firm was
contracting for marigold.
Apart from the uncertainty in securing international orders, the firms have had to contend with
other problems. In 2003, protests from local villagers against the contamination of water from
the extraction plants forced one firm to shut down and relocate to another district, farther from
the procurement shed. Plants have had to invest in pollution control measures.20 More recently,
with contracting defined against a strong alternative domestic market, the firm has faced serious
challenges with regard to enforcement of contracts. The fact that the marigold growing season
coincides with key festivals in the study region implies that the prices for fresh flowers increases at
19In fact, this area is only a small portion of the volume of procurement, with a majority coming the neighboring
state of Karnataka, from across the border.
20This is based on the interviews with the firms, and is not independently verified.
107
Figure 6.6: India’s Oleoresin Exports
Source: Oleoresin from marigold is classified as of 2010 under HS-8 digit Code 13021990 “Other Extracts Vegetable Saps and Extracts, whether or
not modified derived from vegetable products”. The data for trade is obtained from Directorate General for Commercial Intelligence and Services
(DGCIS). The 8-digit ITC-HS is with effect from January 2, 2003. For years before that, the figure corresponds to same commodity group under
the older HS classification system.
these times to several times the contract price tempting farmers to breach. Given weak enforcement
of contracts and the fact that the firms contracts with a large number of very small farmers, the
firms have struggled to maintain the contracting arrangements.
6.3 The Contract Farming Schemes
This study focuses on one firm’s operations in each of the commodity complexes described above.21
This section outlines briefly some salient features of the contract farming arrangements to introduce
the schemes, mainly based on interviews with the contract firm’s executives, field officials and
observations from the field. Several of these themes will be taken up for detailed discussion in
subsequent chapters.
21The names of the firms are withheld in keeping with Non-disclosure Agreements to protect the identity of both
the firm and their contract suppliers.
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6.3.1 Scale and Evolution of the schemes
The scale of operations varies across the commodities, and interestingly, over the lifetime of the
scheme as well. All the contract firms selected for the study started their operations in the 1990s,
but have followed different trajectories.22
The cotton firm’s efforts at contract farming are the most recent. The firm originally started
contracting in 2003 with 600 farmers in 25 villages, and over the next three years dwindled to 130
by 2006-07. In the season of the survey, the cotton firm was procuring from 77 farmers in a handful
of villages in the study region.23 As a company executive stated, we “find that 200 farmers or so
is reasonable for us as a CSR initiative, but it doesn’t make sense otherwise. We need 10000 bales,
we get 150-200 bales from contracting and scaling up is not possible.”24
When the papaya firm commenced operations on a commercial scale in 1994, the area under
contract was about 1500 acres in the first year. Over the next decade, the firm scaled up gradually
to around 2000 acres, contracting with 500-600 farmers at a time in three districts, namely,
Coimbatore, Erode and Dindigul. In recent years, however, owing to extensive yield loss due
to mealy bug and fewer international orders, this has reduced to 600 acres of tapping area with
around 120 farmers. At the time of the survey, the firm was exploring new areas for expansion and
several of the contract farmers were contracting for the first time with the firm.
The broiler firm has a more chequered history in the region. In 1984, the firm began procuring
broiler through contracts, but gave up operations soon after, due to several constraints unique to
the firm. It resumed contracting within Tamil Nadu in 2004 on a large scale. The procurement shed
straddles three districts, Erode, Dindigul and Coimbatore, with offices in three hubs, Coimbatore,
Pollachi and Dindigul. At the time of the survey, there were around 400 contract growers in these
three districts.
The gherkins firm has the largest scale of operation in terms of acreage of contract procurement.
It started commercial operations in 1999. By 2008, the firm has expanded to contract from over
22Chapter 10 discusses the dynamic aspects in greater detail.
23The firm had contracted with 93 farmers in the summer in another area, after which they abandoned contracting
altogether in the latter region.
24Agribusiness Survey, Tiruppur district,Tamil Nadu, March 2008.
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5000 farmers spread over more than 3000 acres and has stabilized at that scale, though depending
on the economic conditions in the importing countries, this fluctuates a bit from year to year.
As described earlier, marigold procurement is confined to mid-elevation regions in Erode district.
The has been contracting since inception in 1992, but with intermittent breaks owing to a lack
of international orders. The most recent of such spells was the year 2006 through 2008, when
procurement was from only a fraction of the farmers. At the time of the survey, the firm was
procuring directly from about 150 farmers within the study area.
The spatial dimension of operations varies across these schemes (Chapter 7). Broiler and papaya
contract farmers are scattered over a large area with typically a handful of growers in each village
the firm operates in. In contrast, for marigold, cotton and gherkins, the firms follow what is known
as the ‘cluster’ approach, so that contract farmers are densely concentrated in particular villages.
For instance, in the case of gherkins, in villages where the firm contracts, typically only one or
two cultivators are not contract suppliers. The marigold procurement shed is confined to the hilly
regions of Thalavady and Kadambur in Sathyamangalam taluk in Erode district. Marigold demands
cooler temperatures and yield more flowers under these conditions. The firm’s plant is located at
the foothills. Cotton similarly requires particular soil types and climate, so that the firm procures
exclusively from traditional cotton growing areas of Coimabatore and Salem districts. Gherkins
cultivation is confined mainly to Dindigul and parts of Madurai districts in the study area, tied in
part to the location of the processing plant. This is primarily owing to the high perishability of
gherkins that demand quick processing of the harvested produce.
The study area represents only a subset of their procurement shed for all contract commodities
other than cotton. All of the cotton that the mill procures is from within the study area. For
gherkins and papaya, a major proportion of the contract procurement is from within the study
area, with procurement from other areas accounting for about 5-15% of total procurement by the
firms. In the case of broiler, the firm operates across the country. The procurement from Tamil
Nadu accounts for between a third and a half of their countrywide operations. Similarly, in the
case of marigold, a major portion of the firm’s procurement comes from the neighboring state of
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Karnataka so that only a small portion of the contract produce is sourced from the study area.
The firm’s executive puts it at 25%.25
6.3.2 Operational Aspects
For all field crops, firms contract acreage rather than quantities, so that the firm takes on the yield
risk. This is a shared feature across schemes in India, and is quite different from practice in most
developed countries, where contracts are written in terms of quantities. Firms and farmers arrive
at how much land the farmer will bring under the contract crop, and the firm provides seeds for
that acreage, factoring in the spacing recommended for optimal yields. In the case of broilers, it is
equivalent, in the sense that the maximum number of birds per contract cycle is determined by the
size of the shed and the number of feeders and drinkers available for use, with the final buyback
based on live weight of the birds.
In the cotton scheme, seeds come from the mill’s own breeding division that has developed
a variety appropriate to their needs. A multinational input provider partners with the firm and
provides the farmer with inputs at cost, monitors the crops and also provides advice. Loans are
offered by commercial banks against the contract but they also require that the land documents be
deposited with them. No farmer seems to be clear as to the consequences of default. In some cases,
firms contract with groups, but the group contract is notional and often involves a large landowner
with several marginal farmers that the lead farmer has identified. In general, some sign contracts,
and other do not. Some farmers sign contracts directly with the firm, others have a contract with
the lead farmer (Chapter 10). The price is not fixed and is linked to market price, a mark-up over
a wholesale price for an agreed reference period.
In the gherkins contracting scheme, every farmer has a passbook. Three copies of these are
made, one is with the farmer, the second is with the procurement wing of the firm, the third copy
is filed with the head office at the gherkins factory. The procurement wing also provides inputs to
the farmers, including pesticides and fertilizers, according to a set of recommended practices. Five
grades of gherkins are identified. These grades are related to the size of the gherkins, the smallest
25The area in Karnataka from where marigold is sourced shares the same geographic and socio-economic conditions
and form a contiguous unit constituting the Sathyamangalam hills.
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size commanding a premium, at Rs.14/kg. and declining to Rs.2/kg. as the size increases. Pricing
is fixed up front, before sowing, and interviews with firms in the region suggest that industry
buyers coordinate on farmer price to prevent undercutting. Grading takes place in the presence of
the farmer at harvest time, when a sieve separates gherkins by size. At this stage some obviously
poor quality produce (very crooked, rotten and so on) is winnowed.
The papaya contract farming scheme is unique in this region. The firm in question is a pioneer
and also the only one operating in the study area currently. The study area is not a traditional
papaya growing region and observers suggest that it was a highly unpopular fruit until recently. So
although the firm is a monopsonist, it is dependent on a small pool of papaya contract farmers for
its supply. The agreement with the farmer is mostly oral, and when there is a written contract, it
is usually modeled as a land leasing arrangement rather than as a marketing contract. Thus, the
terms of the contract do not find explicit mention in the document, but is agreed upon orally.
The firm supplies seeds, for which the farmers pay. The variety that is cultivated is Co2 and
the farmer undertakes to follow a package of practices recommended by the firm, procuring the
required inputs on their own. During the nursery stage, there is close supervision and assistance,
with the field officials of the firm visiting the farm on a daily basis. During the flowering stage,
make and female trees are identified; culling is done at this stage. Once the tree starts producing
fruits, after the seventh month, the firm assigns two laborers to each farmer for extracting latex.
The farmer pays the wages, but because latex extraction requires skill, the firm trains a pool of
workers themselves for the purpose. The equipment for harvesting is provided by the firm, although
occasionally the farmer takes on this responsibility.
Once the latex is collected, it is stored in drums provided by the firm for that purpose. The
latex needs to be taken to the plant as soon as possible and it is the farmer’s responsibility to bring
it to the local collection centers. Quality is measured rigorously with the help of the Brix meter that
monitors papain activity and latex is weighed in the presence of the farmer. Farmers often check
the reading themselves, using the Brix meter, having been taught its use by the firm. Accounts
are maintained on the farm and at the collection center. The terms of the contract are very clearly
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specified here. The contract price for latex is specified “as Rs.90/kg.. latex at 17 degrees”.26 Once
the latex has been extracted from the fruit, the firm agrees to buy the fruits from the farmer at a
prespecified rate (Rs.0.75/kg.). Payment is made at the time of collection, or within a fortnight of
delivery. It is mutually agreed of course that the farmer will not divert or side sell, nor adulterate
the latex with milk, flour, water, etc.
The marigold firm first establishes the acreage a farmer wants to commit and distributes seeds
accordingly. Seed distribution takes place in early summer (April-May). Seeds are obtained from a
multinational seed company. The variety that was in use during the time of survey was Peruvian.
The firm usually collects money for that, although it subsidizes the cost of seeds heavily. At that
time, the firm typically signs a written contract with the farmers that fixes price and has the farmer
commit that all produce from the acreage contracted is delivered to the firm. The contracting firm
also provides credit, or cash advance, to farmers if they need it, apart from the required fertilizers,
herbicides and offers technical support should the farmer require it. Typically, for each crop of
marigold there are 7-8 harvests. Flowers are harvested weekly. When they harvest it they put it in
bags given by the firm, stitch it and bring it to different collection points for weighing. Sometimes,
they are picked up at the farmgate. Payment is made weekly in settlement of the previous week’s
delivery minus any amount owed to the firm, sometimes in installments. Entries for transactions
are made in a passbook.
The system of contracting in the broiler industry is remarkably similar across firms. Under this
system, the integrator invests in the entire value chain, including grandparent farms, parent stock
farms, hatcheries and feed mills. Poultry farmers invest in poultry sheds and equipment on their
existing land. Integrators provide day-old chicks, feed, medicines/vaccines, training to farmers in
process and cost management, and technical supervision. Integrators pick up the broilers at around
42 days of age (six weeks), and farmers are paid growing charges according to a formula that factors
in feed cost and a given productivity norm based on the feed conversion ratio (FCR). The farmers
are given an incentive bonus if the FCR and/or mortality rate is better than the contracted level.
The birds are weighed on farm and collected on site. Payments are made within a week. Although
26This was for the year 2009-10.
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the contract is fixed for a 42-day cycle, typically the firm communicates to the farmer the number
of cycles the farmer will be provided for the whole year. This is by way of an oral agreement.
For the farmer, given the fixed investment in sheds, drinkers and feeders, ideally they seek to
undertake six cycles of contract production annually. The placement of the birds is however the
firm’s discretion, and often this varies depending on the firm’s particular strategy to exert control
over supply conditions.
6.3.3 Relationship intensity
In many ways, the five schemes are fairly typical of contract production arrangements elsewhere in
the developing world. All contract commodities are cash crops and involve production processes that
require farmers to respond continuously to the need to maintain quality. These quality standards
are often established outside the production system, driven by end-user preferences. In the case
of gherkins, food safety issues imply stringent norms governing the use of inputs, fertilizers and
pesticides, especially of pesticides that need to be on the “approved” list of the importing country.
So too with poultry, that enters domestic food chains directly. In the case of cotton, quality is
expressed as the need for exporting mills and garment manufacturers for Extra Long Staple (ELS)
cotton that is not contaminated, i.e., free from impurities and particulate matter. In the case of
papaya and marigold, while the varietal choice is more critical than the production process, they
do require good cultivation practices, especially for papaya, that ensure high yield and care during
harvesting.
Firms engaged in contract farming thus engage actively in the production process, not only
providing critical inputs but also maintaining close supervision from sowing through to harvest and
post-harvest handling. The commodities and firms selected for study represent varying degrees of
involvement by the firm in the production process or intensity of contractual relationship.
The cotton firm brings in a third-party input manufacturer to monitor and advise farmers,
arranging for credit from a bank and providing materials to store the harvested cotton. The mill’s
role is confined to coordination and oversight of operations.
The gherkins firm provides farm inputs (seeds, fertilizers and pesticides) on credit; this is
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later recovered from the farmers at the time of harvest, when farmers are paid for the produce,
net of input costs. Field officers on the company’s rolls monitor crop health and advise farmers
periodically.
Broiler represents even higher relationship intensity with the firm’s officials visiting contract
growers every day to monitor health and status of the birds. These firms provide day old chicks to
the farm and has detailed protocols for the feed mix and vaccination schedules.
For papaya, the involvement of the firm varies over the life cycle of the crop. In the nursery
stage, field officials monitor the crop closely with daily visits and once the plant matures into the
flowering stage, there is limited oversight, unless the situation demands it. In papaya, an interesting
feature is that labor for latex extraction is organized and trained by the firm, with the wages being
borne by the farmer. Latex extraction requires great skill and the firm believes it can ensure quality
and supply of latex for the plant by deputing labor to contract farms.
Marigold represents the least participation of the firm in the production process, related partly
to fewer quality requirements that need only modest supervision. In fact, the marigold firm
suggests that monitoring is required more for contract enforcement rather than for production
under contract. The marigold firm thus restricts itself to providing high quality seeds at subsidized
prices and training new contract farmers in the cultivation practice for marigold. Its field officials
advise farmers periodically on pest and disease control.
6.3.4 Challenges and future
Despite the many shared features, the schemes are set up for very different futures. The chief
challenge stems from enforcement issues. In a context of weak mechanisms for public contract
enforcement through the courts, firms have had to work hard to ensure that farmers honor their
contract. In general, the greater the interdependence between farm and firm, the greater the
chances of a contract farming system enduring. The commodities chosen for the study occupy
different positions on a scale of interdependence.
Some commodities offer certain natural advantages over others. Papaya comes close to a
symbiotic relationship. Committing to contract is necessarily a two-three year lock-in, with limited
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options outside.27 In the case of marigold and cotton, however, the contract farming scheme is
embedded in an already existing crop complex that readily accommodates side-selling by farmers.
The cotton complex has been documented extensively by researchers. Contract cultivation methods
are not very different from cultivation for the spot market. Both farmer and firm can resort to spot
market trade at any time. Even in this case, however, the varietal differences imply that ELS cotton
commands a premium that would prima facie differentiate the contract crop from local varieties of
cotton farmers might grow. In fact, the cotton firm selected for study has its own research division
that works with crop varieties and develops its own hybrids. During the time of study, the variety
contract farmers grew was a hybrid developed by the firm.28 Despite this, farmers disgruntled over
price and quality issues, do sidesell to their customary traders. The year of the survey marks the
last season the cotton firm contracted for conventional cotton. The company was proposing to
explore contract farming in organic cotton at that time.
This is far less true of gherkins where the moral obligation to sell to the contracting firm seems
high. As is often the case with export crops, for gherkins, there exists no alternative market in
India. However, over the years, the number of gherkins processors has increased over time and the
intense competition between the firms ensures that there are credible alternatives for the farmer
even without domestic markets. In general, however, firms that have been operating in the region
for long do not “cross-purchase” or poach other firms’ suppliers. However, newer firms and those
from another region sometimes do. Interviews suggest that in the recent past, this happens only in
isolated circumstances and only with some “deviant farmers”. As an executive explained, “that is
why there are the field officers, they keep a very close tab and if the character is not good enough,
we remove them from our suppliers list”.29 Broiler occupies somewhat the same spot as gherkins
on the scale of interdependence, and there is tight oversight on the part of the firm. Although there
are competing firms, firms tend to respect each other’s turf and farmer loyalty to the firm tends to
27Once the latex has been extracted,the fruit does not fetch remunerative prices on account of the lacerations on
the skins.
28Farmers were given a choice of five types they could grow. In the year of the survey, the farmers were all growing
the same variety.
29Agribusiness Survey, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu, November 2008.
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be high (Chapter 10). In general, although relationship intensity is primarily to ensure that quality
norms are achieved, they often do contribute to improved contractual performance.
However, enforcement is not the only challenge firms face. Sometimes, relationships between
the firm and firm come under great strain when there is yield loss triggered by catastrophic risk.
For instance, a mealybug infestation in papaya throughout the region left farmers disillusioned with
contracting for papaya. Similarly, when gherkins is grown repeatedly on a plot, without rotation,
the yields taper off or decline, due to soil nutrient depletion. Firms often move to another region to
procure. In marigold, nematode infestation poses problems, after repeated seasons of cultivation.
The more diligent field officers of contracting firms are careful to advise the farmers on appropriate
steps to prevent these outcomes. However, should these happen, such consequences can undermine
carefully built relationships.
Furthermore, processors who focus on export markets face the constant pressure of keeping
costs of procurement low in the face of global competition. The global nature of the system implies
that fluctuations downstream in international markets, either in the nature of shrinking demand on
account of economic slowdowns or a good crop elsewhere or emergence of new global procurement
sheds have impacts upstream on the firm’s contracting strategies. This uncertainty is a source of
perpetual stress for firm-farm relationships.
6.4 The Survey
The following chapters take up three aspects of contract farming practice across these five
commodities - farmer selection and churning, risks and gains from contracting, and the issue of
enforcement. The empirical analysis draws on both qualitative data collected through detailed
interviews with firms (henceforth Agribusiness Survey) and farmer groups, copies of contract
documents as well as a survey of farmers (henceforth Farmer Survey).
The Farmer Survey constitutes detailed, structured interviews with 822 farmers covering five
commodity sectors, cotton, gherkins, marigold, papaya and broiler in southern India (See Appendix
A for details on survey design and implementation). The survey was done in two phases between
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2007 and 2010.30 The study area, involving seven administrative districts in the state of Tamil Nadu
is heterogeneous in terms of agro-ecology, physical geography and socioeconomic development, as
detailed above and includes districts that figure among the richest as well as the poorest quintiles
in India.
The list of contracting farmers for the year of the survey was obtained from one contracting firm
in each of the commodities studied. Based on this list, all the villages in the sample area were divided
into contracting villages or non-contracting villages. A similar exercise was carried out sequentially
for the larger administrative units, blocks and districts. Starting from the largest administrative
unit for the study area, contracting districts were sampled, within which, contract and non-contract
blocks were randomly sampled and then further on, within sampled blocks, contract and non-
contract villages were sampled. In the villages sampled, a census / houselisting process identified
four key types of farmers,those currently contracting, those who grew the contract crop but for
the open market or for other firms, those who had given up contracting and those who had never
contracted. The sample respondents were randomly selected from each of these types. Appendix A
describes in detail the sampling strategy and its rationale in detail, outlining the distribution and
coverage of sample across administrative units and farmer types.
While the empirical work draws on detailed interviews with various field officials and executives
from the five firms selected for study, this is supported by a broader survey of agribusinesses
across several other commodity sectors operating in other regions in India. The dataset from the
Agribusiness Survey constitutes interviews with executives and field officers of 42 agribusinesses
across India engaged in contract farming, and offers an opportunity to understand the similarities
and differences in contracting experience across regions and commodities.
30The number of farmers interviewed were 840, but data for only 822 was used, due to problems with date quality
in 18 interviews. Gherkins is represented in both phases. Wherever relevant, the results are reported separately for
the two phases.
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Chapter 7
Safe Gambles? Farmer Perceptions of Risk-return
Tradeoffs and Contracting Decisions
7.1 Introduction
Contract farming is often regarded as possessing multiple advantages for farmers in resource-poor
developing countries. Specifically, when such an arrangement involves production support from
the firm through the supply of inputs, credit, technical advice, etc., it can potentially solve, at
once, many missing market problems for participating farmers. In addition, buyback commitments
at pre-agreed prices implicitly protect farmers from price risk. Contracting can thus bring about
greater transactional certainty and reduced transactions costs in many agrarian settings. Even
as these are valid, empirical evidence suggests that contracting is sometimes associated with high
risks and uncertainties for farmers involved in such arrangements. In particular, it could potentially
leave a contracting farmer exposed to certain catastrophic risks, even while simultaneously insuring
farmers against certain other kinds of risk. A firm could, for instance, offer a fixed price for the
produce but renege on the commitment to buyback produce. This acquires particular importance
when the enforcement of firms’ contractual commitments is weak so that farmers are rendered
vulnerable within the contractual relationship.
The motivation for this chapter stems from this latter counter-premise, that a contract farming
arrangement in a developing country context, rather than being an insurance mechanism for the
farmer, is instead akin to a new technology that comes with its own attendant risks.1 This study
suggests then that if contract farming arrangements mitigate many risks but bring others in their
wake, farmers must make more complex assessments of the relative returns, benefits and risks
associated with contracting before making decisions on whether or not to contract. In other words,
contracting decisions of farmers are driven not by a unidimensional preference for protection from
1For a more general view of markets themselves as technologies, see Barrett (2008).
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a generalized notion of risk but by subjective evaluations of multidimensional attributes involving
multiple sources of risk and uncertainty.
Participation in contract farming schemes can therefore be regarded as a matching problem,
so that although contracting firms have the final say on farmer selection, the pool of farmers
available for contracting is determined in the first place by farmers’ willingness to contract.2 From
a policy perspective, this view implies that the degree to which contract farming can take root
depends significantly on farmer perceptions of contract farming arrangements. Too often, contract
farming arrangements are regarded as unambiguously welfare-enhancing. Viewed simplistically,
revealed preference theory suggests that farmers only ever agree to participate in a contracting
scheme if they expect, on an average, to benefit from the arrangement. A chief theoretical result
that underwrites this viewpoint presumes that risk-neutral firms, possessing a greater capacity for
risk-bearing, are able to insure risk averse farmers through contracts, thus generating gains from
transacting. Explanations for difficulties in scaling up contracting arrangements or uptake are then
assessed within this frame of reference.
The high mortality rate of contract farming schemes in developing countries suggests otherwise.
In particular, it indicates that these contractual arrangements perhaps themselves carry elements
that trigger disadoption or prevent uptake, which could influence the trajectory of institutional
evolution in important ways.3 There is also the oft-neglected issue of catastrophic risk, when
events trigger an implosion of existing schemes. These could emanate from discrete changes in
downstream markets that force contracting firms to alter procurement practices or production
processes dramatically and often suddenly.4 Alternatively, the source of such risks could be more
local, in the sense that a particular firm fails to honor the contract due to strategic overcontracting
2Chapter 8 discusses the notion of selection and outcomes of this matching in detail. This chapter focuses
exclusively on mapping farmers’ perceptions of contracting and its next best alternative, drawing insights from the
theoretical model of a farmer’s contracting problem discussed in Chapter 4.
3Empirical literature on technology adoption typically assumes that a given technology is beneficial (Foster and
Rosenzweig, 1996). Disadoption is less frequently studied. Theoretical work using the property rights approach,
described in Chapter 3, offers greater scope for incorporating technologies with ambivalent impacts, but its empirical
applications in the area of contract farming have been few. Barrett et al. (2010) cite instances of such farmer exit
from modern supply chains, others instances of churning are reviewed in Reardon et al. (2009) and Reardon and
Timmer (2005)
4For example, Fold and Gough (2008) discuss how varietal preferences of consumers in Europe impacted pineapple
contract arrangements in Ghana. Ashraf et al. (2009) documents a breakdown of a contracting scheme in Kenya.
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or rejects produce arbitrarily for the same reason. Despite its enormous implications, this aspect
has been largely left out of rigorous empirical work on contract farming.
A central goal of this chapter is to examine if the claims implied by this viewpoint hold: Is
contracting in a developing country setting itself a gamble pretty much like the alternative spot
market? If this is correct, to what extent is it a safe gamble relative to the alternatives available to
a farmer? How does the heterogeneity of farmer perceptions of relative risks between contracting
and its alternatives match up with contracting status? Relatedly, might the perceived relative costs
of risks induce certain farmers, especially those who are risk averse, to opt out of contract farming
schemes even if there might be perceived benefits of contracting, i.e., high mean returns associated
with contract farming coexists with a high risk associated with such returns?
This chapter is organized as follows. Following this introduction, I explore the rationale for
investigating farmer expectations and perceptions of risk. I then elaborate on the multidimensional
aspects of risk with contracting in general, and discuss the structure of risks for five specific contract
farming schemes in India that form the basis of this study. Thereafter, I describe the methods
used in the field survey for eliciting farmer perceptions, before I present an analysis of farmers’
perceptions of returns and other risks associated with contracting and the next best alternative,
illustrating that contrary to popular perception, contracting is less of an insurance mechanism and
itself contributes to variations in incomes not unlike the alternative arrangement it seeks to or does,
in fact, replace.
7.2 The Structure of Risks and Metrics
7.2.1 Assessing Risk and Uncertainty
Traditionally, risk in agrarian contexts has been articulated in terms of risk preferences (Binswanger,
1980; Dillon and Scandizzo, 1978; Moscardi, 1977). The emphasis was typically on objective risk,
with differences in decisions across farmers being attributed to difference in risk aversion or attitudes
toward risk. More recently, there is increasing recognition that perceptions of risk matter a great
deal, so that economic decisions involving uncertainty are shaped not just by risk preferences but
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by interpersonal and intertemporal variation in subjective assessments of conditional distributions
of relevant outcomes. In short, differences in preferences for risky alternatives are associated with
differences in perceptions of the relative risk of choice options, and not only with differences in
preferences (De Weerdt, 2005; Delavande et al., 2009; Gine et al., 2008; Slovic, 1987; Weber and
Milliman, 1997).
The usefulness of eliciting subjective expectations cannot be underestimated (Anderson et al.,
1977; Dominitz and Manski, 1996b,a). For instance, there is an old but relatively brief tradition of
this in agricultural economics, which finds that farmers’ cropping decisions and land allocation
patterns are consistent with their yield and returns expectation (Grisley and Kellogg, 1983;
Goodwin et al., 1980; Herath et al., 1982; Smith and Mandac, 1995; Botha and Meiring, 1999).
Norris and Kramer (1990) provide a review of this tradition.
There is now resurgent interest in collecting subjective probabilities and elicitation of expec-
tations in surveys, partly prompted by recent advances in behavioral economics. Manski (2004)
demonstrates that preferences and expectations are often consistent with observed data for a whole
range of applications. Nyarko and Schotter (2002) report, using experimental techniques, that the
beliefs they elicit from participants do a better job of explaining choices that those that come from
three common belief formation models.
To the extent that perceived risk and not actual risk determines economic behavior, risk
perceptions obtained through surveys have important informational content for data analysis.
Delavande et al. (2009) and De Weerdt (2005) make a strong case for the measurement of sub-
jective expectations, arguing that notwithstanding methodological caveats, they provide important
information and are easy enough to collect in developing country contexts. As Smith et al. (2001)
explain, subjective risk perceptions are valuable since they incorporate multiple factors, including
the individual’s understanding of the objective risks, the individual’s expectations about his or her
own exposure to risks, and his or her ability to mitigate (ex ante) or cope (ex post) with the adverse
events if they occur. Recent studies have used measures of risk perceptions both as explanatory
factors to analyze economic decisions and as dependent variables to investigate the formation of
these perceptions. A number of them use subjective expectations in the context of agriculture and
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livestock (Bellemare, 2009; De Mel et al., 2008; Delavande, 2005; Delavande et al., 2009; Doss et al.,
2008; Gine and Klonner, 2005; Gine et al., 2008; Lybbert and Barrett, 2007; Smith et al., 2001,
2000).
The approach adopted in this study draws on this tradition that suggests eliciting subjective
probabilities and expectations regarding uncertain events can contribute to explaining economic
decisions. The formation of these perceptions is not within the scope of this study and is hence not
addressed.
At the outset, it is important to clarify the concepts of risk and uncertainty as used in this
study. Since Knight (1921), it is common to treat risk as random events to which mathematical
probabilities of occurrences can be assigned and uncertainty as pertaining to random events to which
mathematical probabilities cannot be assigned, with the latter, known as Knightian uncertainty.
I assume that agents who make decisions are able to assign subjective probabilities to all random
events when making decisions, or declare their inability to do so based on their lack of knowledge
that might form the basis of these assessments. The study’s focus is on a collection of attributes
that represents aspects of uncertainty associated with contracting and not contracting. Since these
attributes are associated with uncertainties, they contribute to value assessments that farmers
make for these choices depending on whether they have a negative impact or a positive impact
on their well-being. Like Smith et al. (2001) this study then sees risk as denoting a conjunction
of uncertainty and adversity. In other words, these attributes, representing different source of
uncertainty, can be either risk exacerbating or risk mitigating.
In the following part, I lay out the architecture of these attributes of uncertainty and their
potential influence on risk exposure as perceived by the farmers and describe the method used in
the field survey to measure farmer perceptions of these.
7.2.2 What contract farming insures and what it does not
In general, elements of contract farming practice can contribute either to reducing risks associated
with production and marketing or to increasing them relative to the farmer’s alternative to
contracting. It is not unusual for both phenomena to coexist, so that a contract farming
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arrangement might reduce risks with respect to some aspects while simultaneously introducing
or exacerbating those on other fronts. Empirical work on contract farming demonstrate this amply.
A number of studies show that participation in these schemes holds a number of advantages for
the farmer, such as availability of inputs in a timely manner of reliable quality and technical advice
that contributes to increased and more stable yields (da Silva, 2005; Eaton and Shepherd, 2001;
Minot, 2008; Gulati et al., 2008).5 Farmgate collection of produce and delivery of essential inputs
reduce transactions costs and time significantly, which can otherwise be substantial in developing
countries. Having an assured buyer who will pick the produce at a pre-agreed price simplifies
selling decisions, obviating the need to negotiate a transaction. Contract farming schemes are
known to have protected farmers, with a large part of the price risk being transferred to the firm
that might possess a greater capacity to bear such risks (Knoeber and Thurman, 1995; Bellemare,
2010; Ramaswami et al., 2005, for example). Each of these aspects is typically rendered variable
if the farmer chooses to produce for the open market, although in traditional settings, the farmer
might be able to rely on a network of known traders and input dealers.
Emerging empirical evidence suggests, on the other hand, that while contracting with a firm for
inputs/outputs mitigates some risks for the farmer, it entails its own set of risks (da Silva, 2005).6
From the point of view of the farmer, moral hazard arises primarily from the fact that the firm
could reject their delivery on grounds of poor quality, timing, etc., attributes that are typically left
unspecified in the contract or arbitrarily enforced. This is particularly the case when the firm, which
needs a minimum procurement volume (say, to run a processing plant to its desired capacity) might
also contract more quantity than they need, as a buffer against production risk or farmer default.
This rejection at the factory or farm gate has been cited as one of the most contentious aspects of
the farm-firm relationship (Echanove and Steffen, 2005; Glover, 1987; Mannon, 2005). There have
been documented instances of firms setting quality standards arbitrarily, becoming inexplicably
stringent if spot market prices collapsed, indicating ample supply available from alternate suppliers.
Sometimes, farmers have also had to bear the brunt of poor technical assistance, even plain cheating
5This literature is surveyed in Chapter 2 and recollected here.
6As discussed in Chapter 3, this makes the case for treating contract farming between farmer and firm as an
institution with two-sided risk.
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and deliberate default (Glover, 1987; Ramaswami et al., 2005). Additionally, the farmer might also
evaluate the risk that the firm might not return the next season to contract. This is important,
for instance, when the farmer would not want to sever the long-term relationship (s)he has with
the village broker or trader. There could be other perhaps longer term risks as well, such as
ecological damage or adverse health impacts on account of particular production processes and so
forth (da Silva, 2005; Pomareda, 2006).
Which risks are mitigated for the farmer and which ones are exacerbated depends crucially
on the precise nature of the contract farming arrangement and is hence essentially an empirical
question.7 The contract farming schemes I study operate in rainfed agricultural areas in the
southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu and have diverse arrangements with farmers. The details
of the schemes are described in Chapter 6 and hence not invoked here, barring salient operational
aspects relevant to the discussion.
In many ways, the five schemes are fairly typical of contract production arrangements elsewhere
in the developing world. All contract commodities are cash crops and involve production processes
that require farmers to respond continuously to the need to maintain quality. Firms engaged in
contract farming thus engage actively in the production process, not only providing critical inputs
but also maintaining close supervision from sowing through to harvest and post-harvest handling.
The commodities and firms selected for study represent varying degrees of involvement by the
firm in the production process or intensity of contractual relationship. The cotton firm brings
in a third-party input manufacturer to monitor and advise farmers, arranging for credit from
a nationalized bank and providing materials to store the harvested cotton. The mill’s role is
confined to coordination and oversight of operations. The gherkins firm provides farm inputs (seeds,
fertilizers and pesticides) on credit; this is later recovered from the farmers at the time of harvest,
when farmers are paid for the produce, net of input costs. Field officers on the company’s rolls
monitor crop health and advise farmers periodically. Broiler represents even higher relationship
intensity with the firm’s officials visiting contract growers every day to monitor health and status
7The theoretical literature on contracting offers ways of understanding how existing risks are distributed in different
ways across contracting parties, along the lines of Eswaran and Kotwal (1983), for example. There is less theoretical
work admitting the possibility of new risks that might be borne exclusively by one party.
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of the birds. These firms provide day old chicks to the farm and have detailed protocols for the
feed mix and vaccination schedules. For papaya, the involvement of the firm varies over the life
cycle of the crop. In the nursery stage, field officials monitor the crop closely with daily visits
and once the plant matures into the flowering stage, there is limited oversight, unless the situation
demands it. In papaya, an interesting feature is that labor for latex extraction is organized and
trained by the firm, with the wages being borne by the farmer. Latex extraction requires great
skill and the firm believes it can ensure quality and supply of latex for the plant by maintaining
a pool of trained workers, who extract latex on contract farms. Marigold represents the least
participation of the firm in the production process, related partly to fewer quality requirements
that need only modest supervision. In fact, the marigold firm suggests that monitoring is required
more for contract enforcement rather than for production under contract. The marigold firm thus
restricts itself to providing high quality seeds at subsidized prices and training new contract farmers
in the cultivation practice for marigold. Its field officials advise farmers periodically on pest and
disease control. Across the schemes there is heterogeneity in the way risks are distributed between
firm and farmers, although they do share many features, such as provision of some critical inputs,
technical advice and an agreement to buy back at the end of the season.
There is a priori reason to believe that the revenue for the farmer from contracting is, by design,
a stochastic variable. This arises both from yield variability and on account of price structures. A
shared feature across the commodities in the study is the firms’ practice of contracting for acreage
rather than quantities, implying that the firm takes on yield risk.8 Interviews with agribusinesses
suggest that contracting acreage is more acceptable to the farmer especially in the case of crops such
as gherkins, with which the farmer might not be familiar. Even with the others, in the absence
of easy access to crop insurance, a widespread perception is that exposing farmers to yield risk
would undermine the relationship the firm has with farmers. Once contract acreage is agreed upon,
contracting firms then provide farmers with as many seeds as is technically recommended for optimal
yields on the contracted area. The understanding then is that farmers sell the entire crop from the
contracted area to the firm. While this implies that the firm faces uncertain contractual delivery
8For broiler, the size of the shed sets the scale of contracting and firms allot birds so that there is one bird for one
or 1.2 square feet of shed space.
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volumes from a given contractee, equally, it implies that for farmers, revenues from contracting a
particular acreage could vary with yields. The yield is both naturally variable and related to the
effort and ability of the individual farmer. So this introduces some stochasticity in the revenue
stream from contracting. Further, contracted produce is accepted by the firms only if it meets
certain established though not necessarily measurable standards. For a farmer accustomed to a
less discerning buyer in the traditional channel, this could compound the uncertainty associated
with delivered volumes.
As far as the price is concerned, the belief that contract farming, by fixing a price, reduces
price risk is valid only in a limited sense. For instance, cotton contract price is a mark up on a
reference wholesale market price and hence fluctuates along with the market price. Further, it is
not unusual for price to be tied to some measure of quality or benchmark. Often, this implies that
price is rendered dependent on farmer effort or on factors beyond his or her control.
While returns to contracting are potentially stochastic, there are other risks farmers might
associate with contracting. It is important to note that some are pre-existing risks (or risks shared
across modes of operation, contracting and not contracting) that continue to be borne by the
farmer. Others are new risks that come with contracting. Some risks are somewhat long-term.
for instance, the effects of contract inputs on human health and soil quality, whereas others are
immediate. Further, risks could be one-off, like losing title to land, or they could be recurring risks,
risks that occur each season the farmer contracts. For instance, in each contracting season there is
a perceived possibility that the firm does not turn up to collect the harvest. This is potentially a
critical risk when there exists no alternative domestic market for the contract commodity. If the
firm does evacuate contracted produce, there is always a chance that the product is downgraded
on the basis of quality checks that are not always transparent, price might be discounted, and so
on.
In the balance, only a subset of these risks is reflected in the farmers’ subjective distributions of
returns. Other risks that are more difficult to translate into monetary terms also figure prominently
in the farmers’ ‘mental model’ of contract farming and could potentially exert a powerful influence
on decision to contract. Quite apart from this, for farmers, contract farming is part of a larger
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set of decisions that are made as part of the farmer’s livelihood strategy, for instance, how much
exposure to have to markets and how much to provide for one’s food needs.9 There are also other
dimensions that are not easily monetized, like the notion of self-respect and independence that
drives farmer decisions (Key, 2005).
Given the nature of risks and to be able to address the particular concerns of this work I use
a combination of two approaches to record farmers’ subjective assessments of these risks. The
first involves elicitation of entire subjective distributions of net returns associated with contracting
and not contracting and the second comprises a psychometric mapping and measurement of other
uncertainties or risks that farmers might find difficult to assign monetary values to and hence might
not be easy to incorporate in assessment of returns distributions.
Eliciting Subjective Distributions
The first approach entails eliciting the subjective distributions of the farmer with respect to yield,
price and net profit, wherever possible, under contracting and for an appropriate alternative. The
appropriate alternative refers to the farmer’s articulation of what (s)he considered as the next best
alternative course of action, were the contracting option not available to them. This is characterized
as either growing the contract crop for another firm or the open market or switching to a competing
crop.10 As part of the survey, farmers were asked about the benefits associated with their actual
choice and the benefits from the alternative the farmer did not choose. The aim is to compare the
benefits from the farmer’s choice (of contracting or not contracting) relative to the other option,
had it been available. This was asked of four classes of farmers, those currently contracting, former
9Echanove Huacuja (2003); Echanove and Steffen (2005), for instance, provide instances where farmers in Mexico
try to minimize their risks by planting vegetables for two different companies and, on occasion, cultivating produce
for the national fresh market.
10This pertains to questions 21, 23, 10 and 9 and in the questionnaires for each type of farmer, Contract Farmer
(for the subject firm, also referred to as Subject Contract Farmer), Other Contract Farmer (contract with other firm
or spot market if relevant), Attrition Farmers and Never Contract Farmers, respectively, in Schedules 1(A), 1(B),
1(C) and 1(D) found in Appendix C. In the survey, almost all farmers named a single crop as the alternative to the
contract crop. Where there were multiple competing crops, they were able to pick one that was the closest substitute
for the contract crop. Only in a couple of cases, the farmers suggested that they would leave the land fallow, in which
case there exists no alternative distribution. The returns distribution associated with the alternative was treated as
being degenerate at zero. Given the typically small size of contracted acreage, the possibility of the contract acreage
being assigned to multiple crops contemporaneously did not arise.
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contract farmers, those contracting for other firms or cultivating for open market, and those who
have never contracted.11
The survey thus collected six subjective distributions for each farmer : yield, price and net
returns, each for the contract crop under contracting and the alternative option as chosen by the
farmer.12 The returns here refer to net profit per acre per season (net profit per cycle for broiler)
of the contract or alternate crop and refer to the income earned minus all paid out costs. Unpaid
inputs are not factored in and fixed costs were not apportioned. Farmers were simply asked for the
net income they were left with per unit area of production at the end of the season, after paying
out all production and transactions costs for the entire season, including multiple harvests. This
seemed to be a reasonable, though admittedly not the only, basis for assessing farmers’ evaluations
of alternatives. Farmers typically clarified that these net profit assessments factored in a subset of
risks associated with the marketing channel like price discounts and rejection of quality, etc., so that
there is some overlap of the attributes accounted for in the two approaches. It must be noted that
the subjective distributions were obtained with specific reference to the particular firm sampled
or the trader or firm they were transacting with at that time and not any representative firm or
abstract notion of contracting. This is essential if it is to relate to participation and contracting
status, given the heterogeneity of firms and practices.13
In general, the minimum, modal and maximum value of expected outcomes were elicited through
the survey and the farmers were then asked to assign 20 stones as weights to each of these three
points, reflecting the expected relative frequencies of the outcomes. These serve as the subjective
probabilities at the minimum, mode and maximum values.14
Despite the usefulness of such elicitation techniques, these are not without problems, being very
11See Appendix A for sampling details. The sample was typically drawn from a census of cultivators in the villages,
themselves drawn from a stratified sample based on contracting status.
12This pertains to questions 19 and 22 for 1(A), 21 and 24 for 1(B), 11 and 13 for 1(C), 10 and 12 for 1(D) schedules
for the different types of farmers, for the contract commodity and for the next best alternative selected by the farmer.
13This is to suggest that a farmer’s perception of contracting with firm A need not be identical to the farmer’s
perception of contracting with firm B even if the salient aspects of contracting, price and quality are exactly alike,
that there might be non-contractual elements that drive farmers to prefer contracting with one firm rather than the
other.
14In practice, it was not easy to implement this procedure literally and farmers frequently preferred to assign
frequencies verbally. Some even expressed their desire to assign fractions of points which the number of stones would
not allow them to do. The relevant questions that elicit these for price, yield and net returns are 19 and 22 for 1(A),
21 and 24 for 1(B), 11 and 13 for 1(C), 10 and 12 for 1(D).
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sensitive to the way questions are posed and also the context of heuristic biases, among other things
(De Weerdt, 2005; Delavande et al., 2009). To illustrate, all three subjective distributions (price,
yield and net returns) were not possible for all cases. For gherkins, for instance, because contract
pricing is a schedule of prices related to size of output, farmers had difficulties in articulating a
single (average, effective) price. Similarly, the heuristic of availability, or rather the lack of it, was
at work for farmers who had never contracted. Having never experienced contracting themselves,
and having little vicarious knowledge of this option, the idea of contracting seemed too remote to
be able to articulate their expectations regarding returns, yield and price. This data ‘gap’ however
itself carries information in the sense that lack of information of options (and the related absence
of subjective assessments) might influence farmer choices.
Another potentially important problem is the self-confirmation bias, where farmers articulate
expectations that affirm the choices they have made because affirmation is desired for its own sake.
In this study, since the farmer makes repeated decisions on whether to contract or not, the issue of
self-confirmation bias is reduced to the extent that farmers get repeated opportunities to reassess
their choice afresh at each decision point. Indeed, if we admit that farmers learn in a dynamic
setting, the problem of self-confirmation bias seems less of a concern. Another way I try to deal
with this is to frame the question in terms of a longer time horizon, implicitly urging farmers to
‘span out’ before revealing their expectations.15 I did not ask ex post about a choice they made ex
ante, which would make it hard to distinguish between regret over a stochastic outcome and regret
for a poor decision. I also place this set of questions before discussing their recent experience or
the immediate plans so as not to anchor their responses in time.16
For analysis, I use mainly the subjective distributions of returns or the net profit per acre.
Given that both price and yield are stochastic, the focus on the measure for net returns that have
15The question, translated from Tamil, reads: “If you were to follow the same set of procedures, with the same
firm and field officer, under the same contractual terms and assuming the general conditions in your family, village
and weather are unchanged, out of 20 seasons growing the contract crop in a plot of your choice, which has the
same qualities, what is the number of occasions you would attain the minimum/ the most likely / the maximum
price/yield/net income per acre of the commodity?”
16I necessarily assume that these subjective distributions are somewhat stable, i.e., they are consistent with the
domain being in a frictional equilibrium. This is necessary to be able to relate the data on subjective distributions
to contracting status in the most recent season. If the subjective distribution is influenced disproportionately by the
most recent experience, then these expectations might be more closely related to contracting status for the season
that follows rather than the season just passed. To an extent this problem is addressed by the question’s time horizon.
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been directly elicited presumably accounts for any potential covariance between price and yield,
making it a more reliable indicator. Data on subjective returns to contracting versus the next
best alternative for each respondent enables me to compare, at the farmer level, the moments of
these distributions as well as the comparison of the entire distribution using stochastic dominance
techniques, again for each farmer. In general, it makes more sense to compare these distributions
for each farmer rather than across farmer categories. This is owing to the significant differences
in alternatives available to farmers both across regions and schemes so that the moments, say, the
mean net return for alternatives, averaged over farmers, requires careful interpretation.17
Mapping of Risks
The second component of elicitation is mapping a comprehensive list of attributes that can either
contribute to increasing or decreasing risk associated with a contracting or its alternative. This
roster of attributes was assembled in the course of the pilot survey as the collection of all possible
attributes listed or mentioned by farmers in a series of open-ended questions about the relative
merits and demerits they saw in contracting versus not contracting. These attributes are listed
in Table 7.1. Some of these risks could be accounted for in farmers’ articulation of subjective
distributions of price, yield or returns. Attempts to focus on only those risks that are unlikely
to be factored into the farmer’s calculation of subjective net returns were difficult. For example,
a farmer who felt the firm’s poor quality of inputs often ended up factoring this into his or her
response on subjective yield and net returns distributions while also mentioning it as a valid concern
in the open-ended listing of risks. In practice, therefore it was not possible to account for these
overlaps. So these are necessarily coarse measures.However, the farmer was asked to state his/her
17In general, the units and crop duration of the alternatives varies from the contract commodity. In the survey,
these have been harmonized over units and time frame for each scheme to make them comparable. For example,
for papaya, the return to contracting was expressed as income per month since it is from a crop which lasts for
three years, whereas the alternative crop would be a three month crop - the net return for which is converted to the
equivalent for a month. In general, the gestation period for crops was not considered. Effectively, the comparison is
only for a window when the contract crop or its alternative is generating a return. It must be noted that the yield
can vary over the life of a crop and these subjective returns are not adjusted for the age of tree crops. This is less of
a concern because these returns were elicited from farmers for conditions that were held similar across the 20 ‘times’.
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expectations under ‘regular’ conditions, so that catastrophic occurrences are likely not incorporated
in the net returns distributions.18
The superset of attributes formed the basis for the final survey of farmers in the form of a list
of risk-attenuating and risk-enhancing attributes that farmers associate with contracting and its
next-best alternative.19 The questions themselves were open ended, however, so that the relevant
attribute is checked off on the list based on the farmer’s unprompted listing of these. The roster
was meant merely to assist investigators clarify or code the responses. 20
Given the multiple nature of risks and their varying impact, the relative importance of several
sources of risk is not clear. This poses a significant challenge for measurement. Many researchers
have now begun to ask about the extent to which an individual perceives him or herself to be at
risk. One way to measure risk perception is to ask people an intensity measure with regard to a
specific risk (Kohler et al., 2007); another is to get a ranking of the relative importance of different
risks(Doss et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2001). Aggregating these measures into reliable indices can
however be tricky especially when one wishes to compare measures across individuals. As Smith
et al. (2001) illustrate, ranking the importance of an attribute as the second most important among
three concerns could potentially be very different from a case where the attribute is ranked second
among ten such attributes.
To avoid this problem, the survey uses psychometric measures of perceptions on cardinal scales.
Once a farmer identifies a particular attribute as either risk mitigating or risk enhancing, the farmer
18For example, some risks such as the firm not showing up to collect the produce or a complete loss of crop on
account of pest were not incorporated in the expectations of net returns. For instance, the minimum expected net
return was rarely close to 0 and never negative.Chapter 9 shows the range of these elicitation.
19The relevant portions of the questionnaires that elicit these responses are 20 and 23 for 1(A), 22 and 25 for 1(B),
12 and 14 for 1(C) and 11 and 13 for 1(D) respectively.
20Occasional prompting was required for reticent farmers, who took time to be persuaded that we were not sent by
the contracting firm. In most cases, however, no such prompting was required. Whenever the listing of these relevant
attributes was sparse, investigators prompted the farmer to ensure that these attributes were truly irrelevant and
not a result of a farmer’s reluctance to share such information. This was necessary especially for farmers interviewed
first in a village. Prompting, as a rule, implied offering a set of attributes from the roster as examples and only
in the case of soil fertility and health implications did prompting entail mentioning the risk specifically. In general,
farmers in the study area were candid about deeming the prompted risks as irrelevant, if that were indeed the case.
For example, in the gherkins area since many farmers voiced a perception that gherkins cultivation affected health,
when other farmers who did not mention this risk were prompted, often the response was ‘we do not think this is a
problem, though in the village many women have experienced difficulties after working on the gherkins fields’. That
said, it is difficult to gauge precisely the effect of prompting on the nature of responses and detailed information on
which risk was obtained after or before prompting for each farmer was not recorded as part of the survey.
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is asked the frequency of occurrence (that is, the probability of the risk) out of ten occasions and
the importance of the risk to their personal sense of well-being on a scale of 0 to 10 (these are akin
to weights attached to the risk). These weights were meant to proxy the monetary value of loss
that farmers associate with the risk in order to capture the distinction between low probability of
high loss versus high probability of low loss.21
This approach to collecting perceptions of risk allows me to construct risk scores for individual
farmers that factor in their perceptions of the benefits of risk reducing attributes and costs of
risk enhancing attributes of contracting and not contracting. The primary motive for this is
to be able to see how contracting does relative to not contracting from an individual farmer’s
perspective and to see if these scores relate in expected ways to contracting status. To do this, all
attributes are partitioned into four sets, each representing attributes that increase risks associated
with contracting, Rc, increase risk exposure when not contracting, Rnc, reduce risk exposure under
contracting,P c, or when not contracting, Pnc. An attribute can appear both as a risk reducing and
risk enhancing factor. For example, when availability of inputs appears as an attribute, contracting
can imply assured availability, so that it would be counted as an attribute in P c , and it could also
be the case that under not contracting, farmers face the risk of not having access to inputs, so that
it falls under Rnc. A list of these attributes is presented in Table 7.1 and detailed discussion of that
is reserved for Section 7.3.2 of this chapter. Here, I outline the method for constructing a simple
metric to represent the collection of attributes.
I compute three scores for each farmer, a risk frequency score (Rfi ), a risk criticality score
(Rgi ) and a combined risk score (R
fg
i ). The frequency score weighs the relevant attribute with the
frequency of occurrence as stated by the farmer. The criticality score weighs each relevant attribute
by a cardinal response of how important the attribute is to the farmers indicated as relevant to
farmer i. The combined score weighs each relevant attribute with both the frequency and criticality
scale. In this case, a high frequency, low loss risk is treated as equivalent to a low probability high
loss risk.
21The pilot survey tested the possibility of eliciting monetary values of losses associated with these risks, but owing
to sparse and often imprecise data, this was not retained for the final survey. The frequency and criticality of the
risk was elicited via questions 20 and 23 for 1(A), 22 and 25 for 1(B), 12 and 14 for 1(C) and 11 and 13 for 1(D).
134
Denoting I(r) as an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the attribute r is relevant to
the individual farmer i and 0 if not, the collection of all attributes r represent the universe of
such attributes, i.e., all the possible attributes listed by sample farmers as either contributing to
increasing risks or decreasing risks associated with contracting and its alternative. The score is
summed within each set of attributes to yield the following structure of scores.
Rgi = (
Risk enhancing︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
r∈Rc
I(r)gi −
Risk attenuating︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
r∈P c
I(r)gi )− (
∑
r∈Rnc
I(r)gi −
∑
r∈Pnc
I(r)gi) (7.1)
Rfi = (
∑
r∈Rc
I(r)fi −
∑
r∈P c
I(r)fi)− (
∑
r∈Rnc
I(r)fi −
∑
r∈Pnc
I(r)fi) (7.2)
Rfgi = (
∑
r∈Rc
I(r)figi −
∑
r∈P c
I(r)figi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net risk score from contracting
− (
∑
r∈Rnc
I(r)figi −
∑
r∈Pnc
I(r)figi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net risk score from not contracting
(7.3)
Rgi , R
f
i R
fg
i are interpreted as the net incremental risk the farmer associates with contracting.
The greater the score, the greater the risks farmers believe they are taking on with contracting,
relative to their next best alternative and after factoring in the benefits they associate with
contracting. This score does not reflect monetary values though some of the component attributes
affect incomes directly.
The score is an absolute measure but is best interpreted in its broader context. The survey
identified 22 attributes as belonging to Rc, 14 factors in P c 13 in Rnc and 10 in Pnc. A farmer
treating every attribute in every set as valid ends up with a risk score of 5. In other words, when
a farmer believes that each of the attributes in each set is relevant, that each of it is extremely
important to his or her sense of well-being (and hence carry the maximum score 10) and occurs
every time the farmer chooses to contract or not contract (with a frequency of 10 out of 10), that
farmer would have component scores of 22, 14, 13 and 10 yielding a combined risk score of 5. A
farmer who sees none of these attributes as relevant has 0 for each component score and hence a
combined net risk score of 0.22 The greatest incremental risk comes when a farmer associates all 22
22The risk scores are cast as differences and not as ratios in order to avoid instances of component scores being 0.
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risk enhancing attributes with contracting and believes that all 10 risk mitigating attributes from
not contracting as valid. Should the farmer choose contracting the net incremental risk would be 32.
This is the maximum risk farmers take on, given the set of risks defined by the sample. The least
incremental risk from contracting is associated with a farmer who treats all positive attributes with
contracting as relevant and the alternative option is associated only with risk increasing attributes
and all the risk increasing attributes. In this case, the net incremental risk a farmer takes on would
be -27. This defines the range of possible frequency and risk mitigating scores. The combined net
risk score is higher whenever a farmer associates a particular option with either a larger number of
risks, a greater criticality of risks or a greater frequency of risks, or combinations of these, ceteris
paribus.
These risk scores are coarse measures but offer useful tools to make select comparisons across
farmer groups distinguished by contracting status. It also offers a tool to map the heterogeneity
in the distribution of attributes that operate on risks and uncertainties across different contracting
schemes.
7.3 The Stochasticity of Contract Prices and Net Returns from
Contracting
With the combination of tools described above, it is now possible to map farmer perceptions of
relative risks and returns associated with contracting. For the purpose of this analysis the sample
farmers are treated as either contract farmers (implying they could either contract with not just
the sample or subject firm but for any other firm) or as non-contract farmers (denoting those who
do not currently contract at all).
Subjective distributions of net returns from contracting across farmers and commodity sectors
suggest that contracting is indeed a gamble. This is an outcome of the perceived stochasticity of
both price and yield by farmers.
The elicitations of subjective distributions of contract price that farmers expect confirm that
the notion of fixity of contract prices is only approximately correct. Figure 7.1 plots the coefficient
of variation of subjective distributions of contract prices for all the farmers in the survey illustrating
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Table 7.1: Risk Enhancing and Risk Attenuating Attributes
Contracting Not Contracting
14 22 10 13
Risk attenuating factors
associated with contract-
ing
Risk exacerbating factors
associated with contract-
ing
Risk attenuating factors
associated with next best
alternative
Risk exacerbating factors
associated with next best
alternative
Pc Rc Pnc Rnc
Yield fluctuations Yield fluctuations Yield fluctuations Yield fluctuations
Cash advance for input
purchase
Yield fluctuations on ac-
count of weather
Transactions time and cost Yield fluctuations on ac-
count of weather
Credit availability Yield fluctuation on ac-
count of pest and disease
Food self-sufficiency Yield fluctuation on ac-
count of pest and disease
Availability of inputs
(Seed, fertilizers,
pesticides)
Initial investment Credit availability Rejection or downgrading
quality of produce
Quality of inputs Rejection or downgrading
quality of produce
Can sell anytime, flexibil-
ity
Price fluctuations
Availability of technical
advice
Firm might not return to
contract in the future
Rejection or downgrading
quality of produce
Availability of inputs
(Seed, fertilizers,
pesticides)
Crop duration Group default Availability of buyer /
known trader
Quality of inputs
Transactions time and cost Firm may not show up Self respect Availability of technical
advice
Farmgate collection Field officials are not trust-
worthy
Lumspum payments Quality of technical advice
Availability of
buyer/Assured buyer
Impact on health Timely payments Transactions time and cost
Price premia Impact on soil quality Cash advance for input
purchase
Lumspum payments Fear of losing land Credit availability
Timely payments Availability of labor Payment delays
Sure income Labor intensity
Firm bears losses Input costs
Administer vaccines Labor costs
Transactions time and cost
Quality of technical advice
Delayed payments
1 These are assembled from the relevant tables in the questionnaires in Appendix C. They are questions 20 and 23 for 1(A),
22 and 25 for 1(B), 12 and 14 for 1(C) and 11 and 13 for 1(D).
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the extent of variation in the contract price that farmers expect.23 It is evident from the kernel
density function that far from being a degenerate distribution which would imply zero variation in
price, farmers expect to get different contract prices, on account of factors that might be related
to quality or due to complex structures of pricing linked to commodity attributes or market price
anchors to contract pricing or farmer productivity. The figure suggests too that non-contract
farmers are more likely to expect higher variation in contract prices than contract farmers.24 This
shows significant, albeit incomplete price risk reduction from contracting.
Figure 7.1: The Stochasticity of Subjective Contract Prices of Contract and Non-contract farmers
Note: The Kolomogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions suggests that with a D-statistic of 0.25, and an associated
p-value of 0.00 the null that the two distributions are equal can be rejected at 1% level of significance.
Contract farmers refer to those who contract with any firm, i.e., either the subject or sample firm or any other firm. Non-
contract farmers refer to those who do not contract with any firm, these are either farmers who grow for the spot market or are
attrition farmers or those who have never contracted.
23The coefficient of variation is presented since this enables pooling of data for all commodities. It must be noted
here that the data on subjective distribution of contract price is computed only for non-missing observations. Close
to eight percent of the respondents across both phases were unable to give complete and consistent distributions for
the contract price.
24It is worth recalling that non-contract farmers here include farmers who have never contracted, those who have
ceased contracting and those growing for the open market. Contract farmers include farmers contracting for either
the subject firm or for any other firm.
138
While individual farmers’ subjective expectations of contract price suggest that they may be
stochastic, it is instructive that the subjective modal contract price that farmers expect varies
widely, despite the fact that these farmers work with the contracting firm on the same contractual
terms. They have the same contract but different expectations of price. These figures show the
distribution for contract farmers for subject firm alone.
Figures 7.2 for gherkins contract farmers in the two phases shows that the distribution of
expected contract price varies widely over the range of contract prices established by the firm for
different size categories, indicated by the vertical red dashed lines. This is true of the sample in both
phases. In the case of cotton (Figure 7.3), the contractual price is a mark-up on a reference price,
which is typically a three-day average of the price prevailing in the wholesale market preceding the
stated time of delivery. Farmers expectation of the modal expected contract price varies widely,
reflecting perhaps their perception of the variability in market prices that anchor the contract
price.25 The case of papaya and marigold present a contrast since for these two, the objective
contract price, as specified in the contract, and the subjective modal contract prices expected by
farmers vary only marginally and is shared across farmers (i.e., does not vary across farmers).
In general, it makes sense to think of contract prices as representing an objective price and a
subjective price, where the objective price is agreed upon as part of the contract and is conditioned
on certain parameters for delivery. The subjective price, meanwhile, is the contract price that
farmers expect to get. These are however distinct from what might be called the actual realized
contract prices.26
Figure 7.3 shows the distribution of prices contract broiler growers actually received at the most
recent contractual delivery, so that this is a distribution of contractual prices received across broiler
growers. 27 The distribution of realized contract prices on delivery lies to the left of the distribution
of subjective modal contract prices. This implies that farmers are either optimistic so that their
expectations of the contract price run higher or that this was a disappointing season.
Thus, this comparison reveals that the objective contract price need not necessarily coincide with
25These objective prices were obtained from the firms according to the contract specific.
26The realized prices were obtained through question 33 in Schedule 1(A).
27The vertical line in the figure represents a benchmark price per kilogram of live weight broiler for a feed conversion
ratio (FCR) that the firm considers optimal.
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the subjective prices that farmers expect to receive in reality, and that this is an important source of
variation in expected net returns from contracting that differs across farmers and potentially over
time and hence affects a farmer’s propensity to contract. Moreover, both objective and subject
expected prices may differ from actual realized prices.
The actual price a farmer earns for a given contractual delivery, ore realized price, can therefore
be regarded as a draw from a distribution, be it from a farmer specific distribution of prices or
from a distribution of prices across farmers. These examples suggest that price under contracting
need not necessarily be a degenerate distribution, much less the farmers’ subjective expectations
of these prices, although the more transparent and rigorous the measures of quality employed, the
more certain the price offered for produce.
The stochasticity in farmers’ perception of prices combined with yield fluctuations renders the
expected net returns from contracting stochastic as well.28
In essence, if contracting is associated with some sort of certainty, it is not in an absolute sense,
and not in the realm of net returns. The question is then, if contracting is a gamble, how safe a
gamble is it? One way to explore this aspect is to compare, for an individual farmer, the moments of
the subjective distributions of net profit per unit area across possible choices. These include mean,
coefficient of variation, skewness, kurtosis measures for the subjective distribution from contracting
as well as that for the next best alternative. These are expressed in relative terms to facilitate
comparison across the self-declared choices. Table 7.2 gives details of these measures as a prelude
to subsequent tables.
Table 7.3 shows measures reflecting the average relative moments of the subjective distributions
of contracting versus the next best alternative for the different contracting schemes and farmer
types, distinguished by contracting status.29 The raw measures of the ratio of relative subjective
returns between contracting and the next best alternative suggest that contracting in gherkins,
cotton and papaya is associated with higher mean returns, irrespective of farmer type, i.e., whether
28The issue of yield fluctuation is not addressed here since not contracting is often associated with not growing the
contract commodity making yield comparisons difficult.
29For this part of the analysis, the farmer types are disaggregated so that there are Subject Contract Farmers (who
contract with the subject firm), Other Contract Farmers (who contract with any other firm, Attrition Farmers and
Never Contract Farmers.
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Figure 7.2: Subjective Modal and Objective Contract Prices of Subject Contract farmers
Note:The contract farmers include farmers who contract with the sample firm. Vertical dashed lines represents the objective
price obtained from the contracting firms.
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Figure 7.3: Subjective Modal and Objective Contract Prices compared with Actual Realized Prices
for Subject Contract farmers
Note: The contract farmers include farmers who contract with the sample firm.Vertical dashed lines represents the objective
price obtained from the contracting firms.
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they are currently contracting, have exited the arrangement or have never contracted. Tellingly,
however, farmers tend to associate contracting not only with a higher mean, but also with higher
coefficient of variation, barring cotton farmers who do not contract. This is evident from the ratio of
the coefficient of variation in subjective returns between contracting and the next best alternative.
In the case of marigold and broiler, the reverse is true, so that the subjective mean returns from
contracting are lower relative to not contracting, except for marigold farmers who do not contract
with the sample firm. Marigold farmers however associate contracting with a higher coefficient
of variation. Only with broiler are clear indications of contract farming serving as an insurance
against risky returns, with contracting associated with a low mean and also a low coefficient of
variation relative to the alternative.
Furthermore, higher variability in returns to contracting relative to its alternative, which Table
7.3 suggests is comparable across farmers, might not in itself be a significant factor. Critical is
the skewness of the distribution. Contracting protects the farmer from downside price risk by
fixing a price. However, this also prevent farmers from exploiting high prices in the next best
alternative. Table 7.3 shows the difference in skewness between the expressed returns distribution
of contracting and not contracting. Whenever this figure is positive, not contracting allows a greater
possibility of higher returns the contracting. In the Farmer Survey, many farmers who choose not
to contract suggest that the advantages with the open market is that when prices sometimes shoot
up in the open market and by opting to go for a contract crop one loses the opportunity to take
advantage of these price spikes, even if they were infrequent occurrences. Marigold farmers, for
instance, associate the spot market net profit distributions with a negative skewness, which renders
the difference in skewness between contracting and not contracting positive (Table 7.3) indicating
relatively larger opportunities of a higher return in the spot market than when contracting. The
t-test of difference in means across farmer groups is however not significant for any comparison
across farmer groups for marigold. For gherkins (Phase 2) and papaya, the difference in skewness
for each group of non-contracting farmers is positive and the figure is statistically significantly less
than for contract farmers, in most cases.
Similarly, the difference in kurtosis of subjective distributions of contracting and the next best
143
alternative imply that a positive figure indicates fatter tails associated with contracting relative
as compared with not contracting. In the case of broiler and papaya, the contract farmers, with
both the sample firm and other firms, associate contracting with a relatively thinner tail, whereas
for those not contracting the opposite is true. This pattern is evident in the gherkins sample from
Phase 2.
Inter-group comparisons of the means of these relative moments corroborate this pattern. For
gherkins and cotton, there is a statistically significant difference between contract and a subset of
non-contract farmers for both mean and coefficient of variation, emphasizing that contract farmers
see contracting as a high variance option, but also one that has a higher mean return relative to
not contracting. At the other end, for broiler and papaya, the difference between contract and
non-contract farmers for the relative mean and coefficient of variation is statistically significant.
This signifies that contract farmers for papaya and broilers might be willing to settle for a lower
mean return if it is also associated with a lower variance.
Table 7.4 shows, groupwise, the percentage of farmers for whom the subjective returns
distribution from contracting stochastically dominates that from the next best alternative. Oddly
enough, the tests for a significant difference in proportion indicates that contracting stochastically
dominates not contracting for a significantly greater proportion of non-contract farmers than for
contract farmers. Where this difference is with respect to the Never Contract Farmers group,
as it is for gherkins and papaya, it is plausible that a large proportion of those who have never
experienced contracting tend to associate it with a returns distribution that is unambiguously better
than not contracting, in part due possibly to inaccurate perceptions in the absence of experience
to contract. The weak correspondence of contracting status and stochastic dominance also points
to other possible sources of exclusion, either by virtue of having been rationed out by the firm or
on account of other concerns that do not readily reflect in returns distributions. The table shows
for instance that for those farmers who do not contract but believe that returns from contracting
stochastically dominates not contracting, an overwhelming majority stated in the survey that they
144
Table 7.2: Description of Indicators of Relative Moments for an Individual Farmer
Variable Computation
Ratio of mean subjective net returns from contracting and next best
alternative
[
µc
µnc
]
i
for each farmer i
Ratio of coefficient of variation of subjective net returns
[
σc
X¯c
/ σnc
X¯nc
]
i
for each farmer i
Difference in skewness in subjective net returns between contracting
and next best alternative
[
Skc − Sknc
]
i
for each farmer i
Difference in kurtosis in subjective net returns between contracting
and next best alternative
[
Kc −Knc
]
i
for each farmer i
1 These are computed using the elicited returns distributions for each farmer. These are then averaged across farmer types
or groups to make intergroup comparisons.
were unlikely to want to contract at any time in the next three years, 72%, 90% and 93% for
gherkins (Phase 1), marigold and papaya, respectively.30
The data on farmers’ subjective returns points to two broad issues. First, farmers are attentive
to mean returns from contracting but are likely take into consideration the entire distribution
of returns. Second, other attributes that enhance or mitigate risks can exert a reinforcing or
countervailing influence on the decision to contract.
If non-contract farmers too associate contracting with higher relative mean returns, and indeed,
where subjective returns from contracting first order stochastic dominates not contracting, the
question arises as to why many farmers opt not to participate. While one explanation is that they
were rationed out by the contracting firm, this is not always the case. Indeed, when those had
never contracted were asked whether the firm excluded them or they opted out, the percentage of
farmers who had never wanted to contract despite an opportunity to do so was 48% for gherkins,
50% for marigold, 55% and 30% for broiler and papaya respectively.31 Evidence from the survey
bears out the premise that there might exist other overriding concerns for non participation.
To see this, it is useful to superpose risk scores with subjective returns distributions. Figure
7.4 compares the distributions of relative mean returns of contract farmers (irrespective of which
30This figure is available for gherkins, for instance, from question 33 and 21 in questionnaires 1(C) and 1(D).
31This information is tabulated from question 6 for 1(D).
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Table 7.4: Stochastic Dominanace of Net returns for Contracting and the Next Best Alternative
for Different Farmer Types
Commodity and Farmer
type
Proportion of
farmers for
whom
contracting
first-order
stochastic
dominates the
next best
alternative
Proportion of
these who do
not want to
contract
Z-statistic for
equality of
proportion for
contract
farmers with
each farmer
type
Proportion of
farmers for
whom
contracting
second-order
stochastic
dominates the
next best
alternative
Z-statistic for
equality of
proportion for
contract
farmers with
each farmer
type
Number of
observations
Gherkins:Phase 1
Subject Contract Farmers 35 45 40
Other Contract Farmers 26 29% 0.97 33 1.23 58
Attrition Farmers 40 31% -0.46 45 0 40
Never Contract Farmers 60 72% -2.45 ∗∗∗ 63 -1.8 ∗∗ 60
Cotton
Subject Contract Farmers 28 30 60
Other Contract Farmers 50 100 % -1.01 50 -1 6
Attrition Farmers 22 57% 0.67 25 0.51 32
Never Contract Farmers 31 81% -0.28 35 -0.52 52
Gherkins:Phase 2
Subject Contract Farmers 56 59 54
Other Contract Farmers 65 7% -0.79 70 -0.85 23
Attrition Farmers 56 50% 0 56 0.28 18
Never Contract Farmers 62 50% -0.5 71 -0.98 21
Marigold
Subject Contract Farmers 14 19 59
Other Contract Farmers 42 90% -2.82∗∗∗ 42 -2.19 ∗∗∗ 24
Attrition Farmers 17 100% -0.33 17 0.19 18
Never Contract Farmers 5 0% 1.04 10 0.9 20
Papaya
Subject Contract Farmers 32 36 72
Never Contract Farmers 52 93% - 1.82∗∗ 56 -1.75∗∗ 27
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 Farmer Survey, Phase 1 and 2,2007-10.
2 The computations include only observations for which the responses of farmers regarding subjective distributions is complete.
3 Broiler farmers are excluded since the proportion of farmers for whom contracting first order stochastically dominates not
contracting is zero for all farmer groups.
147
firm they contract with) and non-contract farmers, wherein the distribution of the latter is only
marginally more heavily concentrated below one than that of the non-contract farmers. Whereas,
the risk scores computed for attributes indicates that non-contract farmers believe they are taking
on significantly greater incremental risks with contracting that contract farmers believe is the case.
Kolomogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions suggests that contract and non-contract
farmers do not differ overall in their perceptions of relative returns from contracting versus its next
best alternative, but do differ significantly in the perceptions of the relative risks they associate
with contracting (Figure 7.5).
Figure 7.4: Contracting and its Alternative: Comparison of Relative Returns
Note: The Kolomogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions suggests that with a D-statistic of 0.254, and
an associated p-value of 0.20 the null that the two distributions are equal cannot be rejected at even 10% level of
significance.
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Figure 7.5: Net Incremental Risk from Contracting: Combines Risk Scores for Contract and Non-
contract Farmers, 2008-10
Note: The Kolomogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions suggests that with a D-statistic of 0.17, and an
associated p-value of 0.00 the null that the two distributions are equal can be rejected at 1% level of significance.
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7.3.1 Mapping Sources of Risk across Attributes
Anecdotal evidence suggests that regardless of farmer perception of the variation in returns to
contracting or in the skewness of these distributions, contracting decisions are often driven by the
perception of possibilities of catastrophic risk.
In general, there is much variation across commodities. Table 7.5 shows the average scores by
commodity and farmer type for the three measures - the Combined Risk Score, Criticality Risk
Score and the Frequency Risk Score. These three measures appear equivalent. Hence, the Combined
Risk Score is used as the main indicator of the net incremental risk associated with contracting.
Figure 7.6 shows the distribution of the Combined Risk Scores according to commodity and farmer
type. It is clear that of the commodities studied, marigold contracting is generally associated very
low incremental net risk exposure. Papaya and broiler contracting are associated with relatively
moderate net additional risk exposure, with gherkins and cotton occupying the higher end of the
combined risk score scale.
This is consistent with the qualitative information collected from the field survey. Even as
gherkin is regarded as lucrative and despite the decade long embrace of gherkin, it continues to be
an exotic crop grown for the “factories”. No local market exists for gherkin and it does not figure
in local diets. Many farmers had visited the factories as part of the company’s efforts to build
confidence of farmers in this new crop. To most farmers the rapid growth of the gherkins crop was
a wonder, attributed to the high level of inputs. In fact, across the survey region, the Tamil name
for the crop was visha vellri, or poison cucumber, a reference to the relatively high level of chemical
inputs it required.
It is also clear that gherkin is a highly demanding crop in terms of labor inputs, especially
during harvesting. Timely harvesting of produce is critical. This has something to do with the
structure of the contract, where small gherkins command a premium over larger ones. Since the
gherkins grow rapidly in size, from day to day, in order to get the maximum returns, the farmers
need to harvest gherkins “on the day that matters”.32 Any delay could cause a profound dent in
the revenues a farmer can get. Farmers opined, for instance, that “even if there is a death in the
32Farmer Survey, Phase 1, 2008, Reddiarchatram block, Dindigul district.
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house at harvest time, we have to put the body aside until we finish with the gherkins”.33 Many
who chose not to contract cite small families and lack of family labor or lack of availability of labor
as reasons for not doing so.
Also, women tend not to work on gherkins plots. There is a popular perception among the
farming families that the pesticide use in gherkins fields is detrimental to women’s reproductive
health and causes workers (especially women) to faint. While this is largely unsubstantiated in the
sense that there is no independently available scientific evidence on the link between morbidity and
pesticide use in the specific context of gherkins cultivation in the study area, the higher incidence
of women’s health issues in the villages has been enough to keep the women away from working on
gherkins fields. This sometimes has an impact on the willingness to contract as well.
Another impression that was shared across villages in one part of the study area is that gherkins
cultivation led to deterioration is soil quality. Some farmers claimed that paddy, when it followed
gherkins on the same plot, yielded half of what it would otherwise. Some others claimed they
changed the top soil layer, when they switched from gherkins to another crop, in order to restore
soil quality. As a consequence of soil quality concerns, some farmers participate in episodes, growing
gherkin every other year, but not more frequently. Indeed, field officers recommend switching plots
and rotating crops to maintain soil fertility.
The riskiness associated with cotton contract farming is quite different in complexion. Cotton
is a traditional cash crop in the region, and the firm contracting is well known. Farmers associated
cotton contracting with significant benefits. For example, a positive externality from contracting
for both cotton (and gherkins, in fact) is the advice farmers got for plant protection for other
crops. This has obvious value, against the background of a collapse in state agricultural extension
programs. According to most farmers, the field officers advised them against the indiscriminate use
of pesticides and that fertilizer application needs to take into account the type of soil. This seemed
to be a revelation for the farmers. But this advice also seemed very dependent on who the field
officer was. Despite this, the pricing in the cotton contracting scheme is a mark-up on the market
price, which exposed farmers to the market price fluctuations the same way as the alternatives for
33Farmer Survey, Phase 1, 2008, Natham block, Dindigul district.
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the farmer. The quality requirements of the firm for staple length and cotton free from external
impurities was considered a problem. Most of all, however, many farmers believed that the firm
did not pay on time and discounted prices somewhat arbitrarily. Collectively these rendered cotton
contracting a risky proposition relative to the alternative. Most cotton contract farmers suggested
that they would opt to grow a competing crop like tomato or chilies, or cotton for the open market.
Interestingly, the year of the survey was the last season the cotton firm contracted. It seems that
the high risk scores reflected farmer discontent, an important ingredient of the failure of cotton
contracting in the region.
In the case of papaya, Table 7.5 suggests that farmers who do not contract associate papaya
contract farming with lower risks than do contract farmers. This is likely owing to the particular
turn of events during the time of the survey. Papaya contracting had been growing popular across
swathes of the study area. Despite requiring a long gestation period, since the trees bear fruit only
in the eighth month or so, farmers were content with the arrangement. However, in June 2009, the
worldwide epidemic of papaya mealybug reached southern India and the contract papaya fields and
farmers in the area lost entire plantations to the pest. Consequently during the survey, virtually
all contract farmers expressed risks of pest and consequent yield loss as the most important risk
associated with contracting.
Marigold is viewed as bringing on less incremental risk for several reasons. This crop needs
low initial investment, it is not too labor demanding and in a region that is fairly remote up in
the hills, firms collect produce at the farmgate, while delivering all the inputs to the farmer. The
firm has been around for over two decades. In addition, unlike gherkins or papaya, there is a
vibrant alternate domestic market. In the case of marigold, therefore, the fixed price offered by the
firm and the relative indifference to quality makes it a reliable insurance mechanism for the farmer.
Indeed, as Chapter 10 elaborates, the spot market offers a lucrative sideselling option during festive
occasions when the marigold price spikes. For the farmer, the alternative of growing for the spot
market and growing on contract are not mutually exclusive owing to weak contract enforcement.
For broiler, there are no substantial perceived risks and those that exist have to do with the
placement of birds, administration of vaccines, quality of feed and timely lifting of birds. In general,
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Figure 7.6: Net Incremental Risk from Contracting by Commodity and Contracting Status, 2008-09
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Table 7.5: To Contract or Not: Mapping Farmer Perceptions of Alternatives
Commodity and Farmer Type Risk Scores Number of
Farmers
Combined Risk
Score
Criticality Risk
Score
Frequency Risk
Score
Range: -270 to +320
All commodities
Subject Contract Farmers -1.57 -1.85 -1.92 347
Other Contract Farmers -1.24 -1.30 -1.48 122
Attrition Farmers -0.65 -0.91 -0.84 118
Never Contract Farmers -0.61 -0.81 -0.83 241
Gherkins
Subject Contract Farmers -2.93 -0.42 -15.40 95
Other Contract Farmers -24.30 -3.64 -19.41 82
Attrition Farmers 58.91 35.19 61.29 58
Never Contract Farmers 65.85 92.15 55.51 81
Cotton
Subject Contract Farmers 0.28 0.55 0.40 60
Other Contract Farmers 0.53 1.20 0.68 6
Attrition Farmers 0.32 0.36 0.36 32
Never Contract Farmers 0.55 0.94 0.56 52
Marigold
Subject Contract Farmers -6.12 -8.71 -7.28 59
Other Contract Farmers -3.27 -4.88 -3.84 24
Attrition Farmers -3.82 -5.82 -4.61 18
Never Contract Farmers -4.61 -7.12 -5.50 21
Broiler
Subject Contract Farmers -1.94 -1.07 -2.41 61
Other Contract Farmers -3.00 -2.73 -3.87 10
Attrition Farmers -0.95 0.20 -1.17 10
Never Contract Farmers -0.29 0.30 -0.30 60
Papaya
Subject Contract Farmers -0.96 -0.51 -1.21 72
Never Contract Farmers -1.07 -1.28 -1.27 27
1 Farmer Survey, Phase 1 and 2,2007-10.
2 The scores are designed to lie between -270 and +320. The former is for farmers who associate contracting with only positive
attributes and not contracting with only negative attributes and list all attributes as relevant, and assign the maximum score
of 10 to each of these. The latter is for farmers who associate contracting with only negative attributes and not contracting
with only positive attributes, treat all of these attributes as relevant and assign 10 for frequency or criticality or both.
3 The combined risk score has been divided by 10 so that all the scores have the same range.
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the broiler contracting firms exert substantial control over wholesale market prices of live birds by
regulating the volume traded. Each growing cycle spans six weeks and firms calibrate the volume
of chicks placed with contract farmers based on projections of market prices six weeks ahead. This
implies that whenever the firm wants to curtail supply in the upcoming months, it cuts back on
placements of chicks with contract farmers. Alternatively, farmers who are promised five or six
poultry batches (or cycles) annually are offered fewer batches.34 By the same token, firms can also
time the picking up of the birds, so as to control supply in the wholesale market. For the broiler
grower, this affects the price they get via the weight of the bird at the time of pickup, so that they
might end up with a sub-optimal feed conversion ratio.
In general, several risks appear important that have important implications for why contract
farming schemes are so fragile in India. Noteworthy is the farmer perception of the risk of losing
land. Poor land titling often implies that farmers hesitate to sign contracts for fear that it might
involve confiscation of their land in case of defaults. Close to 15 % of the sample farmers stated that
they associated contracting with a firm with the possibility of losing their land. The qualitative
information from the survey suggests that some of these farmers stated a preference for oral
contracts on account of this.35 Attributes that were most often cited as risk attenuating in the
context of contracting were availability of inputs, technical advice and the benefits of not having to
physically travel to a market to sell produce. An assured buyer who pays lumspum is also viewed
as a distinct advantage, with almost 30% valuing this as a relevant benefit with contracting. Labor
demands also appear to occupy a big place, as the case of gherkin illustrates.
Throughout the survey villages, it was common to find that farmers who contracted were less
sure about the company they were contracting for than the field officer who interacted with them.
This is not surprising, since to most of the farmers the field officer was the face of the company
and took responsibility for every interaction throughout the cropping cycle. This also meant that
where farmers were aware of the identity of the contracting firm, the field officer’s competence was
34Some farmers are rationed out on the extensive margin by not being offered fewer batches per year, so that their
bird sheds are left empty. Many farmers are offered fewer birds per cycle, or are rationed out on the intensive margin.
35Chapter 11 discusses the nature of contract and enforcement in greater detail. This is mentioned here to highlight
some important aspects that affect a farmer’s willingness to contract.
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projected on to that of the company. The latter did not seem to have an existence independent of
its personnel. The trustworthiness of the field officer also finds place in the risk map.
It is evident from the discussion that the motivation to contract is driven by considerations that
interact in complex ways. Importantly, it emphasizes that it is not adequate to think of contract
participation as being driven exclusively by firm preferences and to accord a substantive role to
farmer willingness to participate in these arrangements.
7.4 Concluding Remarks
This chapter set out to examine the idea of contract farming as an insurance mechanism for
farmers, hypothesizing that such arrangements are rather analogous to new technologies with
ambivalent welfare implications. Using elicitation techniques to map farmer perceptions of returns
from contract and its next best alternative this chapter suggests that contract farming is indeed a
gamble. Data from the survey suggests that while contract farming is associated with a high mean
return, it is also associated with a high variance of returns.
Farmers who do perceive contract farming returns as being higher than their alternatives, on an
average, nevertheless might not participate if they perceive large and catastrophic risks associated
with it. Further, whenever the alternative market offers options for an occasional windfall, this
might override considerations of mean returns when opting out of contracts.
Implicitly, the empirical evidence presented here argues for a more careful consideration of
farmer perceptions of the risks and benefits associated with contract farming when studying
participation in contract farming arrangements. In particular, the psychometric mapping of risks
points to the presence of a number of attributes that are not easily monetized and are hence difficult
to account for through perceptions of profitability expressed in monetary terms.
These considerations of perceived risks and benefits collectively define a farmer’s individual
rationality constraint when a firm presents the farmer with an option to contract. The next chapter
uses the metrics presented in this chapter to investigate the selection of farmers into contract farming
schemes from the perspective of the firm.
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Table 7.6: A Mapping of Attributes Influencing Risk Exposure under Contract and its Alternative
Contracting Not contracting
Risk enhancing Risk reducing Risk enhancing Risk reducing
Count C F Count C F Count C F Count C F
Production related attributes
Yield fluctuations 317 7.7 4.9 31 8.0 6.9 70 9.3 7.2
Yield fluctuations on account
of weather
18 8.8 6.0
Yield fluctuation on account of
pest and disease
103 9.2 6.5 32 8.8 6.9
Initial investment 3 8.3 10.0
Cash advance for input pur-
chase
50 7.6 5.0 57 6.6 9.0
Credit availability 77 7.3 5.1 52 6.4 4.9 223 7.1 2.8
Availability of inputs (Seed,
fertilizers, pesticides)
50 6.9 4.9 320 8.0 7.9 87 6.8 4.8
Quality of inputs 174 8.0 4.5 131 7.7 5.1
Availability of labor 62 8.1 7.0 215 8.7 6.7
Labor intensity 23 8.4 8.5 29 7.7 8.9
Input costs 3 10.0 10.0
Labor costs 88 7.2 5.3
Availability of technical advice 190 6.7 6.7 246 8.1 4.3 134 9.0 8.9
Qaulity of technical advice 302 8.9 6.1
Crop duration 4 7.5 10.0
Food self-sufficiency 30 8.9 9.8
Marketing Attributes
Transactions time and cost 14 8.3 8.0 1 5.0 10.0
Farmgate collection 150 8.5 7.4
Availability of buyer 226 8.9 2 5.5 1.5
Price fluctuations 150 8.5 7.1 340 8.8 9.2 337 9.4 5.4
Price premia
Rejection or downgrading
quality of produce
162 7.7 5.0 117 8.1 5.3 29 6.9 7.9
Lumspum payments 245 8.7 9.9
Timely payments 72 7.8 5.1 230 8.8 8.4 60 6.4 4.7
Firm might not return to con-
tract in the future
7 5.4 4.4
Group default 12 8.1 3.8 141 7.6 7.2
Firm may not show up 86 8.6 4.5 8.4
Field officials are not trustwor-
thy
19 7.1 5.2
Impacts
Impact on health 117 8.8 8.5
Impact on soil quality 54 8.6 7.1
Fear of losing land 112 7.1 5.2
Self respect 7 6.4 10.0
Firm bears losses 10 10.0 7.0
Administer vaccines 1 5.0 4.0
Sure income 42 7.9 4.8 6 7.5 7.5
Assured buyer 90 7.2 4.8 201 9.4 7.5
1 C: Average of responses on a scale of 0 to 10 indicated criticality of the risk. This serves as criticality weights for each
farmer in the computation of risk scores. F:Average of responses on a scale of 0 to 10 indicated frequency of the risk. This
serves as frequency weights for each farmer in the computation of risk scores.
2 Farmer Survey, Phase 1 and 2,2007-10.
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Chapter 8
Choosing Farmers: Selection and Participation
8.1 Introduction
The previous chapter focused on farmer perceptions of the risks and returns associated with
contracting for a particular commodity relative to specific alternatives available to farmers. It made
the case for incorporating farmer perceptions in the analysis of farmer participation in contract
farming schemes. This chapter examines the perspective of a contracting firm, whose problem is to
select a portfolio of willing and reliable suppliers, in a way that minimizes the costs of transactions
and reduces uncertainties in contract deliveries. In essence, the firm needs to select individual
farmers with whom to contract, who not only have heterogeneous observable and unobservable
attributes and perceptions as agents but are also spread over a large geographic domain.
The empirical evidence on contract farming, although rich, tends to trip over the question
of which farmers participate in contract farming systems and which ones are left out. Farmer
participation is important for obvious reasons. If contract farming is advocated as a way for
resource poor farmers in developing countries to achieve higher incomes, for instance, it needs to
be inclusive in the first place. Whether it is or not is a matter of debate.
Much of the current literature on farmer participation in dynamic supply chains, both in agro-
processing as well as the supermarket-driven retail sector, focuses on whether smallholders are
prone to exclusion. They also attempt to articulate shared features of agrarian systems that might
promote participation of small farmers or at least not put them at a particular disadvantage.1 This
aspect has come to be called ‘social performance’ (Warning and Key, 2002), indicating a certain
notion of ‘equity’ in selection.
A number of studies show that small farmers do indeed participate in modern supply chains and
contract farming schemes. Some suggest they they participate overwhelmingly. There are examples
1See Reardon et al. (2009), Reardon and Timmer (2005) and Minot (2008) for recent reviews of this issue.
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of firms contracting exclusively with smallholders; in others, small farmers account for a majority of
participants in contract farming arrangements (Glover and Kusterer, 1990; Von Braun et al., 1989;
Wang et al., 2009). In several other schemes, however, larger farmers seem the likely participants
(Dileep et al., 2002; Kumar, 2007; Carter and Mesbah, 1993). This is often despite the high labor
intensity of contract crops, where small farmers might be able to draw on unpaid family labor. Some
studies find that large scale retailers tend to source from large-scale processors or suppliers in order
to reduce transaction costs, because those processors possess adequate logistics and transportation
capacity and are able to meet the private standards of the retailer. Small farmers who do not have
the capital to meet the requirements of retailers tend to be excluded, as illustrated in studies of
potato contracting in Ecuador (Zamora, 2004) and vegetable producers in Thailand (Boselie et al.,
2003). Neven et al. (2009) find that a threshold capital vector for entrance into the supermarket
channel hinders small, rainfed farms in rural Kenya. Most of the growers participating as direct
suppliers to that channel are a new group of medium-sized, fast-growing commercial farms managed
by well-educated farmers. These are just a few examples of recent empirical evidence. In general,
it is apparent that the findings are diverse and highly context-specific. The inconclusiveness of
empirical results has led observers to conclude that there exists ‘theoretical ambiguity’ in whether
smallholders can participate or not (Reardon et al., 2009).
Typically, the study of farmer participation has involved modeling the probability of a farmer’s
contracting or supplier status based on a set of explanatory variables, one of which is land size.
In other versions, selection is addressed as subsidiary to the question of whether contract farming
increases incomes or other welfare measures. In other words, selection assumes relevance mainly in
the context of measuring the true welfare impacts, where the systematic selection of some types of
farmers over others could contaminate the estimation of the relationship between participation and
well-being. Here, Heckman’s estimator corrects for selection bias, and the size of holding enters as
one variable in the selection equation. In older studies, the inclusiveness of the small farmer was
gauged by simple inspection of the proportion of contractees who are small farmers. While each
of these approaches provide some interesting insights, they often do not throw enough light on a
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firm’s process of selection and how a firm’s choice of attributes interacts with farmer perceptions
of contracting.
I contend that in the existing literature on farmer participation in contract farming schemes
(and modern supply chains, in general), there has been an overemphasis on using farm size as a
theoretical category for analysis in a way that does not throw light on critical, policy relevant aspects
of contract farming practice, especially those pertaining to exclusion. In a typical empirical paper
in this field today, the idea of selection and participation is rarely conceptualized with sufficient
care. It does not spell out, for instance, whether the structure of the underlying economic model is
one where farmers choose to contract or a firm choosing farmers or whether it is both, and how this
drives the empirical approach that is used. It often refers to a static, binary notion of participation
in contract farming schemes that denies farmers agency and treats a firm’s selection of farmers as
an event rather than as a complex process.
The study of farmer participation in terms of small versus big farmers implicitly presumes that
there is something essential about the smallness or largeness of farms that drive firms to prefer
one group over another. The approach of this study turns the focus of selection away from the
small farmer-big farmer dichotomy based on farm size, treating it instead as a valid, but only a
proximate correlate. This latter point is recognized by several scholars (Runsten and Key, 1996a,b;
Dev and Rao, 2005; Glover and Ghee Lim, 1992; Miyata et al., 2009; Warning and Key, 2002; Aoki
and Hayami, 2001, for example,). Sometimes the drivers of inclusion have little to do with size.
Sometimes, it is social collateral (e.g., reputation for reliability). In other cases, it may be related
to non-land assets, including farming equipment, irrigation, etc. Further, there might be several
explanatory variables related to landholding size that are omitted from empirical models (for e.g.,
soil fertility) that might be misattributed to landholding size. In this context, the idea of small
farmers being the parameter for judging inclusiveness may not be adequate or even appropriate, not
to mention that there is no universally valid definition of a ‘small farmer’. I suggest that moving
away from the question of small-large categories to focus instead on the process of a firm’s selection
of farmers, offers a more nuanced understanding of the drivers of selection (which may or may not
include farm size).
160
Towards that end, this chapter unpacks the idea of farmer selection and participation into
contract farming systems, characterizing selection into contract farming schemes as a layered
process, where firms first choose regions before choosing farmers with whom to contract, so that
spatial selection of procurement sheds precedes the identification by contracting firms of farmers
willing to contract. It attempts to model this structural process of selection, drawing on qualitative
empirical material to do so. It then examines the implication of this empirical framework to
assess the nature of participation of farmers in five contract farming schemes in southern India.
Specifically, this chapter suggests that selection and exclusion occurs at multiple levels and firms
routinely sort both over geographic regions as well as over heterogeneous farmers. It further suggests
that ignoring this layered process of selection can lead to misleading conclusions regarding the
drivers of farmer selection, of which inferences on whether land holding size matters or not is just
one example.
My ultimate goal is to see if this conceptualization of selection supports the notion that exclusion
of farmers from participation can take place at multiple levels, and whether it resolves the theoretical
ambiguities of using farm size as the chief analytical category for analyzing farmer participation
in contract farming schemes. This has important implications for policy. If exclusion happens
both at the level of individuals as well as at the level of geographies, policy interventions need to
operate at the appropriate level, targeting geographies when necessary and addressing constraints
of individuals when these are relevant.
The rest of the chapter implements this idea. Following this introduction, Section 8.2
conceptualizes selection, drawing on examples from existing literature and qualitative evidence from
India. Section 8.3 describes the data sources and methods used for empirical analysis. Sections 8.4
and 8.5 discuss the results from the model, while section 8.6 concludes the chapter.
8.2 Conceptualizing Participation and Selection
The starting point for conceptualizing farmer participation in or selection into contract farming
schemes is to admit the notion of selection as a process and not as an event. Firms adopt a
portfolio approach in their selection of farmers with whom to contract, one that balances the need
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to minimize the transactions costs of contracting and the need to choose farmers to minimize moral
hazard and hold up problems. This logic, along with constraints imposed by the technical-biological
characteristics of the contract commodity leads firms to adopt a layered selection process (Figure
8.1).
Firms first select broad agro-climatic regions where it is feasible for contract commodities to
grow, and within that choose particular geographic tracts before choosing individual farmers. Firms
then pick a portfolio of contract farmers, with specific volumes (or acreage) to contract and reassess
and modify this portfolio over time, based on experience and learning as well as on changes in the
external conditions. All of this is conditional on farmers being willing to contract with the firm.
If selection is, in fact, a layered process comprising different stages, then excluded farmers
constitute a complex, differentiated category, with a distinct set of covariates influencing each
aspect or stage of the selection process.
Qualitative empirical evidence suggests that there is indeed such a structural process of
selection.2 Usually, a contracting firm chooses the region (blocks) to contract in (Figure 8.1).
This way of choosing particular agro-climatic tracts seems typical in India. I refer to this spatial
selection as the domain layer of selection. Firms then pick villages in these areas. Within these
‘contract villages’ (CV), the firm usually draws up a list of potential participants who are willing
to contract, either through field officials or through intermediaries, or farmers self-identify and
express a desire to participate. Subsequently, contingent on the potential participants fulfilling any
eligibility criteria that the firm might establish, the firm ‘chooses’ farmers with whom to contract
(Figure 8.1). At this stage, participation in contract farming schemes is a matching problem, of
farmers willing to contract with the firm, and the firm choosing farmers with whom to contract.
This is driven not just by the perceived benefits of doing so but also by mutual perceptions of
reliability and trust or, inversely, riskiness. I refer to this as the matching layer.
Interviews with agribusinesses in India suggest unambiguously that this approach is universal.
Agro-climatic conditions and seasonality are important considerations for spatial selection. For
instance, cotton requires black soils and is typically less productive in other types of soils. Papaya
2This observation is based on the Agribusiness Survey, 2007-09.
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does not do well in windy areas, where the trees could break. Similarly, mid-elevation works best
for marigold. As a marigold processor explained, “although earlier we procured from the plains,
today we focus 90% of the procurement from the mid-elevation areas. The oleoresin content is
much higher in these areas. Yield of marigold is also higher. In the plains if we get 6-7 tons/acre,
in the hills it could even be as high as 15 tons/acre.”3 One agribusiness executive said that the
firm avoided procuring from some regions close to the plant because the gherkins that grew in that
particular tract had “no color”.4 Firms often choose areas where they can procure across many
seasons, in order to run the plant through the year or choose a portfolio of geographic regions where
they can procure in different seasons (procurement smoothing). Sometimes firms choose regions
only as a source for procuring off-season. For example, Jharkhand was seen to be attractive for
potato contracting purely because it offered the processing plant potatoes during a season when
potatoes were not available elsewhere.5
Often, plants are established within the agroclimatic zone where cultivation of the contract
commodity is feasible. To that extent, plant location is a function of agro-climatic factors. Once
the plant is established, perishability of produce often induces firms to procure within an acceptable
radius around the plant. For papaya, for instance, once latex is extracted, it has to be used in the
plant within three or four hours. So, the firms choose farmers located close to the plant. Gherkins
firms in India usually procure from within a 50 kilometer radius from the plant. Gherkins are
highly perishable and firms “want to get them to the processing plant as quickly as possible, within
hours if possible”. Other firms choose a portfolio of villages before the matching stage. These can
be either to ensure yields and, hence, volumes or to obtain better contractual performance in terms
of reliable deliveries. As one executive said, “we choose villages. That’s what makes sense to us.
We select villages where land is suitable, where there are sandy soils and good water.”6 This would
reduce risks of not getting enough volumes for processing. Another said “we want to go and select
villages where the farmers are very poor or tribals.”7 Yet another executive explained, “we focused
3Agribusiness Survey, Karamadai, Tamil Nadu,2007.
4Agribusiness Survey, Sirumalai, Tamil Nadu, 2007.
5Agribusiness Survey, Ranchi, Jharkhand, 2008.
6Agribusiness Survey, Bangalore, Karnataka, 2008.
7Agribusiness Survey, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, 2008.
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on villages that had no market access. There are many villages where farmers have no clue about
the outside world, let alone about markets. Their mentality is such that they never cross the line”
or transgress.8
Once villages are chosen, firms try to identify farmers with whom to contract. While firms
try to sort heterogeneous farmer types based on location, reliability, size, soil quality and so forth,
farmers perceptions of the benefits and risks associated with contract farming and its spillovers
drive farmers’ propensity or willingness to be considered for contracting (Chapter 7). This could
include a range of factors such as entry costs, family size, perceived mean and variance of the returns
to the contract crop relative to alternative uses of land and labor, social learning and beliefs about
impact on soil fertility and quality, health and so on. At this stage, it is not simply a matter of
firms picking farmers. There is often a time lag between a farmer getting to know of the option
and actually declaring willingness to contract. In some places it is easy. An agribusiness executive
said of the Punjab: “Adoption by farmers in Punjab is fairly quick. Farmers tend to watch others’
fields keenly. As soon as they find something interesting, they approach you and ask : “What is
this? How does it grow? What do I have to do? Can I join?”.9
In other places, it may not be so easy. An executive explained, “In the beginning, the ethanol
factory was still waiting for a license. But in order to establish link with the farmer, we undertook
some demonstrations. This gave the farmers some confidence that such an option was indeed
possible and real. Farmers were skeptical and did not understand the process of ethanol making.”10
In some cases, it is hard to persuade certain classes of farmers . For example, a firm contracting
sorghum claims that they could never get the large and rich farmers interested in contracting
because sorghum was considered a poor man’s crop. Sometimes firms choose poor farmers, just like
they choose distant villages, to ensure sustainable relationships. “We ensured that we picked some
really vulnerable people who had few other alternatives. When there were enough people like that
there was a critical mass that wanted to keep the contracting scheme going”.11 At the matching
8Agribusiness Survey, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu, 2007.
9Agribusiness Survey, New Delhi, 2008.
10Agribusiness Survey, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, 2007.
11Agribusiness Survey, Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh, 2007.
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Figure 8.1: The Process of Selection and Hypothesized Stage-Specific Covariates (at time t)
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stage, there is a two-sided selection process that eventually sorts farmers into contract farmers and
non-participating farmers.
Thus, this conceptual framework sees farmer participation in contract farming schemes as a
matching problem that is embedded in a stratified selection process. The main thrust of this
chapter is to evaluate the suggestion that each stage of ‘selection’ (or alternately ‘exclusion’) can
be associated with a distinct group of factors that influences the selection outcome for the farmer
(Figure 8.1).
Farmer exclusion can thus happen due to multiple reasons working at different levels. For
example, across the domain, farmers located in villages farther away from the processing plant
or wholesale warehouse might be prone to exclusion, whereas within a ‘contract’ village, the
farmer whose ethnicity is distinct from the ‘lead’ farmer or the dominant group might be excluded.
Exclusion in these two settings means very different things. Farmers with comparable characteristics
in different villages or geographic units could end up with different contracting status, not because
165
the firm chose one farmer over the other, but because the firm chose one geographic domain over
the other. At this level, there is sorting of geographic units, but not of farmers. In other words, very
different kinds of farmers might be equally be predisposed to participate or be selected into contract
farming system purely by virtue of their shared geographic domain. Modeling this stage gets at the
notion of regional specialization in particular commodities based on comparative advantage and of
geographic poverty traps (Barrett and Swallow, 2006). Exclusion in the sense of which farmer is
preferred, say, based on individual farmer characteristics, acquires relevance only within a selected
village or hamlet. The firm sorts heterogeneous cultivators in the village, all of who are potential
contractees, into contract suppliers and those who are not. It is at this stage that matching is
relevant and farmers have some agency. Even where firms have the last word on whether to award
a farmer a contract or not, this is predicated on there being a pool of farmers willing to take up
contract farming. In empirical work, farmers are usually not accorded such agency.
Thus, if farmer exclusion from systems is relevant, the nature and cause of exclusion is critical
in determining the transformative reach of contract farming, especially for poverty alleviation
purposes. If, on the other hand, contract farming systematically establishes itself only in certain
milieus, this would have important implications for public policy in the excluded zones.
Furthermore, when empirical work neglects this layered nature of the selection process, it can
appear that there is farm size-based sorting, when, in reality, there is none. For example, if
the firm needs farmers with rich soils available in specific regions, such areas tend to be more
densely populated and hence have a disproportionate participation by farmers with small land size.
Participation in this instance is not because of land size but on account of a common driver, soil
quality, that affects both land size and contracting status.
The empirical analysis in this chapter is confined to a static notion of selection, referring to
the contracting status of a farmer at a particular time. Further, it also focuses on extensive
participation rather than the intensity of participation. Extensive participation is a binary concept
that has to do with whether or not, at a given point of time, a farmer participates in a scheme,
whereas intensity of participation refers to volumes or acreage that forms part of the contractual
commitment. Extensive participation has dominated discussions of farmer participation in schemes,
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and is hence the focus of this chapter.12 Interviews with agribusinesses suggest that firms do select
on the extensive margin, deeming some farmers to be more desirable partners than others. As the
theoretical model in Chapter 4 suggests, the firm assesses the relative costs of transacting with a
particular farmer and the reliability of the farmer to honor the contractual terms before choosing
farmers. If there were perfect and costless enforcement, and if firms generally knew the differential
abilities of various farmers, selection on the extensive margin would be straightforward. In a context
of friction, with uncertainty and imperfect and asymmetric information on abilities, firms rely on
proximate correlates to identify a pool of contract farmers from among many.
8.3 Modeling Static Selection and the Decomposition of the
Sources of Participation
To address, empirically, the layered process of selection and the multiple levels of exclusion, this
study adopts a simple decomposition exercise, following Heckman and Smith (2003), to judge
the relative contribution of the different stages to a farmer’s contracting status, as described in
Figure 8.1. Such a decomposition enables determination of the sources of unequal participation
and identify the level at which exclusion takes place. In addition, it is possible to identify how an
attribute can be associated with contracting status differently in different stages. For instance, a
firm might opt to work in geographic areas where landholding sizes tend to be large on an average,
however, within that region, they might prefer to choose farmers with smaller landholdings. A
decomposition exercise enables recognition of such patterns.
Let Citk denote the event that a farmer i is a contract farmer at time t for commodity k. Let Vtk
denote the event that a village is selected by the firm as a source of procurement and Btk a region
that the firm identifies for a procurement shed. Given the structure of selection, using probability
theory, we can decompose the probability of a farmer contracting into constitutent (conditional)
probabilities. Accordingly, overall, the probability that an individual farmer i contracts for a
particular commodity k at time t is given is the product of different constitutent probabilities,
which can be modeled as functions of stage-specific covariates (X = xc,xv,xb).
12Intensive participation, or the quantity or proportion contracted, is an important dimension as well, and is
addressed briefly in Chapter 10.
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Define
Pr
(
Cikt
∣∣ xc,xv,xb) = Pr(Cikt ∣∣ V ; xc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Matching Stage
Pr
(
Vkt
∣∣ B; xv)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Village Selection/Placement
Pr
(
Bkt
∣∣; xb)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Region Selection︸ ︷︷ ︸
Spatial or Domain selection stage
(8.1)
The probability that a farmer does not contract at time t is therefore
Pr
(
C ′ikt
∣∣ xc,xv,xb) = 1− Pr(Cikt ∣∣ xc,xv,xb)) (8.2)
Each probability listed above can be modeled distinctly, depending on the level of selection that
is of particular interest. Recasting these probabilities in Equation 8.1 as dependent variables, in
the context of empirical work, we have
ρiktc = ρ
ikt
c/v × ρktv/b × ρktb (8.3)
where, ρiktc/v is the probability of a firm-farm match, given that the village is selected, ρ
kt
v/b is the
probability that the village (V) is selected given that the region or block (B) is selected, and ρktb is
the the probability that the region or block (B) is selected for contracting. The probabilities are,
as before, superscripted to denote farmer i for commodity k at time period t. Here (xc,xv,xb)
represents the set of explanatory variables, likely to be different in the three component regressions.
We can estimate the components of the right hand side. This helps disaggregate and hence assess
the relative importance or probability contribution of the different layers of selection, the domain
level layer versus the matching layer for each farmer.13
Specifically, this allows one to examine if ‘similar’ farmers in terms of the propensity to be
selected (that is, the estimated probabilities based on observable farmer characteristics at the
matching level) still end up with different contracting status because of selection at the domain
13Mobley et al. (2008) use a similar approach to separate the effects of geography and individual characteristics in
the use of mammography across the United States.
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level. This is one kind of exclusion. The other kind of exclusion would be where the propensity of
region selection is the same, but farmers could nevertheless get sorted into those who are excluded
and those who are included based on individual characteristics salient in the matching stage. I
use this to demonstrate the levels at which sorting by firms takes place for different contract
commodities studied.
The introduction of covariates for the selection of regions adds predictive power to the issue of
spatial selection, or placement effect, as it is sometimes referred to in the econometric literature.
This contrasts with current practice of introducing region fixed effects to account for spatial regions,
which has a weak theoretical rationale (albeit a clear statistical rationale) and little explanatory
power for how firms choose geographies. The matching layer allows a reduced form representation
of the principal-agent problem, where the firm as principal chooses farmers with whom to contract.
At the matching stage it is possible to incorporate farmers’ perceptions of contracting representing
an individual farmer’s individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints. This is not
the only way of organizing farmers but is a consistent way of thinking about it in the sense that it
is organized with the firm as the central decision maker, although an individual farmer does have
agency.
In general, the two approaches, of piecewise or sequential estimation and a one-shot estimation
are not equivalent, since the latter includes all farmers in the estimation of the matching stage,
involving an implicit assumption that the matching stage is relevant even in the regions that have
not been chosen by the firm for contracting.
The greatest mileage from this approach is that the probability of inclusion or exclusion can be
decomposed so as to isolate the pathways through which the different covariates might influence
participation. By estimating each of the component probabilities, we can determine the effect of
each hypothesized explanatory variable on the overall probability of participation in the contract
farming scheme and can determine the level at which it works significantly. A variable that has
no effect on the overall probability of participation may nevertheless have strong, but offsetting,
effects on the component probabilities. In short, factors that affect selection at one stage may not
affect other stages.
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8.3.1 Estimation and Variables used
The different component probabilities in the selection decomposition scheme presented in Equation
8.3 can be estimated piecewise (Heckman and Smith, 2003). For a given commodity, the structure
of the selection problem suggests that the most appropriate model is the conditional logit model
proposed by McFadden (1974), derived from a random utility framework. Thus, for every farmer
i ∈ C, where C denotes the set of farmers who are selected for contracting, it is true that
U(i) ≥ U(j))∀j ∈ C ′, i 6= j, where C ′ is the set of all those who do not contract.
Strictly speaking, C ′ should refer to those who are willing to contract but the firm does not
select. However, those unwilling to contract can be included in C ′ by assuming that their reservation
level is ∞. The problem has a multinomial logit flavor, given that contracting firms decide from
among various alternatives in terms of geographic regions at different scales and at the level of
the individual farmer. However, since each contracting firm assesses the relative attributes of each
farmer, especially in terms of the transactions costs that the farmer entails, the potential for moral
hazard and of individual farmer reliability, the attributes of the farmers are the relevant covariates
governing the firm’s choice of a portfolio of farmers, rather than a firm’s attributes, which would
be shared within each commodity group.
The central task is to estimate the different stages, the component probabilities in Equation 8.3
:
ρiktc/v =
ex
c
ikβ∑
j∈C
exjkβc/v
(8.4)
ρvktv/b =
ex
v
ikβ∑
v∈CV
ezkβv/b
(8.5)
ρbktb =
ex
b
ikβ∑
b
ez
′
kβb
(8.6)
In this setting, there is little justification for assuming that errors are independent across
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observations. The data generating process implies correlated errors across observations within
a given particular contracting scheme. First, given that for each contract commodity a single firm
acts as a principal selecting a portfolio of farmers in order to maximize expected profits, net of
production and transactions costs, the first order condition derived in Chapter 4 implies that the
firm chooses farmers and quantities for contracting so as to equalize the risk-transactions costs
ratio across the farmers. Given the structural process of selection, there is potentially a clustering
effect that drives selection. This leads to a breakdown of the assumption of the Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), while inducing spatially correlated errors across observations. In order
to get efficient estimators of the coefficients on the stage-specific covariates, I first estimate stage
specific equations as conditional likelihood regressions. Estimating this model gives consistent but
inefficient estimates of the coefficients, due to the correlated error structure. Owing to the absence
of data on spatial coordinates, I cluster standard errors at the hamlet or village level, that corrects
for correlation within the village or hamlets.14 In addition, I correct errors for heteroscedaticity.
8.3.2 Data and Variables
Recalling the figure from the Appendix A on the sampling structure (Figure 8.2), I build up a dataset
that integrates secondary data on region characteristics with primary data from the Farmer Survey
that contains characteristics of contract and non-contract farmers. Starting with complete lists
of contract farmers in the study area, provided by the five contracting firms, I identified contract
hamlets (CH) and non-contract hamlets(NCH) for each commodity and based on the location of the
hamlets, identified all the panchayat villages in the sample districts, dividing them into contracting
villages (CV) or non-contracting villages (NCV). A similar exercise was carried out sequentially
for the larger administrative units, blocks and districts. This offers a mapping of the sample firms’
choice of regions for contracting. These data were matched with available secondary data on regional
characteristics. The decadal census in India collects data on village level facilities, comprising 141
variables representing village amenities, i.e., locational attributes, infrastructure, communication,
14A number of recent studies explore the issue of spatially correlated errors in the context of conditional logit
models Conley (1999); Duchesne et al. (2010); Anselin (1988); Heckman and Smith (2003). Conley (1999) develops a
GMM correction for the covariance matrix for logit models with spatially correlated errors, implementable in STATA.
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irrigation, finance and social development infrastructure. I combined these with the population
census that gives the the socio-demographic and occupational profile of the population in these
villages. For the districts in the study area, there are data for 2714 villages.
The Farmer Survey, representing different types of farmers distinguished on the basis of
contracting status, sampled respondents at the level of the hamlet (or habitations). Typically,
several such hamlets constitute a panchayat village, for which census data on village facilities is
available. Contracting and non-contracting hamlets were therefore mapped to their corresponding
census village so that it is possible to assign to the hamlets data for village level facilities. 15
In estimating the different stages, I use block and village selection as sequential stages in the
domain layer or spatial selection. I estimate the model pertaining to the matching layer at the
village level and cluster the standard errors at the hamlet or village levels, depending on the
commodity.
Figure 8.2: Sampling structure
Modeling 
Stages 
 
Stage of 
Selection 
Sampling 
Unit Contract Region 
Non-
Contract 
Region 
b Spatial Selection 
Stage 
Block 
 (fsu) CB   NCB 
v/b Spatial Selection 
Stage 
Panchayat 
Village 
(ssu) 
CV  NCV  NCV 
Spatial 
Selection 
Stage 
Hamlet 
(Houselisting 
Level)  
(tsu) 
CH NCH NCH NCH 
c/v 
 
Matching 
Stage 
Farm 
Households 
(Sampled 
from 
Houselist)  
(usu) 
CF OCF AF NCF OCF 
 
AF* 
 
NCF OCF AF* NCF OCF AF* NCF
 
 
 
 
Given that there are five contract commodities, I estimate the regression for each particular
layer or stage, for each contract commodity separately. Based on the proposed layered structure of
selection, I choose a range of stage-specific covariates.
At the block level, the probability of a block being a contract block (CB), ρktb , is estimated
as a function of block characteristics constructed as the average of those characteristics across
15The data pertain to 1999 in some cases and 2001 in others. Despite the fact that it is somewhat dated, the
assumption is that it faithfully captures differences in village level facilities for the purpose of the study.
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villages belonging to the block. This is estimated for all the blocks in the seven study districts. As
explanatory variables, I use proportion of land irrigated, proportion of land cultivated, average
literacy, proportion of population belong to the Scheduled Castes or Tribes, the number or
proportion of cultivators in the total workforce, population density, average farm size, average
family size, and average household monthly income.
For the next level of spatial selection, estimating ρktv/b I restrict the data to all villages belonging
to contract block (CB). The dependent variable here is a binary variable on whether a village is a
contract or non-contract village (CV or NCV, respectively). This is regressed on a set of variables
denoting facilities and socio-demography at the village level, from the decadal census. These include
the same set of variables used for the model for block selection.
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 presents comparisons of the means these independent variables for farmers
who contract with the subject firm of the contract commodity and all other farmers in the sample,
irrespective of the scheme for which they were sampled. Thus, in the regression models for selection,
a subject contract farmer is one who contracts with the subject firm for a particular commodity
and the comparison group (referred to in the tables as “All farmers other than Subject Contract
Farmers’ refers to farmers who do not contract for that particular commodity with the subject
firm. This category thus includes farmers who might grow the contract commodity for other firms
that are not the subject firm and also those who may be contracting for some other commodity
altogether.
For the matching layer of selection, the estimation of ρktc/v I now use data from the Farmer
Survey restricting the data to the selected sample villages (CV), where within CVs the Farmer
Survey comprises data on contract and non-contract farmers. At this level of selection, to reflect
matching, I use farmer characteristics, which firms might use as proxies for reliability or transactions
cost, as well as farmer perceptions of the benefits and risks of contracting with the sample firm,
that reflect farmers’ individual rationality constraint. These variables were developed in Chapter
7.
Tables 8.3 through 8.8 record the summary statistics of variables that are used in the matching
stage regressions for contract participation.
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In this instance, I assume selection based on observables. While there may be several
unobservable factors that drive firms to select some blocks over others, detailed interviews with the
sample firms on what constitutes the basis for selection of geographies, suggest that the covariates
identified as explanatory variables together account for the chief drivers of selection or serve as
credible proxies for the unobservables.16
I use estimates from this set of models for two broad purposes. The first seeks validation of
the idea that ignoring spatial selection in examining farmer selection could potentially lead to
misleading conclusion regarding the drivers of selection. The second is to map the layer at which
exclusion possibly occurs. The goal is to investigate whether firms choose geographies or farmers
or both and how these differ across commodities.
8.4 The Problem of Misattribution
To validate the idea that ignoring spatial selection does matter for inference, I present results from
two probit regression models for each contract commodity. The first regresses farmers’ current
contracting status on matching layer covariates for the sample farmers across all blocks, accounting
for placement via variables representing firm presence in the block. The second works with a
restricted sample of only selected villages or contract villages (CV) and regresses current contracting
status on the same set of covariates as in the first model. Of the two, the former ignores the
domain or spatial selection layer and is hence equivalent to a one shot estimation (equivalent to
estimating ρc), whereas the latter, focusing on selection within contract villages (CV), presumes
that regional sorting has occurred previously (equivalent to estimating ρc/v). These two models are
equivalent only when each village is a contract village (CV). Both models control for a rich array of
farmer perceptions of subjective distributions from contracting and the next best alternative that
potentially account for a lot of variables that might be jointly determined with farm size.
The results show that the drivers of selection that emerge as statistically significant are different
across the two models, implying that accounting for spatial selection leads to results that differ from
16In principle, it is feasible to incorporate indicators representing various geophysical and agroclimatic features.
Owing to the difficulty in procuring this data for the required level of disaggregation, I have been unable to account
for a richer set of geographic and agroclimatic characteristics.
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an approach that does not account for levels of sorting. In the discussion here, I focus on land size
(Table 8.9).
First, in case of papaya and gherkins (phase 2), land size is not significantly associated with
contract participation in either model. In marigold, larger farmers are associated with greater
likelihood of participation in both models. The key findings, from the perspective of this work are
for broiler, gherkins (phase 1) and cotton. A one-shot model that ignores spatial selection would
lead one to conclude that larger farmers are more likely to participate in broiler contracting. Yet,
the model for farmer level selection within contract villages suggests farmers are not sorted by the
firm on the basis of land size. Rather, the firm is selecting villages with larger mean farm size. In
the case of cotton, the one shot model suggests that farm size might not matter. Yet, within the
contract villages (CVs) small farmers are have a greater likelihood of contracting. In the case of
gherkins (phase 1), while ignoring regional selection would lead one to conclude that land size does
not matter, there is a significant positive correlation between contract participation and land size
for the sample restricted to contract villages.
Table 8.9: Land Size as Driver of Selection
ρc ρc/v
Explanatory Variable Z-statistic AME Z-statistic AME
Marigold 2.26 0.002 ∗∗ 2.5 0.0239 ∗∗
Broiler 1.72 0.001 ∗ 0.13 0.000
Gherkins 2 0.01 0.001 -0.75 -0.004
Gherkins 1 -0.69 -0.004 2.04 0.008 ∗∗
Cotton -1.00 -0.004 -2.28 -0.023 ∗∗
Papaya 0.07 0.000 0.55 0.002
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 This is excerpted from Tables 8.10,8.11 and 8.12 presented at the end of the chapter.
2 AME is Average Marginal Effect
Tables 8.10, 8.11 and 8.12 contain the detailed estimated models showing the effect of accounting
for regional selection. It suffices to say that these suggest overturning of the statistical significance
for a number of variables across the two models for the different crops. These include, apart from
land size, variables representing distance to the nearest surfaced road, level of outstanding debt,
percentage of household income derived from cultivation, the relative poverty of households and
household size. These variables are all typically used to judge inclusiveness of contract farming
183
schemes. The fragility of these estimates when spatial selection is or is not ignored underscores the
need for careful empirical investigation and inference.
The rest of the work discusses the layers of selection, using the latter of the two models presented
above as representing the estimation of the matching layer. The emphasis here is on a comparative
perspective across contract farming schemes, rather than a detailed treatment on particular drivers
for each scheme.
8.5 The Drivers of Selection
8.5.1 The Spatiality of Selection and Geographic Comparative Advantage
The spatial aspect of contract procurement or sourcing based on geographic characteristics is
obvious enough to empirical researchers. Yet, typically survey based research focusing on a single
scheme, even with multiple crops, does not allow for a comparative perspective on differences
in geographies of contract procurement across heterogeneous commodities. This survey enables
investigation of this idea of geographic comparative advantage since it covers multiple firms, each
contracting for a different commodity.
The broiler contracting firm chooses areas (blocks) where the average cultivated land per
household is high and where villages are tightly clustered around urban centers (Table 8.13). Within
these blocks, however, the firm appears to pick large, more sparsely populated villages, where
cultivation is not on a large scale, indicated both by the per household availability of cultivable
land and by the total number of cultivators. These villages tend to depend on agriculture, given
that the majority of the workforce are cultivators. The average income of the villages selected is
also lower relative to those that are not.
Interviews with the marigold contracting firm suggest that marigold is sourced primarily from
mid-elevation regions in the northern part of the study area, where cooler temperatures are
conducive to higher yields. While the set of explanatory variables does not explicitly account for
these specific attribute, they include characteristics that one would associate with the hilly regions
in peninsular India (Table 8.14). The selection of blocks reflects this spatial preference accurately,
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i.e., the statistically significant characteristics are those that one would associate with the hilly
regions in peninsular India. Villages within these tracts are scattered around a handful of urban
centers, these blocks tend to be more sparsely populated than those in the plains. The availability
of cultivated land per household is low, owing to parts that are thickly forested. However, the
contracting region is also characterized by a predominance of (rainfed) agriculture, represented by
the higher proportion of land that is cultivated. Block selection is also positively associated with
the percentage of workforce whose main occupation is agricultural labor. Within these blocks,
the firms choose villages where availability of cultivated land per household is higher, and those
that are less remote, in terms of distance to the nearest town. It is interesting to see how the
same attribute, nearness to a town, works in opposing ways at different stages of selection. While
marigold contracting is prevalent in blocks where villages are scattered so that, on an average,
villages are farther away from the nearest town than in non-contract blocks, within a block firms
choose villages close to urban centers. There are obvious reasons for this choice. The distance
from the nearest town is a proxy for road infrastructure and choosing villages closer towns makes
it easier for the firm to evacuate contracted volumes, just as it lowers the costs associated with
delivering inputs and monitoring.
A similar pattern of block and village selection is evident with papaya contracting (Table 8.15).
Here, the papaya firm tends to contract in blocks where villages are, on an average located farther
away from towns amid sparsely populated blocks, and yet within a block tend to choose villages
that are closer to towns. In the case of papaya, the collection centers for latex are located close to
towns, but firm officials suggest that the location of the latex collection point is established after
they identify farmers who contract for supplying latex. The firm’s selection of village is associated
positively with the irrigation facility in a village as indicated by the percentage of cultivated land
that is irrigated.
The spatial selection for gherkins procurement indicates a greater preference for blocks where
average cultivable per household is small, where family sizes are large or where a relatively larger
proportion of the workforce are agricultural laborers, reflecting, perhaps, the labor demands
required for gherkins cultivation (Tables 8.16 and 8.17). Within blocks, firms seem to choose
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villages that are farther away from the town or those populated predominantly by those from
marginalized castes. Indeed, even within the surveyed villages, during the survey, it was apparent
that the hamlets where contract farmers were located tend to be remote or populated by particular
social groups belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. The selection of tracts for gherkins
in Phase 1 and 2 are broadly and fundamentally consistent, even though coefficients (and their
statistical significance) on particular variables are different.
At the time of the survey, cotton contracting was concentrated highly in a few blocks in
Coimbatore district and given that this was the last season of operation it represents the vestiges
of a scheme Table 8.18. A large number of blocks located in Salem district had just been dropped
by the firm. This clustering around Coimbatore city is reflected in the selection of blocks with the
average distance of villages being lower in the contracting blocks. Within the block, selection of
villages is associated with lower literacy but higher average income per household. Villages where
the average cultivated land per household was smaller were more likely to be contract villages.
Despite the fact that the models estimating spatial selection do not include variables for specific
agro-climatic characteristics, these models fit the data well and are consistent with sample firms’
description of their locational preference.
8.5.2 Farmer Characteristics
Across schemes, farmer level estimations of correlates of participation affirm that farmer perceptions
of the risk and returns of contracting, relative to a next best alternative, matter. While different
measures representing these are significant for the different contract commodities, the signs on the
coefficients that are statistically significant are intuitive. The higher the perceived net incremental
risk associated with contracting, as expressed by the risk scores, the less the likelihood of a farmer
contracting. The higher the ratio of expected mean returns to contracting over that for a next
best alternative, the greater the probability of a farmer contracting. The variable representing
interaction between the estimated coefficient of risk aversion and the coefficient of variation of
the contract commodity’s price in the alternative market is associated positively with contracting
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Table 8.13: Spatial Selection: Broiler
Block selection Village selection
Explanatory Variables Z-statistic AME Z-statistic AME
Total number of cultivators 0.15 0 -2.16 ∗∗ 0.000
Proportion of land under cultivation (% of all
land)
1.78 ∗ 0.000 3.14 ∗∗∗ 0.000
Proportion of land not available for cultivation
(% of all land)
3.02 ∗∗∗ 0.681
Proportion of land not available for cultivation -1.03 -0.258 0.07 0.020
Average cultivated land per household (acres) 2.67 ∗∗∗ 0.310 -2.96 ∗∗∗ -0.174
Main cultivators ( % of total workforce) -0.86 -0.006 2.19 ∗∗ 0.007
Agricultural labor ( % of total workforce) -0.4 -0.001 -1.81 ∗∗ -0.002
Average household size -0.27 -0.019 1.65 0.120
Proportion of cultivated land that is irrigated
(%)
0.12 0.000 1.42 0.001
Population density (persons/acre) -1.21 -0.020 -2.99 ∗∗∗ -0.067
Literacy Rate (% of total population) 0.09 0.000 -0.01 0.000
Scheduled Caste /Tribe population (% of total
population)
-0.28 -0.001 0.78 0.001
Average distance of villages from their nearest
town (kms)
-2.96 ∗∗∗ -0.013 -1.55 -0.004
Average income per household per year (Rs.
00000)
1.51 0 -2.25 ∗∗ -0.006
Constant -0.4 -2.05 ∗∗
N 108 293
Proportion of observations classified correctly 95 82
Wald statistic χ213=43.34 χ
2
14=30.35
p-value 0.00∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.51 0.15
Log pseudolikelihood -17.56 -118.67
Clusters - 292
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 AME refers to Average Marginal Effects.
2 Blank cells indicate that the explanatory variable was not included in the regression.
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Table 8.14: Spatial Selection: Marigold
Block selection Village selection
Explanatory variable Z-statistic AME Z-statistic AME
Proportion of not land under cultivation (% of
all land)
-0.97 -0.159
Average cultivated land per household (acres) -4.74 ∗∗∗ -0.246 2.44 ∗∗ 0.232
Total number of households -0.99 0
Total number of cultivators 0.28 0
Proportion of land under cultivation (% of all
land)
4.01 ∗∗∗ 0.240
Main cultivators ( % of total workforce) 1.35 0.002 0.94 0.008
Agricultural labor ( % of total workforce) 3.64 ∗∗∗ 0.002 0.6 0.001
Average household size -1.61 -0.047 1.49 0.337
Proportion of cultivated land that is irrigated
(%)
-3.22 ∗∗ -0.001 -2.72 ∗∗∗ -0.010
Population density (persons/acre) -1.97 ∗∗ -0.021 1.85 ∗ 0.083
Scheduled Caste /Tribe population (% of total
population)
-1.11 -0.001 -1.34 -0.002
Average distance of villages from their nearest
town (kms)
2.74 ∗∗∗ 0.006 -2.63 ∗∗∗ -0.007
Average income per household per year (Rs.) 3.34 ∗∗∗ 0
Constant 1.58 -1.39
N 108 40
Percentage of responses classified correctly 99.2 92.5
Wald statistic χ212 = 34.69 χ
2
9 = 29.49
p-value 0 ∗∗∗ 0 ∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.41 0.73
Log pseudolikelihood -5.91 -5.43
Clusters 40
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 AME refers to Average Marginal Effects.
2 Blank cells indicate that the explanatory variable was not included in the regression.
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Table 8.15: Spatial Selection: Papaya
Block selection Village selection
Explanatory variable Z-statistic AME Z-statistic AME
Total number of households 0.67 0
Total number of cultivators -0.39 0 0.82 0
Proportion of land under cultivation (% of all
land)
1.94 ∗ 0.52 -0.53 -0.06
Proportion of land not available for cultivation
(% of all land)
1.74 ∗ 0.51 -1.03 -0.11
Average cultivated land per household (acres) -2.36 ∗∗ -0.85 0.04 0.00
Main cultivators ( % of total workforce) 0.27 0.00 0.38 0.00
Agricultural labor ( % of total workforce) 1.95 ∗ 0.01 0.1 0.00
Average household size 0.16 0.02 0.76 0.03
Proportion of cultivated land that is irrigated
(%)
-0.13 0.00 1.85 ∗ 0.00
Population density (persons/acre) -1.98 ∗∗ -0.07 -0.27 0.00
Literacy Rate (% of total population) 0.35 0.00 -0.44 0.00
Scheduled Caste /Tribe population (% of total
population)
-0.78 0.00 0.69 0.00
Average distance of villages from their nearest
town (kms)
2.36 ∗∗ 0.01 -1.91 ∗ 0.00
Average income per household per year (Rs.) 0.1 0 -0.71 0
Constant -0.65 -1.53
N 108 239
Percentage of responses classified correctly 90.8 93.3
Wald statistic χ214 = 21.91 χ
2
14 = 14.48
p-value 0.08 ∗ 0.1 ∗
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.1
Log pseudolikelihood -27.02 -52.66
Clusters 237
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 AME refers to Average Marginal Effects.
2 Blank cells indicate that the explanatory variable was not included in the regression.
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Table 8.16: Spatial Selection: Gherkins Phase 2
Block selection Village selection
Explanatory variable Z-statistic AME Z-statistic AME
Total number of cultivators 1.71 ∗ 0.00
Total number of households 0.48 0
Proportion of land not available for cultivation
(% of all land)
1.83 ∗ 0.382 2.85 ∗∗∗ 0.515
Proportion of land under cultivation (% of all
land)
1.11 0.288 1.41 0.328
Average cultivated land per household (acres) -1.05 -0.221 -2.47 ∗∗ -0.290
Main cultivators ( % of total workforce) -0.55 -0.004 -0.27 -0.001
Agricultural labor ( % of total workforce) 2.73 ∗∗∗ 0.005 -1.1 -0.001
Average household size 2.94 ∗∗∗ 0.351 1.58 0.097
Proportion of cultivated land that is irrigated
(%)
-0.32 0.000 -2.31 ∗∗ -0.002
Population density (persons/acre) -0.71 -0.013 -1.77 ∗ -0.031
Literacy Rate (% of total population) 1.4 0.010 0.21 0.001
Scheduled Caste /Tribe population (% of total
population)
-2.77 ∗∗∗ -0.015 1.74 ∗ 0.003
Average distance of villages from their nearest
town (kms)
0.34 0.002 1.18 0.003
Average income per household per year (Rs.) 1.7 ∗ 0 -0.25 0
Constant -2.41 ∗∗ -1.98 ∗∗
N 108 232
Percentage of responses classified correctly 95 90
Wald statistic χ212=24.15 χ
2
12=38.83
p-value 0.02 ∗∗∗ 0 ∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.56 0.35
Log pseudolikelihood -10.26 -46.98
Cluster 231
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 AME refers to Average Marginal Effects.
2 Blank cells indicate that the explanatory variable was not included in the regression.
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Table 8.17: Spatial Selection: Gherkins Phase 1
Block selection Village selection
Explanatory variable Z-statistic AME Z-statistic AME
Total number of cultivators 2.1 ∗∗ 0.00
Total number of households -0.78 0
Proportion of land not available for cultivation
(% of all land)
1.4 0.58 -0.41 -0.05
Proportion of land under cultivation (% of all
land)
-0.37 -0.10 -0.1 -0.02
Average cultivated land per household (acres) -1.71 ∗ -0.73 -1.02 -0.04
Main cultivators ( % of total workforce) 1.26 0.01 -1.05 0.00
Agricultural labor ( % of total workforce) 2.19 ∗∗ 0.01 0.02 0
Average household size 3.12 ∗∗∗ 0.43 2.34 ∗∗ 0.08
Proportion of cultivated land that is irrigated
(%)
-1.55 0.00 0.44 0.00
Population density (persons/acre) -1.36 -0.07 -1.57 -0.03
Literacy Rate (% of total population) 1.34 0.01 -0.48 0.00
Scheduled Caste /Tribe population (% of total
population)
-0.91 0.00 0.62 0.00
Average distance of villages from their nearest
town (kms)
-0.58 0.00 1.8 ∗ 0.00
Average income per household per year (Rs.) 1.6 0 1.24 0
Constant -2.71 ∗∗∗ -1.63
N 108 197
Percentage of responses classified correctly 93 89
Wald chi2(12) χ212 = 16.22 χ
2
14 = 26.96
p-value 0.1 ∗ 0.02 ∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.39 0.22
Log pseudolikelihood -17.36 -52.29
Clusters 195
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 AME refers to Average Marginal Effects.
2 Blank cells indicate that the explanatory variable was not included in the regression.
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Table 8.18: Spatial Selection: Cotton
Block selection Village selection
Explanatory variable Z-statistic AME Z-statistic AME
Proportion of land not available for cultivation
(% of all land)
-0.84 -0.437
Proportion of land under cultivation (% of all
land)
1.86 0.527 -0.32 -0.172
Total number of households -0.48 0 -0.37 0
Total number of cultivators 0.66 0 0.47 0.000
Average cultivated land per household (acres) -0.63 -0.105 -1.74 ∗ -0.180
Main cultivators ( % of total workforce) -0.13 -0.001 -0.74 -0.008
Agricultural labor ( % of total workforce) 1.56 0.004 -0.15 0.000
Average household size 0.79 0.081 1.35 0.232
Proportion of cultivated land that is irrigated
(%)
-1.12 -0.001 0.86 0.002
Population density (persons/acre) -2.08 ∗∗ -0.086 -1.18 -0.014
Literacy Rate (% of total population) -1.78 ∗ -0.008 -3.27 ∗∗∗ -0.017
Scheduled Caste /Tribe population (% of total
population)
-1.17 -0.006 -1.35 -0.004
Average distance of villages from their nearest
town (kms)
-1.9 ∗ -0.011 -0.97 -0.006
Average income per household per year (Rs.
‘0,000)
-0.38 0 2.64 ∗∗∗ 0.002
Constant 0.37 0.27
Percentage of responses classified correctly 97.56 86.54
N 108 104
Wald chi2(13) 26.79 47.11
p-value 0.01 ∗∗ 0 ∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.5 0.35
Log pseudolikelihood -11.5 -32.9
Clusters 104
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 AME refers to Average Marginal Effects.
2 Blank cells indicate that the explanatory variable was not included in the regression.
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status, suggesting that farmers who are more risk averse are likely to contract or given risk aversion,
a larger variation in market prices lead farmers to contract.
Not only do these results validate the concerns raised in Chapter 7 that farmer perceptions of
risk matter, they also corroborate the view that contracting is indeed a two-way, matching problem,
where farmers have agency.
In the case of skewness measures and stochastic dominance, the results are somewhat variable.
One would expect that the difference in skewness between expected returns from contracting and
its next best alternative is linked negatively to contracting status. The higher the difference in
skewness, the greater the likelihood of windfalls when not contracting. This implies that those who
want to exploit these spikes in the spot market are less likely to contract. This is true of gherkins
(phase 2) and papaya, but in the case of cotton, this coefficient has a positive sign. For other
commodities, skewness does not seem to be statistically significant. As for stochastic dominance,
when contracting stochastic dominates not contracting, the likelihood of contracting ought to be
higher. The reverse seems to be the case, wherever the variable is statistically significant, for
example, marigold. This somewhat puzzling result in the case of marigold for example could be
owing to the porosity of contract and non-contract channels for the contract farmers. As Chapter
11 discusses, many marigold farmers contract cannily, expecting to divert some of the contracted
volumes to the spot market when prices shoot up. It is possible that the data on expected returns
distributions from contracting incorporates this phenomenon, leading to unexpected signs on the
stochastic dominance coefficients.
That different commodities make different demands on farmers is well known. Additionally, in
the context of a developing country, and in the absence of strong public enforcement through the
courts, firms often look for farmer characteristics that minimize their risks of contracting and costs,
achieved partly though picking farmers capable of getting higher yields. These attributes naturally
differ depending on the nature of the commodity and the firm itself.
Of the contract commodities studied, papaya and broiler require investments up front. Broiler
growers invest in sheds, drinkers and feeders for the birds, and papaya growers need to ensure that
basic irrigation facilities are in place. Gherkins farmers too tend to invest in spraying machines as
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the crop demands high pesticide application. Consequently, for all these crops, these investments
by the farmer potentially increases the likelihood of being offered contracts by the firm (Tables
8.16, 8.15, 8.13 and 8.17). In the case of marigold and cotton, there is practically no investment
upfront.
Papaya contracting is associated with farmers who are more literate, and who are among the
better off in the village, who are less indebted and have a greater market orientation (with a greater
proportion of food being purchased rather than consumed). Those belonging to the Scheduled
Castes are more likely to be selected.
The likelihood of a farmer being offered broiler contracts is higher when the farmer is literate,
but also when the proportion of annual income is derived from cultivation is higher. Farmers often
contract for broiler owing mainly to constraints on water availability that impinges on their ability
to grow field crops. However, even when there is no such constraint, farmers often opt for poultry
since, in their words, it is almost like receiving a salary, bringing in regular income throughout the
year.
In the case of cotton, farmers with smaller landholdings and smaller families are associated
with greater likelihood of contracting. Younger farmers appear to be more likely to contract.
Interestingly, the farther away a farmer is from the nearest wholesale market the more likely the
farmer contracts for cotton. Given that cotton has a spot market that makes sideselling feasible,
and the fact that farmers are scattered, it could well be the case that the scheme’s last season
hinged on those for whom costs of sideselling were relatively high.
Farmers who have a higher likelihood of participating in marigold contracting appear to also be
illiterate, from marginalized social groups, have larger families and work rainfed farms. However,
the larger the land owned and less the proportion of annual income derived from agriculture the
greater the likelihood of contracting.
For the gherkins scheme across the two phases, interestingly, there is not much consistency in
the drivers of selection. For instance, while in Phase 1, farmers who had better road access are
more likely to contract whereas the opposite holds true for the sample in Phase 2. This is partly on
account of the seasonal differences in sources of procurement. Phase 1 was conducted in the summer
197
whereas Phase 2 was conducted in the winter months. Further, the sample firm had dropped areas
close to the plant owing to the stiff competition from other gherkins processors in the same region.
The switch in the drivers might be on account of this shift. According to the sample firm, each
firm was providing cash advances to the farmer in order to attract participation and matching the
competitor’s cash advance became increasingly difficult to sustain.17
The evidence across crops on the drivers of selection suggests that there is much heterogeneity
across crops, even as there are some elements shared across schemes (risk perceptions, for example).
This reinforces scholarly opinion that suggest there is considerable diversity and context specificity
in who participates. The value of this evidence is that such heterogeneity is present even within a
contiguous area with the same political administrative structure.
8.5.3 Levels of Sorting
The selection decomposition exercise allows for a simple comparison of the contribution of spatial
selection or the domain layer and the contribution of farmer selection at the matching stage.
To do this, I use the nearest neighbor matching method, where each observation belonging to
the group of farmers that contracts for a commodity is matched up with an observation from
the group of farmers who do not contract with the commodity, on the basis of the closeness of
predicted constituent probabilities. The average difference in the predicted probability of the other
constituent probabilities is computed.18 For example, to estimate the difference in the estimated
predicted probabilities that a block or village is selected, observations are matched on the basis
of the closeness of the estimated predicted probability of a farmer being selected, given that the
block or village is selected. Thus, to examine how significant the aspect of spatial selection or the
domain layer is, each non-contract farmer is matched up with a contract farmer such that both
share the same predicted probability of participating, given their village is selected (i.e., based on
predicted ρc/v). The difference in predicted probabilities of village selection and of block selection
is computed. In other words, the average difference between predicted ρv/b is computed for village
level exclusion and the average difference between ρb gives the difference in sorting at the block
17Agribusiness Survey, November 2007, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu.
18This is implemented using the nnmatch command in STATA (Abadie et al., 2004).
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level. For sorting at the farmer level, the matching is made on the basis of predicted probabilities of
both estimated predicted ρv/b and ρb. The average difference between predicted probability of the
farmer being selected ( ρc/v) across contract and non-contract farmers is computed to produce an
estimate of farmer level sorting. Given that the data constitutes predictions that are estimated as
part of the selection decomposition exercise, there is a prediction error associated with the variables
used for matching as well as those used to compute the differences. The estimation hence allows
for biases in matching. In addition, the standard errors correct for heteroscedasticity. Table 8.19
presents data on the difference in probabilities that are associated with the sample farmers for the
five commodities. Whenever the difference in estimated predicted probability of the block or village
being selected is statistically significant, given matching or comparable predicted probabilities that
the farmer is selected, one can infer that there is significant domain level or spatial level sorting. So
too, if the difference in estimated predicted probability of the farmer being selected is statistically
significant given matching propensities for block and village selection, it implies that farmer level
sorting is relevant in the process of selection.
The table suggests that contracting status relates significantly to both region level sorting as well
as farmer level sorting. This is true for most cases. In the gherkins sample from phase 2, however,
sorting at the region (at the block level) appears to be significant, while for papaya, farmer level
sorting appears to be significant. This implies that for gherkins, exclusion of geographies might
be relevant and given a shared propensity for a block to be selected, the farmer level exclusion
is less of an issue. In the case of papaya, it appears that farmer level selection is a key driver.
This is consistent with the contracting firms’ approaches to selection, where gherkins firms follow
a cluster approach, choosing villages. In papaya, in contrast, social contact drives most initiation
of contractual relationships, and farmers are scattered fairly widely. Also, papaya needs significant
upfront investments and enterprise, the firm is perhaps discerning in its choice of contract farmers.
8.6 Concluding Remarks
The method of selection decomposition discussed so far was motivated by a discontent with the
use of farm size as a dominant theoretical category for assessing farmer participation and its use
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Table 8.19: Levels of Sorting: Farmer versus Domain Selection Assessed using a Simple Matching
Estimator
Exclusion at what level? Differences in
average predicted
probability at
region level
Differences in
average predicted
probability at
farmer level
Commodity Village Block Farmer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Marigold 0.46∗∗∗ 0.2 ∗∗∗ 0.30 ∗∗∗
Papaya 0.02∗ 0.02 0.34 ∗∗∗
Broiler 0.21 ∗∗∗ 0.63 ∗∗∗ 0.47 ∗∗∗
Cotton -0.07 ∗∗∗ 0.06 ∗∗∗ 0.16 ∗∗∗
Gherkins (Phase 1) 0.01 0.15 ∗∗∗ 0.15 ∗∗∗
Gherkins(Phase 2) 0.28∗∗∗ 0.64 ∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 This is a simple matching estimator, implemented using nnmatch in STATA following Abadie et al. (2004).
2 The matches are based on the predicted probabilities computed as part of the selection decomposition exercise. For the
region level (columns 2 and 3) matching is on predicted ρc/v and for the farmer level (column 4) matching of observations
is based on predicted block and village selection, ρb and ρv/b respectively.
3 Since the matching is based on predicted values, the matching is corrected for possibly biased matching.
4 The standard errors to compute statistical significance are corrected for heteroscedasticity.
and interpretation in modeling selection. Further, this chapter suggested that modeling selection
as a layered process allows us to identify the level at which farmer exclusion from contract farming
schemes occurs, as well as the differences in factors driving selection at multiple stages. The
evidence suggests this might be an appropriate way to assess farmer participation. Furthermore
the survey also points to diverse patterns across commodities. This emphasizes the virtue of getting
away from generalized notion of contract farming and drivers of participation, focusing instead on
contracting for specific commodities and to recognize that the nature of exclusion is more complex
that in typically acknowledged in existing research on contract farming. Selection of farmers based
on observable and unobservable farmer characteristics is only one aspect of selection. Spatial
selection over a geographic domain by a contracting firm constitutes another important element in
determining a farmer’s contracting status. This has important implications for the level at which
public policy interventions should operate.
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Chapter 9
Assessing Welfare Gains
9.1 Introduction
The issue of welfare gains to participation in emerging supply chains has acquired much significance
in recent times. Should participation in these chains lead to clear net welfare gains, it offers credible
opportunities for farmers in developing countries to transform their livelihoods. The attempt to
assess empirically if participation in contract farming schemes is associated with higher welfare is,
however, fraught with several methodological and epistemological problems. Many methods have
been evolved to address them. A clearer recognition, if not resolution, of these issues is essential,
since such empirical evidence often provides the basis for policy advocacy for the promotion of
smallholder participation in contract farming schemes.
This chapter brings together the issue of selection, participation and benefits to make particular
welfare comparisons in the five commodity sectors studied. Do contracting farmers do better? How
much do they stand to gain relative to their counterparts who do not participate? This study
examines these questions, arguing for a more careful consideration of the particular nature of
comparison for heterogeneous crops, especially when the treatment involves both a different crop
and a different mode of transaction. It also calls for according a prominent place to the influence
of farmers’ risk perceptions in controlling for selection and participation while making such welfare
comparisons. In the context of the five commodities I study, the decision to contract often coincides
with a decision to grow the contract commodity, which poses difficulties for separating the welfare
gains from contracting versus that from growing a different crop. I adopt an endogenous switching
model where farmers sort themselves into two regimes, contracting and not contracting, based, in
part, by the perceived differential welfare gains between the two regimes. While this enables me to
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estimate welfare implications of participation in the two regimes, it also allows me to identify the
differential returns to factors across these regimes. My goal is therefore to examine, not merely the
effect on a welfare metric but to see if different regimes reward key factors of production differently.
The chapter is organized as follows. I first outline the different empirical approaches to assessing
welfare gains, following which I lay out in detail the approach I adopt and the justification for its
use in the context of my work. After a description of the data, I present key results from estimation
of the model, namely the incremental net profit associated with contracting. I then discuss briefly
the structure of costs and returns to highlight the possible sources of gain and comment on the
returns to key factors of production under contracting and not contracting, before concluding the
chapter.
9.2 Empirical Approaches
Much of the recent literature on assessing welfare gains from contract farming (and more generally,
modern supply chains) has focused on tackling the problem of selection. A direct comparison of
welfare metrics based on contract participation could potentially lead one to conclude, for instance,
that contract farmers do better, without acknowledging the possibility that it might be the higher
ability farmers who participate.1 An important challenge is therefore to account for factors that
might implicitly influence both participation and the welfare outcomes. If these factors remain
neglected then welfare gains might be wrongly attributed to participation, when in fact, they are
due to competing factors that have been omitted from the model specification.
One empirical approach is to account for selection based on observables. Whenever selection
of farmers into contract schemes is transparent or there is adequate understanding of the process,
a model based on selection on observables could credibly and fully account for the selection effect.
A common approach has been the use of Heckman’s selection model to control for selection bias.
Propensity score matching methods represent another similar approach. Maertens and Swinnen
1Many studies present simple comparisons, admittedly, without making claims of causal effects. Kumar
(2007),Swain (2008),Rangi and Sidhu (2000),Haque and Birthal (1998) provide examples of contract farming in
India. To the extent that these studies unpack the structure of costs and returns and the sources of welfare gains to
contracting, they provide useful starting points for analysis.
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(2009) use this to compute average treatment effect (ATE) where the treatment is participation in
modern supply chains. Minten et al. (2009) only observe households who participate in contract
farming, and so they resort to comparing households who participate in contract farming with
households who do not participate in contract farming by constructing a control group from a
different data set. In general, these approaches rest on the assumption that selection into treatment,
i.e., participation in contract farming schemes, can be reliably based on observable characteristics
(Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
In many situations, this requires a leap of faith. A firm’s selection of farmers to contract with and
farmers’ own choices on whether to contract or not are driven by their attitudes to risk, perceptions
of the alternatives, and in the context of weak contract enforcement, on trustworthiness, reliability
or reputation, referred to sometimes as ‘social collateral’.2 These are typically unobserved by the
researcher, while firms and farmers tend to have relevant information or proxies in their information
sets. While this problem is redressed somewhat by obtaining more and better information from
surveys, alternate approaches provide ways to overcome this constraint.
In the Instrumental Variable (IV) approach, participation is instrumented for by a variable
that is correlated with participation but not with the welfare outcome of interest. However, IV
identification is still achieved only through the observable instruments, and hence inherits the same
problems of Propensity Score methods or Heckman models.
Naturally, each of these approaches has relative merits and demerits and none can be singled
out as the best across contexts. The selection on observables design, for instance, enables richer
treatment of the selection process, often a question of considerable importance in its own right. On
the other hand, where the survey data do not contain enough detailed information on drivers of
selection, this can jeopardize the credibility of the results. In such cases, a selection on unobservables
design is probably preferable.
The efficacy of these approaches invariably depends on the choice of an instrument that enables
identification of the parameters of the model. As Bellemare (2010) elucidates, many instruments
that have been used can be faulted for possibly being endogenous to the outcomes studied. Miyata
2Ch 8 discusses aspects of the selection process in detail.
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et al. (2009) treat the distance between a respondents farm and the farm of the village chief as an
instrument. Rao and Qaim (2011) use farmer group membership to serve as an instrument and
Simmons et al. (2005) choose number of organizations farmers are members of as an instrument.
Other instruments include the number of female laborers in the respondents household as well as
a dummy for whether a female in the household is a member of a womens organization (Maertens
and Swinnen, 2009). Bellemare (2010) makes innovative use of an experiment, deriving farmer
willingness to pay (WTP) for a certain return from a randomly drawn level of investment. Across
methods, the central challenge is to find an appropriate instrument that can break any correlation
between selection and the unexplained variation in welfare outcomes. At the same time, instruments
constructed in experimental settings need to be appropriate to the structural process of selection.
For example, if WTP (for insurance, i.e., a certain income) is used to instrument for participation,
the implicit assumption is that contracting offers a certain income, or at least insurance relative
to no contract. If, as Chapter 7 suggests, however, contracting itself is something of a gamble,
the instrument loses intuitive appeal, although its correlation with participation, even if spurious,
could still contribute to identification.
9.2.1 Estimation strategy
The particular context of my work makes it imperative to spell out in detail the nature of welfare
comparisons between contract and non-contract farmers. A reliable estimate of its impact hinges
on the construction of an appropriate and valid counterfactual, which needs to be defined rigorously
but in ways that faithfully factor in the empirical context.
In general, it is hard in the case of cotton, papaya and gherkins to separate the contracting
effect from the cropping pattern effect. Farmers who participate and are selected are committing to
both a mode of production and/or transaction and simultaneously to growing a new crop. Gherkin
has no alternate spot market. A majority of cotton farmers in the study region express that the
only way they would grow cotton is if it were under contract cultivation, preferring to grow tomato
otherwise. The same is true for papaya, where, if farmers were not contracting, they would opt for
other crops or other table varieties of papaya.
204
Even when there is an alternate domestic market, as in the case of marigold and broiler,
the definition of the counterfactual can be challenging. If the identity of firms matter, then the
treatment is not contract participation per se but contracting with one firm rather than another.
Given that contractual practice, or what is contractual and what is not, is fuzzy on many aspects,
if one admits the possibility that there is considerable diversity in the manner firms operate, even
with similar terms of contract, crop or destination, it no longer makes sense to speak of a generalized
notion of contracting.
Similarly, the counterfactual to contracting should ideally refer to farmers who supply to
precisely the same markets and for the same purpose. In the case of marigold for instance, the firm
contracts for extraction and the non-contract farmers sell in the fresh flower market, conflating these
two implies that it is no longer clear if the welfare gains record the gains from distinguishing use or
destination or whether it measures incremental benefits from contracting versus not contracting.
It is essential therefore to distinguish between concluding that contracting benefits small farmers
and concluding that supplying to export markets is more lucrative than to domestic markets.
The recent literature on supermarket participation makes this distinction clear by framing the
question differently, asking if farmers benefit from participating in modern supply chains rather
than traditional channels (Minten et al., 2009; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009).3
Furthermore, even with comparisons for the same crop between contracting and a traditional
channel, given the crop has the same use across channels, the character of the local market can
be transformed by the presence of contracting on a large scale and this leads to different kinds of
empirical problems, so that the general equilibrium effect on the local market can alter the returns
to non-participants as well.
Thus, whenever contracting appears jointly with some other distinguishing characteristic, either
in terms of destination, end use or varietal difference, the challenge is to measure of welfare impact
3In the context of India, there are several examples that suggest supplying for export markets yield higher returns
than serving domestic markets. A study of Mahagrapes showed that profits earned per acre per annum by contract
growers were nearly 38 percent higher than that for non-contract growers mainly because Mahagrapes serves global
markets, and hence prices received are almost three times higher than in the local markets (Narrod et al., 2009).A
similar case study of contract grape growers in Andhra Pradesh, also supplying the export market, showed that
contract growers received 55 percent higher net returns than supplying to the domestic markets (Dev and Rao, 2005).
For gherkins growers in Andhra Pradesh in 2004-05, returns over variable costs were 30 percent higher than for other
vegetable crops (Dev and Rao, 2005).
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of contracting per se, delinked from other coincidental attributes. In general, it is extremely difficult
to isolate these impacts in survey data. This problem permeates each of the commodity sectors
that is the subject of study.
The need to deal with this problem leads me to the following approach. The welfare metric I
propose is net profit per acre. For contract farmers, whether or not it is the subject firm, this is
the net profit per acre under the contract crop and for non-contract farmers, it is the net profit
per acre either under the contract crop for an alternate market or under the crop they have chosen
to be the closest substitute for the contract crop. This refers to the income earned from all main
and byproducts of cultivation minus all paid out costs. This approach of accounting for costs is
somewhat different from the cost concepts traditionally used in India (presented in Table 9.1). I
combine a subset of components from A1 and A2, while adding a few others. First, fixed costs
were not apportioned and rent on own land, farm assets and costs of family owned labor were
not imputed. Second, transactions costs, specifically those included in transport and marketing
were accounted for, given that this is often an important source of gains for contract farmers. The
constituents of net profit per acre for the contract commodities in this study are presented in Table
9.2.4 Farmers were thus simply asked for the net income they were left with per unit area of
production at the end of the season, after paying out all production and transactions costs for the
entire season, including multiple harvests.5
An exclusive focus on net profit per acre as a welfare measure, i.e. the assumption of separability,
can be faulted for not taking the entire context of household decisions, the particular place of the
contract commodity in a portfolio of crops or of its impact on other aspects of welfare. However,
given that eliciting reliable data on incomes from households is notoriously difficult in the context
of the study area, this was not pursued. Further, it is typical for farmers to treat the contract
commodity as a cash crop substitute so that they allocate acreage either to the contract commodity
4For other crops, cited by farmers, as the next best alternative, the same components of costs are used and
depending on the nature of the crop, the income is either from sale of flower, fruit or vegetable.
5An alternate welfare metric involves net profit per acre after accounting for imputed costs of family labor,
depreciation of machinery and equipment, and fixed investments, including interest on working capital. Depreciation
on fixed investment is set at 20% and on equipment at 10% following practice established by the Commission on
Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) in India. This measure involves making a range of strong assumptions on
parameters used to derive these and is hence not used as a welfare metric in this study. In general, imputed costs
pose particular problems for empirical research .
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Table 9.1: Cost Concepts
Cost Concept Includes
A1 All actual expenses in cash and kind incurred in production by the producer. The items
covered in cost A1 are costs on: (i) hired human labor, (ii) hired bullock labor, (iii)
owned bullock labor, (iv) home produced/purchased seed, (v) plant protection chemicals,
(vi) home produced/purchased manure, (vii) fertilizers, (viii) insecticides and pesticides,
(ix) depreciation on farm machinery, equipment and farm building, (x) irrigation, (xi) land
revenue, land development tax and other taxes, (xii) interest on working capital, (xiii) interest
on crop loan, and (xiv) miscellaneous expenses.
A2 Cost A1 + Rent paid for leased-in land
B Cost A1 + Interest on value of owned capital assets (excluding land)
B2 Cost B1 + Rental value of owned land (net of land revenue) and rent paid for leased-in land
C1 Cost B1 + Imputed value of family labor
C2 Cost B2 + Imputed value of family labor
C2 Cost C2 estimated by taking into account statutory or actual wage rate which ever is higher
C3 Cost C2+ 10 per cent of Cost C2 to (on account of managerial functions performed by farmer)
These concepts are defined by the Commission of Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP), Government of India.
Table 9.2: Computation of Net Profit per acre for Contract Commodities
Cost Concept Income Costs
Gherkins Income from sale of fruit Farm yard manure + Seeds + Micronutrients +Plant
protection+ Fertilizer application + Weeding + Land
preparation + Seedbed preparation + Seed treatment
+ Intercropping expenses (if any) + Transport Costs
+ Commission + Female hired labor + Male hired
labor
Marigold Income from sale of flower Same as above
Cotton Income from sale of kapas Same as above
Papaya Income from latex and fruit Same as above
Broiler Income from sale of bird, poul-
try manure
Medicines + Electricity + Water charges + Charcoal
+ Cleaning Costs + Supplementary feed + Hired labor
+ Transport + Commission
1 For broiler the chick and feed are provided by the firm across the industry, and hence does not constitute a cost incurred
by the firm.
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or to an alternate cash crop. The assumption that the contracting crop does not alter the essential
nature of the entire portfolio of crops is therefore reasonable in this case.
For all the commodities, the net profit per acre was obtained for the entire cropping season. The
aggregation over the season would account for multiple pickings or harvests and smoothen biases
introduced by price volatility over the season. While this contributes to aggregation bias, it also
makes inter-farmer comparisons more reliable. For perennials like papaya, data was obtained for the
most recent month and for broiler, for the most recent completed cycle (comprising six weeks from
chick to broiler). While farmers were typically encouraged to refer to any written accounts they had,
in most cases, farmers relied on recall. The detailed costs and returns was obtained according to
established protocols for collecting such data.6 This approach enables crosschecks, both internally
so that the different components derived through a detailed recording of quantity and price make
sense, as well as across farmers growing the same commodity or in the same geographic region to
ensure that such recall data was reliable.7
The other caveat, which holds for most studies of this nature, is that the net profit per acre
recorded in the year of survey is one draw from a distribution, as illustrated in Chapter 7. It
is therefore natural that these can be very different in different years, depending on a host of
exogenous conditions such as weather, pest pressure and external market conditions. There is also
a large variation across farmers. The results on welfare outcomes are therefore to be interpreted
with caution. In the context of the larger work, this is in fact illustrative of heterogeneity of farmer
experiences across time, contributing to the dynamics or life cycle of contracting schemes.
An endogenous switching regression (under known sample separation) offers a way to negotiate
the difficulty in separating out a cropping pattern effect from the contracting effect.8 The rationale
for this is that selection into contracting puts farmers in different groups, associated with different
profit streams. The survey data on net profits per acre collected for both contract and non-
contract farmers implies that I observe sample outcomes, or draws, from both profit streams or
6as presented in question Section E, questions 24, 26,15, 14 in schedules 1(A), 1(B), 1(C) and 1(D) respectively.
7I also had access to cost of cultivation studies that provided benchmarks as crosschecks.
8Maddala (1983) discusses the endogenous switching regression approach in detail.
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both regimes, presumably coming from different distributions. This is analogous to sorting into
different occupations or into public and private sector employment.
I assume that this sorting is potentially endogenous, driven at least in part by the difference in
the net profits per acre when contracting and not contracting.9 This separates the sample into two
streams, those that contract and those that do not. While this separation into two streams does
not help isolate the cropping pattern effect from the contracting effect, it is now possible to account
for specific elements of the contractual relationship to assess its impacts on the welfare metric for
those who are sorted into the ‘treatment’ group. For example, controlling for inputs or supervision
provided by the firm, etc., for those that are in the contracting regime, allows identification of the
impact of contractual elements, given that the farmer is participating in the growing of a contract
commodity. This approach is not only essential to overcome the difficulties in separating the crop
switching effect from the contracting effect but it also draws attention to an important aspect that
is often neglected in empirical work in contract farming. In estimating welfare metrics as functions
of farmer characteristics, it is possible to compare the returns to particular factors of production
across the two regimes. In other approaches that account for selection, since regimes are pooled
by construction, they mask the differential structure in returns to factors of production and other
covariates. In contrast, the switching regression approach allows for structural differences in the
relative determinants of profitability.
This approach has been used in a variety of contexts. Among the earliest is an application by
Lee (1978), examining the joint determination of the extent of unionism and the effects of unions
on wage rates. This accounts for the interdependence of union membership and wage gain, wherein
the latter can motivate workers to become members in the first place. Adamchik and Bedi (2000)
study wage differentials in public and private sectors in Poland, wherein the choice of sector is partly
determined by intersectoral wage differentials.Fuglie and Bosch (1995) study housing demand in
Spain as do Manrique and Ojah (2003) to study differences in rental prices. Cadot et al. (2006)
and Dutoit (2007) use this approach in the context of agriculture assessing the impact and ability
of farmers to switch regimes, from subsistence farming to commercial agriculture in Madagascar.
9Exogenous factors drive participation too in terms of the selection process adopted by the firm that rations out
farmers who might be willing to contract but are not offered contracts by the firm.
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Cai et al. (2008) applies this to contract farming in Thailand and Rao and Qaim (2011) look at
effect of supermarket participation on welfare of Kenyan farmers.
Suppose Y˜i represents a latent variable that marks the threshold that drives farmers to contract
or not. While this is typically regarded as the expected utility from participation, here, it is
treated as farmer i’s net welfare gain from participation in contracting relative to the next best
alternative. This latent subjective utility of a farmer i can be modeled as a function of covariates
comprising individual farmer characteristics and perceptions and other hypothesized determinants
of participation, denoted by Wi. As Chapter 7 elaborated, this includes not merely farmer
perceptions of contracting in terms of relative expected means, but also relative moments of a
higher order along with risk scores that capture perceptions of contracting that are difficult to
monetize. Wi also includes constraints imposed on participation by the firm, for example in the
firm’s choice of villages to work in. This then becomes the basis of sorting farmers into the regimes,
defining contracting status. Let Ii be the indicator variable representing contracting status (at the
time of survey) of farmer i. This is given by
Ii =
 1 iff Y˜i > 0,0 iff Y˜i ≤ 0
Y˜i = Wiα+ vi
The endogenous switching regression model then suggests that farmers who are seen to contract
face a welfare outcome Y1i from one distribution and those who do not contract face a draw Y2i
from possibly another distribution. The net profit per acre, the welfare outcome of interest, is
determined by a set of explanatory variables, X1i and X2i that could be different across regimes.
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Yi =
 Y1i iff Ii = 1,Yi2 iff Ii = 0
Y1i = X1iβ1 + u1i
Y2i = X2iβ2 + u2i
Y1i and Y2i are only partially observed, since the former is observed only for those belonging to
regime 1 and the latter only for those belonging to regime 2. What is observed is, in fact, Yi. This
set of equations describes in detail the structure of the model I estimate. The indicator variable
takes 1 or 0 for contracting status. This is driven by a latent variable, which is modeled as a
function of a set, Wi, of farmer specific characteristics, farmer perceptions of contracting as well as
the firm’s choice of regions from which to procure.
If Σ is the variance-covariance matrix for the error terms u1i, u2i and vi. The diagonal terms in
the matrix are the variances of the error terms, denoted by σ2j where j = 1, 2, v and the covariance
terms are given by σjl where j, l = 1, 2, v and j 6= l.
∑
=

σ21 . .
σ12 σ
2
2 .
σ1v σ2v σ
2
v

In this model, I assume that the following properties hold
(1) uji ∼ N(0, σ2j ), j = 1, 2
(2) vi ∼ N(0, σ2v)
(3) σ12 = 0
(4) σ2v = 1
Assumptions 1 and 2 are standard for Maximum Likelihood estimation methods, and the third
assumption comes from the fact Y1i and Y2i are never observed together. In fact, this cannot usually
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be estimated since it does not explicitly appear in the likelihood function and is usually treated as
being equal to 0. The last assumption is typically made since α can only ever be estimated up to
proportional scale.
We need to make additional assumptions here that
σ2v 6= 0
σ1v 6= 0
If these are zero, then there is exogenous switching. Typically this is tested via the correlation
coefficients 10
ρ1v =
σ1v
σ1σv
ρ2v =
σ2v
σ2σv
The efficient way to estimate this model is via Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML)
that estimates the entire set of equations at once.11 Lokshin and Sajaia (2004) develop a module
for implementation of this model in Stata.12 Once the parameters are estimated, it is possible to
calculate the following unconditional expectations,
E(Y1i|X1i) = X1iβ1
E(Y2i|X2i) = X2iβ2
10The notation used here is distinct from those used in Chapter 8 to denote probabilities of selection of contract
block, villages and farmers.
11The derivation of the likelihood function is presented in Appendix C.
12For a discussion see Dutoit (2008) and Lokshin and Sajaia (2004).
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and conditional expectations,
E(Y1i|Ii = 1, X1i) = X1iβ1 + σ1ρ1vλ1
E(Y2i|Ii = 1, X1i) = X1iβ2 + σ2ρ2vλ1
E(Y1i|Ii = 0, X2i) = X2iβ1 − σ1ρ1vλ2
E(Y2i|Ii = 0, X2i) = X2iβ2 − σ2ρ2vλ2
where,
λ1 =
φ(Wi
α
σv
)
Φ(Wi
α
σv
)
λ2 =
φ(Wi
α
σv
)
1− Φ(Wi ασv )
and represent the Inverse Mills’ Ratios. The functions φ and Φ represent normal distribution
and the cumulative normal distributions, respectively, associated with probit models.
This model structure offers an opportunity to examine two phenomena. First, it is possible to
compute treatment effects using the means. In particular, it is possible to compute the average
treatment effect among the treated (TOT). In the following equation,
E(Y1i|Ii = 1, X1i)− E(Y2i|Ii = 1, X1i) (9.1)
the mean of the left hand side variable is equal to the average difference between a sample contract
farmer’s average profitability under the contract and without the contract. A similar figure for
the non-contract farmers gives the average treatment effect for those not treated. If non-contract
farmers were able to contract, the average profitability premia is given by
E(Y1i|Ii = 0, X2i)− E(Y2i|Ii = 0, X2i) (9.2)
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Second, it is possible to investigate the pattern of sorting. Supposing the signs of the estimated
correlation alternate across the coefficients, it implies that farmers are in regimes that offer them
comparative advantage, so that, say, if ρ1v < 0 and ρ2v > 0, farmers with above average net income
in regime 1 (contracting) are associated with a higher likelihood of being in regime 1 (contracting)
and those earning a higher net profit not contracting are less likely to participate in contracting.
Alternatively, if both coefficients are negative, i.e., ρ1v < 0 and ρ2v < 0, there is what Fuglie and
Bosch (1995) refers to as hierarchical sorting, so that those in regime 1 have better than average
net profits in both regimes, but are better off in regime 1. Those in regime 2 face below average
profits in both regimes, but are better off in regime 1. If, on the other hand, ρ1v > 0 and ρ2v < 0 it
represents a situation where, regime 1 farmers would actually have below average profitability with
their status quo but would have above average gains in regime 2 and those in regime 2 have above
average performance in regime 1 but below average performance in regime 2. The last possibility,
when ρ1v > 0 and ρ2v > 0, implies that farmers in regime 1 have higher than average profitability
whether they contract or not, whether they are in regime 1 or 2, and hence have absolute advantage.
From the perspective of implementing this approach, the endogenous switching model comes
with a few caveats. First, it assumes joint normality of errors. Normality is often a stringent
requirement and does not necessarily hold.13 Further, the identification of the model comes through
variables in the participation equation that influence participation but not the welfare outcome.
The challenge is therefore to find a set of such variables. The next section discusses the nature of
comparisons for each of the commodities and describes the variables used in the estimation of the
model in detail.
13Min (2007), for instance use a nonparametric test to show that in the specific context of his empirical work,
the assumption of normality is untenable. Choi and Min (2009) then propose a method for a more general class of
distributions (Johnson’s s-normal) and explore Korean housing demand.
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9.3 The Nature of Comparisons and Variables Used
The welfare metric I use is net profit per acre per month for the field crops and net profit per
month per 5000 birds for broiler.14 The treatment effect is computed as the change in this variable
associated with a change in contracting status, conditional on covariates.
For each scheme, the treatment group constitutes all contract farmers for that particular
commodity, implying that they contract with either the subject firm or for any other firm. The
Farmer Survey sampled non-contract farmers specifically for each of the five contracting schemes
studied, as described in the Appendix A. I am able to pool all the commodity or scheme-specific
non-contract farmers across the schemes to form a larger control group, given that the welfare metric
and the explanatory variables collected were common across schemes. In other words, the relevant
comparison group for gherkins, for instance, is not only the control group sampled specifically
within the gherkins contracting scheme (or commodity /scheme-specific controls) but includes the
non-contracting farmers sampled in the marigold, papaya and broiler as well (pooled controls). This
is possible because there are no overlapping identities, i.e., there is no case where a farmer who is
not a contract farmer with respect to one commodity is a contract farmer for another commodity.
The control group for the treatment for each commodity is therefore the pooled sample of farmers
who do not contract with either the subject firm(s) or any other firm. Non-contract growers of
poultry are however excluded from the control group, since these include broiler producers, would
alter the composition of the control groups substantially.
Figures 9.1, 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4 map the distributions of monthly net profits for contract farmers for
each contracting scheme sampled in Phase 2.15 The figures also graph the distributions of monthly
net profits for two comparison or control groups : (1) a scheme or commodity-specific control
group and (2) the pooled control group that pools control groups from all the contracting schemes
studied, including the scheme-specific control group. This latter group represents all farmers not
contracting at all from across schemes. For example, Figures 9.1 portrays the distribution of net
profits for gherkins contract farmers (first, for the subject firm alone, and the second, for any firm),
14This is for a 5000 square feet shed space, that is considered a standard scale for broiler farmers in the region, by
broiler contracting firms.
15The treatment effect is computed only for the sample from Phase 2.
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the net profits for the gherkins-control and also the distribution of net profits for pooled control
that includes the gherkin, marigold, papaya and broiler control group. From the broiler control
group, only those farmers are included, who do not grow poultry and grow a field crop. For each of
these commodities, it is apparent that these unconditional distributions of net profits per month are
different for contract farmers (the treatment group) and non-contract farmers (the control group).
This is valid for both the commodity specific control group as well as the pooled group.
In the case of papaya and broiler, the net profit distribution for contract farmers is starkly
different from that for the non-contract farmers. Comparisons for broiler deserve special attention.
The broiler control group includes farmers who do not grow poultry. Since growing a field crop
and growing poultry are quite different, the control group turns out to be heterogeneous, although
the monthly net profits for those who do not grow poultry has been scaled down to an area area
of 5000 square feet.16 As a result of this, when the control groups from other commodities are
pooled, there is a marked difference in distributions. Despite the fact that including non poultry
growers in the control group implies comparisons across very different categories, in the context of a
regime switching model, this yields special insight. Broiler farmers often require heavy investment
in fixed assets (sheds to house the birds, feeders, drinkers, etc.) that work as barriers to entry. Most
farmers convert farmland to broiler sheds. Those who are unable to do this are invariably resigned
to continuing cultivation of field crops. In this context, the particular nature of comparison makes
sense.
Table 9.3 presents the Kolomogorov-Smirnov tests for comparing distributions. Consistently, the
distributions of returns for contract farmers (whether they contract exclusively for the subject firm
or for any firm) is statistically significantly different from those of the control groups, irrespective of
whether the comparison is restricted to a commodity specific control group of non-contract farmers
or to the entire pool of non-contract farmers.
For a pooled control group to be a valid basis for comparing welfare gains, there needs to be
an instrument or a set of instruments that is/are correlated with non-participation for both the
16The underlying assumption is that farmers who do not grow poultry would use the farmland to grow other field
crops.
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Figure 9.1: Distribution of Net Profit per month for Gherkins Contract and Non-contract farmers
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Figure 9.2: Distribution of Net Profit per month for Marigold Contract and Non-contract farmers
Figure 9.3: Distribution of Net Profit per month for Papaya Contract and Non-contract farmers
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Figure 9.4: Distribution of Net Profit per month for Broiler Contract and Non-contract farmers
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Table 9.3: Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of net profit distribution functions
Commodity D p-value
Gherkins
Subject contracting firm
Contract with subject gherkin firm versus commodity-specific control farmers 0.315 0.02∗∗∗
Contract with subject gherkin firm versus all control farmers 0.266 0.01∗∗∗
Any contracting firm
Contract with any gherkins firm versus commodity-specific control farmers 0.275 0.04∗∗
Contract with any gherkins firm versus all control farmers 0.222 0.01∗∗∗
Marigold
Contract with subject marigold firm versus commodity-specific control farmers 0.273 0.01∗∗∗
Contract with subject marigold firm versus all control farmers 0.209 0.03 ∗∗∗
Papaya
Contract with subject papaya firm versus commodity-specific control farmers 0.491 0 ∗∗∗
Contract with subject papaya firm versus all control farmers 0.662 0∗∗∗
Broiler
Subject contracting firm
Contract with subject broiler firm versus other commodity-specific control farmers 1.000 0.00∗∗∗
Contract with subject broiler firm versus all control farmers 1.000 0.00 ∗∗∗
Any contracting firm
Contract with any broiler firm versus commodity-specific control farmers 1.000 0.00∗∗∗
Contract with any broiler firm versus all control farmers 1.000 0.00∗∗∗
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 Farmer Survey, Phase 2.
2 The distribution for which the tests are conducted refer to net profit per acre in Rs./month for gherkins, papaya and
marigold.
3 The distribution for which the tests are conducted refer to net profit in Rs./month for 5000 birds or 5000 square feet of
space.
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commodity-specific control group as well as for the pooled control group, but not with the welfare
metric of interest.
The instrument I use is a variable that is constructed by an interaction of an individual farmer’s
coefficient of absolute risk aversion elicited though experiments recording the bid price of a risky, fair
bet17 with the coefficient of variation of the spot or alternate market price of the contract commodity
for which the model is estimated.18 The higher the farmer’s risk aversion or the coefficient of
variation of spot market price for a commodity, the greater would be the propensity of the farmer
to opt to contract. There is no strong argument to suggest that the coefficient of variation in the
price of a commodity influences net profit per acre. While it is possible that absolute risk aversion
coefficients might indicate a farmer’s preference for risk that might impact farming practice and
hence net profits, the fact that it is interacted with price variability that is set in the regional
markets breaks this relationship. Further, it is an absolute number that allows for pooling farmers
who might grow different crops. I also control for the possibility that farmers are not afforded the
opportunity to contract with the contracting firm by using the number of contract hamlets in the
block where the respondent is located. If, as Chapter 8 suggests, firms select spatially, this would
control for the sample contracting firm’s locational preference for sourcing supplies. Region fixed
effects were ineffective since often the choice of contract regions coincides with schemes, or social
group. Hence the number of hamlets was chosen over region dummy variables. In fact, this scores
over the use of region dummy variable, since it captures the variation in the intensity of a firm’s
presence within a particular region. This cannot serve as an instrument since firms would choose
regions that are more suitable for growing the contract commodity and hence does influence the
welfare metric, but it is important to control for spatial selection in order to admit the validity of
the pooled control group as a basis for comparison.
In addition, I use a set of instruments for the commodity specific control group that reflect
17This was obtained from maximum price farmers would be willing to pay for a lottery that would fetch them, with
equal probability, an amount equivalent to two days of wages for a male unskilled agricultural laborer (rs.300)or one
day’s wage for an unskilled male worker (Rs.150). These are from questions 63, 65, 51, 38 in 1(A), 1(B), 1(C) and
1(D) respectively.
18The prices for marigold and papaya were collected from secondary data and for gherkins and broiler, the
distribution of actual realized prices obtained by the non-subject firm growers in the survey season was used, as
presented in Chapter 7.
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farmer perceptions of contracting relative to the next best alternative (Chapter 7). In the Farmer
Survey, I elicit subjective distributions of net profits per acre that farmers associate with contracting
versus the next best alternative that they have nominated. Relative moments of these subjective
distributions and stochastic dominance between them presumably influence whether they want to
contract or not. In addition, risk scores from psychometric mapping of risks that include those
that influence subjective perceptions of returns and those that are harder to express in monetary
terms (for example, impact on health, the notion of self-respect, etc.) indicate the net incremental
risk farmers associate with contracting with the firm in question.19 These variables are summary
measures that incorporate risk attitudes, assessments of farmers’ abilities and expectations with
regard to uncertainties of nature, among other things. In particular, it represents the net
incremental risk a farmer associates with contracting (net, because it factors in both the risk and
benefits to contracting, incremental, because the net risk from not contracting is subtracted from
the score) and hence indicates a farmer’s inclination towards contracting. Clearly, these perceptions
of relative benefits and risks of contracting over alternatives potentially drives selection, but cannot
determine net returns per acre, and can be used as instruments for identification.
There is a case to be made however of potential endogeneity, that the current outcome influences
perceptions, given that the survey collects information for these after realization of net profits that
season. I would argue that this endogeneity is weak at best. First, subjective distributions of profits
were elicited for a twenty season time frame, and for a typical year, so that while the most recent
experience is surely incorporated, it is unlikely to drive the responses overwhelmingly. Also, the
measures used in the selection equation are relative measures, of contracting and not contracting,
so that the influence of the most recent experience is further muted.
Figure 9.5 plots the range of subjective net profits per acre per month elicited in the survey
alongside the actual net returns, for contract and non-contract farmers. Whenever the range bar
straddles the line of equality, the actual or realized net profit that season falls within the range of
subjective expectations. It is evident that in a number of cases, observations lie outside the ‘typical’
range expected by farmers, indicating that the most recent actual outcome has not overwhelmingly
19The Combined Risk Score is used here. It weights each relevant attribute by the stated frequency of occurrence
as well as the criticality of the attribute to the farmer’s sense of well-being. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 7.
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influenced the range of typical subjective returns. Had that been the case, one would expect the
actual outcomes to fall within the range for most farmers. In other words, if the season of the
survey happened to be an extraordinarily good or bad year for the farmer, the figure suggests
that farmers have not incorporated this in their assessments of subjective distributions of typical
returns, suggesting that the instruments for identification are reliable.
In the case of poultry, I use, additionally, fixed costs on infrastructure as a driver of selection.
As mentioned, the sunk cost in often an entry barrier and hence impacts selection. Also, total
investment in shed only sets the scale of operations, while there are no scale economies associated
with the range of shed space farmers in the region can possibly achieve, implying that scale of
investment cannot contribute to net profit per area operated. Furthermore, there is not much
difference in the quality of these fixed investments that might affect net profits. It is difficult too to
argue that it might be endogenous since the investment has already taken place, and is influenced by
perceptions of incremental risk at the time of the investment and not influenced by current welfare
outcomes. By the same logic, I use investment in irrigation facility in the selection equation for
papaya, controlling for land owned that influences the ability to make such investments.20 Together,
the instruments capture essential elements for a specific non-contract farmer to serve as a control
group for any of the contract commodities.
In the selection equation that sorts farmers into different regimes, apart from these instruments,
I include specific farm and household characteristics, when it is of particular relevance to the
contract commodity. Implicitly, these capture variables that are associated with attributes firms
might be concerned about when choosing farmers and those that represent farmer willingness to
contract. The attempt in this chapter is not to model the selection process, which was dealt with
in Chapter 8.
For the outcome equation, I use a hybrid of a traditional production/profit function approach
with those more commonly used in studies in contract farming. This is in part to judge the relative
strength of association between inputs and profits across the two regimes, and to account fully for
20This is collected in the survey through a very question as to whether the farmer undertook any investment
specifically to be enable to contract for papaya, so that this irrigation investment is not a generic investment but can
be regarded as sunk cost for initiating contract farming in papaya.
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Figure 9.5: Comparing expectations and outcome
the fact that in the commodities studied contract growing almost always involves higher intensity
of input use, be it family labor or fertilizers and pesticides. The outcome, net profit per acre,
is treated as a function of the total area under contract cultivation, application of human labor,
use of fertilizers (both chemical and farm yard manure), plant protection chemicals. It is also a
function of farmer and farm characteristics that might be associated with entrepreneurial abilities,
experience and so on.
The estimated model varies across commodities in terms of the set of explanatory variables
used. This was driven, in part, by what seemed relevant to the particular commodity. Farmer
characteristics include age, social group, some indicator of education, either of the farmer or of the
most educated member of the household, land owned, and distance from the nearest road. The
availability of irrigation is represented by either the proportion of land irrigated or by an indicator
variable for whether the farmer is dependent on rain. In the equation for outcomes, depending
on the crop, input use, labor days over the season, of both hired and family labor is invariably
included. Supervision enters in some cases as a binary variable. This is derived from the number of
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visits over the entire cropping season or growing cycle, since the use of the latter yielded unstable
coefficients. If there has been any supervision at all in the past season, the variable carries a value
of one and zero otherwise. Not all the variables are used in all the equations. Tables 9.4, 9.5, 9.6
and 9.7 present the summary statistics of the variables used in the models.
The models correct for heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are clustered at the village level
to account for correlation in the errors. This model is run to gauge treatment effects and not to
study the correlates of selection, which have been addressed in detail in Chapter 8. Hence, the
inclusion of variables, other than the instruments, to account for selection have broad relevance
but are not meant to to be rigorous specifications of covariates of selection. The results of the
estimation are presented for each commodity in Tables 9.8, 9.9,9.10 and 9.11. For gherkins and
broiler, the relevant treatment group includes all farmers who contract, and not restricted to just
the subject firm.
9.4 Estimated Treatment Effects
Table 9.12 shows the average treatment effect for both the treated (contract farmers) as well as
for the untreated (non-contract farmers). The treatment effect is measured as the incremental net
profit per month in rupees (Rs.). For the former, it represents the average difference between the
expected net profit for contract farmers and what they would have earned had they not contracted.
For the latter, it represents the average difference in expected net profit for non-contract farmers had
they been contracting and the expected net profit when not contracting.21 These are computed for
the commodity-specific sample to ensure tighter comparisons and for the pooled sample to enable
a broader comparison. The table also shows the standard deviation of the distribution of the
estimated treatment effects to emphasize that notwithstanding the sign of the average, particular
farmers might gain significantly from contracting whereas others might be significantly worse off
with contracting. The variation is in part reflective of the large variations in the predicted net profits
21As mentioned, for gherkins and broiler, the treatment group represents contract farmers who contract with either
the subject firm or any other firm.
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Table 9.8: Gherkins: Endogenous Switching Model
Dependent variable: Net profit per acre per month (Rs.)
Variable Coefficient Robust Stan-
dard Error
z-statistic
Regime 1: Contracting with any firm
Percentage of cultivated land that is irrigated
Land owned (acres) 79.12 44.26 1.79 ∗
Distance from surfaced road (kms.) 1431.78 626.44 2.29 ∗∗
Total hired labor (days) 34.26 38.13 0.90
Total family labor (days) 56.59 24.58 2.30 ∗∗
Age (years) 32.88 83.74 0.39
Plant protection (liters) -1.64 3.26 -0.50
Fertilizer application (kgs.) -2.85 4.85 -0.59
(D) Family member has post-secondary education -819.09 1269.06 -0.65
Constant -7272.07 2665.34 -2.73 ∗∗∗
Regime 2: Not contracting with any firm
Land owned (acres) -24.52 23.61 -1.04
Distance from surfaced road (kms.) 51.14 134.46 0.38
Total hired labor (days) 10.17 11.59 0.88
Total family labor (days) 8.02 16.7 0.48
Plant protection (liters) 2.04 0.89 2.29 ∗∗
Fertilizer application (kgs.) 1.78 1.85 0.96
(D) Family member finished schooling -908.66 1217.62 -0.75
Age (years) -41.6 44.31 -0.94
Constant 4515.43 2018.73 2.24 ∗∗
Regime selection
Land owned (acres) -0.02 0.02 -1.00
Distance from surfaced road (kms.) 0.03 0.04 0.75
Total hired labor (days) 0.0132105 0.0044574 2.96 ∗∗∗
Total family labor (days) 0.0199565 0.0040036 4.98 ∗∗∗
Age (years) -0.04 0.02 -2.00 ∗∗
Plant protection (liters) -0.0001685 0.0004513 -0.37
Fertilizer application (kgs.) 0.0010447 0.0004734 2.21 ∗∗
(D) Family member finished schooling -1.24 0.54 -2.30 ∗∗
Combined risk score X Dummy for Gherkins 0.0007893 0.0010128 0.78
Risk aversion to open market prices 4.87 1.32 3.69 ∗∗∗
Ratio of mean returns from contracting over next best alternative -0.06 0.04 -1.50 ∗
Number of contract hamlets in block 0.12 0.03 4.00 ∗∗∗
Constant -8.52 2.26 -3.77 ∗∗∗
Mills’ Ratio Regime 1 (mean) 2.9
Mill’s Ratio Regime 2 (mean) 0.46
N 261
Wald chi2(8) 71.02
Prob > chi2 0.00 ∗∗∗
Log pseudolikelihood -2682.57
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 (D) means dummy variable taking on the value 1 when the variable is true and 0 otherwise.
2 FOSD means contracting first order stochastic dominates next best alternative.
3 SOSD means contracting second order stochastic dominates next best alternative.
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Table 9.9: Marigold: Endogenous Switching Model
Dependent variable: Net profit per acre per month (Rs.)
Variable Coefficient Robust Stan-
dard Error
z-statistic
Regime 1: Contracting with sample firm
(D) Rainfed farm 160.53 381.13 0.42
Fertilizer application (kgs.) 15.16 5.07 2.99 ∗∗∗
Land owned (acres) 45.97 42.43 1.08
Distance from surfaced road (kms.) -53.33 106.89 -0.50
Total hired labor (days) -0.44 3.25 -0.14
Total family labor (days) 122.96 52.25 2.35 ∗∗
Age (years) 19 17.95 1.06
(D) Family Education (1=Illiterate) -32.46 350.2 -0.09
Constant -4274.66 1741.75 -2.45 ∗∗
Regime 2: Not contracting with sample firm
Land owned (acres) -17.32 17.04 -1.02
(D) Rainfed 1544.48 1040.3 1.48
Fertilizer application (kgs.) 0.6 1.09 0.55
Distance from surfaced road (kms.) 71.52 139.22 0.51
Total hired labor (days) 10.63 10.28 1.03
Total family labor (days) 7.32 7.28 1.01
(D) Family illiterate -750.48 2689.73 -0.28
Age (years) -28.89 35.39 -0.82
Constant 2562.74 2144.39 1.20
Regime selection
(D) Rainfed 1.38 0.77 1.79 ∗
Fertilizer application -0.003 0.001 -1.93 ∗
Land owned (acres) 0.05 0.02 2.50 ∗∗∗
Distance from surfaced road (kms.) -0.02 0.01 -2.00 ∗
Total hired labor (days) 0.00 0.00 1.07
Total family labor (days) 0.03 0.01 3.00 ∗∗∗
Age (years) 0.01 0.01 1.00
(D) Family illiterate 0.02 0.33 0.06
Combined risk score X Marigold Scheme dummy -0.01 0.00 -3.31 ∗∗∗
Risk aversion to open market prices -0.1 0.16 -0.63
Difference in skewness -0.06 0.19 -0.32
(D) FOSD -1.13 0.66 -1.71 ∗
(D) SOSD 1.19 0.59 2.02 ∗∗
Ratio of mean returns -0.15 0.16 -0.94
Number of contract hamlets in block 1.21 0.36 3.36 ∗∗∗
Constant -7.89 2.75 -2.87 ∗∗∗
Mills’ Ratio Regime 1 (mean) 3.83
Mill’s Ratio Regime 2 (mean) 0.31
N 267
Log pseudo-likelihood -2675.51
Wald chi2(8) 23.51
Prob > chi2 0.003∗∗∗
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 (D) means dummy variable taking on the value 1 when the variable is true and 0 otherwise.
2 FOSD means contracting first order stochastic dominates next best alternative.
3 SOSD means contracting second order stochastic dominates next best alternative.
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Table 9.10: Papaya: Endogenous Switching Model
Dependent variable: Net profit per acre per month (Rs.)
Variable Coefficient Robust
Standard Error
z-statistic
Regime 1: Contracting with sample firm
Percentage of cultivated land that is irrigated 7.95 22.63 0.35
Land owned (acres) -210.92 107.13 -1.97 ∗∗
Distance from surfaced road (kms.) 914.22 404.54 2.26 ∗∗
(D) Supervision -656.35 1343.36 -0.49
Total hired labor (days) -1.2 5.65 -0.21
Total family labor (days) -8.5 14.9 -0.57
Age (years) -22.78 48.92 -0.47
Plant protection (liters) 1.87 0.58 3.22 ∗∗∗
(D) Family illiterate -5441.89 2242.54 -2.43 ∗∗
(D) Scheduled Caste/Tribe 1904.13 1501.49 1.27
Number of crops grown annually per acre 455.33 952.15 0.48
Constant 9405.84 3986.8 2.36 ∗∗
Regime 2: Not contracting with sample firm
Land owned (acres) -16.6 13.36 -1.24
Percentage of cultivated land that is irrigated 55.28 15.77 3.51 ∗∗∗
Distance from surfaced road (kms.) 47.65 110.31 0.43
Total hired labor (days) -2.92 14.03 -0.21
Plant protection (liters) 1.43 0.83 1.72 ∗
Total family labor (days) 20.31 10.49 1.94 ∗
(D) Scheduled Caste/Tribe -6141.49 1342.13 -4.58 ∗∗∗
(D) Family member finished primary school -1625.52 1001.63 -1.62
Age (years) 13.14 40.15 0.33
(D) District 2 5259.96 1726.09 3.05 ∗∗∗
(D) District 1 1810.08 1258.55 1.44
Number of crops grown annually per acre -313.28 287.79 -1.09
Constant -4038.88 2458.45 -1.64
Regime selection
Percentage of cultivated land that is irrigated 0.01 0.01 1.00 ∗
Distance from surfaced road (kms.) 0.01 0.03 0.33
(D) Supervision -2.35 0.49 -4.80 ∗∗∗
Total hired labor (days) 0.00 0.00 -0.32
Total family labor (days) 0.01 0.00 2.94 ∗∗∗
Age (years) 0.005 0.02 0.23
Plant protection 0.0004 0.00 1.90 ∗
(D) Family illiterate -0.99 0.44 -2.25 ∗∗
(D) Scheduled Caste/Tribe 0.38 0.42 0.90
Number of crops grown annually per acre -0.94 0.31 -3.03 ∗∗∗
Land owned (acres) 0.06 0.05 1.20
(D) Family member finished primary school -0.79 0.48 -1.65 ∗
(D) District 2 8.68 5.27 1.65 ∗
(D) District 1 9.91 5.31 1.87 ∗
Combined risk score X Papaya dummy -0.0009224 0.0016392 -0.56
Risk aversion to open market prices -0.57 0.23 -2.48 ∗∗
Ratio of coefficient of variation in returns 2.52 1.82 1.38
Difference in Skewness 0.06 0.23 0.26
(D) FOSD -0.48 0.71 -0.68
(D) SOSD 0.52 0.76 0.68
Ratio of mean returns -0.51 0.23 -2.22 ∗∗
Sunk Cost (Rs.‘0000 ) 0.222 0.115 1.93 ∗
Number of contract hamlets in block 0.18 0.13 1.38
Constant -7.54 6.23 -1.21
Mills’ Ratio Regime 1 (mean) 4.44
Mill’s Ratio Regime 2 (mean) 0.48
Number of observations 267
Log pseudolikelihood -2712.45
Wald chi2(11) = 438
Prob >chi2 = 0.00∗∗∗
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 (D) means dummy variable taking on the value 1 when the variable is true and 0 otherwise.
2 FOSD means contracting first order stochastic dominates next best alternative.
3 SOSD means contracting second order stochastic dominates next best alternative.
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Table 9.11: Broiler: Endogenous Switching Model
Dependent variable: Net profit per acre per month (Rs.)
Variable Coefficient Robust Stan-
dard Error
z-statistic
Regime 1: Contracting with any firm
Land owned (acres) -48.87 25.49 -1.92 ∗
Percentage of cultivated land that is irrigated 10.38 5.65 1.84 ∗
Distance from surfaced road (kms.) 153.95 129.87 1.19
Age (years) 13.15 14.86 0.88
Total hired labor (days) 4.38 2.15 2.04 ∗∗
Total family labor (days) 21.41 3.57 6.00 ∗∗∗
Constant 7935.9 981.34 8.09 ∗∗∗
Regime 2: Not contracting with any firm
Age (years) 5.02 5.87 0.86
Land owned (acres) 10.57 3.5 3.02 ∗∗∗
Percentage of cultivated land that is irrigated 9.7 2.04 4.75 ∗∗∗
Total hired labor (days) 1.56 1.29 1.21
Total family labor (days) 0.77 0.89 0.87
Distance from surfaced road (kms.) 3.83 13.05 0.29
Constant -507.39 299.88 -1.69 ∗
Regime selection
Land owned (acres) 0.04 0.65 0.06
Percentage of cultivated land that is irrigated -0.03 0.14 -0.21
Distance from surfaced road (kms.) -0.75 2.58 -0.29
Age (years) -0.01 0.25 -0.04
Total hired labor (days) 0 0.08 0.00
Total family labor (days) 0.01 0.12 0.08
Combined risk score X Broiler dummy -0.01 0.0046 -2.17 ∗∗
Risk aversion to open market prices 0.68 3.97 0.17
Sunk cost (Rs. ‘0000) 0.894 9.683 0.09
Number of contract hamlets 0 11.26 0.00
Constant -2.9 102.16 -0.03
Mills’ Ratio Regime 1 (mean) 3.99
Mill’s Ratio Regime 2 (mean) 0.69
N 289
Log likelihood -2431.53
Wald chi2(6) 55.76
Prob > chi2 0 ∗∗∗
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 (D) means dummy variable taking on the value 1 when the variable is true and 0 otherwise.
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earned in the season surveyed and partly from similar variations in the estimated counterfactuals
as in Equations 9.1 and 9.2.
The findings differ across schemes. In the case of gherkins and marigold, the treatment effect
on both the treated and untreated is negative, implying that contracting leaves both contract
and non-contract farmers worse off in terms of net profit per acre per month. Gherkins contract
farmers have earned, on average, a lower net profit per month by virtue of choosing to contract.
Had they not, they would have, on average, earned, close to one and a half times their net profit
from contracting. Marigold farmers could have earned a return that was fifty percent higher than
their net profit from contracting had they not grown for the sample firm.
For the commodity-specific control group of non-contract farmers, the results suggest that non-
participating farmers are better off that way, and contracting either for gherkins or marigold would
leave them worse off. To put these results in perspective, those who did not grow gherkins often
grew tomato or other horticultural crops, which fetched the farmers particularly good returns this
season. As for marigold, as Chapter 11 describes in detail, the price in the fresh flower market often
shoots up and is typically higher than the contract price. The negative treatment effect reflects,
in all likelihood, this effect. It is important to note that this is an average across farmers and also
picks data for just one season, so that it only represents a snapshot view, that is not necessarily
robust.
For broiler and papaya, contracting increases net profits on average, for both contract farmers
and those not currently contracting. Papaya contract farmers would have foregone 37% of their
current net profits had they chosen not to contract for papaya, broiler growers would have lost
one and a half times their average net earnings had they not opted to contract. For those not
participating, entering papaya contracting would enhance a non-participating farmer’s net profit
by 47% and if non-contract farmers were to take up contracting with the sample firm for broiler,
they would earn net profits that are more 123% higher.
In the gherkins contracting scheme, ρ1v is positive and statistically significant. This indicates
that farmers who contract for gherkins have a absolute advantage in participating. They tend
to have a higher than average net profit whether or not they are contracting. In the broiler
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contracting scheme, there is clear evidence of hierarchical sorting. Both ρ1v and ρ2v are negative
and statistically significant. This indicates that those who contract have better than average profits,
irrespective of whether they contract or not, but are better off when contracting. Those who do
not contract face below average profits in both regimes, and would be better off contracting. This
is indicative of exclusion of ‘low ability’ farmers. Papaya is similar to broiler in that both ρ1v
and ρ2v are negative but neither is statistically significant indicating that selection is potentially
exogenous. The coefficient of correlation is not statistically significant for marigold and hence, here
too selection is possibly exogenous. This is broadly consistent with the current operational status
of the schemes, as evident from interviews with agribusinesses. For example, for the marigold
scheme, the contracting arrangements are not tight in the sense that sidesale to the spot market is
very high (discussed in detail in the next chapter). This muddies any evidence of sorting. Again
for papaya, this year saw a catastrophic loss of the papaya crop to mealybug infestation, again
rendering inferences regarding sorting murky.22
When treatment effects on the untreated are computed for all controls, participation in contract
farming in each of the commodities studied is associated with positive net gains on an average (Table
9.12). Should these farmers be able to contract for gherkins, they could increase their incomes by
about 28% in gherkins and for marigold, by 79% and substantially more for papaya (114%) and
broiler (206%).
Treatment effects that measure an average impact on the set of farmers can potentially mask
the heterogeneity of farmer experiences. To unravel these farmer level differences, it is useful to
graph the distribution of treatment effects. Figures 9.6, 9.7, 9.8 and 9.9 show the range of treatment
effects for different farmers, mapping the two distributions for contract and non-contract farmers
separately. These distributions are key to understanding the origins of the dynamics of contract
farming arrangements. In most cases, the distributions of treatment effects for both contract and
non-contract farmers straddle the positive and negative axis. This suggests that some contract
22The coexistence of the beneficial treatment effect and the catastrophic loss is partly on account of the timing of
the survey. The actual net profits recorded for papaya were for the preceding year, which was then converted to net
profit per acre per year. At the time of the survey, the mealybug epidemic had been affecting crops for about three
months. Since papaya latex extraction is a continuous process, the welfare metric captures a mixture of high yields
and low yields. Without the mealybug attack, papaya contract farmers are likely to have benefited much more from
papaya contracting, and there might have been stronger evidence on sorting.
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Table 9.12: Treatment Effects and Regime Sorting
Variable Mean
incremental
income (Rs.)
Standard
Deviation of
distribution
of point
estimates
Average Treatment
effect as a propor-
tion of average ac-
tual net profit
Number of
observations
Treatment Effect on the Treated
Gherkin -4407 1989 -1.46 77
Marigold -1577 1334 -0.49 59
Papaya 3175 3594 0.37 71
Broiler 11082 1236 1.51 81
Treatment Effect on the Untreated(Commodity-specific controls)
Gherkin -174 3009 -1.02 38
Marigold -4167 2557 -1.29 62
Papaya 4030 2112 0.47 27
Broiler 9040 1331 1.23 57
Treatment Effect on the Untreated(All controls)
Gherkin 1172 4162 0.28 180
Marigold 3377 9699 0.79 208
Papaya 4844 492 1.14 196
Broiler 10066 1682 2.66 208
Correlation Coeffi-
cients in the Switching
Models
Regime 1 : ρ1v Regime 2 : ρ2v
Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error
Gherkins 0.51 0.20 ∗∗ 0.45 0.46
Marigold 0.22 0.21 -0.14 0.11
Papaya -0.17 0.58 -0.05 0.37
Broiler -0.97 0.54 ∗∗ -0.99 0.60∗∗
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 For gherkins and marigold all costs are for the most recent season completed, for one acre, which spans three months.
2 For papaya, this is an annual figure that has been converted to an equivalent per month per acre.
3 For broiler, this is a monthly figure per 5000 birds or 5000 square feet of shed space.
4 All treatment effects are computed and averaged over the sample within commodities.
5 For gherkins
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farmer might be better off opting out of the regime, while there are some non-contract farmers who
might have an incentive to participate in contracting arrangements. This opens up the possibility of
farmers reassessing their decisions to contract or taking specific actions to enter into transactional
arrangements with firms.
There are only two cases in this sample where the treatment effect is unambiguously positive
across treatment and different control groups. For papaya and broiler, non-contract farmers appear
certain to benefit from contracting I suggest that for marigold and gherkins, the results require
careful interpretation. Apart from the fact that this is evidence for one season and aggregates
substantial heterogeneity across farmers, it might reflect the prices in the markets for the other
crops that control group farmers grew, tomato, for instance. The treatment effect in this case can
easily switch signs depending on market conditions. The key finding is however the heterogeneity
of farmer experience. The large standard deviations in the point estimates of the average treatment
effect reflect both the variation in the net profits accruing to the farmers in the survey season but
also the range of potential impact of contracting for the various farmers.
Figure 9.6: Treatment Effect for Gherkins Contract and Non-contract farmers
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Figure 9.7: Treatment Effect for Marigold Contract and Non-contract farmers
Figure 9.8: Treatment Effect for Papaya Contract and Non-contract farmers
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Figure 9.9: Treatment Effect for Broiler Contract and Non-contract farmers
9.5 Sources of Welfare Gains: The Structure of Costs and Returns
The heterogeneity of levels in treatment effects goes hand in hand with the sources of these gains
(or losses) from contracting. This section first undertakes a simple decomposition of costs and
returns to identify whether incremental incomes for contract farmers come from higher prices for
the produce (being high-value crops as compared to the substitute) or via savings in transactions
costs. It then assesses the returns to key factors of production across regimes that come from the
estimation of the endogenous switching models.
Tables 9.13 and 9.14 indicate that other than for marigold, contract farmers, irrespective of
whether they contract with the sample firm or any other firm, earn higher net returns on average.
This is despite higher costs associated with contract growing.
This conforms with several previous studies that examine returns and cost structures in India.
Singh (2007) and Gulati et al. (2008) review these in some detail. In general, findings suggest that
the contract growing is associated with much higher costs of cultivation, 17-24 % in potato contract
farming in Haryana (Tripathi and Singh, 2005) and for tomato in the Punjab (Kumar, 2007; Dileep
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et al., 2002), but also higher gross and net returns driven in part by higher yields and in savings
in transactions costs. Examples are gherkins (hybrid cucumber) in Andhra Pradesh (Haque, 2000;
Dev and Rao, 2005), tomato in Punjab (Haque, 2000; Rangi and Sidhu, 2000) and Haryana (Dileep
et al., 2002). Contract farming, when it involved a switch from traditional crops, gave much higher
(almost three times) gross returns compared with that from the traditional crops of wheat, paddy
in a study of tomato (Rangi and Sidhu, 2000). Studies show too that transactions costs were over
20% lower for contract milk and vegetable producers (Birthal et al., 2005). In several cases, contract
farmers emerged with larger net returns per unit area of contract crop relative to those who were
not contracting or grew traditional crops.
As shown in Table 9.14, broiler contracting requires large fixed investments in sheds to house
birds, drinkers and feeders and so on. The chicks and feed are provided by the firm. In the schemes
studied, typically, the farmers procures medicines and takes care of the maintenance expenses.
Typically, women are far less involved in broiler production than men.
The other commodities do not require much fixed investment, although for gherkins and papaya,
most invested in either irrigation facilities or in spraying machines. Input costs of gherkins tends
to be high, owing to heavy use of fertilizer, pesticides and micronutrients. This is not the case
for marigold and papaya where contract farmers make do with farm yard manure and minimal
fertilizers.
An interesting contrast is the use of labor (Table 9.13). Gherkins farmers rely heavily on family
labor, and it is clear that relative to farmers who do not contract, they use far greater labor
per three months, owing to the demands of harvesting in time and in the application of inputs,
trellising and so on. In the case of marigold, there is much greater reliance on hired labor. Here
too contracting implies a greater need for labor, mainly for harvesting. Papaya and broiler require
very little labor in general. As is to be expected the costs associated with transactions, marketing,
transport, commissions is typically zero for contracting farmers, while non-contracting farmers do
incur these expenses.23
23In general, individual circumstances of a farmer and demands made by particular commodities drive selection.
Among those who grow poultry, it is also apparent that the higher the incremental risk associated with contracting,
as indicated by higher combined risk scores, the lower the propensity to contract. For gherkins, younger farmers are
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Table 9.13: Cost of Cultivation for Broiler growers (in Rupees)
Subject Contract Farmers Other Contract Farmers Attrition Farmers
Returns
Net profit per month per 5000 birds 11602 12747 11487
Net Return (per cycle of six weeks) 23205 25494 22974
Gross Return (per cycle of six weeks) 34839 35565 33804
Recurring Costs (per cycle of six weeks
Total costs 11635 10071 10830
Total labor cost 3189 1736 2386
(as % of total cost) 27 17 22
Total other costs 8446 8336 8444
(as % of total cost) 73 83 78
Fixed Costs
Fixed Costs 82700 85692 85130
Labor per cycle of six weeks
Male hired labor(days) 14 8 10
Male family labor(days) 16 20 14
Female hired labor (days) 6 1 3
Female family labor (days) 2 5 3
1 All costs and returns are in Rupees.
2 Feed and chick costs are excluded from estimate of costs since the costs are borne by the contracting firm. The return is
computed using grower charges, net of the costs of feed and chick for all farmer categories.
3 The never contract farmers here grow other crops and are not presented in this table.
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These differences point to the heterogeneity across crops and the need to acknowledge these
differences in studying the instrumentality of contract farming in transforming smallholder liveli-
hoods. The switching models offer a way to compare the above structural differences, in a limited
way, between contract growers and non-contract growers in different schemes. Examining returns
to factors of production for contract farmers also reflects key contractual elements. Given that
all the contracting firms engage in offering technical advice, supervision and monitoring, and by
supplying inputs, variables representing these aspects reflect the contribution of contractual inputs
provided by the firm.
Returns to fertilizer use and family labor is statistically significant for marigold contract farmers,
whereas these do not seem to matter to farmers who do not contract for marigold. For gherkins,
farmers with larger landholding sizes are associated with greater net profit per acre as are farmers
located farther from the road.
The presence of monitoring, denoted here as a dummy variable, does not seem to impact net
profit per acre. Monitoring the production process is a very important aspect in the gherkins
contracting scheme and is valued highly by the farmers. This result is somewhat surprising.
However, it is possible that it is the intensity of supervision that matters rather than whether
or not there is supervision.
In the case of papaya, contract and non-contract farmers earn higher profits per acres with plant
protection, this is highly significant for contract farmers and is most likely owing to the mealybug
infestation during the season surveyed. As with gherkins, farmers located farther away from the
road tend to earn higher net profit per acre than those who are closer to a road. Larger size of
farms tend to earn less net profit per acre from the contract farm. This is presumably due to
the managerial demands made as the scale of operation increases. For those who do not contract
for papaya, family labor inputs are associated with higher returns, and less educated and those
belonging to marginalized communities fare worse. Plant protection for non-contract farmers is
less significant than is the the case for papaya contract farmers.
more likely to contract. Further, the higher the variation associated with the realized prices paid by other contract
firms for gherkins, the greater the likelihood of farmers wanting to contract with the sample firm in the study.
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9.6 Concluding Remarks
The findings of the chapter underscores the variation in the treatment effects not only across
contract farming schemes but also across farmers within a particular scheme. The net gains or
losses that are associated with the participation suggest a complex pattern of sorting into schemes.
While in broiler, it seems clear that farmers who do better than the average are selected, for
gherkins it is evident that farmers who opt out of contracting do not have a comparative advantage
participating.
The diversity and heterogeneity in sorting is valuable in the light of recent suggestions that
from a public policy perspective, that one needs to recognize that there are diverse groups of
farmers.Only a subset of them fare well participating in modern supply chains, others are likely
to fare poorly irrespective of whether they participate or not. It is when farmers can do better
with contracting, but are rationed out by the firm, that exclusion of farmers from contracting
arrangements becomes a policy concern. As long as farmers opt out voluntarily, on account of
perceived risks or because they fare better when not participating, there is less cause for concern
with regard to farmer capacity to participate in schemes.
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Chapter 10
Churning and the Dynamics of Participation in
Contracting Schemes
This chapter offers a brief descriptive account of the dynamic elements in the contract farming
schemes studied, focusing on churning in firm portfolios of farmers and procurement sheds. The
goal is to highlight the fluidity in these systems.
The dynamics of farmer participation and temporal change in contract farming practice have
been issues of monumental neglect despite widespread recognition of their importance. It is clear,
and recognized as such in the literature, that firms might alter their portfolio of farmers based
on experience and learning. Over time, those farmers who were contracting may be dropped and
others who were not, included. The evolution of a firm’s portfolio is only just beginning to get
serious attention. Runsten and Key (1996b) find that multinational tomato processors in Mexico
first contracted with large growers but then eventually involved also the small growers because side-
selling was a problem with their larger growers. An exporter in Thailand that started producing
its own horticultural products on company land later shifted to smallholder contract production
(Minot and Ngigi, 2004). Herath and Weersink (2009) note that the Sri Lankan tea sector has
changed from being dominated by vertically integrated plantations to one where processors source
from from small, independent growers. Minot and Ngigi (2004) describe the evolution of several
contract farming schemes in Kenya, including one (Del Monte pineapple) that gave up on contract
production and others than have shifted from large scale to small scale production. The reverse, i.e.,
movement from small to large-scale suppliers could happen as well. For example, the Xiaobaiyang
chain in Beijing is known to have shifted from 1000 to 300 processed food suppliers in two years as
it centralized its procurement system (Hu et al., 2004). Dolan et al. (1999) show a consolidation in
the export sector in Kenya with a sharp reduction in the proportion sourced from small farmers.
In the case of processing, Farina et al. (2005) find a similar trend dairies in Argentina and Brazil.
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Similarly, leading Russian chains focus only on a handful of foreign and domestic suppliers for dairy
products (Dries and Reardon, 2005). In Senegal, green bean exporters switched from small-scale
contract production to large-scale production (Swinnen and Maertens, 2008).
While changes in the composition of contract suppliers is one aspect, another is the survival rate
of the schemes themselves. Yet, as Minot (1986, 2008) points out, the failure of contract farming
schemes is high, but poorly documented. Rarer are studies that offer rigorous analysis of what
drives these changes.
Analysis of contract participation at a given point of time is useful in its own right. It cannot,
however, in itself provide a credible basis for policy making for contract farming, for which it is
important to have information on dynamic outcomes, if only to help stave off potential catastrophic
risks for the intended beneficiaries.
The first section of this chapter presents the recent contracting experience for two schemes,
cotton and gherkins, using firm data on the geographies of procurements and attrition in farmer
portfolios in the study region. The two present a contrast. The cotton contracting scheme did
not survive beyond the year of the field survey, whereas the gherkins firm has been successful in
securing volumes for processing.
The second part of the chapter uses data from the Farmer Survey to examine farmer entry
and exit. This section also elaborates on two phenomena that have not received due attention in
empirical research on contract farming. The first is the episodic nature of farmer participation
in contracting arrangements, wherein a spell of non-participation is sandwiched between spells of
contracting. The second relates to the intensity of participation. Extensive participation, judged on
the basis of whether a farmer contracts or not, in binary terms, is only one aspect of participation.
The notion of intensive participation refers to the degree to which a farmer participates, measured
by the extent of contract acreage, proportion of contracted produce supplied, etc.
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10.1 Firm’s strategies
I present trends in the procurement patterns for two firms from Phase 1 representing the changing
patterns for the cotton contract farming scheme and the gherkins contracting schemes (Figure 10.1).
The two firms shared select data for multiple seasons.1
The two schemes present a contrast. The cotton firm started contracting with a lot of promise
in 2004-05. By the time of the survey in 2007-08, however it was apparent that it would not survive.
In the case of cotton contracting, therefore, the dynamism can be read equally as demise. While the
main focus of the firm was to procure from particular cotton growing areas in Coimbatore district,
this was restricted to the winter season. In 2007-08, the firm began to procure summer cotton from
Salem district, and this is reflected in the increase in the number of blocks, villages and hamlets
that year (Figure 10.1). Despite this expansion in procurement area, the contract acreage and the
number of farmer-suppliers did not increase substantially, indicating possible farmer attrition in
the Coimbatore region. By 2008-09, the firm had abandoned contracting in conventional cotton.
An executive associated with the program declared “Contract farming in conventional cotton is
an absolute flop everywhere.”2 The firm was planning to commence contract farming operations
in organic cotton. As a newspaper reported “the mill sector has lost its initial enthusiasm for the
concept”.3 Most of the spinning mills that embarked on contract farming operations in 2003-04,
had abandoned contracting by 2008-09, save as Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives.
The gherkin firm, in contrast, has endured. In this case, the dynamics of a scheme reflects
adaptation and changing strategies, without destabilizing the contract farming scheme itself. It is
interesting that while the numbers of contract hamlets, villages and blocks or even contract farmers
in the study area have not declined dramatically, the volume procured from the study region has
seen a comparatively marked decline, indicating decreasing volumes procured per farmer (Figure
10.1).
1In general, obtaining information on procurement volumes and farmer-specific information over several years is
extremely difficult. The firms did not share all the details and data gaps were filled through interviews with executives
of the firm. This section uses select variables to demonstrate the dynamics of the two schemes.
2Agribusiness Survey, Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu, November 2008.
3L.N.Revathy “Mills losing interest in cotton contract farming” in Businessline, July 9, 2010.
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2010/07/09/stories/2010070954411800.htm. Accessed July 9,2010.
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Interviews with executives of the firm indicate the firm’s strategic shift to new geographies for
procurement. At the time of the survey, the gherkin processor was sourcing a majority of gherkins
from outside the study area, moving to the east and south of the study region. This was partly
on account of the stiff competition from other gherkin processors located in and around Dindigul
town. The other reason, according to an executive with the firm, is declining yields from the “old
areas”.4 It reflects too the effects of the economic downturn in importing countries, that saw fewer
international orders, so that the firm reduced total procurement nationwide in 2007-08 and 2008-09.
The two examples above suggest the temporal fluidity of contracting arrangements in a given
region. It is worth recalling that Chapter 3 elaborated on the Aokian notion of institutional
evolution as punctuated equilibria, suggesting that the dynamic elements of a contract farming
scheme can be either a consequence of a discrete exogenous change or can be a more gradual
adjustment process reflecting the contracting firms’ evolving strategies and farmers’ learning. The
case of cotton represents a failure of contract farming as an institution to take root, lacking a
critical mass and stability of mutual expectations required of agents playing the game.
10.2 Churning
The dynamic of participation includes both addition and attrition, or entry and exit, collectively
referred to as ‘churning’ in the labor economics literature. This section draws on survey data to
suggest that even while firms select over geographies, this is not the only source of dynamism. There
could be considerable variation over time in the nature of participation among farmers within a
contract village.
10.2.1 Attrition
In general, for any contract commodity, there could be a number farmers exiting the system
or farmer attrition. The key to stable contracting schemes is to maintain attrition rates below
threshold levels. This section presents data from two databases for all the five commodities studied
over the two survey phases. The houselisting process mapped the participation of households in
4Agribusiness Survey, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu, November 2008.
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Figure 10.1: Contracting in the Study Area: Firms’ Histories
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the sampled hamlets comprehensively. While these are not presented in detail here, there was no
contract hamlet or village that was sampled that did not have at least a few attrition farmers.
Data from the Farmer Survey indicates that there exists a wide variety of reasons for farmer
attrition (Table 10.1). Some involve the firm terminating the relationship, when they drop villages
or when they drop farmers from their portfolio. While farmers might not be candid with admitting
that they were dropped by the firm (especially, for cotton and gherkins), several confess that they
are unable to deliver contract commodity of the quality that the firm requires, notably for broiler
and gherkins, leading likely to higher rejection rates or to the firm dropping the farmer altogether.
There is strong evidence here of farmers facing a disconnect between realized outcomes and
expectations. Other than for broiler, a considerable proportion of attrition farmers state that the
profits were not as high as anticipated, and that this was a reason for exit (Table 10.1). Other
reasons for exit include excessive demands on family labor, limited availability of hired labor at low
wages and yield losses. Personal circumstances constitute idiosyncratic reasons for farmer attrition.
As Chapter 7 indicated, perceptions of detrimental impacts on soil quality and health appear serious
enough to drive some farmers to exit contracting. Finally, a set of issues that pertain to perceived
performance of the contracting firm, in terms of timely delivery of quality inputs, proper payment,
and so on, also triggers farmer attrition from contracting schemes.
10.2.2 Addition
The notion of entry and exit have an element of time and duration that is not adequately
acknowledged even in studies that draw attention to the dynamics of contracting arrangements.
There is often a time lag between a farmer’s recognition of an opportunity to contract and actually
being willing and able to contract. In this sense, time taken to enter a contracting scheme is both
a product of and cause of friction.
Figure 10.2 graphs the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, that are non-parametric estimates of
the population survival function and is appropriate for censored data (Kaplan and Meier, 1958).
The function
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Table 10.1: Attrition: Why did farmers exit?
Reason for attrition Percentage of Attrition Farmers citing the reason
Gherkins
(Phase 2)
Marigold Broiler Cotton Gherkins
(Phase 1)
Weighted
Average
Not as profitable as anticipated 17 11 0 44 18 20
Labor costs too high 9 25 0 10 20 16
Too much labor required 14 21 0 7 21 16
Low price for output 0 23 0 2 3 7
Improper payment by firm 3 4 53 2 0 6
Soil quality deterioration 17 4 0 0 5 5
Rain related yield loss 3 0 0 15 5 5
Firm stopped contracting in the village 0 0 0 15 6 5
Pest problem 14 0 0 2 2 3
Farmer unable to maintain quality standards 0 0 20 0 5 3
Poor quality of inputs 0 2 20 0 3 3
Health issues 9 4 0 0 0 3
Inadequate or poor technical support from firm 0 2 0 0 6 2
Firm refused me a contract 3 0 0 0 5 2
Personal reasons 6 0 0 0 3 2
High cost of cultivation relative to other crops 0 5 0 2 0 2
Water problem 6 0 0 0 0 1
No advance or credit available 0 2 0 0 0 1
Delay in input delivery 0 0 7 0 0 0
Number of responses 35 57 15 41 66
1 No papaya attrition farmer was interviewed. Hence, papaya is not included in the table.
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S(t) = (nj − dj)/nj
where nji is the number of observations at risk at the beginning of time j and dj is the number
who transition status or do not survive. Here, where the hazard here is defined as initiating a
contractual relationship with the sample firm, so that those at risk refer to the sample farmers
who have not yet initiated contracting. It shows the proportion of sample farmers who have not
entered the system as of a particular time. The X-axis shows the number of years beyond 1990.
The figure shows that broiler and papaya are relatively recent schemes, with the first contracting
farmer enters the schemes relatively recently. Marigold is the oldest scheme as far as the sample
villages are concerned.
Figure 10.3 shows that several years often pass between a contract farmer becoming aware of
the contracting option and entering into contracts. This could be partly on account of the firm not
selecting them in the first instance, or that the farmer is circumspect about the arrangements and
waits to learn from others’ experience. The commodity specific kernel density estimates indicates
that for commodities that farmers are familiar with, especially cotton, broiler and papaya, a
majority of the sample farmers began contracting within three years of becoming aware of the
option. For gherkins, an exotic crop in the study area, there is much more variation, and some
farmers took more than a decade to go in for gherkins cultivation. Marigold too has a similar time
span. This could be due in part to the fact that the spot market for marigold flowers was attractive
enough for farmers. Modeling time to entry as a function of farmer and contract characteristics
could yield valuable insights into the dynamics of adoption, and is an area for future investigation.
10.3 Episodic Participation
Episodic participation is perhaps the least studied phenomenon in the context of contract farming.
In general, there is nothing about the nature of contract farming that implies constancy as far
as participation is concerned. Most contracts tend to be for a season and even for tree crops the
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Figure 10.2: Initial entry time across schemes
Figure 10.3: Time taken to contract: Phase 1 and 2
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contract is for about three years at the most. In the area of study, farmers can potentially grow a
contract crop three times every year. The commodities selected for study, namely cotton, gherkins
and marigold, are three month crops. Broiler has a six week cycle with a prescribed gap of one
fortnight between cycles. Only papaya is a three year crop, with an eight month gestation period
and returns that vary over the life cycle of the tree.
Almost universally, even when firms are willing to offer contracts every season, farmers who
contract prefer to contract only for a subset of the seasons, opting not to contract the rest of the
year. Importantly, a contract commodity has a very specific place in the farmer’s annual cropping
pattern and portfolio, wherein there are a set of competing cash crops that farmers move in and
out of over the year. Over the longer term too, farmers’ participation in contracting is often
episodic, where a spell of not contracting can be sandwiched between two periods where the farmer
is contracting for the commodity. Table 10.2 shows that 46% of contract farmers reported that
they had breaks in their contracting history. It is as low as 8% for broiler and as high as 73% for
marigold farmers. The former reflects both the level of fixed investments required and the fact that
broiler farmers have begun contracting only recently. In the case of papaya, breaks from contracting
indicate spells when no latex was extracted.
Figure 10.4 presents the duration of breaks in the contracting history of sample farmers. This is
plotted against land owned, to map the prevalence across classes of farmers, and the rug plot shows
the density of observations according to land ownership. It is clear that a number of gherkin and
marigold contract farmers have had breaks in their contracting history. 5 In the case of gherkins,
there is a fair spread across time. For marigold, on the other hand, most spells are clustered around
2004 to 2008, several ending in 2008. For broiler and papaya, such breaks appear less common,
and seem to be of shorter duration, typically, less than a year.
The reason for episodes of not contracting could be on account of the firm’s withdrawal or the
farmer opting out. The Farmer Survey mapped the reasons for breaks in contract (Table 10.2).
In many instances, the episodic nature of farmer participation is governed by the ebb and flow of
the international orders downstream that the processing firms get, implying that there are years
5The sparseness of contract breaks among the larger classes of farmers here indicates sparseness of observations.
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Figure 10.4: The Episodic Nature of Participation
when the pool of contract farmers shrinks. About 28% of those with breaks declared that the firm
had not offered them contracts. In particular, the pattern for marigold, which saw breaks clustered
between the years 2004 and 2008 mark the time when the firm had few export orders and had
scaled down operations considerably. In many other instances, the individual farmer often opts out
of the contract crop, either willingly, responding to potentially high profits for a competing crop, or
involuntarily, when personal circumstances of the farmer, for example, illness of family members,
poses particular constraints on contract cultivation.
Such episodic participation especially when the termination of spells is from the farmer’s end
renders the notion of participation fuzzier and participation acquires the sense of a repeated event.
10.4 Intensive Participation
Intensive participation refers to contractual volumes or quantities or contract acreage that a farmer
and firm agree to for a given contracting season. Churning, i.e. entry and attrition, on the
other hand, has to do with extensive participation. Sometimes, firms might choose to work on
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Table 10.2: Episodic participation
Percentage of farmers contracting with any firm reporting episode of non-participation
Commodity Percentage of total
respondents
Number of
respondents
Phase 2
Gherkins 44 77
Marigold 73 59
Papaya 43 72
Broiler 8 71
Phase 1
Gherkins 49 98
Cotton 55 58
Reasons for the break in contracting for those with episode of non-participation
Reason Percentage of total
responses
Frequency
Firm did not offer contracts 28 34
Water issues 18 22
Pest issues 16 20
Losses with contract crop the previous year 11 14
Low contract price 9 11
Wind and weather issues 4 5
Contracted with another firm 3 4
Grew for the spot market 2 3
Health issues 2 3
Went away from village 2 3
Death in the family 2 2
Labor shortage 2 2
1 Farmers were allowed multiple options to capture all the relevant reasons for the break.
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the intensive margin rather than on the extensive margin so that the additional (or differential)
contractual volumes work on intensive participation rather than with number of farmers or regions
in the firm’s portfolio. The notion of intensity of participation is important because it can disrupt
notions of small-big farmer dichotomies in complex ways. Assessments of small farmer inclusion
could then be cast in terms of the proportion of contracted produced in a given season sourced from
small farmers. For instance, even in instances where,say, 80% of the firm’s portfolio of farmers are
smallholders, they might account for only 20% of the total volume contracted.
The intensity of participation not only limits the usefulness of small versus large farmers as
useful analytical categories, but evidence from India suggests that this turns out to be an arena
for a contracting firm’s strategic action that is often neglected in empirical work. This is especially
relevant when firms adjust portfolios over time. In the Agribusiness Survey, for instance, several
firms said that they prefer to focus on yield improvements on a low acreage base to secure large
volumes from a limited number of small farmers rather then expanding on the extensive margin.
A related question is who becomes the shock absorber among contract farmers, when firms reduce
procurement volumes.
Figure 10.5 shows the change in intensity of participation of the entire portfolio of contracting
farmers for the years 2007-08 and 2006-07. The figure shows a fitted curve, with the change in a
contract farmer’s contract acreage plotted against the initial acreage under the contract crop in
2006-07.6 It is apparent that smaller farmers have expanded acreage under cotton contracts whereas
the larger farmers have on average reduced the acreage devoted to contract cultivation. This
could be due to a combination of factors. First, it could reflect learning, and perhaps gravitating
to an optimal ratio of contract and non-contract acreage. Some farmers might have started off
experimenting on a small area and given a positive experience, might have expanded the contract
acreage, the reverse holding for those who started with larger contract acreage. It could also be
that larger farmers are contracting a small acreage but are growing cotton for the open market as
well. In field visits, many cotton farmers considered the advice provided by contracting firms to
6This includes only those farmers who have contracted both years.
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be very valuable and it could be that they are leveraging this to increase yields on all cotton plots,
while retaining access to the spot market which makes fewer demands on quality.
Figure 10.5: Cotton Contracting: Fractional Polynomial Fit for Changing Intensity of Participation
Figure 10.6 shows fitted plots for each of the other contract commodities. These are, however,
based on the survey data and do not have the same interpretation as Figure 10.5, which was based
on contracting histories supplied by the firm. In particular, Figure 10.6 plots the change in an
individual farmer’s intensity in participation, of the most recent contracting year relative to the
farmer’s first year of contracting. Since different farmers in the sample entered the system at
different points of time, these figures do not reflect a firm’s strategy. Nor is it sensitive to the
exogenous context in terms of the general economic conditions, volume of procurement and so on.
Tellingly, for gherkins, marigold and broiler it appears that farmers who have increased intensity
of participation are those who started off with a low intensity of participation. Those who devoted
greater acreage or took in more chicks in the first year of contracting appear to have lowered these
in the most recent year of contracting. In the case of broiler, although this relationship holds
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broadly, there is much variation. As for marigold, there is no instance of farmers increasing acreage
under marigold contract relative to their first year of contracting.
Papaya is the clear exception. Papaya farmers appear to have added acreage since they first
began contracting. The figure needs to be interpreted with caution. The observation period is only
four years, and for a contract that is three years, it is premature to identify trends. Also, this
expansion does not reflect the mealybug infestation that had taken hold just prior to the survey.
When this is factored in, it is certain to reflect in the intensity of participation of contracting
farmers more accurately.
Figure 10.6: Changing Intensity of Participation among Contract Farmers
10.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter mapped the fluidity of farmer participation in the contract farming schemes selected
for study. One goal was to highlight the dynamic elements in the schemes. It offers a cautionary
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story against generalizing from research that focuses on static participation and welfare gains. The
second goal was to complicate static, binary notions of participation, highlighting in particular the
phenomena of episodic participation as well as the intensity of partipation. While the chapter did
not seek to model these phenomena so as to generate causal explanations, it shows that one needs
to pay due attention to the dynamics of contract farming schemes, while assessing the normative
implications of contract farming for public policy. It highlights the need to track farmer-level and
scheme-level variation in participation over time and to model these rigorously. If empirical research
is to serve as a credible basis for contract farming policy, it would have to take the dynamics of
these systems seriously.
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Chapter 11
Relationship Farming: The Problem of Enforcement
11.1 Introduction
The chief problem with contract farming schemes in India stems from enforcement issues (Asokan
and Singh, 2003; Gulati et al., 2008; Jain, 2008). Weak public institutions for enforcement give
latitude to both farmers and firms to renege on the contract and parties inevitably resort to
various forms self-regulation and other private means of enforcement to maintain transactional
relationships.
It is common, therefore, to see policy discussions urging establishment of legal and institutional
mechanisms for enforcing contracts between agribusiness and farmer. These prescriptions are
predicated on the notion that developing a legal framework for contracting and enforcement is
desirable, even necessary, to enable expansion of contract farming relationships and would provide
incentives for both farmer and firm to enter into formal, legally valid agreements.
This chapter interrogates the prescriptive logic that sees legislative mechanisms as the main
vehicle for resolving contractual disputes, arguing, as others before have done in other contexts, that
legislative mechanisms might be neither necessary nor sufficient for maintaining agribusiness-farmer
relationships. The central argument of this paper is that this view is at odds with the empirical
agrarian context in India, where agents - both farmers and firms - express a reluctance to develop
formal contracts with legally binding obligations, preferring to continue with transactions outside
the prescribed legal-institutional structure. While exploring the many reasons for this reluctance,
this study suggests that the presumed efficacy of legal institutional development neglects the more
complicated role that legal systems play in the midst of other,‘informal’, regimes of enforcement
in Indian agribusiness, as it does the particular relevance of socially-embedded relationships for
contractual performance.
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This chapter offers a broad analysis of contract and enforcement in select contract farming
schemes in India, examining the role of relationship in contract farming schemes, using qualitative
and quantitative data from the Farmer and Agribusiness Survey.
11.2 The Prescription and its Logic
Recent years have seen enormous emphasis placed on developing strong and effective legislative
frameworks for contract enforcement and dispute resolution in India with a view to creating
favorable conditions for the growth of contract farming. These recommendations have taken many
forms.
In 2003, the Government of India proposed a Model Act (The State Agricultural Produce
Marketing Development and Regulation Act), which outlined a framework for contract farming
operations that would safeguard the interests of both firms and farmers. States were urged to adopt
this legal framework to enable rapid growth of contract farming.1 The Model Act provided for regis-
tration of all contracts and a thirty-day window for resolving contractual disputes. The World Bank
(2005) too believes that the “government can foster the development of contractual arrangements
by facilitating the creation of producer organizations, legislating an appropriate contract law and
enforcing it effectively” (emphasis added). The US-India Knowledge Initiative (KIA)2, a bilateral
program in agriculture, suggests that “legal mechanisms for contracts and alternative mechanisms
for regulating contracts would be evolved based on the American experience”(Kuruganti, 2008).
There have also been calls for regulating contract farming so that firm-farm relationships are more
“equitable and farmer-centric” than at present.3 This is a cross-section of opinion with diverse
ideological content that emphasizes legislation to varying degrees as a way to foster contract farming
1In India, agriculture is a State subject, so the legal provisions regarding contract farming would be State-level
laws rather than a federal-level or national law.
2The U.S.-India Knowledge Initiative on Agricultural Education, Teaching, Research, Service, and Commercial
Linkages (AKI) was initiated on July 18, 2005, with the United States, with secured funding of $8 million in fiscal year
2006 and a total of $24 million pledged through 2008. (http://www.fas.usda.gov/icd/india knowl init/factsheet.asp,
accessed October 23, 2008)
3The National Commission on Farmers (Third Report, 2006), for instance, advocates a Code of Conduct for all
agribusinesses engaged in contract farming, that would pay special attention to clauses dealing with quality standards,
withdrawal conditions, pricing standards, paying arrangements, acts of God clauses and arbitration mechanism.
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arrangements, under the implicit assumption that legislation would in fact encourage actors to enter
the legal fold to transact while protecting poor farmers.
Interestingly though, even where such mechanisms have been introduced in credible ways, they
have not met with success. In Maharashtra, for instance, four months after an ‘appropriate law’ with
a blueprint for enforcement was put in place, the officer overseeing proposals had failed to receive
even a single proposal.4“Earlier, contracts between companies and farmers were not governed by a
dedicated Act. Now, we have the Act which stipulates rules that have to be followed. But contracts
are not being signed under this Act.” (Ghadyalpatil, 2008) This is not unique. In states where
the Model Contract Farming Law has been adapted, the response of firms to undertake contract
farming schemes within this framework has not been encouraging (Ghadyalpatil, 2008; Gulati et al.,
2008).
Why is there a disconnect between the perceived merits of legislative frameworks and actual
practice? What explains the reluctance of agribusinesses in India to respond to state initiatives
to promote formal contract farming? These questions invite us to examine the more fundamental
issue of the role of ‘formal’ or third party enforcement in supporting economic exchange.
It has long been recognized within economics that markets need to be supported by institutions
for economic governance. Institutional creation and maintenance was a role left to the state, by
even the most libertarian of economists, like Friedman (1962). Traditional economics typically
veered to the view that the framework of law is a necessary condition for the market to succeed,
for, in its absence, unbridled opportunistic behavior could lead to dysfunctional societal systems.
Another view, derived from Coase (1937), went further to suggest that such a legal framework
might even be a sufficient condition, so that as long as property rights are well-defined, in the
absence of transactions costs, voluntary economic exchange would follow as a matter of course and
produce optimal welfare outcomes.5
Correspondingly, in the development literature, early views associated ‘development’ with a
4The credibility of these interventions is important. In a transition economy, new initiatives might take some time
to take root and intended beneficiaries might lack faith in the institutions that oversee these initiatives. While this
typically contributes to an initiative’s lack of success, in the example cited in the text, the firms articulate a different
concern, which is central to the preoccupations of this paper. This is taken up specifically in a later section.
5Admittedly, in the context of Indian agricultural relations, this Coasian view was never admitted seriously into
discussions, given the high transactions costs.
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move from relation-based transactions to rule-based transactions, or from custom to contract and
informality to formality.6 This strand is evident in more recent works, like those of de Soto (2000)
and Acemoglu et al. (2005), who see well-defined property rights as fundamental institutional
preconditions for ‘development’ (Harriss-White, 2008).
To the extent that contracts assign relative property rights and given that institutions that
enforce these contracts protect these rights (Furubotn and Richter, 2005), ‘development’ itself is
associated with the establishment of such enabling institutional frameworks that accommodate
formal contracts. Prescriptions that emphasize the installation of legal mechanisms to enable
contract farming are aligned closely with this tradition of legal centralism and a positivist-formalist
understanding of contracts.7 They privilege the view of a rational state that oversees economic
exchange in a non-partisan and costless manner. These prescriptions thus retain validity insofar
as the non-trivial assumptions that inform these theoretical viewpoints hold in reality. As I argue
below, this is far from self-evident. In short, there is often a schism between institution design and
use.
11.3 Enforcement as Theoretical Subject
The challenge to the above positivist-formalist view comes from various quarters. Among these is
the natural and intuitive critique that transactions costs do exist and influence forms of economic
governance structures. Furthermore, the state (or judiciary) is itself socially regulated, far from
being an informed, non-partisan, omniscient arbiter.8
The presence of transactions costs then implies a search for an economic governance structure (in
this case, an enforcement mechanism) that minimizes these costs (Williamson, 1996). A number of
6As Harriss-White (2008) points out, each of the classical political economists - Smith, Marx, Weber, Veblen,
Schumpeter and others - expected archaic forms of exchange to be replaced by markets, the struggles of wage labor
against exploitation and illusion, and the rationality of state bureaucracy and planning, and by the discipline of
machines, technology and education, respectively.
7The core of legal centralism presumes contractual conflicts are costlessly decided by well-informed courts in an
objective, legalistic way. See Griffiths (1986) for a detailed discussion.
8The transactions costs economics view or the NIE view is thus not the only critique. Economic exchange represents
a complicated subject where law, economics and sociology intersect. For instance, sociologists fault the legal-centric
view for being “under-socialized” in ignoring the social embededness of transactions (Granovetter, 1985) and the role
of social networks and norms. In this study, I choose to retain a somewhat narrow focus, adopting the NIE line of
critique.
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enforcement mechanisms outside of the state are, in fact, available to parties engaged in economic
exchange and governance is not always carried out by government. Taxonomies of enforcement
mechanisms classify these modes of economic governance either as private ordering versus public
ordering depending on the role of the state, or as first, second or third party enforcement (Dixit,
2004).
First party enforcement operates at the level of the individual. Norms of behavior are
internalized so that reward for compliance or punishment for deviation takes the form of moral
or social imperatives (Dixit, 2004). Platteau (1994a,b) elaborates for instance on the role of
‘generalized morality’, while Fafchamps (2004) discusses incentives to comply driven by shame
and guilt.9
Second party enforcement refers to bilateral and multilateral links with other members of the
same community or network, for relationship-building and punishment. Bilateral relationships
recall the notion of a repeated game setting between two players and of the Folk Theorem result,
where short term gains from defecting are overshadowed by long-term gains from cooperation
(Kandori, 1992). In the case of multilateral enforcement, the group collectively sanctions deviant
behavior on behalf of the aggrieved player. Greif (1993) studies Maghribi trader coalitions that
supported the operation of a reputation mechanism to tackle agents’ commitment problem, and
Genoese traders’ use of merchant guilds. Milgrom et al. (1990) look at the role of merchant courts
in the Champagne fairs of medieval Europe as institutions for enforcement. Establishment of credit
reporting bureaus is a contemporary example(de Janvry et al., 2010).
Third party enforcement is a broad term that refers to an outsider-arbiter, who is not directly
involved in the transaction. In game-theoretic terms, this third party essentially transforms a
one-shot game between two players into a repeated game of each player with a third party. Third
party enforcement is traditionally thought of as enforcement by state agencies, e.g., courts or quasi-
judicial entities. The literature on enforcement has now come to recognize this category as being
immensely diverse. The third party could adjudicate privately in the shadow of formal law, as
“private government”(Dixit, 2004) or it could be for-profit direct enforcement (as in the case of
9Kolm (2000) makes the distinction between moral and social imperatives. Guilt for violation is moral but shame
is social.
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the mafia (Gambetta, 1996)). Another kind of third party enforcement could simply involve the
provision of information to various players who then use this as the basis for sanctioning, so that
the third party facilitates second party enforcement (for example, credit and quality certification
agencies).
The plurality of enforcement mechanisms implies that the choice of means of enforcement rests
on the assessment of relative transactions costs, following Williamson’s “discriminating alignment”
hypothesis (Williamson, 1996). State mechanisms for contract enforcement are then neither the
only mechanisms available nor the most important. In fact, state institutions might be neither
sufficient nor necessary for economic exchange.10 Further, the different means of enforcement
(formal and informal) are not mutually exclusive categories; state enforcement, for example, is
often embedded in other forms of enforcement (Barzel, 2002). Such a “mixture of both formal and
informal relations” (Macneil, 1980) is common across diverse contexts and empirical studies observe
that the different means are jointly employed to support diverse kinds of exchange (Macaulay, 1963;
Bernstein, 1992; Guo and Jolly, 2008; Johnson, 2002; Johnson et al., 1999; Lane and Bachmann,
1996; Maze and Menard, 2010; Poppo and Zenger, 2002).
These formal and informal mechanisms of enforcement could interact in complex ways, in
particular, as complements, where, formal mechanisms strengthen informal enforcement, or as
substitutes, where, formal mechanisms replace informal private mechanisms and could potentially
undermine or replace self-enforcing arrangements (Lazzarini et al., 2004; Poppo and Zenger, 2002).
The complementarity view suggests that the joint use of formal and informal arrangements provides
more efficient outcomes than the use of either arrangement in isolation. For instance, third party
enforcement by the state provides a backstop for second party enforcement mechanisms (Klein,
1996, 1985; Lazzarini et al., 2004). Complementarity arguments assert, too, that formal contracts
through incentives or punishments can reduce gains from short-term defection thereby increasing
10For example, Gow et al. (2000) demonstrate that in the Slovak sugar industry self-enforced contracts in the absence
of public or third party enforcement increased productivity and efficiency. McMillan and Woodruff (2000, 1999)
elaborate on the role of private enforcement for businesses in Vietnam, Otsuka et al. (1986) study the Philippines,
Clay (1997) discusses mining rights during the Gold Rush in California and Ellickson (1991) discusses boundary and
cattle trespass disputes in Shasta County, California.
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the value of honoring informal dealings, what Klein (1996) refers to as the “self-enforcing range of
agreements”.
In general, the complementarity view has often taken precedence in discussions of agrarian
transactions in developing countries (Fafchamps and Minten, 2001; Maze and Menard, 2010).
However, formal contracts can also have a significant “motivation crowding effect” or substitution
effect. The prospect of punishments could discourage an individual’s voluntary compliance based on
reciprocity norms, thereby damaging the quality of exchange outcomes (Macaulay, 1963; Malhotra
and Murnighan, 2002; Sitkin and Roth, 1993). Sitkin and Roth (1993) caution that “legalistic
remedies can erode the interpersonal foundations of a relationship they are intended to bolster
because they replace reliance on an individual’s good will with objective formal requirements.”
Likewise, Macaulay (1963) stresses that detailed negotiated contracts get in the way of creating good
exchange relationships between business units. In essence, rules can compromise the ‘handshake
ethic’.
These theoretical insights on the plurality of enforcement mechanisms and their complemen-
tarity and substitutability offer an appropriate lens to examine agribusiness practice of contract
farming in India. In particular, the tension between the ‘motivation crowding out’ effect and
complementarity effect is especially valid in the context of enforcement in contract farming systems
in India.
11.4 Enforcement, Enforceability and the Contract
References to Indian customs in early Greek literary sources during the time of Herodotus (5th
Century B.C.) suggest that Indians had a reputation for seldom going to law to settle disputes
(Singer, 1972). This rings true for agribusiness in contemporary India as well, where contractual
relationships are seen more as relationships and less as contracts.
In conversations with agribusiness executives in India, the very mention of the term ‘contract
farming’ evokes passionate response. One executive pointed out “We don’t do contract farming,
we do relationship farming”.11 Another interjected “I call what we do contact farming” leaning
11Agribusiness Survey, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, 2007.
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forward to ensure one did not miss the point. “We have contact with the farmers, there is no written
contract; it is by word of mouth, based on mutual understanding” he elaborated.12 Yet another
said, “I would prefer you called it corporate-linked farming”.13 Each phrase used to describe their
procurement strategy negates the idea of formal contracts that are enforceable by law.
Their careful rewording also suggests that these firms’ executives view firm-farm transactions
as a problem of relationship maintenance rather than of contract enforcement. On the one hand, a
combination of a languid legal system and the sheer number of farmers involved offers little prospect
of economical public enforcement of contracts, pushing firms to rely on informal mechanisms.
Indeed, this lies at the heart of arguments that advocate establishing formal, legal mechanisms
for contract enforcement. However, on the other hand, even with a hypothetical legal system
that works efficiently for agribusinesses in India, the social context of contract farming and the
inherent nature of agricultural transactions bestows judicial options for enforcement with limited
value. This comes partly from difficulties of non-observability and verifiability of contracts and
partly from farmer perceptions of formal legal modes of economic exchange, which could crowd out
personalized transactional relationships. The following sections investigate how, in this empirical
context, a combination of these elements drive agents to choose certain modes of contracting and
enforcement over others.
11.4.1 The Question of Enforceability
First, there is the question of whether the contracts used in contract farming schemes in India are
enforceable at all. Given the nature of agriculture, it is virtually impossible to fashion a contract
that provides for all possible contingencies in a way that is verifiable by a third party. Contracts
are, therefore, invariably incomplete. As an executive observed “Our problem is, these contracts
are not actionable. There is nothing we can do in the event of a breach.”14 Some contractual
obligations are only imperfectly observable at the farm level or have a very high cost of detection -
like the farmers’ use of recommended practices or even side-sale of contracted produce. A firm that
12Agribusiness Survey, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, 2007.
13Agribusiness Survey, Mumbai, 2007.
14Agribusiness Survey, Hubli, Karnataka, 2008.
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contracted for marigold (by acreage) in southern India explained how side-selling of the flowers was
rampant, especially during the festival season, when the open market prices shot up relative to the
contracted price. “Every contract farmer is sending our flowers from the contracted acreage to the
open market; each of us has at least fifty farmers to look after, we cannot be in every farm at the
same time to detect that.”15
Such de facto non-observability and non-verifiability then renders the outcome of judicial
enforcement highly uncertain. Dispute resolution in this case is a probabilistic outcome. A legally
binding contract does not offer the kind of guarantee it would for less complex transactions in
manufacturing or services. This, in effect, undermines the Weberian notion that “legal guaranty
gives a higher degree of certainty that the promise will be kept”(Weber et al., 1978, page 667).16
However, it is not merely the lack of predictability of dispute resolution outcomes that is a
problem. A shared perception holds among a number of firms that the judiciary in India would
give the farmer the benefit of the doubt for political reasons. Especially in a context where the
might of large agribusinesses dwarfs a smallholder’s power, dispute resolution is widely perceived to
be pro-farmer. Essentially, agribusinesses perceive it to be hard to get verdicts against the farmer.
As an executive observed “in India, corporates have to be very careful; in any dispute between a
farmer and corporate, the firm is always assumed to be the culprit”.17
The problem of enforceability also arises from the way contracts are written. This is not so
much an economic perspective of contracts as it is a legal perspective. Still, it has implications for
the economic analysis of transactions, since it renders judicial proceedings stochastic.18
15Agribusiness Survey Thalavadi, Sathyamangalam, Tamil Nadu, June, 2009.
16The certainty that comes with legal guarantee is what led Weber(1922/1978 edition) to suggest that it would be
possible to expand the sphere of voluntary economic exchange because this higher certainty would enable people who
did not know each other to transact with one another.
17Agribusiness Survey, Mumbai, Maharashtra, 2007.
18The legal perspective on contracts in these schemes is important to see why firms shy away from contracts. This
is discussed in Narayanan (2009).
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11.4.2 The Writing of Contracts
“When I use a word,”Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone,“it means just
what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less.”
-Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland, page 124.19
This contract is so one-sided, I am astonished to find it written on both sides of the
paper.
- Lord Evershed, M.R. quoted in Robert E. Megarry,Discussing a standard form contract, page 276.20
These two quotes sum up many written contracts between farmer and agribusiness in India.
They are replete with ambiguity and are often one-sided.
One written contract carries a clause that reads: “This agreement is based on mutual trust and
belief” (Singh and Asokan, 2005). Quality requirements are couched in similarly ambiguous terms
in the contract - “contract produce at the time of delivery should be of satisfactory quality”.21
There are indeed cases where it is possible to define, precisely, parameters for judging what might
be satisfactory.22 Similar clarity is not offered for the color and appearance of chipping potatoes,
for instance, which potentially leads to disputes with uncertain outcomes.23 Likewise, it is hard to
imagine that a firm’s contractual commitment that it “shall provide high quality seeds and technical
knowhow at reasonable prices” assigns clear, judicable responsibilities to the firm.24
Further, even if one were to assume that the contract document itself did not offer opportunities
for interpretative haze, when contracts are written by one party in the form of take-it-or-leave-it
contracts, the terms of the transaction are often explicitly (and expectedly) in favor of the firm.
Singh and Asokan (2005) find that often, any loss or encumbrance not mentioned in the contract,
contracts make growers liable to compensate the company. While a few allowed for compensation
19Carroll (1898).
20Megarry (1973/2006).
21Contract provided by agribusiness in Andhra Pradesh, April 2007. Contract details are proprietary, thus cannot
be cited directly without the firm’s permission.
22For example, in papaya contracts, firms use a device called the Brix meter to measure papain activity in latex
in papaya contract farming by gauging the refraction and translucence of the latex which in turn indicates papain
content, a minimum of which is required as per the contract. This device is easy to use and the farmers have an
opportunity to measure it themselves.
23In the state of Jharkhand, when a multinational chipping company rejected payment to farmers for their small
potatoes claiming that they couldn’t process these, the farmers confronted the firm with chips packets, demonstrating
that the firm was in fact processing even the smallest potatoes. Agribusiness Survey, Ranchi, Jharkhand, 2008.
24Contract provided by agribusiness in Karnataka, November 2007.
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to the farmer in the event of the firm violating certain terms of the contract, in others, firms seek
compensation for farmer’s breach of contract, while remaining silent on the question of the firm
reneging on its contractual obligations. Other aspects, for instance, involving termination of the
contractual relationship, are also often one-sided. “The parties hereby agree that the lease shall be
discontinued for genuine reasons which shall be decided by the first party (the firm)”(Singh and
Asokan, 2005). Another contract states that at the time of delivery,“canneries have the discretion
to increase/decrease the quantity of (contracted commodity) to be supplied”.25
Should contract breach make it to courts, firms would run into another problem.The writing of
contracts in India today involves no participation of the farmers. In most legal traditions, such non-
involvement of farmers in drafting contracts to which they are party would make these contracts
non-judicable. Acceptance, in judiciary terms, needs to be a ‘valid acceptance’. As Sridevan
(2006) elaborates, to be faithful to the Indian Contract Act, the relevant piece of legislation for
agribusiness-farmer contracts, every clause in the agreement needs to be discussed, negotiated and
then finalized, once there is consensus on each point. The contracts in use in contract farming
schemes suggest otherwise. Indeed, farmers across schemes seek an opportunity to draft the
agreement and “assist in the wording of specification in terms the farmer can understand” 26
and demand that the “management ensures that farmers know what they are signing”27.
It is not clear that farmers understand the specific commitments implied by their signature.
This is despite an explicit statement of acceptance of the terms laid out in the contract. The
Farmer Survey reveals that while a number of farmers did understand the legality of the contract, a
number of others were not sure what was meant by a contract document. They were not sure if the
‘passbooks’ they had were, in fact, contracts.28 This is owing partly to farmers being unaccustomed
to formal transactions, a related absence of understanding of the import of contracts, and partly
due to illiteracy.
Interestingly, farmers often maintain a contract in someone else’s name (usually a member of
25Contract provided by agribusiness in Punjab, March 2007.
26Interview with farmers, Coimbatore, 2008.
27Interview with farmers, Dindigul, 2008.
28In some schemes, firms hand passbooks to contracting farmers, in which transactions are recorded whenever there
is transfer of inputs, credit or produce.
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Table 11.1: Modes of Contracting and Farmer Awareness
Details Average among Range across Number of
all schemes(%) schemes (%) Respondents
Percentage of farmers who have a written agree-
ment
54 18-90 438
- Percentage of these who have a copy 52 9-82
- Percentage of these who have read it or had it read to
them
44 22-67
- Percentage of these who believe it is valid in court 49 0-58
- Percentage of these who are unaware if it is valid in court 14 0-40
- Percentage of these who think it is not valid in court 37 2-100
Percentage of contract farmers who contracted as
part of a group (See note 2)
44 14-95 158
1 The data uses responses from Phase 1 and Phase 2 of Farmer Survey
2 This figure for group contracting pertains to only the Phase 1 farmers in cotton and gherkins.
3 All figures have been rounded off to the nearest whole number.
the farmer’s family “who has brought luck in the past”). In some cases, these were toddlers, in
others, deceased family members. The contract is then signed by yet another person (cousins,
extended family and so forth), while the actual contractual obligations and cultivation are carried
out by the farmer. In the Farmer Survey, several names on the contracting firms’ roster of contract
suppliers were of toddler-children of the farmers.
The Farmer Survey shows that only a half of all contract farmers who signed contracts kept a
copy (Table 11.1), ranging from a tenth to four-fifths across the schemes.29 Fewer still (44%) had
read them or knew of its contents through other means. Importantly, a significant proportion (37%)
who had signed contracts did not think it was valid in court. Less than half thought the contracts
were legally valid, and 14% were not sure. This is true across schemes, although to varying degrees.
It is interesting, for instance, that in the broiler subsector, only a small proportion stated that they
had signed written contracts. Yet, almost all of them considered these valid in court. In contrast,
in the papaya contracting scheme, while an overwhelming proportion had written contracts, almost
all the contract farmers believed these had no legal validity.
In general, this absence of farmers’ clear understanding of their legally binding contractual
obligations raises interesting questions about whether the courts would in fact consider these
29It must be noted here that the Indian Contract Act deems oral contracts admissible in courts provided there
is evidence of such a contract. In general, such proof is not available in the context of contract farming schemes in
India.
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contracts valid and uphold farmers’ acceptance of their obligations. This contributes to uncertainty
in judicial outcomes.
11.4.3 Costs of Enforcement
Even if it were possible to write out complete, verifiable contracts, farmers and agribusinesses in
India encounter public institutions for enforcement that are expensive relative to the loss associated
with the contractual dispute. The proverbially slow legal machinery in India, caused in part by a
backlog of pending cases, almost guarantees long waiting times.30 This prevents new cases from
entering the court system without a very good incentive.
Given that firms transact with a large number of farmers for very small quantities, often the
costs of legal action exceed any claim firms could realistically hope to recover. Further, most
contractual disputes would be on a case-by-case basis. This implies that for the firm, every farmer
taken to court, however small the transaction, entails a fixed cost.31 As a procurement officer put
it, “we had a big problem with enforcement, but it is simply not worth going to court.”32
As an illustration, consider the data on defaults by farmers in a gherkins contract farming
scheme in Tamil Nadu. Farmers are offered inputs on credit at the time of sowing, agreeing that
when the contract produce is delivered to the firm, the amount owed against inputs is adjusted
and the farmer is paid the net amount. For various reasons, such as yield risk and side-selling, the
farmer often ends up delivering less than the expected commitment and hence becomes indebted
to the firm. Firms are left with the choice of writing off the outstanding debts, carrying it over to
the next season, or attempting recovery, either through private means or through courts. It is not
unusual in contract farming schemes in India to have a very large number of defaulting farmers,
each with a very small debt. In this example, 37% of contract farmers in the study area had some
default (485 out of 1296 contracting farmers), but the average value of default was only Rs.3750
30As on October 31, 2001, 20.3 million cases were pending in the district and subordinate courts, 3.5 million in the
High Courts and 21,995 in the Supreme Court (Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, 2003). Normal
adjournments in Delhi’s courts, for example, are for 4-6 months, the trial dates are not available before 2 years and
settlement of suit takes place over 15 years(Upadhyay, 2003).
31Procedurally, in most legal systems, even mass standardized contracts would not admit class libel and would
have to be decided on a case-by-case basis (The Yale Law Journal Company Inc., 1949). This is necessarily the case,
therefore, for individual contracts.
32Agribusiness Survey, Hubli, Karnataka 2008
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(approximately US $78).33 Figure 11.1 plots these defaults in decreasing order of magnitude.
Given that the firm could potentially seek to recover these amounts from each defaulting farmer,
this represents a maximal marginal recovery curve.34 Superimposing a rough estimate 35 of the
marginal cost of taking a farmer to court, it is clear that for a majority of the defaulters (and
constituting a large proportion of actual procurement) the costs of recovery far exceeds the amount
that can be recovered. From a purely economic perspective, the higher the costs of court-aided
enforcement, the fewer the farmers the firm would go after; in particular, it only ever makes sense
for them to attempt recovery from farmers located to the left of point E, the optimum, where the
marginal returns to recovery effort and marginal cost that it entails are equal. At the higher end of
the enforcement cost range, E′ is the optimum, so that it makes sense to take even fewer farmers
to court than at E. In this example, assuming an enforcement cost of Rs.5000/farmer, the firm
could seek court enforcement for about 124 of them (approximately, 26% of all defaulting farmers),
without incurring fiscal losses, assuming full recovery of outstanding dues. This figure drops as
enforcement costs increase. At Rs. 12500/farmer, it would make sense for the firm to incur this
enforcement cost for only 14 farmers (less than 3% of defaulters), again assuming complete recovery
of dues.
Indeed, the gherkins firm in question asserted that legal recourse emerges as a less-preferred
option given the relatively small recovery amounts per farmer and the large number of farmers who
are culpable.36 Firms express a willingness to “let it go” if the volumes or defaults are small and
even larger amounts if they trust the farmer not to have diverted contracted output.
The farmers’ enforcement options are far more limited, especially given that most contracts
explicitly favor the firm; most often this involves opting out of contracting itself. Few ever go
to court (about 1% of the respondents in the Farmer Survey), partly because for many farmers,
33This is equivalent to the retail value of eight, 12-oz. jars of gherkins pickles or around 220 kgs. of the highest
grade of contract output, which is 0.05% of what was eventually procured that season in the study area.
34It is a “maximal” curve because, given uncertain judicial enforcement, this represents the best case, where the
firm recovers all that is due to it by the farmer.
35This was collected from interviews with agribusinesses in Tamil Nadu, but is a crude ballpark figure.
36The firm may still choose to strategically enforce contracts to induce future compliance. This is taken up in
Section 11.4.4.
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Figure 11.1: Farmer Defaults in Gherkins, 2008-09
recourse to legal redress is practically out of reach, if not in terms of monetary costs, in terms of
other barriers such as legal literacy, demands on time and access to legal assistance.
11.4.4 The Idea of a Contract: Private Ordering in the Shadow of the Law
Given that both enforceability and enforcement are problems in equal measure, what is the role
of the contract itself in these contract farming schemes? Is it conceivable that if enforcement were
not a constraint, firms would treat contracts as legally binding instruments, preferring these to
informal arrangements? Interviews with agribusiness indicate that such a scenario is unlikely.
First, the very fact that a contract tries to be specific and rigid in defining contingent claims is,
in the firms’ view, a disadvantage, since the firms lose ‘flexibility’(Klein, 1996). Gow et al. (2000)
observe in the context of Slovak sugar industry that firms often value the flexibility that comes
with informal arrangements. In India, for instance, the year 2008-09 saw gherkins processors lose
international orders on account of the global economic slowdown; many firms had contracted far
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more than they wanted. At times like this, an executive explained,“we would like the farmers to
cheat and side-sell to other companies. That would actually be a great help! But the contract
obliges us to buy what they produce, even though we have no orders”.37
Importantly, the social context these firms operate in influences agribusiness attitudes to the
contract as a legal instrument. The very idea of a contract carries little meaning when few farmers
understand the document they are supposed to sign. In fact, in some parts of India, fly-by-night
operators have duped farmers of their lands, while the farmers had no idea that they had signed
away their land as collateral. Several such cases have been reported in the state of Orissa in recent
years.38 In much of rural India, the idea of committing to anything in writing is often disconcerting
to the farmer. “If you go to a farmer with a pen and a document, you can be sure he will run
away”, said a field official , explaining how the company first establishes contact before explaining
the procurement arrangement to the farmer.39 This can often be a long process and some farmers
take years before accepting to grow produce for the company. Firms thus tend to believe that
for contract farming relationships, “trust is a precondition, whereas a contract is not, absolutely
not.”40 This sentiment is pervasive. Said one executive: “what is the use of contract? You can’t
do anything with it anyway. Trust is a hundred times more valuable than a contract”.41,42
The firms typically claim that they are unlikely to ever take legal action for breach of contract.
One firm’s executive pointed out that it was a very sensitive issue, politically. “In our country, we
can’t go after the farmers, it is not even right to go after them in case of breach - you can’t fight
the annadatas”.43
Another agribusiness executive explained that “even if contracts were easily enforceable in
courts, that is not the way you work with farmers. You need to establish a relationship with
37Agribusiness Survey, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu, 2009.
38Personal communication with Action Aid (India), Bhubaneshwar, Orissa, March 2007.
39Agribusiness Survey, Secunderabad, Andhra Pradesh, 2009
40Agribusiness Survey, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, 2009.
41Agribusiness Survey, Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu, 2008.
42While it is conceivable that that exogenous change in education, literacy and awareness would assist transition
to contract-based relationships, it is unlikely that court-aided enforcement would ever render trust irrelevant, as has
been pointed out repeatedly even in developed countries (Macaulay (1963), for instance).
43Agribusiness Survey, Mumbai, Maharashtra, 2007. The term annadatas means ‘givers of food’ and carries the
connotation of a noble profession.
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them. The loss from breach is easily made up; a relationship that is strained is not!”44 Another
executive said, “governments don’t understand these things. You can’t force farmers to enter into
paper contracts with some third party settling disputes.That would make it impossible for us to
work with them.”45 In the case of Maharashtra, while the stated reason for the poor response of
agribusinesses was that these laws were not sufficiently well-publicized, industry sources felt that
both firms and farmers preferred “informal arrangements based on trust, experience and market
dynamics instead of having a formal arrangement”(Ghadyalpatil, 2008).
Indian agribusinesses typically articulate a concern that the motivation crowding out effect
or substitution effect might outweigh the complementarity effects of formal mechanisms, that
formal agreements might undermine voluntary compliance and hence the self-enforcing nature
of arrangements. Firms appear to factor in the substitution effect seriously in their contracting
decisions, ensuring, even in the context of formal written contracts, that the highly personal and
customized nature of engagement is not undermined. This is sometimes evident in the contract
document itself. For example, one of them reads: “In case of any dispute with regard to the lease
between the parties, the same shall be settled by mutual discussion” or, as another puts it, disputes
will be “endeavored to be solved through dialogue”.46
The Farmer Survey reveals that private order enforcement dominates overwhelmingly as the
means through which transactions are maintained, with law playing only a peripheral role, if at
all (Table 11.2). Only 6% of those interviewed as part of the Farmer Survey thought the firm
would take them to court, if the farmer breached the contract. More than a fifth of the farmers
felt that the firm would attempt to recover outstanding amounts privately, through field officers,
by complaining to village leaders and local representatives and so forth.
Firms often rely on repeated interaction over the long term to discourage farmers from breaching
contracts. “We are so big, that none of them can afford to burn bridges. At some point of time if
not now, at some time in the future, they have to sell to us. No one can hope to avoid us completely
all the time, so this helps and encourages them to keep up their commitment.”47 Across schemes,
44Agribusiness Survey, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, 2007.
45Agribusiness Survey, Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu, 2008.
46Contracts provided by firms in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, 2008.
47Agribusiness Survey, Kangeyam, Tamil Nadu, 2007.
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Table 11.2: Farmer Perceptions of Enforcement in Select Schemes
What would the firm do if you breached the contract? %
Stop contracting, deny advances or credit 35
Attempt recovery through appropriate action, not pay us 21
Warn us or do nothing 15
Go to court 6
Others 14
No response 9
What would you do if the company breaches the contract? %
Stop contracting, and/or switch firms 36
Give up the contract crop altogether 13
Nothing, we are powerless 32
Make a representation to the firm,complain to other authorities, demand compensation 17
Go to court 1
Others 1
Total number of respondents 484
1 The data uses responses from Phase 1 and Phase 2 of Farmer Survey
2 All figures have been rounded off to the nearest whole number.
farmers seem to know this. A majority of 35% of the respondents in the Farmer Survey said the
firm would stop contracting with them in the future if the farmer breached the contract in some
way.
In some cases, it is a form of collective punishment. “As a rule, we always tell the farmers,
if any of you cheat we will boycott the village and even the good ones will lose out. This works
a bit, but there are always a few who cheat.”48 In still other cases, reputation plays a big role.
The gherkins cluster in Karnataka and the poultry cluster around Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu have
developed a system where they inform one another of ‘blacklisted’ farmers. While the gherkins
firm felt it was beginning to work, the poultry firms were still refining the system. In the initial
phase, they did not anticipate that farmers would approach other companies through other family
members and sometimes alter the name of the farm to escape recognition. The firms were now
working to identify farmers by the survey number of the plot they owned.49
As Galanter (1981) points out, the plurality of enforcement mechanisms available implies that as
48Agribusiness Survey, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, 2008.
49Another relatively recent development is a whole class of contracting intermediaries who have emerged as
aggregators of contract produce for the firm. This is particularly true for firms that operate on a large scale. They
are involved in selecting and maintaining farmer relationships on a commission basis, not unlike traders in traditional
market channels. This appears to be the firms’ response to get the incentive-moral hazard problem right, and from
the perspective of this work, it outsources enforcement, in some sense. This is discussed further in Narayanan (2010b).
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the parties come to terms with the intrinsic limits of court ordering, they craft their own transaction-
specific contractual supports that involve private ordering. As agents recognize that their purposes
are served by continuity and cooperation, the concept of contract as legal rules gives way to the
more flexible concept of contract as framework, or a focal point. A contract is then incomplete and
“almost never accurately indicates real working relations, but affords a rough indication around
which such relations vary, an occasional guide in cases of doubt, and a norm of ultimate appeal when
such relations cease in fact to work” (Galanter, 1981; Llewellyn, 1931). The contract document is
then something of a “social artefact” or a “social representation of a relationship”(Suchman, 2003).
In the Indian setting, the contract is, at best, a tool to declare seriousness of intent or to initiate
a process of discussion with the farmer for better clarity of the terms of the transaction. Thus, even
if the contract is rarely (meant to be) enforced, contract agreements help to spell out clearly the
rules of a relationship (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999). One representative of a firm that contracted
for gherkins stated that even though the chances of litigation were minimal, they were investing
a lot of effort in making the contracts tighter and more specific so that the farmer understands
the parameters of engagement well. Another agribusiness representative stated, “We have written
contracts but they are of no use. They are not legal binding; but they are moral binding. Every
year about 5-8% of the contract farmers deceive us, but others have integrity.”50
At other times, rather than serving as a mechanism to ensure that farmers honor their
commitment, the contract is a defense mechanism for the firms so that should the farmer approach
the courts they have adequate protection. This explains, in part, why contracts are one-sided. A
procurement manager explained, “Sometimes the farmer can also be unreasonable. We once had
a notice from a lawyer suing us for Rs.4 lakhs (approximately US$ 8500). The farmer blamed us
for his low yields. We countered it by saying that he had not really followed the practices and the
contract clearly states that the farmer is expected to follow the recommendation. His fields were
waterlogged and we had already advised him. The court saw the point.”51
When viewed in these terms, it is possible to read the terms of the contract differently.
50Agribusiness Survey, Belgaum, Karnataka, November 2008.
51Agribusiness Survey Hubli, Karnataka, November 2008.
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What seems like ambiguity from a legalistic perspective is now consistent with the purpose of
the document, that is, when there is such a thing as a document.
On those rare occasions when the firm does sue the farmer for breach in contract, a very
different logic is at work. For instance, in 2007, a contract supplier for a broiler firm sold the
entire stock of over 6000 birds to a wholesaler even though the contract expressly forbade this. The
broiler firm decided to take him to court. There were other things the firm could have done, a
multilateral strategy, for instance, where all broiler firms would boycott the farmer.52 However, such
a coordination mechanism had run into difficulties since they were unable to establish the identity
of defaulting farmers with certainty.53 Further, the wholesalers, the alternate market channel, were
outside their network, so the penalty for the farmer would not be effective. The case had been
going on for two years and an executive confessed that they had spent far more money than the
loss they incurred. “But”, he said, “we feel that this sets an example. We show other contract
suppliers that we will not take it lying down. From that perspective, we think, rather, we hope that
it is worth it.”54 There are similar cases where the firm has successfully sued intermediaries who
sub-contract with farmers. Their experience has been that this reduces the chances of cheating.55
This can work both ways, though. One executive confessed “we would never take a farmer to
court; it would jeopardize relations with all the farmers and not just the one who defaulted”.56
There is a pervasive sense among contracting firms that suing a farmer would effectively scare away
or lose them all their contract farmers the following season.
Here, we see evidence that third party public enforcement mechanism goes beyond a backstop
and is quite differently embedded in a set of multiple enforcement mechanisms. Legal recourse is
not the last resort. Rather, it becomes an instrument of information transmission and conveys a
set of incentives through a demonstration effect but at the same time, could potentially transmit
disincentives as well. Firms need to factor in this tradeoff between the complementary and
52In the broiler industry in Tamil Nadu contracting firms tend not to cross-purchase, so that the side-selling usually
occurs with wholesalers in the open market.
53This is because the farmers often used names of firms for their farms while signing the contract, changing these
if they did default. So too with individuals, who typically signed contracts in the name of different members of the
family each time they signed a new contract.
54Agribusiness Survey Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu, 2009.
55Agribusiness Survey Dindigul and Nilakkottai, Tamil Nadu, 2007.
56Agribusiness Survey, Mettupalayam, Tamil Nadu, 2007.
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substitution effects of formal contracts and their enforcement in their procurement and enforcement
decisions.
11.5 The Moral Economy of the Contract
It is evident from the above that farm-firm contractual relationships in India are viewed in very
broad terms. This is indeed relationship farming more than contract farming. An agribusiness
executive likened the firm-farmer link to a marriage,“you have to work at it until you die, there
may be lots of ups and downs, but you have to stick with it.”57
There is ample evidence in India of what scholars have noted to be true of contract farming
schemes in other developing countries, that there exists a “moral economy” of the contract (Clapp,
1994). This moral economy of the contract offers a space wherein firms reward the “ostensible
observance” of the salient terms of the contract by farmers by overlooking minor transgressions
(Clapp, 1994; Scott, 1976). The firm-farmer relationship occupies a space larger than that defined
by the contract; even as everything in these “contracts is not contractual”(Durkheim and Bellah,
1973), extra-contractual interactions between the firm and farmer influences contract performance,
for instance, by altering the incentives for compliance.
For instance, many field officials working to monitor crops and offer technical advice to the
farmer often end up helping the farmer with other crops as well, teaching them about pesticide use
for non-contract crops, crop planning and so forth (Table 11.3). Nearly, a fifth of all respondents in
the Farmer Survey had sought advice from the field staff of the contract firm for crops other than
the contract crop. The nature of inputs sought range from specific actions to tackle problems with
specific crops to a much broader engagement seeking general advice on new technologies, crops
and markets, cultivation practices and so on. Some firms employ workers from farming families,
many of whom are contract suppliers. While the Farmer Survey does not provide cases of this,
it is apparent that the firm-farm relationship for those families who transact with the firm for
both wage employment and supplier of produce, could enhance the durability of the relationship.58
The Agribusiness Survey reveals too that several firms directed Corporate Social Responsibility
57Agribusiness Survey, Hyderabad/Ranchi, 2008.
58This parallels the contract interlinkage literature, e.g., Braverman and Stiglitz (1982).
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Table 11.3: Kinds of Breach and the Moral Economy of Contract Farmers
Details Average
percentage
across all
schemes (%)
Range in
the different
schemes (%)
Number of
respondents
Percentage
- who diverted contract inputs for non-contract crops 17 0-26 481
-who engaged in side-selling the previous season (self-
reported)
17 2-64 484
- of other farmers in the village who engaged in side-selling
the previous season
12 0-26 484
-who received advice for other crops from the field official 19 0-43 475
Percentage unable to deliver on the contract at
least once in the past
44 0-88 484
The reason for this, in the last such instance:
- Weather or yield loss 52 35-65
- Urgent need for cash 15 10-25
- Market or competitor price was higher 10 6-22
- Firm delayed or did not show up 5 0-18
- Produce fell short of quality standards 5 5-19
- Personal reasons (e.g., death in the family) 13 9-19
Percentage who felt the firm had not honored the contract
in the last season
10 0-23 438
Percentage reporting rejection of some contracted produce 45 9-97 475
Ratio of days until full repayment under contract (relative
to alternate market)
7* 1-27 381
1 Data pertains to Farmer Survey, Phases 1 and 2
2 Figures have been rounded off to the nearest whole number
3 The total number of respondents varies depending on the category of farmers who were asked the question. Some questions
were addressed only to currently contracting farmers, others were addressed to both current and former contract farmers,
and so on.
4 * This figure is a pure number, not a percentage.
activities to contract villages, including donations to schools, village festivals, conducting medical
camps, etc. Larger agribusinesses leverage goodwill created over the years through their community
engagement to put contract farming arrangements in place.59
Such non-contractual actions influence tacitly, and positively, the contractual performance of
farmers. Often there is ex-post-forgiveness of deviations from the contract and a large class of
actions is pardoned as “excusable breach” (Fafchamps, 2004). In general, the moral economy of a
contract implies explicit recognition of “excusable breach” on account of reasons the field agents
deem as being beyond the farmers’ control or too minor to merit enforcement(Fafchamps, 2004).
Often, breach is not literal or obvious. There are many elements to a contract and even when
59These firms, especially, see the grafting of formal contracts onto their preexisting relationships as detrimental to
the trust that has been built over the years, undermining farmer-firm relationships.
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there is not an obvious violation of the salient terms of contract (i.e., delivering the produce of a
given quality at a particular time and place) the terms of engagement can be subverted by farmers
in many ways.
For instance, several contract farmers are known to the firm to use contract inputs for non-
contract crops (called ‘input diversion’). According to the Farmer Survey, 17% of the farmers
admitted to input diversion in the most recent contracting season. Often, contracts oblige farmers
to follow recommended cultivation practices. Many do not. “Our procurement takes place from
25,000 farmers, of whom about 65% really follow all the technical information we provide”.60 In
other cases, it can get more innovative. Some marigold contract farmers soak the flowers before
they deliver to the company so that they weigh more. Sometime papaya latex is adulterated with
flour, sometime with water. “One season, they got our laborers to adult our latex with water. But
for the farmers, we are their adaikalam or refuge. They went astray but all of them have come
back to the fold.”61
The more blatant kind of contract breach by farmers is side-selling. It is common for firms to
contract acreage, obliging the farmer to sell all the crop harvested from the contracted acreage to
the firm. Sometimes, farmers divert contract produce to other buyers who pay more at the time
of harvest. In the Farmer Survey, 17% of the farmers admitted to have sold at least some part of
the contracted produce to buyers other than the contract firm during the most recent season they
contracted (Table 11.3). Despite side-selling being a clear breach of contract, it is sometimes on
account of personal exigencies. Firms recognize this, often saying, “we don’t penalize the farmers
for doing that. They are not entirely to blame. Sometime they need cash urgently, so they sell to
someone else.”62
Indeed, the Farmer Survey suggests that in general, about 44% of the farmers have been unable
to deliver the contracted produce as promised at least once in past (Table 11.3). More than half
the farmers who admitted this was the case attributed their violation to crop loss due to pests or
the weather. Close to 15% of them said they sidesold only because they were in urgent need of
60Agribusiness Survey, UgarKhurd, Karnataka, November 2008.
61Agribusiness Survey, Oddanachatram, Tamil Nadu, 2007.
62Agribusiness Survey, Karamadai, Tamil Nadu, 2007.
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cash. Another 13% were unable to deliver owing to personal reasons, like a death in the family or
illness. These were typically overlooked by the firm as excusable breach. One executive, like his
counterparts elsewhere, put things in perspective “We found that whereas the loyalty was 92% in
1995, it has now dropped to 82% thanks to the other plants encroaching. Farmers sell to them
because of many reasons. Sometimes, they are in need of cash. At other times, they want to sell
(and harvest) earlier than we recommend so that they can accommodate another crop. Also, there
are some mills that outprice us after we announce our price. But, we have been here about 60 years
and we are the largest, so we are not under major threat. In our company, loyalty of farmers is
high.”63
Only when the transgression exceeds limits does the firm actively seek to enforce, by whatever
means they deem appropriate. Many firms that are committed to maintaining trust often take huge
losses.“We succeeded in contract farming because we did not reject or refuse to accept produce, once
we had got what we want. We used to take it even if we did not want it.”64 Another procurement
officer said that there were seasons when they weighed the produce, paid the farmers and emptied
it into the mud to discard. In one scheme for medicinal herbs, operating in Karnataka, the firm
specifies in the contract that should the firm fail to take delivery of contract produce, it would
cover the expense and arrangements to sell in the open market.
From the farmer’s perspective, knowing that this moral economy offers space for minor
transgressions prompts them to maintain the system. They offer similar room for the firm’s
transgressions and address these by raising the relevant concerns with the firm’s officials or field
agents. In the Farmer Survey, 17% of the farmers said they would approach the firm if they found
that the company had breached the contract.
About 10% of the farmers in the Farmer Survey felt that the contracting firm had not honored
the contract in some way in the most recent contracting experience (Table 11.3).65 The firms’ breach
of contract can be just as varied as the farmers’. It is not confined to a refusal to show up to buy
the contracted produce and is often more insidious. Firms could instead establish non-transparent
63Agribusiness Survey, Dharwad-Belgaum, Karnataka, 2008
64Agribusiness Survey, Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu, 2007.
65This is likely an underestimate, since in some survey villages farmers were reluctant to discuss this issue, fearing
that doing so would jeopordize their relationship with the firm.
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quality standards, reject produce arbitrarily and alter prices when the produce is delivered. It
could even offer harmful technical advice. A few farmers in the Farmer Survey mentioned that
firms recommended chemicals that kill the standing crop if they have obtained sufficient supplies.
Farmers stated that this often depended on the field officer and a few of them mentioned this had
happened in the most recent contracting season. There could be other issues as well, as a particular
NGO employee, who was mediating the firm-farm relationship, explained “Our agreement was that
seeds would be delivered on such-and-such date and harvest and delivery at the factory gate would
happen at a certain date. In practice, the delivery of seed takes a time-span. It is sent in lorry
loads and there is almost two weeks separating the arrival of the first consignment and the last
consignment. So the farmers who sow last, nevertheless have to harvest the potato on the given
date, so these potatoes all tended to be under-sized; they were harvested prematurely. These are
rejected. So the firm actually controls the supply by regulating timing of seed delivery”.66 In broiler
contract farming, the firm’s need to have control over total market supply to influence prices implies
that they often contract for fewer growing cycles per year than they originally promise the farmers.
The Farmer Survey reveals for instance, that in 2009, while contract growers were promised six
batches that year, 43% of the growers were offered only five batches, 48% were offered four, and
the rest had to settle for three of fewer batches that year. Other ways in which the firm dilutes
its commitment include delayed payments for contracted produce, or late lifting or evacuation of
contracted produce (which results in higher rejection rates or sub-optimal weights).
But, as with firm response to farmer breach, it is only when the firm’s breach inflicts a cost
beyond what is perceived to be reasonable to the farmer, that the supplier revisits his/her decision
to contract. In general, farmers are in a weaker position, relative to the firm, unless there is a
viable alternate market and one where collusion among buyers is not possible. Close to a third of
farmers say that they are powerless to do anything in the event of the company breaching the terms
of the contract. Again, this goes back to the way contracts tend to be written. Close to half would
stop contracting with the firm, switch firms or give up the contract crop altogether (Table 11.2).
A few farmers also stated that they would not let the concerned firm step into the village again if
66Agribusiness Survey, Ranchi, Jharkhand, 2008.
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they violated their terms of the contract. The Farmer Survey suggests too, that in the event of the
company breach only 1% of the farmers would attempt to go to court.
Given the contract farmer’s weak position in a contractual arrangement, the ability to side-sell,
to stop contracting or to switch firms is what gives farmers agency and depending on the particular
market structure for the contract commodity, can redress, partly, imbalance in the contractual
relationship.67 The exit of farmers itself offers a signal to the more responsive firms, who then have
an opportunity to assess their own contractual performance and make necessary adjustments in
order to survive. This is particularly the case when there are competing firms that offer contracts
to attritioning farmers.68 Interviews with businesses that have survived suggest that most respond
with new arrangements that work on the participation constraint of the farmer, where a contracting
firm has to make offers at least as attractive to the farmer as the next best option available. In
2007-08, there were so many firms contracting gherkins in the study area that firms had begun to
offer cash gifts and vacation packages to the farmers to induce them to contract.
In general, the centrality of personal relationships in contract farming systems in India is
manifest in the way firms identify and conduct business with farmers. The process of identifying
farmers with whom to contract differs substantially across schemes. For both papaya and poultry,
the identification of farmers is primarily through social networks and contacts; 57% of papaya
contract farmers and 95% of broiler growers entered into contracts based on preexisting social
relationships with the firm’s employees. For marigold and gherkins, the firms tend to identify a
small region and then canvass in the villages within that region for farmers who might be willing
to contract. Only 8% of all gherkins contract farmers and about 12% of marigold contract farmers
were selected based on social networks. Once the contracting arrangement is in place, field officers
of all the firms in the survey interact closely with the farmers in a highly personalized way, partly
owing to the need for oversight of the production process. In the case of broilers, field officials
visited the farmer everyday, for gherkins and marigold this was three to four times a fortnight. For
67Swinnen (2007), for instance, discuss the effects of competition on rent distribution and the welfare implications
for farmers.
68This is reminiscent of Hirschman (1970)’s thesis on exit, voice and loyalty, which suggests that the firm’s ability to
respond to exit and voice would contribute to maintaining the system. In another sense, this also bears out the view
that competition among contracts leads to convergence in forms(Eggertson, 1990). In most commodities, competing
firms end up offering remarkably similar terms of contract, at least on paper.
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papaya at the nursery stage, field officers visit contracting farmers daily, tapering off their visits
once the tree attains maturity.
The primacy of trust and relationship both enables informality in contracting and is also a result
of the absence of legally valid written contracts. It is common in the contract farming literature to
see a scheme described in categorical terms as being formal (written contracts) or informal (oral
agreements) or as contracting with groups or individuals. In contrast, the Farmer and Agribusiness
Surveys suggest that firms engage with farmers in different ways depending on what works for each
farmer, so that even within the same scheme there is a mix of formal and informal, of oral and
written contracts, of group contracting and individual contracting, etc., although the major terms
of the contract might be shared. It is ‘contact’ that enables field officials to determine where an
oral contract would work better than a written contract or where it is appropriate for farmers to
contract as groups rather than as individuals.69
11.6 Contractual Commitment and Performance: Examining
Breach and the Self-Enforcing Range of Agreements
One way of examining, empirically, the primacy of relationship is to identify the “self-enforcing
range” (Klein, 1996) of contracts in contract farming schemes(Gow and Swinnen, 2001). If, as
earlier sections suggest, farmers and firms view contracts at a particular time period as part of a
broader and longer term relationship, one would expect contracting farmers and the firm to desist
from myopic opportunistic behavior.
As far as the farmers are concerned, those who value the contractual relationship beyond the
present might be willing to sell on contract even if the alternate or market price were to fall below
the contract price. Farmer ‘loyalty’ to the firm could manifest as inertia in sideselling response to
differentials between spot market price and contract price in the delivery period, at least up to a
threshold, beyond which the farmer would breach the contract and side-sell.70
69This paper focuses purely on the firm’s field officers functioning at the firm-farm interface or as ‘boundary’
persons. When firms expand and scale up, several re-intermediate, using agents on a commission basis to mediate these
relationships with farmers. This raises a set of interesting questions on its own and is explored elsewhere.(Narayanan,
2010b)
70In Klein (1996)’s formulation, a similar threshold from the firm defines the other end of the self-enforcing range.
This is not considered in this paper. The analytical model underlying this approach is detailed in Chapter 4.
287
Previous sections described in detail the importance of personal relationship in maintaining
transactional relationships, mainly from the perspective of the firm. The Farmer Survey offers an
opportunity to examine this from the farmers’ perspective, and to see specifically if the empirical
evidence from the survey corroborates the importance of relationships for contractual compliance.
The remainder of the chapter maps these threshold price differentials and their correlates and
also analyzes self-reported side-selling behavior to identify its correlates. The first is equivalent
to mapping contractual commitments onto expected price differentials, the latter is equivalent to
assessing contractual performance in relation to actual price differentials. Throughout the section,
the goal is to distinguish explicitly between two opposing forces, a negative price differential that
provides incentives for breach and ties that bind the farmer to the firm and hence act as restraints
to breach. In other words, do “relationships” really matter? If yes, how much do they matter
in terms of unit price foregone and to what extent can they improve contractual performance, or
neutralize price-driven incentives to breach?
11.6.1 Threshold price differentials
Defining normalized price differential Dit as
Dit =
Pct − Pmt
Pmt
× 100 (11.1)
where, Pct refers to the contract price for delivery at time t, and Pmt refers to the spot market (or
alternate/alternative) price at the same time, this marks a range of possible price differentials at
the settlement time. Throughout this section, Dit serves to represent price-driven incentives that
influence (1) contractual performance (whether a farmer chooses to honor a contract or not) and
(2) contractual commitment (whether a farmer accepts a contract or not).
I now define D¯i as the normalized threshold price differential. This is best characterized as the
minimum difference between contract price and the spot market or alternative price, represented
by a farmer’s expectation at the time of contracting of the spot market price at delivery and
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settlement time, that the farmer would be willing to tolerate in accepting a contract.71 These
threshold differentials, D¯i are farmer-specific, but are assumed, for the present analysis, to be
stable over time. This is given by
D¯i =
[
Pct − E(Pmt)
E(Pmt)
]
i
× 100 (11.2)
At any time t, whenever Di ≥ D¯i, the farmer will be willing to accept the contract and if it were
the case that D¯it < D¯i the farmer would decline the contract. So, the threshold defines the price
differential tolerance of a farmer and the range of price differentials over which the farmer accepts
contracts. It is easy to see that when D¯i ≥ 0, the farmer demands a contract price that offers a
premium over the expected alternative price and for D¯i < 0, the farmer will tolerate a contract
price that sinks below the expected competing price. Drawing on Minten et al. (2009), the Farmer
Survey elicits these thresholds, for pre-specified levels of E(Pmt).
72 The normalization with respect
to E(Pmt) enables comparison across commodities.
Figure 11.2 and show the cumulative distribution of price differential thresholds for contract
71In examining the threshold for contract acceptance, I focus on the price differential per unit of contracted produce
for a given volume of contracted produce.
72First, farmers were asked if, in general, they would accept to abide by the contract if the contract price were
lower than the market price, i.e. whether their D¯i < 0. Farmers who answered in the affirmative were then asked
how much lower the contract price could be relative to the market price. Farmers who declared that they would
not abide by the contract if the contract price were lower than the market price were asked how much higher the
contract price would have to be over the market price before they were willing to go with the contract. In essence,
these farmers indicate that the contract price would necessarily have to match market price. The followup questions
are to ascertain if it is a sufficient condition or whether firms would have to offer a premium over the market price.
Farmers were asked to state these with respect to a notional average farmgate price for the contract commodities
the past year, according to industry sources. This was Rs.6/kg. for marigold, Rs. 40/kg. for broiler. They were
further asked to state the threshold differential for a representative ‘high’ (Rs. 10/kg. for marigold and Rs. 60/kg.
for broiler) and ‘low price’ (Rs.2/kg. and Rs.20/kg. for marigold and broiler, respectively). These figures were based
on estimates offered by traders, industry sources and farmers, as ‘typical’ low and high prices. Thresholds were
elicited for these three reference market prices to take into account that the price differential that induces farmers
to side-sell might vary over the range of prices prevailing for the particular commodity. Unless otherwise mentioned,
the analysis is with reference to the ‘average’ alternate price. For gherkins, which has no alternate domestic market,
the average reference price used is the competitor’s price for the smallest size gherkins (Grade I), which forms the
bulk of production and carries the highest rate per kilogram.
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farmers for gherkin, broiler and marigold. 73 The Y-axis is the proportion who will accept a
contract at that price differential.
These thresholds differ widely across the three contract commodities. For gherkins, few farmers
(3%) are willing to accept a contract which offers a price less than the next best alternative. For
marigold, at the other end, most farmers (76%) would accept a contract price that is below the
market price. Broiler presents an intermediate case, where 62% of the contract farmers would
accept a contract that offers a price lower than the alternative market price.
While negative threshold price differentials can be interpreted as reflecting farmer loyalty to
the firm or a farmer’s value of his/her relationship with the firm, it is important to recognize that
there are several competing factors that explain these threshold differentials. Broadly, the farmers’
willingness to accept a lower contract price relative to the alternative is related to the ability of
farmers to access an alternate market for the contract commodity. This can be physical access that
pushes up the transactions cost of spot market participation or it can be the particular market
structure of a commodity or issues of social access due to caste, ethnicity, gender and so on. When
the contract farmer has few options outside the contract so that the farmer’s expectation spot
market price, i.e., E(Pmt), is very low, it is conceivable that the firm can drive down the contract
price close to the farmer’s threshold D¯i.
In the case of gherkins, although the absence of a local market for a highly perishable commodity
puts pressure on farmers to accept a low price, the presence of multiple firms who compete for
suppliers and supplier loyalty implies that the farmers are less willing to accept a contract that
offers a price lower than the competitor’s offer. In order to keep contracting farmers in the fold, a
firm has to match the competitor’s price.
The broiler market represents an intermediate case, being segmented between a large section
of highly organized broiler firms, that are close to being vertically integrated, and contract with
growers and small traditional open market chain dominated by wholesalers dealing in backyard
poultry.
73Papaya has been excluded from analysis since there was no meaningful alternate spot market or competitor
price in the region. Also, at the time of the survey, several papaya contract farmers had lost most of their crop
to mealybug, and farmers were reluctant to answer questions pertaining to their contractual commitments and to
firm-farmer relationships.
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The case of marigold is more complex and deserves special attention. At the time of the survey,
there was only one firm contracting for marigold in the study area. A thriving spot market for
flowers, however, provides huge incentives for breach. Marigold is a differentiated commodity in this
setting. For the firm, it is a low value input; flowers are crushed to extract a high-value product,
i.e., oleoresin. In contrast, the open market highly values fresh flowers sold for decorative purposes.
Yet, even while the incentive for breach is high, the open market prices are highly volatile with
the high Pmt concentrated around a handful of festival days. It is also a discerning market which
selects only big and fresh flowers. In contrast, the firm offers a fixed price through the season
(six pickings, typically), is far less sensitive to quality and accepts very dry and small flowers too.
For the farmers, therefore, this is a valuable relationship to maintain. This is manifest in a large
proportion having very low (negative) thresholds, despite high incentives for breach. In general,
as mentioned in Chapter 8, many marigold farmers contract cannily, expecting to divert some of
the contracted volumes to the spot market when prices shoot up. The figure presented here could
reflect not this aspect. It could also reflect an aggregation bias since over the season the market
price is highly variable, and the elicitation of the threshold price differential does not disaggregate
particular time periods within the season.
Figure 11.4 maps the actual price differential the last time contract farmers delivered on their
contract .For gherkins, the price differential is tightly clustered around zero, indicating competition
between procuring firms (Table 11.4).74 Broiler has a distribution centered around zero, with a
greater spread than for gherkins, reflecting the more mixed structure of the market.
The product differentiation in marigold between a high-value spot market and a low-value
contract commodity shows up strongly, as the contract price is lower than the market price by
around 80%(Table 11.4). This could be in part because the market price itself is endogenously
determined since the market supply of fresh flowers is reduced by contract sales.
While the alternatives the farmer faces influence thresholds, another important driver is
attitudes towards risk and ambiguity. If, as is widely believed, contracting offers some certainty
of market access or price stability in a way that the alternative does not, then one would expect
74This is related somewhat to Eggertson (1990)’s observation that over time, competition among contracts can lead
to convergence in the terms of the contract.
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Figure 11.2: Broiler and Gherkin: Threshold Price Differential and Contract Breach, 2009-10
Figure 11.3: Marigold: Threshold Price Differential and Contract Breach, 2009-10
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Table 11.4: Summary Statistics of Price Series for Selected Contract Commodities
Variable Gherkins Marigold Broiler
Mean (SD) Min. Max. Mean (SD) Min. Max. Mean (SD) Min. Max.
Threshold price differential
(normalized) (%)
9 (4.5) -13 14 -17 (18.1) -35 40 -2 (5.1) -13 13
Contract price(in Rs./kg) 17 (1.4) 14 18 3 (0.2) 2 3 43 (1.1) 35 44
Market price (in Rs./kg) 17 (1.1) 14 18 16 (8.6) 5 40 45 (3.9) 35 58
Actual price differential
(normalized) %
-1 (4.7) -18 7 -78 (12.9) -93 -45 -4 (8.3) -27 22
Number of contract farmers 78 59 71
1 Figures have been rounded off to the nearest whole number, so the actual price differential (normalized) could appear
inconsistent with the contract and market price.
2 Contract price is contract price at settlement time corresponds to Pct in the text.
3 Market price at settlement time corresponds to Pmt in the text.
4 Normalized threshold price differential is defined as
[
Pct−E(Pmt)
E(Pmt)
]
i
× 100.
5 Normalized actual price differential is defined as Pct−Pmt
Pmt
× 100.
6 SD means standard deviation, Min. means minimum, Max. means maximum.
7 The data draws only on Phase 2 of the Farmer Survey.
Figure 11.4: Commodity-specific Price Differential at time of Sale, 2009-10
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risk averse farmers to be willing to pay a premium for the ‘insurance’ and hence settle for lower
contract price (Gow et al., 2000; Minten et al., 2009; Bellemare, 2010).
Perhaps more importantly, in the context of relationship farming, farmers often need to maintain
relationships into the future.75 This might trump narrow short-term calculus of price differentials,
even at the cost of current profits, reflecting the repeated strategic interactions of contracting. The
value of the contractual relationship thus goes beyond the price premium a farmer can get over
alternate crops or marketing channels, and includes benefits in terms of reduced search, reputation
and transactions costs, uncertainty, access to inputs, and so on.
Just as the prospect of future relationship with the firm matters to a farmer, the duration of
the farmer’s pre-existing relationship with the firm could influence the probability that the farmer
is willing to accept a contract price that is lower than the spot market or alternative price. The
longevity of prior relationship can have different implications depending on the exact nature of the
relationship. On the one hand, it could imply greater room or bargaining strength for the farmer
so that he/she would be unwilling to settle for a contract price that is lower than the market price.
On the other hand, it could also be the case that the farmer is willing to settle for less, owing to
his/her familiarity with the firm. This is essentially an empirical question, without an unambiguous
theoretical prior.
Quite apart from these, the value attached to a continued relationship can be strengthened by
the nature of the firm-farmer interface. For example, a farmer, who has entered into contracts
through social contacts might attach greater value to the relationship, embedded as it is in the
farmer’s social life. The farmer might, therefore, be more likely to have a lower threshold than one
who has no social link to the firm.
The Regression Models and Variables
In order to map the different correlates of the farmer’s threshold willingness to accept contracts
that offer a price lower than the spot market and the levels of threshold differentials, I estimate
75In a different sense, Macchiavello and Morjaria (2009) estimates the value of relational contracts for flower
producers in Kenya.
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a set of regression models using data for 208 contract farmers for marigold, gherkins and broilers
drawn from Phase 2 of the Farmer Survey.
The first model regresses a farmer’s stated willingness to accept a contract that offers a price
lower than the spot market or alternate price (a categorical variable that takes the value 1 if yes,
and 0 otherwise) on variables that control for the different aspects outlined above. This is estimated
as a probit, accounting for heteroscedasticity.
The second model is a linear regression of threshold differentials D¯i on a similar set of controls,
also controlling for heteroscedastic errors. By construction, thresholds fall below zero for those who
state that they would accept contracts that offered a lower price than the alternative.
In essence, while the first model seeks to establish correlates of a contract farmer’s stated
tolerance for negative price differentials (or inclination to contractual commitment in the context of
negative price differentials), the second model tries to get at the degree of tolerance or, alternatively,
the magnitude of ‘loyalty’ to the contract firm. Both models use broadly the same sets of
explanatory variables. Table 11.5 presents summary statistics for these. Any explanatory factor
that affects thresholds negatively is, typically, associated positively with the probability of accepting
a contract that offers a lower price.
The notion of relationships in this set of models is represented by five attributes. The first
three attributes, each represented by a binary variable, are the nature of initial contact with the
firm (with a binary value of 1 if contract was initiated on the basis of social networks or contact
and 0 otherwise), the years of contracting experience or longevity of the relationship with the
firm and the past history of default of a farmer, taking the value 1 if the farmer has ever been
unable to deliver on the contract during his/her history with the firm and 0 otherwise. Two other
‘relationship’ attributes capture the notion of continuity in contract farming relationship, serving
as proxies for the value of future relationship. The first captures the farmer’s desire and intent to
continue contracting and the second reflects a farmer’s expectation that the firm would do so. In
particular, these two measure the likelihood that the farmer will continue contracting with the firm
(and likewise, the firm with the farmer) for the next three years on an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, with
1 being not at all likely and 5 being certain to continue. Anchoring the base at the middle value of
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3 representing moderate likelihood, for each of the two attributes, two indicator variables enter the
model as regressors, one representing greater than moderate likelihood and the other representing
a lower than moderate likelihood of the relationship continuing.
The notion of generalized morality Platteau (1994a,b) is captured by a variable that measures
the farmer’s general attitude to the contracts, specifically, the farmer’s view on how important it is
to honor the contract on an ordinal scale of one to five, where one denotes that the farmer considers
it extremely important to honor the contract and five, not at all. This is recast as a binary variable
where zero denotes that the farmer believes it is relatively unimportant to honor the contract and
one otherwise (i.e., those equal to or less than three). In addition, the model includes a binary 0-1
variable that takes the value one if the farmer has a written contract with the firm. It is worth
noting that given the highly personalized and customized nature of the firm-farm interface, the
presence of written contracts might be potentially endogenous, given that field officials deem it
necessary to have written contracts when they believe that a particular farmer is more likely to
transact with a firm with a written agreement rather than without. I run models that both include
and exclude this variable.
Side-selling opportunity is represented by the distance of the farmer to the nearest paved road.
Physical access to the alternate market proxies the transactions costs associated with the alternative
for a farmer contemplating breach.
A set of price variables captures the dynamic of market prices and market structure, given that
they are the source of arguably the most powerful incentives for breach. These merit discussion.
The key variable is the actual price difference between contract and market price at the time of last
delivery on the contract. This is normalized by the market price and is referred to in the table as
the actual price differential (normalized).This variable carries information about realized prices Pmt
and in the context of modeling tolerance of negative thresholds serves as a proxy for information
on the market structure.
The (normalized) actual price differentials enters the model in different ways in order to take
into account the structure of the hypothesized relationship. Importantly, the model distinguishes
those farmers who are tolerant of a negative price differential from those who would accept a
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contract only if the contract price is at least as large as the market price. Given a contract price,
if the actual price differential is high, i.e., the market price Pmt is low relative to a given contract
price, given stable expectations, it is reasonable for farmers to expect that firms would seek to drive
down the contract price, and farmers would have to be content with lower contract premia or price
differentials. Thus, when the actual price differentials are positive, one would expect thresholds
(D¯i)to be correlated negatively with actual price differential (Dit). For those whose threshold is
negative and farmers are willing to accept a contract price discount, it is reasonable to expect that
contract firms would not be able to drive down the contract price below the alternative market price
without limit, while still having the farmer maintain the relationship. In this case, the normalized
threshold can be expected to have a non-negative relationship with the actual normalized price
differential.
Several versions of this basic model were run to test the robustness of the estimated relationships.
In the models presented here, the actual normalized price differential enters both on its own and
interacted with an indicator variable for positive thresholds to capture possible differences in the
behavioral responses. Tables 11.6 and 11.7 list the variables included in each model.
Further, a binary variable indicating if the actual contract price was higher (taking the value one
if Pct ≥ Pmt) is included. Whenever the actual contract price is higher than the prevailing market
price or competitor price, one would expect a farmer to have a higher threshold of acceptance, since
it would not be in the farmer’s interest to voluntarily accept a contract price that is lower.
Both models include an interaction term between the dummy for social contact and the actual
normalized price differential to reflect interaction effects. This term picks up the crucial relationship
between price-based incentives and relation-based incentives for committing to contracts. The sign
on the coefficient of this variable indicates the direction of influence of one, given the level of the
other.
Other factors that might push the farmer to sidesell including outstanding debt, land size,
relative poverty enter the model as explanatory variables. Personal characteristics are represented
by farmer’s age, dummy variables for education level and the education level of the most educated
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Table 11.5: Summary Statistics of Dependent and Explanatory Variables
Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
or Proportion Deviation
Dependent variables
(D) Accept a contract when contract price < market price (1=yes) 47% NA 0 1
Threshold (Normalized) (%) -2 15 -35 40
(D) Contractual performance: honored the contract in full 79% NA 0 1
Explanatory variables
Price variables and sideselling opportunity
Actual Price Differential (Normalized) (%) -24 35 -93 22
Actual Price Differential * Dummy for Threshold > 0 -1 4 -27 8
(D) Contract price is higher (1=yes) 49% NA 0 1
Distance from the roadhead (kms.) 1 1 0 10
Relationship variables
(D) Social contact with firm (1=yes) 39% NA 0 1
Length of relationship (in years) 7 6 1 24
(D) Firm less than likely to continue (1=yes) 5 % NA 0 1
(D) Firm more than likely to continue (1=yes) 92% NA 0 1
(D) Farmer less than likely to continue (1=yes) 8 % NA 0 1
(D) Farmer more than likely to continue (1=yes) 72% NA 0 1
(D) Past default (1=yes) 47% NA 0 1
Price differential-social relation variable
Social contact * Actual price differential (normalized) -4 15 -93 22
“Generalized Morality” and enforcement
(D) Important to honor the contract (1=yes) 98 % NA 0 1
(D) Power in relationship (1=yes) 3 % NA 0 1
(D) Firm stops contracting if farmer breaches (1= yes) 6 % NA 0 1
(D) Written contract (1=yes) 56 % NA 0 1
Personal characteristics
Age (in years) 43 12 22 80
(D) Social group:Scheduled Castes/Tribes (1=yes) 8 % NA 0 1
Education level of the contract farmer NA
(D) Illiterate (1=yes) 23 % NA 0 1
(D) Below secondary (1=yes) 4 % NA 0 1
(D) Completed Secondary or High School (1=yes) 28 % NA 0 1
Education level of the most educated member
(D) Illiterate (1=yes) 7 % NA 0 1
(D) Below secondary (1=yes) 3 % NA 0 1
(D) Completed Secondary or High School (1=yes) 42 % NA 0 1
(D) Poor (bottom 40% in the village) 33 % NA 0 1
Outstanding Debt (in ‘000 Rs.) 141 239 0 2000
Land owned by household (in acres) 5 5 0 45
Risk and ambiguity aversion
Risk aversion * Coefficient of variation in spot market price 12 20 0 53
(D) Ambiguity averse 56 % NA 0 1
(D) Risk averse 45 % NA 0 1
Commodity fixed effects and intercept
(D) Gherkins 38 % NA 0 1
(D) Marigold 28 % NA 0 1
1 Farmer Survey, Phase 2,2009-10.
2 (D) refers to binary variables, for which proportions are reported.
3 NA means Not Applicable.
4 Figures are rounded off to the nearest whole number.
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member of the household. An indicator variable captures social group, in particular, whether the
farmer belongs to Scheduled Castes or Tribes.76
To see if thresholds might be associated with attitudes to risk and ambiguity, two variables are
included. Ambiguity aversion is denoted by a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a farmer chose
an option which disclosed the chances of success in a draw over another that did not.(Chapter 7
has the details of the experiment). If contracting offers less ambiguity in terms of price realizations,
a farmer averse to ambiguity might be more likely to accept a contract with a contract price lower
than the market price or have lower thresholds. The second variable interacts an indicator variable
for risk aversion with the coefficient of variation of the alternative or spot market price. The risk
aversion dummy is set equal to one if a farmer rejected a fair bet in an experiment that was part of
the survey and zero otherwise. As long as there is no price risk in the alternative or spot market,
contracting resolves no price risk and offers no insurance against it. So one would not expect
risk aversion to matter when the variation in alternative price is very low or close to zero. On
the other hand, if this were not the case, then a risk averse farmer would seek insurance against
price volatility via contracting. The interaction variable captures this aspect and is expected to be
related positively to farmer tolerance of a lower contract price.
The models include controls for commodity fixed effects in the form of contract commodity
dummies, rather than village dummies, because of the collinearity between the two. It controls
for some crucial unobserved differences across commodities. For instance, the nature of contract
farming arrangement varies across the commodities, across a number of features, including crop
duration, manner of selection of contract farmers, profile of the field officials and differences in
agro-climatic and socio-economic conditions that drive firms to operate in some areas rather than
others conditioned on the characteristics of the commodity.
76The base for comparison can be categorized as other backward classes. In Tamil Nadu, backward classes (BCs)
and most backward classes (MBCs) are together equivalent to the other backward classes used commonly elsewhere
in India (see www.tn.gov.in/department/ bcmbc.htm). Gender and language were not included given the context of
the Farmer Survey, where all farmers were male and all were primarily Tamil speaking. The variables for religion
were dropped because of collinearity issues.
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Estimation Results
The regressions broadly corroborate the preceding descriptive analysis. Table 11.6 presents the
results of the probit model that regresses the probability of accepting a contract that offers a price
lower than the expected alternative price, along with the estimated average marginal effects of
each variable on the probability of a farmer accepting a contract price lower than the expected
market price. This model classifies 96% of the observations correctly. Specification tests such as
the Hosmer-Lemeshow and Wald suggest that this model is correctly formulated.77
Table 11.7 contains the results of the linear regression of normalized thresholds. Two versions
are presented here, both explaining as much as 84% of the variation in the dependent variable.
A salient finding in the context of this work is that relationship matters for contractual
commitment. In the probit model of tolerance of negative threshold, a test for joint significance of
the relationship variables strongly rejects the null hypothesis that relationships do not matter.
Contract farmers, whose contact with the firm comes through social networks and relations
are more likely to accept a contract even when the contract price falls below the alternate price
they can get. Similarly, the continuity of relationships (or the fact that contracting relationships
represent repeated interaction) matters. Whenever a farmer expects that the firm will return in the
future to contract with him/her, the higher the probability of accepting a negative threshold price
differential. Similarly, the less inclined a farmer is to continue the contracting relationship with the
firm into the future, the less the likelihood of accepting a contract that offers a price lower than
expected spot market price. This latter in particular can be interpreted as the farmer being willing
to accept a unit price that is lower than in the alternate market only to the extent that he/she
values the continuity of the contractual relationship.78 A farmer who has defaulted on a contract
before is less likely to accept a contract that offers a lower price and is more likely to default again.
77The Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic tests the null hypothesis that a specified binary response model lacks a good fit.
It partitions observations into ten equal groups based on ascending order of predicted probability. It is computed as
HL = Σ10j=1
(Oj−Ej)2
Ej(1−Ej/nj) where, nj is the number of observations in the jth group, Oj is the observed number of cases
in the jth group, Ej is the expected number of cases in the jth group. So when the the null is rejected, it suggests
that there is no evidence of lack of fit.
78Note that for both these cases the base for comparison is that the firm or farmer is somewhat likely to continue
the relationship. So the variables discussed here represented degrees of certainty of continued relationship relative to
this base.
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This latter suggests a certain fuzziness surrounding enforcement of contracts, reflecting perhaps
the presence of excusable breach or undetected breach and the fact that these might perpetuate
breach in the future.
A written contract has a statistically significant positive association. Owing to the potential
endogeneity of this variable, two versions are run, as a robustness check (Table 11.6). When ‘written
contract’ is excluded from the set of explanatory variables (Model 1), the education level of the
farmer begins to matter. In particular, a farmer who is moderately educated is more likely to
accept a contract price lower than the expected spot market price. This reflects perhaps that this
group is most likely to have written contracts. This is consonant with views held by agribusinesses
that illiterate farmers are unable to commit to written contracts and the well-educated are averse
to them.
These results carry through for the most part to the levels of threshold (Table 11.7). The
idea that relationship farming influences contractual commitment is indicated by the statistical
significance of the social relation variable, so that those who initiated contracts with the firm based
on social contacts have significantly lower thresholds. In addition, whenever farmers value the
relationship enough to continue contracting in the future, the threshold of contract acceptance is
lower. Those who have defaulted at least once earlier tend to have higher thresholds, implying
lower tolerance for the negative threshold price differentials. Presumably, the fact that their prior
breach was excused or gone unnoticed (for otherwise, they would not be contract farmers at the
time of the survey) leave them less pressed to settle for a contract price that is driven below the
expected market price. All of these results hold, after controlling for commodity fixed effects. As
indicated in earlier sections, marigold has significantly lower thresholds (and a greater proportion
who are tolerant of negative thresholds) than is true for gherkins or broiler.
In both the models (threshold tolerance as well as magnitude of threshold differentials), even
as the relationship variables emerge statistically significant in expected ways, it is apparent that
price differentials provide powerful incentives for breach. This opposes the impact of relationship
in important ways.
The probability that a farmer is willing to accept a negative threshold price differential is
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associated negatively with the actual price differential (normalized). It is intuitive that as long
as firms are seen to offer a premium over alternative markets, the farmer is unlikely to accept a
contract that does not do so. Importantly, as hypothesized, for those with a positive threshold, the
actual price differential is related positively to the propensity on the part of the farmer to concede
to a lower priced contract.
Farmers located farther from a paved road tend to accept contracts that offer a lower price.
Presumably, since firms pick up contracted produce at the farmgate, the savings for the farmer
in transportation and related costs make it possible for the farmer to accept contracts even if the
price were below the alternative price he or she expects to get. A variation of this model expands
the set of regressors to include interaction terms. In this case, most of the results of the previous
model remain valid, excepting the one representing social contact (Table 11.7).
The interaction between social contact and normalized actual price differential has a significant
negative association with threshold price differentials. This implies that for those contract farmers
who initiated contracting based on social contact, a lower price differential is associated with lower
threshold. Alternatively, given a particular level of actual (normalized) price differential, social
contact induces farmers to accept a contract that is much lower than the alternative spot market
price. This suggests that firms might be exploiting relationships more than farmers do.
11.6.2 Sideselling behavior
Noting that the threshold price differential (D¯i) reflects the orientation of the farmer towards the
contract (in terms of the threshold price differential and the range of contract acceptance), this
conceptualization can be extended to side-selling behavior at the time of delivery and settlement,
when the actual spot market or alternative price Pmt is revealed. In particular, whenever realized
spot market price at the time of delivery and settlement is higher than the expected market price,
Dit, the actual price differential falls in the range where contracts are rejected. This implies that
farmers would be tempted to breach. Without restraints on sideselling, myopic profit maximizing
farmers would choose to side-sell, breaching the contract.
The approach here is to model the contractual performance (or honoring the contract in full
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Table 11.6: Tolerance of Negative Differentials: Probit Model of the Probability that a Farmer
Accepts a Contract Price lower than the Market Price
Dependent variable: Accepting a Contract when Pc < Pm
Variable Model 1 Model 2
(excluding “written contract”) (including “written contract”)
Coefficient Standard AME (S.E.) Coefficient Standard AME (S.E.)
error error
Explanatory variables
Price variables and sideselling opportunity
Actual Price Differential (Normalized) -0.01 0.09 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 0.08 0.00 (0.00)
Actual Price Differential * Dummy for Threshold > 0 0.89 ∗∗∗ 0.27 0.05 (0.01) 0.88 ∗∗∗ 0.25 0.05 (0.01)
Contract price is higher (1=yes) -1.95 ∗∗∗ 0.75 -0.17 (0.06) -2.03 ∗∗∗ 0.78 -0.17 (0.06)
Distance from the roadhead (kms.) 0.37 0.24 0.02 (0.01) 0.33 0.25 0.02(0.01)
Relationship variables
Social contact with firm (1=yes) 3.31 ∗∗∗ 1.02 0.22 (0.07) 3.37 ∗∗∗ 1.03 0.22 (0.07)
Length of relationship (in years) -0.01 0.08 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.09 0.00 (0.01)
Firm less than likely to continue (1=yes) 1.86 1.71 0.15(0.14) 1.81 1.69 0.14 (0.14)
Firm more than likely to continue (1=yes) 2.81 ∗∗ 1.26 0.11 (0.07) 2.83 ∗∗ 1.24 0.11 (0.07)
Farmer less than likely to continue (1=yes) -3.81 ∗∗∗ 1.35 -0.15 (0.06) -3.74 ∗∗∗ 1.39 -0.16 (0.06)
Farmer more than likely to continue (1=yes) -1.22 0.9 -0.08 (0.05) -1.12 0.87 -0.08 (0.04)
Past default (1=yes) -6.87 ∗∗∗ 1.13 -0.23 (0.04) -7.03 ∗∗∗ 1.19 -0.24 (0.04)
Price differential-social relation variable
Social contact * Actual price differential (normalized) -0.35 ∗∗∗ 0.10 -0.02 (0.01) -0.35 ∗∗∗ 0.10 -0.02(0.00)
“Generalized Morality” and enforcement variables
Important to honor the contract (1=yes) 2.01 1.38 0.08 (0.08) 1.92 1.34 0.08 (0.07)
Power in relationship (1=yes) 0.20 0.74 0.01 (0.05) 0.12 0.73 0.01 (0.05)
Firm stops contracting if farmer breaches (1= yes) -0.05 0.61 0.00 (0.04) -0.18 0.60 -0.01 (0.03)
Written contract (1=yes) NA NA NA 1.24 ∗∗ 0.57 0.08 (0.05)
Personal characteristics
Age (in years) 0.00 0.02 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.02 0.00 (0.00)
Social group:Scheduled Castes/Tribes (1=yes) -0.97 1.09 -0.05 (0.04) -1.04 1.14 -0.05 (0.04)
Education level of the contract farmer
Illiterate (1=yes) -0.15 1.17 -0.01 (0.07) -0.05 1.20 0.00 (0.07)
Below secondary (1=yes) 0.15 0.88 0.01 (0.06) 0.14 0.87 0.01 (0.05)
Completed Secondary or High School (1=yes) 1.30 ∗ 0.76 0.08 (0.07) 1.15 0.72 0.07 (0.06)
Education level of the most educated member
Illiterate (1=yes) 1.93 ∗ 1.06 0.15 (0.09) 2.68 ∗∗∗ 1.01 0.21 (0.06)
Below secondary (1=yes) 1.17 1.02 0.08 (0.07) 1.08 0.97 0.07 (0.07)
Completed Secondary or High School (1=yes) 0.47 0.64 0.03 (0.04) 0.43 0.63 0.03 (0.04)
Poor (bottom 40% in the village) 0.12 0.78 0.01 (0.05) 0.07 0.75 0.00 (0.05)
Outstanding Debt (in ‘000000 Rs.) -0.26 0.54 -0.02 (0.03) -0.27 0.60 -0.02 (0.04)
Land owned by household (in acres) 0.02 0.03 0.00 (0.00) 0.02 0.03 0.00 (0.00)
Risk and ambiguity aversion
Risk aversion * Coefficient of variation in spot market price 0.06 0.04 0.00 (0.00) 0.06 0.04 0.00 (0.00)
Ambiguity averse 0.64 0.48 0.04 (0.03) 0.62 0.45 0.04 (0.03)
Commodity fixed effects and intercept
Gherkins 1.85 ∗ 1.00 0.10 (0.06) 3.11 ∗∗ 1.29 0.14 (0.04)
Marigold 12.61 ∗∗ 5.78 0.67 (0.06) 13.1 ∗∗ 5.71 0.68 (0.05)
Intercept -7.80 ∗∗∗ 2.68 NA -8.76 ∗∗∗ 2.76 NA
N 208 208
Log-likelihood -22.9 -22.56
Wald’s χ2 χ2(30) = 702.34 χ
2
(31) = 706.33
p-value (Prob > χ2) 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
McFaddens R-squared 0.84 0.84
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ27 0.78 3.74
p-value (Prob > χ2) 0.98 0.81
Percentage of responses classified correctly 95.67% 95.67%
Wald test for joint significance of relationship variables
Wald’s χ27 58.58 60.77
p-value (Prob > χ2) 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 Farmer Survey, Phase 2,2009-10.
2 Figures have been rounded off to two decimals.
3 AME refers to Average Marginal Effects, the mean of partial effects evaluated at observed values. This is different from the Marginal Effect at
the Mean or MEM.
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Table 11.7: Correlates of Farmers’ Threshold Price Differentials: Results from Linear Regression
Models
Dependent Variable: Normalized threshold differentials
Least Squares Model 1 Least Squares Model 2
(Without price-social Interaction) (With price-social relation Interaction)
Variable Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Explanatory variables
Price variables and sideselling opportunity
Actual Price Differential (Normalized) 0.19 ∗ 0.10 0.18 ∗ 0.10
Actual Price Differential * Dummy for positive threshold > 0.00 -2.45 ∗∗∗ 0.28 -2.45 ∗∗∗ 0.28
Contract price is higher (1=yes) 6.50 ∗∗∗ 1.72 6.47 ∗∗∗ 1.73
Distance from the roadhead (kms.) 0.29 0.63 0.28 0.63
Relationship variables
Social contact with firm (1=yes) -2.57 ∗ 1.47 -2.11 2.09
Length of relationship (in years) -0.09 0.12 -0.09 0.12
Firm less than likely to continue (1=yes) 1.85 2.94 1.87 2.96
Firm more than likely to continue (1=yes) 2.23 1.64 2.33 1.70
Farmer less than likely to continue (1=yes) 1.98 4.4 1.9 4.51
Farmer more than likely to continue (1=yes) -2.61 ∗∗ 1.29 -2.60 ∗∗ 1.28
Past default (1=yes) 1.48 1.41 1.52 1.39
Price differential-social relation variable
Social contact * Actual price differential (normalized) NA NA 0.01 0.04
“Generalized Morality” and enforcement
Important to honor the contract (1=yes) 5.01 ∗ 2.81 4.93 ∗ 2.89
Power in relationship (1=yes) 0.03 1.06 0.07 1.08
Firm stops contracting if farmer breaches (1= yes) -3.04 2.36 -3.09 2.37
Written contract (1=yes) -0.27 2.03 -0.36 2.08
Personal characteristics
Age (in years) 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05
Social group:Scheduled Castes/Tribes (1=yes) -4.03 2.60 -4.07 2.57
Education level of the contract farmer
Illiterate (1=yes) -2.70 2.47 -2.71 2.47
Below secondary (1=yes) -2.62 2.27 -2.59 2.29
Completed Secondary or High School (1=yes) -3.46 ∗ 1.88 -3.41 ∗ 1.89
Education level of the most educated member
Illiterate (1=yes) -1.65 2.44 -1.71 2.48
Below secondary (1=yes) -0.38 1.67 -0.40 1.68
Completed Secondary or High School (1=yes) 1.54 1.49 1.54 1.49
Poor (bottom 40% in the village) 0.17 1.13 0.19 1.13
Outstanding Debt (in ‘000000 Rs.) -3.24 2.80 -3.17 2.82
Land owned by household (in acres) -0.11 0.08 -0.11 0.08
Risk and ambiguity aversion
Risk aversion * Coefficient of variation in spot market price 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05
Ambiguity averse 1.32 1.10 1.34 1.10
Commodity fixed effects and intercept
Gherkins 2.62 3.13 2.95 3.25
Marigold -5.27 8.58 -5.14 8.52
Intercept -5.28 4.86 -5.75 4.73
N 208 208
R2 0.84 0.84
F statistic F (30,177)=68.51 F (31,176)=66.08
p-value (Prob > F) 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
Root Mean Squared Error 6.29 6.31
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 Farmer Survey, Phase 2,2009-10.
2 (D) refers to binary variables, for which proportions are reported
3 NA means Not Applicable
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without any sideselling on contracted produce), as reported by the farmer, as a function of threshold
differentials, actual price differentials and ‘relationship’ variables. The dependent variable in this
probit model is binary, with 0 indicating that the contract farmer sidesold some part of the
contracted produce in breach of the contract during the most recent contracting season completed,
and 1 if the farmer honored the contractual commitment in full.79
The regression model estimated offers interesting insights (Table 11.8). As before, variables
representing side-selling opportunity, relationship, personal characteristics and views on how much
power farmers perceive to have in the relationship as well as the importance of honoring the contract
are included.
The results from Model 1 show that price variables influence sideselling behavior. Whenever
the contract price offers a premium over the alternative price, i.e., Pct > Pmt, the probability of
honoring the contract in full is higher, and the higher the magnitude of difference between the
contract price and actual spot market or alternative price, the more likely the farmer is to honor
the contract.
Three variables capturing relationship are statistically significant. The farmer’s perception of
the likelihood of the firm continuing the contractual relationship with the farmer in the next three
years makes it less likely a farmer would sidesell. The prospect of continued contracting is thus
associated with better contractual performance. This variable represents the farmer’s expectation
of the firm’s action. As for the farmer’s own inclination, interestingly, whenever a farmer is less
than likely to want to continue contracting with the firm, the contractual compliance is better, i.e.
the probability of honoring the contract in full is higher when the farmer is likely to discontinue
contracting. It is likely that farmers who have decided to stop or switch contract firms (or buyers)
care enough or are more concerned about their reputation with prospective future buyers, that
they want to be seen to be honoring contracts. This is especially true in the current setting, where
marigold, gherkins and broiler contract firms are clustered and are well connected with each other.
79While self-reporting is unreliable in most circumstances, the respondents in the Farmer Survey were surprisingly
candid. That said, it is recognized that any bias in reporting is downward. Farmers were more reluctant to state the
proportion of produce they sidesold. Hence the use of a dichotomous dependent variable.
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Broiler firms inform each other of defaulters, and the field officers of gherkins firm interact closely
with each other during the course of their work.
Furthermore, when the contract farming relationship has been initiated through social contact,
the probability of honoring the contract is higher.
As before, distance of the farmer’s location from the main roadhead, denoting remoteness
and therefore of transactions costs to accessing markets, is significantly positively associated
with probability that a farmer honors the contract. This conforms to the notion among some
agribusinesses that the more remotely located farmers tend to be more reliable, since they have
poorer access to markets (Chapter 8).
The lower the levels of education of the contracting farmer, the greater the likelihood of side-
selling. Given controls for “generalized morality” and written contracts, this reflects perhaps
unfamiliarity with the demands of formal contracts, whether oral or written. Those who have
more outstanding debt are also more likely to sidesell, as are those who are poorer. This provides
evidence that supports the notion of excusable breach, sidesale often occurs due to the pressing need
of some individuals, which is then pardoned. Those contract growers belonging to the marginalized
communities are also more likely to side selling, likely reflecting the exigencies of their socio-
economic condition.
These results are fairly robust across specifications. When commodity fixed effects are
introduced, the actual price differential (normalized) and the binary variable indicating if the
alternative or spot market price was lower at the time of sale become statistically insignificant
(Table 11.8). However, this is not surprising since the scale of this differential coincides with
particular commodities. In the absence of commodity dummies, social contact loses statistical
significance, emphasizing cross-commodity differences in contracting experience and the way social
contact is leveraged to improve contractual performance. The interaction term between social
contact and actual normalized price differential remains insignificant across specifications. This
suggests that on an average, given the level of price differential, social contact does not improve
contractual performance significantly. So too, given social contact, the actual price differential does
not contribute significantly to improving contractual performance.
306
A battery of tests suggests that both models perform well, as indicated by the Wald and
the Hosmer-Lemeshaw χ2 tests. The models presented here (both without and with commodity
dummies) classify 93% of the observations correctly, respectively.
11.6.3 Relationship and Contractual Performance: Extent and Limits
It is apparent from the econometric analysis that relationships are significantly associated with
contractual performance, so that the value of continued future transactions and social contact with
the firm boost compliance, even when spot market price conditions might tempt farmers to breach.
Figure 11.5 summarizes this finding. The predicted probability of honoring the contract is
plotted against actual normalized price differentials.80 The theoretical prediction for a one-shot
interaction would suggest that for any differential less than zero, farmers would not honor the
contract, whereas they would if the differential were above 0. Empirically, however, even when
the actual price differential is less than zero, there is a positive probability of farmers honoring
the contract fully. As the figure points out, a linear fit to the predicted probabilities of honoring
the contract suggests that this probability is fairly high even when differentials are considerably
negative. This reflects the value of future relationships as well as the importance of social contact,
supporting the Folk Theorem result. It is noteworthy that even when Dit > 0 the probability
of honoring the contract is not one. Price incentives notwithstanding, there is rarely perfect
compliance and there is always some incidence of breach. This could reflect in part failure to
deliver on account of personal exigencies, yield loss and excusably small quantities of side sale.
Figure 11.6 plots the cumulative distributions of the probability of tolerating negative price
differentials as well as the probability of honoring the contract. For each of these, it is clear that
when contracting is initiated on the basis of social contact, the distribution first order stochastically
dominates that without social contact. This further corroborates the positive role of relationships
in enforcing contracts.
While the “self-enforcing” nature of contract farming schemes in India comes through clearly,
one must be careful not to overstate the ability of personalized interaction to ensure contractual
80These predicted probabilities are generated by applying the estimated coefficients to the observed covariates for
each contract farmer.
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Table 11.8: Sideselling Behavior: Probit Regression of Probability of Honoring the Contract
Dependent Variable = Probability of honoring Contract (1=yes)
Model 1 Model 2
(Without Commodity fixed effects) (With Commodity fixed effects)
Variable Coefficient Standard AME (S.E.) Coefficient Standard AME (S.E.)
error error
Explanatory variables
Price variables and sideselling opportunity
Accept a contract when contract price < market price (1=yes) -0.79 0.93 -0.10(0.14) -0.57 0.71 -0.07(0.10)
Threshold (Normalized) -0.03 0.02 0.00(0.00) -0.03 0.02 0.00(0.00)
Actual Price Differential (Normalized) 0.02 ∗ 0.01 0.00(0.00) 0.00 0.02 0.00(0.00)
Contract price is higher (1=yes) 0.80 ∗ 0.46 0.11(0.05) 0.56 0.41 0.07(0.05)
Distance from the roadhead (kms.) 0.29 ∗∗ 0.13 0.03(0.02) 0.32 ∗∗ 0.14 0.04(0.02)
Relationship variables
Social contact with firm (1=yes) 0.36 0.67 0.04(0.08) 1.58 ∗ 0.88 0.20(0.08)
Length of relationship (in years) -0.06 0.04 -0.01(0.00) -0.08 ∗ 0.04 -0.01(0.00)
Firm less than likely to continue (1=yes) -1.89 ∗ 1.05 -0.29(0.20) -1.95 ∗ 1.10 -0.30(0.21)
Firm more than likely to continue (1=yes) -0.09 0.73 -0.01(0.09) 0.00 0.74 0.00(0.08)
Farmer less than likely to continue (1=yes) 1.27 ∗ 0.74 0.13(0.06) 1.62 ∗∗ 0.80 0.15(0.06)
Farmer more than likely to continue (1=yes) -0.53 0.41 -0.06(0.05) -0.44 0.44 -0.05 (0.05)
Past default (1=yes) -0.42 0.46 -0.05(0.06) -0.48 0.49 -0.06(0.06)
Price differential-social relation variable
Social contact * Actual price differential (normalized) 0.00 0.01 0.00(0.00) 0.02 0.01 0.00(0.00)
“Generalized Morality” and enforcement
Important to honor the contract (1=yes) 0.28 0.62 0.03(0.07) 0.21 0.69 0.02(0.08)
Power in relationship (1=yes) -0.23 0.30 -0.03(0.04) -0.31 0.30 -0.04 (0.04)
Firm stops contracting if farmer breaches (1= yes) -0.30 0.50 -0.04(0.06) -0.25 0.51 -0.03(0.06)
Written contract (1=yes) -0.84 0.60 -0.11(0.09) -0.39 0.67 -0.05(0.08)
Personal characteristics
Age (in years) 0.01 0.01 0.00(0.00) 0.01 0.01 0.00(0.00)
Social group:Scheduled Castes/Tribes (1=yes) -0.96 ∗∗ 0.47 -0.14(0.08) -0.93 ∗∗ 0.46 -0.13(0.08)
Education level of the contract farmer
Illiterate (1=yes) -1.68 ∗∗ 0.80 -0.26(0.15) -1.68 ∗ 0.86 -0.25 (0.16)
Below secondary (1=yes) -1.60 ∗∗ 0.78 -0.18(0.11) -1.58 ∗ 0.85 -0.17 (0.12)
Completed Secondary or High School (1=yes) -1.14 0.81 -0.14 (0.12) -1.19 0.88 -0.14 (0.13)
Education level of the most educated member
Illiterate (1=yes) 0.16 0.59 0.02(0.07) 0.18 0.62 0.02(0.07)
Below secondary (1=yes) -0.62 0.59 -0.07(0.07) -0.89 0.69 -0.10(0.09)
Completed Secondary or High School (1=yes) -0.23 0.47 -0.03 (0.06) -0.35 0.50 -0.04(0.06)
Poor (bottom 40% in the village) -0.58 ∗ 0.33 -0.07(0.04) -0.78 ∗∗ 0.36 -0.09(0.05)
Outstanding Debt (in ‘000000 Rs.) -1.19 ∗∗ 0.52 -0.14(0.06) -1.11 ∗∗ 0.47 -0.13(0.05)
Land owned by household (in acres) 0.01 0.03 0.00(0.00) 0.01 0.03 0.00(0.00)
Commodity fixed effects and intercept
Gherkins NA NA NA 2.71 ∗∗ 1.16 0.37 (0.04)
Marigold NA NA NA 0.40 1.63 0.04(0.16)
Intercept 4.57 ∗∗∗ 1.42 NA 2.51 1.62 NA
N 208 208
Log-likelihood -44.07 -42.66
Wald χ2 χ2(28) =98.0 χ
2
(30)= 127.3
p-value (Prob > χ2) 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
McFadden R-squared 0.59 0.6
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ28 Goodness of Fit 9.53 3.27
p-value (Prob > χ2) 0.30 0.92
Percentage of responses classified correctly 91.4% 91.4%
Wald test for joint significance of relationship variables
Wald’s χ2(7) 10.83 14.66
p-value (Prob > χ2) 0.14 0.04∗∗
Significance levels:∗ : 10%∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
1 Farmer Survey, Phase 2,2009-10.
2 NA means Not Applicable.
3 Figures rounded off to two decimal places.Hence, 0.00 represents a non-zero value.
4 AME refers to Average Marginal Effects, the mean of partial effects evaluated at observed values.
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Figure 11.5: Predictions of probability of honoring the contract by contract farmers, 2009-10
309
Figure 11.6: Social contact, Contractual Commitment and Performance by contract farmers, 2009-
10
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performance. First, the “relationship” variables rarely operate in isolation and typically work in
tandem with price-based incentives (or disincentives). Second, there are significant differences
across commodities in the relative effectiveness of self-enforcement strategies. So, the degree to
which relationships matter for contractual performance is worth further investigation.
When price differential is positive (Dit ≥ 0), relationships, be it social contact or the promise
of continued contracting, reinforce farmer compliance with contractual commitments. Figure 11.7
shows simulated probabilities for honoring the contract, based on Model 2 presented earlier. As the
likelihood of continued future contracting increases, the probability of honoring the contract in the
current period increases. Similarly, offering a contract price higher than the alternate price always
improves contractual performance, as does contracting initiated on the basis of social contact. This
suggests the potential of substitutability between relationship and price incentives to achieve a given
level of contract performance. It is noteworthy that the combination of greater certainty of future
relationship and social contact can achieve contractual performance close to that of price-based
incentives. This relationship could play out differently across different commodities.
Figure 11.8 illustrates powerfully that relationship farming has its limits and cannot hold its own
as an enforcement strategy.81 There exists a range of price differentials where relationship variables
can kick in either to reinforce the positive price differential and thereby improve contract deliveries
or counterbalance a negative differential and ensure greater commitment to contracts. But when
the differentials are too low and negative, relationships are not powerful enough to ensure that
farmers honor the contract. So too, when the price differentials are very high so that contract
price offers a comfortable premium over the next best alternative, relationship variables do not
contribute significantly to improving contractual performance, and are rendered irrelevant at that
level.
The relative effectiveness of price versus relationship-based incentives in improving contractual
performance could differ across commodities. Table 11.9 reports the estimated change in probability
81These probabilities were computed at the means of all continuous variables, at the modal value for dummy
variables. The two lines represent change in the relationship variables, social contact, likelihood of firm continuing
to contract and past default.
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Figure 11.7: “Relationship” versus Price
Figure 11.8: Relationship farming and contractual performance
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Table 11.9: How much do Relationships Matter for Contractual Performance? Some simulations.
Change in probability of honoring the contract: Model 2 With Commodity Fixed Effects
Nature of Change Gherkins Marigold Broiler
∆Pr 95% C.I. ∆Pr 95% C.I. ∆Pr 95% C.I.
Effect of Social Contact 0→ 1
When Contract Price ≥ 0 Market price 0.00 [ -0.02 , 0.02 ] 0.29 [ -0.44 , 1.01 ] 0.41 [ -0.60 , 1.42 ]
When Contract Price < 0 Market price 0.01 [ -0.07 , 0.09 ] 0.46 [ -0.21 , 1.12 ] 0.54 [ -0.17 , 1.26 ]
Effect of Future Relationship 1→ 5
Without Social Contact
When Contract Price ≥ 0 Market price 0.19 [ -0.66 , 1.03 ] 0.62 [ 0.12 , 1.12 ] 0.51 [ -0.47 , 1.49 ]
When Contract Price < 0 Market price 0.37 [ -0.70 , 1.43 ] 0.46 [ -0.31 , 1.23 ] 0.32 [ -0.68 , 1.31 ]
With Social Contact
When Contract Price ≥ 0 Market price 0.01 [ -0.06 , 0.08 ] 0.42 [ -0.87 , 1.72 ] 0.56 [ -0.46 , 1.57 ]
When Contract Price < 0 Market price 0.03 [ -0.19 , 0.25 ] 0.60 [ -0.36 , 1.56 ] 0.67 [ 0.16 , 1.17 ]
Effect of Price Differential (Pc − Pm) < 0→≥ 0
Without Social Contact 0.01 [ -0.05 , 0.07 ] 0.22 [ -0.11 , 0.54 ] 0.22 [ -0.11 , 0.54 ]
With Social Contact 0.00 [ 0.00 , 0.00 ] 0.04 [ -0.20 , 0.28 ] 0.08 [ -0.19 , 0.36 ]
1 Farmer Survey, Phase 2,2009-10.
2 Predictions and confidence intervals computed using STATA’s SPOST commands as in Long and Freese (2005).
3 Figures are rounded off to two decimal points.
4 Predictions are evaluated at the mean of continuous variables, and for binary variables, it is evaluated at the modal value
of honoring the contract under different price differential and relationship status scenarios.82
Estimated increases in probability are modest and statistically insignificant for gherkins unlike
for marigold and broilers. For broilers, offering a price premium increases the probability of
honoring the contract less than the impact that continued contracting or social network can achieve.
For marigold and gherkins, the potential for continued relationship seems to achieve the greatest
improvements in contract performance, though the differential effect is far greater for marigold than
it is for gherkins. This offers a cautionary lesson that notwithstanding the role of relationships in
improving contractual performance, social embededness of commerical exchange might have limits
and relationships could well be held hostage to the vagaries of the market should the alternatives
for the farmer prove too attractive.
Figures 11.9 and 11.10 sum up the results of the two probit models for each of the commodities
in the study. Gherkins contract farmers are intolerant of negative thresholds, urging contracting
firms to match one another’s price, and tend to honor the contract. Marigold farmers have high
stated tolerance for negative thresholds, because of the particular nature of the market, that
places value on continued relationship with the firm. At the same time however, large negative
82These comparisons are not offered as rigorous tests of differences across commodities, but are merely indicative
of such heterogeneity.
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price differentials, also provide huge scope for breach.83 So the role of relationship in improving
contractual performance is often undermined by huge negative price differentials. For the marigold
firm in question, it has been a constant struggle to maintain the contract farming arrangements.
For broilers, the growers privilege relationships over price differentials and tend to honor their
contractual commitments.
11.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter examined enforcement issues in contract farming arrangements in India by combining
perspectives of firms and farmers. Empirical evidence emphasizes that legal contract enforcement
and the legality of contracts is peripheral in the context of contract farming practice, as personal
relationships underpin virtually all effective exchange.
Further this is related only in part to the costs and inefficacy of formal enforcement mechanisms.
Given the large number of defaulters, and the relatively small amounts of default, the costs of
enforcement imply that the firms can only profitably recover these outstanding amounts from a
fraction of them. In the case of a particular gherkins firm, assessments of the costs of enforcement
suggest that the firm can profitably recover dures from no more than 3%- 26% of the defaulting
farmers. This excludes other costs in terms of waiting times and firm’s reputation. Indeed, this
latter consideration drives firms to avoid legal mechanisms for contracting and enforcing, whenever
feasible. Interviews with agribusiness executives suggest that firms tend to view court-based formal
enforcement as detrimental to farm-firm relationships in a way that undermines the handshake ethic.
It is important therefore to acknowledge the primacy of personal relationships in contract farming
arrangements in India.
Both in terms of mode of contracting and enforcement, what we find here resembles what
Harriss-White (2008) refers to as the “inter-penetration of the formal and informal” in an economy,
rather than one or the other. In any given contract farming scheme, both oral and written contracts
are in use, and there is similar diversity in enforcement mechanisms adopted by the firm even within
the same scheme.
83This effect is somewhat exaggerated due to pooling data by quality and timing.
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Figure 11.9: Predicted tolerance of negative threshold differentials, 2009-10
Figure 11.10: Predictions of probability of honoring the contract in full, 2009-10
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Relationship farming is simultaneously a cause and consequence of friction in contract farming
systems in India, where stability of arrangements is ensured by the maintenance of relationships.
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Chapter 12
Conclusion
12.1 A Summary of Findings
The core of this study suggests that the ideological divide on the normative implications of contract
farming in developing countries, and whether or not the state ought to promote such arrangements,
represents a false binary. This emanates from the fact that particular theoretical frameworks that
inform empirical work do not often speak to each other and are hence unable to reconcile the diverse
and apparently contradictory evidence on the welfare outcomes of contract farming practice.
Within economics, the theoretical lens for analyzing contract farming has viewed the farmer as a
unit of analysis, precluding a systemic view that would accommodate richer empirical realities. The
study argued for a recognition of the different levels of institutions that are relevant to the analysis
of contract farming in a way that (1) traverses different scales to capture phenomena both at the
farmer level and at the level of a contract farming ‘domain’, (2) incorporates substantively the
heterogeneity of farmer types and farmer experiences with contract farming, and (3) incorporates
dynamic elements of contract farming relationships, acknowledging the impact that continuity of
these relationships into the future can have on economic decisions in the present.
This thesis thus made a case for analyzing contract farming as institution, as dynamic systems,
where equilibria are maintained over a domain, advocating the Aokian Comparative Institutional
Analysis framework as an appropriate theoretical apparatus to do this. Given the context of
uncertainty, incomplete information and agents’ constraints on rationality, contract farming emerges
as frictional equilibria over a particular domain. Contract farming as institution then denotes a set
of substantive characteristics representing agents’ subjective expectations of a game and their choice
of stable, procedurally rational actions within it. Individual choices among heterogeneous agents
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then jointly determine the larger form and nature of the contract farming system that emerges,
including relational elements to maintain the system.
If contract farming arrangements are frictional equilibria, it is important to modify the analytical
frameworks that underwrite empirical work in economics. This thesis essentially argues for
unraveling the principal-agent framework into its constituent stages, suggesting that the folding in
or collapsing of these different constituents into a single theoretical model runs the risk of assuming
away critical arena of action. In short, it advocates the development of a theory of contract farming
that dismantles a composite problem into its different constituent stages, of contracting, of honoring
agreed contracts and of contract enforcement. Each of these stages contains elements of friction
that define the substantive features of the arrangement.
The thesis then applied this framework to examine contract farming practice in five different
commodities in southern India, using survey data on 822 farmers, 42 agribusinesses, contract
documents and secondary data as the basis of analysis.
Contrary to existing findings that contracting insures farmers against price risk, this study
finds that farmers’ subjective expectations of the returns from contracting versus the next best
alternative indicate that contracting might be associated with higher mean returns but also higher
variance. This is true across farmer groups, namely, those who contract as well as those who do not.
Those who select into these systems presumably tolerate the higher variance as long as the mean
returns are also higher, i.e., as long as it is a relatively safe gamble, while those not contracting
presumably are averse to the higher variance in returns relative to the next best alternative. The
survey also finds that even where returns from contracting first order stochastically dominates
returns from the next best alternative, some farmers might be disinclined to take up contracting
seemingly due to other risks that are difficult to monetize. Risk scores from a psychometric mapping
of farmer perceptions of risk attenuating and risk exacerbating factors associated with contracting
and the next best alternative show that, indeed, while the distribution of the ratio of subjective
mean returns from contracting and not contracting was comparable across farmer groups, farmers
who are not currently contracting tend to associate contract farming with higher net incremental
risk than do contracting farmers.
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The evidence suggests that farmers do have agency in the context of the emergence or sustenance
of contract farming as institution, a feature not adequately acknowledged in existing contract
farming research. In short, contract farming, like any technology with ambivalent impacts, could
possess intrinsic elements that trigger disadoption or prevent adoption and the mortality of schemes
could well be due to such endogenous factors. Furthermore, contract farming arrangements could,
in the minds of farmers, also be associated with catastrophic risks, like perceived risk of losing title
to land, of impacts on human health and soil quality, prompting certain farmers to opt out of these
arrangements, despite perceived benefits.
Notwithstanding farmer agency in participating in contracting arrangements, firms are selective
in choosing from among a pool of willing farmers, typically offering take it or leave it contracts.
A contracting firm’s problem is to identify a portfolio of farmers with whom to contract, making
sure that their individual rationality constraint is satisfied. The firm seeks to minimize the costs of
transacting while also minimizing the risks of non-delivery. This study makes the case for treating
the entire domain of the contracting scheme as relevant to the firm’s choice of farmers, suggesting
that firms often choose geographies for procurement, sorting regions before choosing from among
heterogeneous farmers. In each of these elements, imperfect and incomplete information on farmer
reliability and abilities introduces friction. Empirical evidence suggests that such geographic sorting
is relevant and ignoring this aspect could lead researchers to misidentify drivers of selection.
As for welfare gains, it is evident that contract farming could potentially increase net profits
substantially for participating farmers. This could however differ substantially across commodities
and be variable over time, and the results presented here reflect the timing of the survey and
the nature of alternatives compared. This study finds that contracting in papaya and broiler are
associated with improvements in net profit per month of for those participating and potential
improvements of 47% and 123% for current non-participants. While for gherkins and marigold this
does not seem to be the case, it appears that contracting could be offering other benefits that are
not reflected in these measures. Also, this result overturns when the benefits are computed for the
entire group of pooled controls rather than for commodity-specific controls.
In the context of India, a major source of friction in contracting arrangements is weak public
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enforcement of contracts through the courts. Contract farming relationships in India are seen
more as relationships and less as contracts, with formal enforcement mechanisms playing only a
peripheral role in maintaining and supporting transactions. This is related only in part to the
costs and inefficacy of formal enforcement mechanisms. Given that firms typically contract for
small quantities from a large number of farmers, court-based enforcement does not usually make
economic sense. In a case presented in this study, 37% of the contract farmers had some default;
most of these were modest amounts. Depending on the costs of enforcement, the number defaulting
farmers who can be taken to court without entailing a net loss for the firm, ranges from only 3%
to about 25% of those who have outstanding dues.
More importantly, however, firms tend to view court-based formal enforcement as detrimental
to farm-firm relationships in a way that undermines the handshake ethic. This latter concern
drives firms to leverage relationships to support economic transactions, mixing formal and informal
elements to do so, with considerable heterogeneity among the commodities. The space of contract
farming then defines a ‘moral’ economy, where breach by both firms and farmers is pervasive, a
large part of which is overlooked or excused in the interests of sustaining the system.
Interestingly even when contract price matches the spot market price, there is evidence of a
fraction of the farmers sideselling. The Farmer Survey finds that the incidence of breach by way of
sideselling farmers is 17% and 10% of contracting farmers reported that the firm had breached the
contract the previous season. While personal relationships underpin these economic transactions
for promoting contractual commitment and compliance, the study suggests that relationships
necessarily work in tandem with price-based incentives. When the contract price offers enough
premium over alternative prices, relationship-based incentives to improve contractual performance
are ineffective since they are rendered irrelevant. When spot market prices far exceed contract
price, relationships are inadequate and fail to induce farmers to honor contracts. Between these
two ends, however, there exists a range of price differentials, where despite the incentives for
breach implied by high market prices, the relationship can overturn or neutralize this influence and
improve contractual performance. In short, there are limits to the role of relationships in defining a
self-enforcing range of agreements, and this could differ across commodities. The manner in which
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relationship farming operates alongside price-differential driven incentives for breach can differ thus
significantly across commodities, illustrating that heterogeneity in the enforcement problems and
strategies in contract farming practice.
12.2 Contract Farming and Public Policy
One of the major policy challenges in India has been that of providing institutional space for private
sector participation in agriculture, especially via contract farming. While there are a number of
ongoing efforts that are regarded as successful in increasing incomes of participating farmers, there
is a popular perception that achieving scale has been a problem and that more needs to be done
to promote contract farming.
This study yields a few insights for policymaking in India. It is evident that there are some
critical bottlenecks that prevent scaling up of schemes, chief of which are enforcement problems.
In general, farm-firm relationships can be fragile and fraught with friction. Enduring partnerships
between farm and firm are difficult to build and to maintain these requires exceptional effort by
the firm. Many firms have had to absorb large losses in order to build trust and persuade the
farmer of the firm’s commitment. Farmers are left especially vulnerable to the danger of firms
reneging on their contract. Quite apart from enforcement issues, for the farmer, the relationship
has to hold significantly greater rewards than alternatives they have and not expose them to a
new set of risks. Evidence on farmer participation in contract farming schemes suggests that there
are groups of farmers who systematically might choose not to participate, sometimes foregoing
benefits from participation, on account of perceived risks. Whether or not the latter concerns are
legitimate or not is a different question. From the firm’s side, choice of procurement sheds often
reflects a geographic or spatial preference, dictated in part by commodity characteristics and in
part by their need to balance transactions costs and risks of procuring from one region rather than
another. The welfare gains from participation tend to vary widely across farmers and schemes and
are essentially stochastic, providing a catalyst for farmers and firms to revisit their contracting
decisions periodically. This last feature implies farmer attrition could be high so that participation
is time-variant with substantial farmer churning in a firm’s portfolio of suppliers.
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All these suggest that the instrumentality of contract farming in delivering technology, access to
markets and finance or in enabling small farmers to take advantage of opportunities in high-value
agriculture, although correct, is probably overstated. Contract farming cannot serve as a broad-
based strategy for rural development (see also Minot (2008)), given the difficulties in sustaining
contractual relationships and the equivocal impact of contract farming.
In this context, the notion that state agencies can be party to contracting arrangements, either
as third party guarantors or even as the buy-back agency does not make sense and that approach
does not entirely resolve all the concerns outlined above as constraints for the expansion of contract
farming. The challenge is then to craft an array of policy instruments that responds to these
realities. Fundamental to this is a recognition that the space of firm-farmer interaction is largely
outside the sphere of influence of state policies. In a way, public policy should focus on the context
of contract farming rather than on contract farming itself.
For example, weak enforcement mechanisms are prompting several Indian firms to take their
contract farming operations to other countries in south-east Asia and Africa. Yet, establishing
a single legal framework that provides for fair contracts and an effective redressal mechanism is
unlikely to encourage formal contract farming. From a business standpoint, they face an expensive
system that does not offer predicable dispute resolution and one that is prone to support farmers,
at the same time crowding out the handshake ethic. Indeed, indications are that mandating state
overseeing of private contracts might further informalize contract farming where firms end up pole-
vaulting the law. Such interventions might therefore be ineffective, if not misplaced. Similarly, it is
difficult for state policies to address farmer perceptions of risks associated with contract farming,
given that these may vary widely across schemes and contexts. Efforts such as securing farmer
titles to land and tenancy laws that protect land rights would rid farmers of the fear of losing
land, for instance. These are however medium to long term measures. For other concerns, such
as perceptions of impact on health or soils, these are likely not issues that policy can address
effectively.
One potentially useful intervention could be establishment of information bureaus. Many
firms in India share information on defaulting farmers and so forth to enable better selection of
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farmers and perhaps to incentivize farmers to improve their record of honoring contracts. For the
farmers, a comparable arrangement is largely absent and information flows are confined to social
networks. An information bureau at the local level that maintains a record of the operations on
the contracting firms in the region and structured feedback of farmers who have had a contractual
relationship with these firms could be one way of disabusing farmers of misinformation and of
helping farmers distinguish the good firms from unscrupulous operators. Such a repository of farmer
experiences so that farmers can clarify the implications of contract farming and access information
on other farmers’ experiences might work better than mandatory state oversight over contractual
relationships. This is not to suggest that public enforcement is irrelevant. Quasi-judicial bodies
can offer mediation services and so forth, but are likely to have limited impact given the reluctance
of parties to seek third-party intervention.
Second, if contracting firms choose regions while choosing farmers, the issue of geographic
comparative advantage becomes relevant. There is a case to be made for enabling policies in
specific areas that have an advantage for particular crop sectors, for two reasons. Presumably, in
regions that agribusinesses see potential for contracting a particular commodity, some clustering of
operations is already likely to occur, so that policy interventions merely contribute to consolidating
a trend. That said, promoting contracting clusters would have to be deployed judiciously, where
it might reinforce negative trends, for example, when there are known consequences of contract
farming such as degradation of soils, etc. The other possibility that supporting clusters offers is
to ensure competitive conditions in a limited way. In clusters, which necessarily involves multiple
firms procuring in the same region, farmers are less likely to be held hostage or left in the lurch by
a monopsonistic firm. While there is a danger of collusion, this situation holds the best prospect
for a balance in power between farmer and firms. As the example of gherkins showed, competitive
conditions with multiple firms in the region meant, despite possible collusion on pricing, that each
firm at least match the other’s price and has an incentive to honor the terms of their contract if
they are to continue contracting with the farmer.
While the above implies that the state focus efforts to promote contract farming in areas that
are already favorably positioned, it goes without saying that public policy should focus sharply on
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zones that are excluded by agribusinesses. This cannot be overstated. Indeed, a recognition that
there might be geographic poverty traps where sustainable contracting for commercial agriculture
by firms is unlikely or infeasible is critical, so that the idea of promoting contract farming does
not crowd out special attention to disadvantaged or excluded regions. For these regions, more
traditional forms of state engagement with agriculture, through the provision of public goods like
irrigation, infrastructure and so forth, would likely be more appropriate.
This is the sense in which it might be possible to negotiate the seemingly polar normative
consequences of contract farming, and to identify ways to ensure that the benefits of contract
farming filter through without its costs.
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Appendix A
The Farmer Survey: Design and Implementation
A.1 Survey Design
The geographical focus of my study is an area representing seven (of the thirty-two) administrative
districts of Tamil Nadu - Coimbatore, Nilgiris, Salem, Erode, Karur, Dindigul and Madurai. Within
this area, the sampling frame comprises only those regions that are regarded as rural according to
the definition of Census 2001.1
The first stage units (fsu) for the survey are sub-district administrative units called blocks. The
second stage units (ssu) are sub-block administrative units called gram panchayats or Panchayat
Village. A Panchayat Village typically constitutes one or more constituent villages, and represents
the local village administrative body, with elected representatives. Its constituent villages might
themselves comprise one or more hamlets, settlements or habitations. So, I refer to these within-
Panchayat Village villages as hamlets, rather than villages, to avoid confusion. For the purpose
of this survey, the second stage units or ssu are gram panchayats or Panchayat Villages, with the
hamlets being the third stage units (tsu). The ultimate stage unit (usu) is the household, also defined
as per the census of 2001, which characterizes a household as a unit of members who usually eats
from the same kitchen. The households that populate my sampling frame are farmer-households
or households where there is at least one farmer. The farmer and, hence, the household, would
necessarily be involved in agricultural activities, whether as main workers or marginal workers. I
do not restrict the sample to landowners, so that tenant households2 also figure in the population.3
1This excludes urban areas which are defined as (a) all places with a municipality, corporation, cantonment board
or notified town area committee, etc. b) A place satisfying the following three criteria simultaneously: i) a minimum
population of 5000; ii) at least 75 per cent of male working population engaged in non-agricultural pursuits; and iii)
a density of population of at least 400 per square kilometer or 1000 per square mile.
2In some of these districts, prevalence of tenancy is very low.
3For the purpose of this survey, a farmer is defined in accordance with the National Sample Survey Organization of
India, as a person who operates some land and is engaged in agricultural activities during the last 365 days. Thus, a
person qualifies as a farmer if (i) s/he possesses some land (i.e. land, either owned or leased in or otherwise possessed),
and (ii) s/he is engaged in some agricultural activities on that land during the last 365 days. By agricultural activities
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The key factor is that the household must make cropping decisions, so that they determine what
to grow. Agricultural laborers are therefore excluded, since they do not make cropping decisions.
In short, I work with any rural household, whose member(s) has/have engaged in agricultural
activities in the past 365 days.
To establish the sampling frame, I use a combination of exogenous and endogenous attributes.
My choice of administrative districts is exogenous, for instance, driven by considerations of what is
practical and appropriate for the study. In the initial phase of the project, I started with a longer
list of candidate regions within India, but settled for interior Tamil Nadu, for the wide prevalence of
functioning contract farming systems over a contiguous zone, and for my familiarity with the region
and language. The number of contract farming schemes in operation over this region enables me
to reach for something beyond a case study, while allowing me to tackle the issue of heterogeneity
across schemes and sub-regions, given a shared administrative system. The procedure to identify
farmers to interview is however endogenous stratified sampling, and in the context of this study, can
be regarded loosely as choice-based sampling, since the fact of a cultivator-household contracting
is the outcome of a match between the farmer wanting to contract with the firm and vice versa.
The first step was to contact the five firms I study, contracting in gherkins, cotton, marigold,
papaya and broiler, to obtain a comprehensive list of the farmers they contracted with within the
past one year (i.e., 365 days) in the study area.
I label those in this list as Contract Farmers (CF), also referred to as Subject Contract Farmers
in the text. Some of the CF might have contracted twice that year, but that does not have a
bearing in this survey design. In this study, therefore, a Contract Farmer refers to the head of
an agricultural household (a household with at least one farmer) who has contracted for one of
the contract commodities selected, with the corresponding firm, for at least one season in the 365
days preceding the date of my securing the list from the Firms. This is a very specific definition
that must inform the interpretation of results from any analysis in the project. For convenience, I
use “currently contract” as a substitute for contracted during at least one season in the past 365
is meant the cultivation of field crops and horticultural crops, growing of trees or plantations (such as rubber, cashew,
coconut, pepper, coffee, tea, etc.), animal husbandry, poultry, fishery, bee-keeping, vermiculture, sericulture, etc.
Those who have left the operational holding fallow in the reference period are included in the survey, irrespective of
whether it was of their own accord or due to natural events.
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days. I use Contract Farmer (CF) to mean households that engage in contract farming or contract
households.
The list of farmers as given by the contracting firm identifies the hamlet of the farmer’s residence.
The second step was to separate hamlets in the region where the company currently contracts (CHs)
from those hamlets where the company does not currently contract (NCHs). The Panchayat Village
to which the contracting hamlets belong to, I designate as Contract Panchayat Villages (CV), and
those to which the non-contracting hamlets belong, I refer to as Non-Contract Panchayat Villages
(NCV). It is possible, for instance, that in a CV, there might be hamlets where the company does
not currently contract. But it is always true that hamlets in a NCV do not currently contract.
At this point, it is important to distinguish the notion of Panchayat Village from a revenue
village or census village. The latter two refer to boundaries that are captured as a unit for the
purpose of revenue records and constitute the ‘village’ that is captured in the decadal Census of
India. While the Panchayat Village and revenue or census villages coincide broadly, they do not
match up precisely. At the level of the revenue villages (or census villages) I have detailed data
on village level facilities. These are matched up with the respective Panchayat Village, so that it
would be possible to distinguish CHs and NCHs on the basis of village facilities.
Working with this, I move up the geographical and administrative scale and designate Blocks
that have at least one CV as Contract Blocks (CB) and those Blocks that have none as Non-
Contract Blocks (NCB). So, essentially, within the districts of the study area, I am able to map the
procurement shed of the contracting firms, dividing the administrative units into Blocks where they
source, and within these Blocks, the Panchayat where the firms source and within the Panchayats,
the hamlets from where the subject contracting firms source produce. In general, the contract
hamlets and villages of the different firms do not overlap, and this was by accident not by design.
The CV, CB, CH are all subscripted for a commodity, and are always defined with respect to
a specific contract commodity. A CB for cotton could therefore be NCB for gherkins.4
With this mapping, I develop a stratified sampling procedure (Figure A.1). I selected randomly
Contract Blocks (CB). Within CBs I selected Contract Panchayat Villages (CV). Once I have
4This particular feature enables me to expand my sample so that a CB for cotton, for example, can serve as NCBs
for all other contract commodities in this study, and so forth.
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selected randomly the CPV that constitute the sample panchayats, I selected all the contracting
hamlets (CHs) there and conducted a houselisting of all cultivator-households. In the houselisting
process, I collected information that enables me to map the contract participation pattern at the
hamlet level. Specifically, it enables me to do two things (1) to verify that the CF have indeed
contracted with the subject firm for at least one season within the past 365 days and (2) to partition
the non-CF (those who are not currently contracting) into categories that are relevant for the study,
and examine the nature of non-participation and classify (CF )′ in ways that can provide useful
insights.
The (CF )′ in this case is partitioned into three categories. The first category is called Other
Contract Farmers (OCF). These are farmers who have in the past 365 days of the houselisting,
grown the contract crop but have either contracted with a firm other than the particular firm
that I have chosen to study or have opted to use some other market channel for their crop. The
second category of (CF )′ is the sometime contract farmer or Attrition Farmer (AF) to denote that
although not currently contracting, these farmers have, during some season in the past, before the
past 365 days, contracted with the sample firm. These farmers have either passed up (or have
been denied) an opportunity to continue being CF after an initial contracting relationship. These
represent the farmers who have attritioned. Whether they will reclaim that status or not (that is,
whether their AF status is temporary) was not assessed at the time of houselisting. The third and
final constituent of the non-CF group is the Never Contracted Farmers (NCF). These are farmers
who have never contracted with the contracting firm in the past and have never grown the contract
crop. These farmers represent excluded farmers, having never been engaged in the contract-based
supply chain, so to speak, of any of the five contract commodities, with any firm or trader in the
region.5
While houselisting, all farmers were asked if there were crops other than the contract commodity,
for which they were engaged in contracting relationships. This was to provide insight into the
degree of contractual marketing relationships in the community. While this information did not
5There is a residual category of farmers who contracted in the past with firms/channels other than contract firms
included in this study, but ceased to do so. I include them as AF in the houselisting process, but did not sample
these farmers in the survey, since the focus of the study was attrition from the study firms and not of any firm in
general. So, these farmers are not represented in the final survey.
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Figure A.1: Sampling Scheme for Farmer Survey
Stage of 
Selection Sampling Unit Contract Region 
Non-Contract 
Region 
Spatial 
Selection 
Stage 
Block 
 (fsu) CB   NCB 
Spatial 
Selection 
Stage 
Panchayat Village 
(ssu) CV  NCV  NCV 
Spatial 
Selection 
Stage 
Hamlet 
(Houselisting Level)  
(tsu) 
CH NCH NCH NCH 
Matching 
Stage 
Farm Households 
(Sampled from 
Houselist)  
(usu) 
CF OCF AF NCF OCF
 
AF*  
 
NCF OCF AF* NCF OCF AF* NCF
*If contracting firm operated here before reference period. 
 
*If contracting firm operated here before reference period.
enter sampling considerations, they provide information on the spread and depth of commercial
agriculture in the region.
Within the CVs, I include all the hamlets that contracted. In all cases, I selected at least one
NCH in the CV. I did not select NCBs, based on the pilot survey, since the questionnaires did not
elicit responses about perceptions of contract farming in a way that I would be able to use to make
comparisons.
This approach to sampling enables me to do two things. First, it would be possible to address
a particular contract farming scheme as a case study, in the way several studies do. Second, it
enables me to transcend a particular contract farming scheme as a unit and capture the broader
domain, so that it is now possible to document and comment on the extent of contracting over the
chosen domain: what are the inroads contract farming has made, in what crops and what is the
socio-economic-demographic profile of areas where there is high prevalence of contracting? Thus,
with this approach, I can examine the phenomenon of contract farming at two levels,a domain-level
mapping, and a higher-resolution view of the contract farming relationship within each scheme.
A.2 Sampling in Practice
While the intended sampling procedure was tight on paper, its implementation in the field was not
without problems, some of which were difficult to resolve. For instance, the sampling procedure
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presumed that I would be able to identify Contract Blocks (CB) and Contract Panchayat Villages
(CV) neatly. An initial cross-check of whether the firms really contract in the villages on the list
revealed discrepancies. It turns out that the firm’s idea of the village is notional and does not
conform to administrative boundaries. Firms (i.e., the field officers) seemed more comfortable
talking about regions they procured from rather than formal administrative boundaries. For
instance, the firm had classified a bunch of villages under Tuvarankurichhi block (in Tiruchirapalli
District). On verification, most of these villages were, in fact, part of Melur block, Madurai District.
Consequently it was difficult to map the company’s list of farmers’ hamlets with the ones I could
identify on the official roster at the level of the district administration. Also many Panchayat
Villages have constituent hamlets that share the same name as the one on the company list, so it
was a huge endeavor getting these clarified. Further some of the CVs straddle boundaries. In one
village, a street separates the Kerala part of the village from the Tamil Nadu part. Owing to these
problems I spent much time reclassifying Contract Panchayat Villages (CVs) correctly.
The selection of usu was fraught with similar problems. It is often the case that the same
family (household) contracts under the name of different members of the family in different years.
I have accounted for these by running the farmer list through field officials who were able to identify
members of the same family, so that each household is counted as one, and not each member (so
a contract or non-contract household is what counts, unless the members have separate titles to
land).6
The other problem was that there were farmers the company claimed they had stopped
contracting in, who claimed that they had sown gherkins, for instance, for the firm that season. So
there were Contract Farmers (CFs) in Non-Contract Villages (NCVs), which was not supposed to
be possible in my sampling strategy. This was only true of one village. In this case, I dropped the
village and replaced it with another sample village, randomly selected from the candidates. The
other issue was an inexplicable reluctance on the part of farmers to pronounce their true contracting
status. Other farmers were aware of the field official they interacted with but not the firm the field
official was representing. In short, even at the houselisting stage, I was not sure of the contracting
6This occurred only in one case, where brothers had separate titles to land, had separate contracts with the firm.
They were counted as two households.
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status of a particular farmer. This difference between the formal claims made by the contracting
firms and the farmers meant that considerable effort was spent in clarification in order to reduce
mistakes in sampling. Despite difficulties, there is reason to believe that the eventual survey has
been rid of these problems, given the considerable effort to clarify the details that were murky.7
Table A.1 describes details of the numbers sampled and the total number of those captured in
the houselisting process. For gherkins, I select three CBs, within each of which I randomly select
two CPVs. Within each CPV selected, I include all CV (or contract hamlets). Apart from this I
select randomly one NCPV from within one of the selected CB. The selection of marigold contract
farmers was done in a similar way.
For the cotton contracting scheme, sampling was more complicated. Since the 76 contract
farmers in the scheme were thinly spread over about 19 villages, I had to opt for a sampling
procedure that would keep the number of survey villages small. Doing a houselisting in too many
villages would have been impossible given the resources at my disposal. So I arranged villages by
descending order of number of contract farmers and went down the list to choose the first N villages
that would get me 60 observations of contract farmers. I ended up with seven villages. I chose one
village, randomly selected from the where no one contracted for cotton. So here the probability that
a contract village was selected was proportional to the proportion of contract farmers in the village.
In the case of papaya and broiler, too, contract farmers were relatively thinly spread over many
villages. Here too the sample farmers were selected from among the hamlets where the highest
concentration of contract farmers were present.
It must be noted further, that all those in (CF )′, in general, may not contract at all for the crop
that is of interest, i.e, the chosen contract commodity, but could be contracting for another “non-
contract” crop.8 This information is available from the Farmer Survey and houselisting process.
7This was achieved by asking several people in the village and cross-checking with the firm headquarters and the
field officials.
8This is to suggest that the sample I eventually work with might be representative of the contractees with respect
to a firm, but I cannot make any general comment about contracting versus non-contracting, although I do use these
categories in the context of assessing welfare gains.
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A.3 Structure of Questionnaires
For the survey, I use distinct questionnaires reflecting the sampling strategy and the composition
of farmer-types in the study, namely, Subject Contract Farmer (CF), Other Contract Farmer
(OCF),Attrition Farmer (AF), Never Contract Farmer (NCF). For the five commodities, therefore,
twenty different questionnaires were designed for the survey. Each questionnaire captures the three
empirical aspects of interest in this study, as also contracting history, the subjective expectations
of price, yield, profits of the contract crop and potential alternatives. Questions on the relationship
with the firm attempt to capture farmer perceptions of the firm-farm interface and issues relating
to enforcement. The questionnaires were coordinated so that they are similar across the crop
sectors or contract farming schemes. The questionnaires were designed so as to be able to pool
the farmers together for the analysis, and to allow for extensions to other crop sectors or contract
farming schemes, if necessary. The differences arise only where the nature of the scheme or the
crop introduces unique aspects that are of interest.
I also conducted unstructured discussions with selected residents (progressive farmers, village
heads, as well as marginal farmers) in the sample villages surveyed in order to get a flavor of
perceptions of contract farming at large and the predicament of cultivators in the region, given
the larger context of ‘agrarian distress’ in India. In particular, I am able to gauge the history of
contract farming practice in the region, as remembered by villagers. In a limited way, I was able
to get ascertain the relevance of the secondary data, from the census, on village level facilities.
All the questionnaires were prepared in Tamil, the language of the interview with farmers, so
as to minimize the errors that could crop up with impromptu translation by investigators. They
also incorporate the regional inflections of Tamil in say, Dindigul and Coimbatore, which can be
quite distinct. The questionnaires attached are English translations of the same.
The Survey Procedures were approved by the Institutional Review Board for Human Partici-
pants in Cornell University (via Protocol 08-02-092) on July 16, 2008. In keeping with the assurance
of anonymity I provided the farmers, throughout the study, I withhold the details of the farmers
interviewed and their location. Similarly, the precise time of the survey is not disclosed to ensure
anonymity, since the identification of the time of the survey could be a possible way to identify
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contracting villages that have been selected for the survey. Similarly, I do not name the firms
involved in the survey in order to maintain their anonymity.
A.4 The Survey
The Survey was conducted in two phases. Phase 1 pertains to cotton and gherkins and was
conducted in 2007-08. Phase 2 includes marigold, broiler, gherkins and papaya and was conducted
in 2009-10. The field survey in Phase 1 was supported financially by a Junior Research Fellowship
(JRF) from the American Institute of Indian Studies and the Ithaca First Presbyterian Church
International Student Fellowship. Phase 2 was supported by a USAID-Borlaug LEAP Fellowship
and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)-New Delhi Office.
A.4.1 Phase 1
The questionnaires for Phase 1 were pretested in a Pilot Survey of 50 farmers in 4 villages in
Tuvarankurichi Block in Tiruchirapalli district. The Survey was conducted between July 2008
and December 2008 with the assistance of graduate student investigators from three city colleges
in Tiruchirapalli. A three-day training programme ensured that they understood the aims and
objectives of the study and were able to interpret the questions in the manner intended. The
training included interview techniques with role play and visits to the field. I either conducted or
was present during a majority of the interviews conducted in the survey.
A.4.2 Phase 2
The questionnaires for Phase 2 were pretested in a Pilot Survey of 25 farmers in 2 villages
in Karamadai Block in Coimbatore district. The Survey was conducted between July 2009
and December 2009 with the assistance of graduate student investigators from the Tamil Nadu
Agricultural University (TNAU) in Coimbatore. A one-day training programme preceded the
survey. During Phase 2, I was present for only a small proportion of the interviews conducted.
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A.4.3 Triangulation and verification
From the perspective of the goals of the study, some critical pieces of the survey data needed
verification and confirmation. Wherever there were gaps in the questionnaire or clarifications
regarding farmer responses, it was possible to return to the farmers that very day to secure these.
A daily editing process of questionnaires filled that day enabled this.
In other cases, I resort to a triangulation method of verification. For instance, the survey
collects the prices that farmers expect to obtain for different agricultural products and those that
they recall having obtained in the past season. This is a critical piece of information. So, to
ensure that farmer responses were not bizarrely different from what really happened, I was able to
check with the prevailing market prices in the nearest wholesale market for the particular produce.
Where it pertained to crops, such as gherkins, that did not have a local market, I was able to
verify the broad range of prices from a number of firms other than the one I had selected for the
study. This was necessary since in many villages, implementing the interviews was a challenge given
farmer reluctance to answering questions on contract farming. Wherever the contracting firms had
given me transactions histories of farmers, going back four to six seasons (spanning two years), this
provided another way of verify the reliability of the data collected through the survey.
In general, the costs and returns data collected from the farmers pertain to the most recent
season of cultivation. The proportion of farmers who maintain written records is very low, so most
of the data so collected was based on recall. I do believe however that these data are reliable owing
to the timing of the survey, which followed the harvest period closely and the fact that farmers in
this region were able to be very precise with the different components of cost and returns.
A.5 Supplementary Data
The survey data are paired with secondary data from different sources in order to contextualize
the operation of the contracting schemes. I have stitched together available secondary data for the
nine study districts comprising 2714 villages. These include around 141 variables covering details of
village amenities, i.e., locational attributes, infrastructure, communication, irrigation, finance and
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social development infrastructure. Also available is the socio-demographic profile of these villages.
The data pertains to 1999 in some cases and 2001 in others. Despite the fact that it is not the
most recent, the assumption is that it can faithfully capture differences in village level facilities for
the purpose of the study. This data is collected as part of the decadal census. Since the census
reports these facilites for revenue villages, two steps are essential before this data becomes useful
for the current study. The first involved mapping the census villages to the panchayat villages, so
that the revenue villages in the Census correspond to the Panchayat Villages, the unit of analysis
relevant to the Farmer Survey. The second step is to map hamlets to their constituent Census or
revenue village. This matching then enables me to assign to hamlets the corresponding village level
facilities. This matching is not readily available to the researcher and required considerable effort.9
In all, there are over 18000 hamlets belonging to the 2714 census villages.
The other important secondary data I assemble are the traded prices in the relevant alternate
market of the contract commodity over the course of the study period. Where available, I also
extract the volumes traded in the alternate market to gauge roughly the relative importance of
contracting. For cotton, the prices are of the closest related variety to contract cotton in the Annur
market, the largest wholesale market relevant to the contracting hamlets. For marigold, it refers
to the Mettupalayam and Coimbatore markets. For gherkins, there exists no alternate market.
For papaya, I obtain the price for the only other variety that is grown on a large enough scale
at Oddanachatram market in Dindigul. These constitute daily prices; typically, the minimum,
maximum and modal traded prices are recorded. These are wholesale prices, and not farmgate
prices, which are likely to be lower than the former on account of transport costs and commissions.
9Efforts are on by various departments of the Governement of India and the state government of Tamil Nadu to
match this data and enable researchers access a harmonized system.
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Appendix B
The Agribusiness Survey
The Agribusiness Survey constitutes interviews with 42 different agribusinesses involved in contract
farming in India across crop sectors. This Survey was meant to provide a macro perspective, an
institutional view of the emergence of contract farming in India at large. It is therefore independent
of the Farmer Survey, although it captures similar themes and issues. A goal of the Agribusiness
Survey was to integrate within the particular study, perspectives of the firm, just as the Farmer
Survey would capture the perspectives of the farmer.
A survey of agribusinesses involved in contract farming poses significant challenges in the context
of India. First, there exists no comprehensive roster of firms who are involved in contract farming.
Those included in the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) do not all practice contract farming and
all those who do, are not necessarily accounted for transparently in the the ASI. In the absence
of a well-defined universe, I extracted lists of contracting firms from the Ministry of Agriculture’s
website and constructed a list of firms mentioned in the popular press in English during 2006-07. I
also contacted industry associations for similar information. With this assembled list, I approached
the firms. Several had ceased to exist and many had stopped contract farming operations. A few
denied they were involved in contract farming and many dodged my repeated requests for interviews.
Those who offered me an appointment also volunteered information of other firms contracting in
the region or in the same commodity sectors as them and this enabled me to identify, via this
snowball technique, a fairly representative set of firms that have or had had some form of contract
procurement.
Most sample firms demanded confidentiality and a subset of them shared contract documents
on the condition of confidentiality. Over the span of a year and a half, I interviewed one or several
members of these firms, traveling across India to do so. The commodities represented in the sample
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include staples like wheat, paddy and others such as gherkins, coconut, soybean, medicinal herbs,
sugarcane, potato, biofuels (jatropha), baby corn, organic products, horticulture and broiler,etc.
The geographies of their operations straddle the southern states of Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh,
Kerala and Tamil Nadu, the north-west and central belt of Punjab, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh
and Maharshtra, with a few from the east, like Jharkhand and West Bengal. The firms include sole
proprietorships as well as large conglomerates and multinationals.
The survey involved informal structured discussions focused on the scale and mode of operations
of the firms, the history of their experience with contracting, the policy environment, challenges and
future plans. This study uses information acquired through these conversations and the contract
documents as qualitative data.
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Appendix C
Derivation of the log likelihood function for
endogenous switching model
The log likelihood function is derived as follows:
L = Πi=1n [f(Yi|Ii = 0) Pr(Ii = 0)](1−Ii)[f(Yi|Ii = 1) Pr(Ii = 1)]Ii
lnL =
n∑
1=1
{
(1− Ii)[lnφ(u2i
σ2
)− ln(σ2) + ln{1− Φ(Wi α
σv
)}] + Ii[lnφ(u1i
σ1
)− ln(σ1) + ln{Φ(Wi α
σv
)}]
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[
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)
− ln(σ2) + ln
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Since u1i and vi are not independent,
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)
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Appendix D
Survey Questionnaires
As described in Appendix A, the survey data was collected through a set of questionnaires, unique
to scheme and farmer type. They were designed keeping in mind the sampling profile and the
structure of markets. For example, since gherkins has no alternate spot market, the gherkins
growers in the sample were necessarily growing on contract with firms other than the subject firm.
So, for gherkins, there is no questionnaire for the farmers who go for the spot market. In contrast,
for broiler, it was possible to have growers supply to other firms in the area on contract or supplying
to the spot market. There is a distinct questionnaire to capture each category. Accordingly, the
following questionnaires were used
• 1(A) Gherkins Subject Firm Contract Farmer (CF)
• 1(B) Gherkins Other Contract Farmer (OCF)
• 1(C) Gherkins Attrition Farmer (AF)
• 1(D) Gherkin Never Contract Farmer (NCF)
• 2(A) Marigold Subject Firm Contract Farmer (CF)
• 2(B) Marigold Spot Market Farmer (OCF)
• 2(C) Marigold Attrition Farmer (AF)
• 2(D) Marigold Never Contract Farmer (NCF)
• 3(A) Papaya Subject Firm Farmer (CF)
• 3(D) Papaya Never Contract Farmer (NCF)
• 4(A) Broiler Contract Farmer (CF)
• 4(B) Broiler Other Contract Farmer (OCF)
• 4(BB) Broiler Spot Market Farmer (OCF)
• 4(C) Broiler Attrition Farmer (AF)
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• 4(D) Broiler Never Contract Farmer (NCF)
• 5(A) Cotton Subject Firm Contract Farmer (CF)
• 5(B) Cotton Spot Market Farmer (OCF)
• 5(C) Cotton Attrition Farmer (AF)
• 5(D) Cotton Never Contract Farmer (NCF)
In this appendix, I include a set of questionnaires for just one scheme, gherkins and one
questionnaire from marigold (for farmers who grow for the spot market) to represent the complete
set of farmer types included in the sample. The questionnaires for all the schemes are the same,
excepting minor differences to accommodate the particular nature of the commodity. For example,
the cost and returns to broiler would have categories of costs that are quite different from field
crops. Similarly, the questionnaires for papaya reflect the fact that the contract commodity is in
fact latex and a tree crop. I also include the Oral Consent Transcript.
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Survey on Contract Farming in Tamil Nadu 
ORAL CONSENT TRANSCRIPT 
 
Sir/Madam, 
 
I am a student interested in agricultural operations of businesses that contract with farmers / 
contract farming in India. I am conducting a study of farmers, like yourself, in the Dindigul-
Coimbatore region to understand issues relating to contracting. In particular I would like to learn 
about your experience contracting with "Name of Firm", the benefits, costs of doing so and 
problems you might be facing, in general, in carrying out your agricultural operations. I would like to 
interview you for this purpose. This would take about 40-45 minutes. 
 
Taking part in this study is completely voluntary. If you decide not to take part I respect your 
wishes. If you DO want to participate but are busy now, let me know when it is convenient for you 
to spare the time. I will return then. During the course of the interview, you may skip any questions 
that you do not want to answer; you are free to withdraw at any time. 
 
I would like to assure you that I am an independent researcher and have no links with the firm you 
contract with or any other firm or the local government. Our conversation today will be kept 
absolutely confidential and will be used only for the purpose of my research. I will note down what 
you say in the questionnaire I have here, and will ensure that this is not viewed by anyone else. It 
shall be kept locked and discarded after a few years, when I have completed my research. 
 
I do not anticipate any risks to you participating in this study other than those encountered in day-
to-day life. There are no benefits to you if you choose to participate in this survey. 
 
If you have any questions regarding any aspect of what I have just said, do not hesitate to ask me 
now. Should you want to know more about my research, you can ask me at any time. I will leave 
my contact number with you after the interview. I will be here in your village all of today. If you have 
any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a subject in this study, I could put you in touch 
with the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at my University. They can be contacted by phone at 607-
255-5138 or if you/you know anyone who can use the internet, you can access their website at 
http://www.irb.cornell.edu/. 
 
I will proceed with this interview if you give your consent. 
 
Sudha Narayanan 
1 
Schedule 1(A): SUBJECT/SAMPLE FIRM CONTRACT FARMER QUESTIONNAIRE 
[Investigator: Interview the head of the farm household in the list of selected farmers. If the farmer is unavailable, do not interview anyone 
else in the household. Introduce yourself and explain the purpose of the survey. Make sure you convey all the points mentioned in the Oral 
Consent Transcript in the same words. Indicate the approximate time the interview will take. If the farmer has written records encourage 
him/her to refer to these, especially if the contract farmer has passbooks. Make sure the farmer has a chance to clarify his/her doubts and 
give consent before you start the interview.] 
Name of the Investigator    Date of Interview 
FARMER ID: (Copy from the Sampling Sheet after verifying identity of the farmer) 
Hamlet     Panchayat             Revenue Village    
Block     Taluk     District 
A. LANDHOLDING, CROPPING PATTERN
1) [Investigator: This is a confirmatory question]  What is the main occupation of your household in the last 1 year or 365 days?
1) Casual Agricultural Labour 
2) Casual Non-Agricultural Labour 
3) Cultivation
4) Other Self-employed 
5) Salaried employment 
6) Other (specify) ___________________________ 
2) How much land does your household currently operate? (a)Owned  _________________  cents / acres / kuzhi 
(b) Leased  _________________ cents /acres /kuzhi 
a) What proportion of your land is irrigated?     ________________ % 
b) What is the main source of irrigation?       
1) Well
2) Tubewell
3) River
4) Canal
5) Rainfed
6) Other (specify) ______________ 
3) Compared to other farmers’ lands in your village, would you say that the agricultural land you own is  
1) More fertile 
2) Equally (or just as) fertile 
3) Less fertile 
4) What has been the cropping pattern this past year? [Investigator: Include land left fallow]
 (A) Crop 
[Investigator: Include tree 
crops as well e.g., 
coconut, banana] 
(B) Month of 
Sowing (for crops 
other than trees).  
(C) Month of 
Harvest (for crops 
other than trees 
(D) Area
(in
acres/centskuzhi) 
Note units 
Quantity 
Produced 
(E)
(Please note 
units) 
Quantity Sold 
(F)
(Please note 
units) 
(G) Marketing Channel 
(See Code below) 
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
1=Trader, 2=Pre-harvest Contractor, 3= Direct to consumer, 4= Contract (Intermediary), 5=Contract (Firm), 6=Self Consumption 
 
 
2B. SELECTION, INITIAL EXPERIENCE 
You mentioned that you contracted for Gherkins with THE “FIRM” in the past season. We would like to know more about your experience.
5) When did you first become aware of the option of contracting Gherkins with THE FIRM? _______          ________ 
6) When was the first time you contracted with THE “FIRM”?  (Specify month  and year, e.g., Masi 2006 ) _______          ________ 
7) Had you ever cultivated gherkins before that?            Yes  /  No 
If YES,
a) How many years’ experience did you have cultivating gherkins before you contracted with this FIRM?  ___________ years  
b) What was the marketing channel you were using then? 
1) Direct selling in the market 
2) Trader / Commission Agent 
3) Company (specify which company)____________________ 
4) Other (specify) _________ 
8) When you began contracting, what were the reasons you decided to contract with THE “FIRM”?  
9) Initially, how much hesitation did you have before going in for contracting with THE “FIRM”? [Investigator: Read out all options]
1) Hesitated a great deal
2) Hesitated a little   
3) Had no hesitation 
10) What were the reasons for feeling the way you did?  
11) How did you first establish contact with the company to express willingness to contract with THE “FIRM”? [Investigator: Circle all relevant options. 
Read out options.] 
1) A friend/neighbour/fellow-farmer/relative introduced me / put in a word for me 
2) I contacted the company official /agent on my own 
3) The company official/ agent approached me personally 
4) The company official/agent was canvassing in the village and asked for volunteers 
5) Others (please specify) ___________________________________________________________________ 
12) Were there any eligibility criteria that you know of in order to get selected by the firm?  Yes  / No   /  Unaware 
i. If YES, please list any eligibility criteria. Why do you think you were selected? [Investigator: Circle the appropriate 
response. Circle ALL that apply] 
1 Faith 8 Through a group or through someone I know 
2 Hard work and ability 9 Those who are interested 
3 Reputation 10 Those who will pay the loan and are creditworthy 
4 Those who will comply and obey 11 Under pressure from other villagers 
5 Land 12 Crop experience 
6 Good soil, well situated parcel 13 They take whoever they wish; it is arbitrary 
7 Irrigation Facility 14  
13) What are the kind of preparations you had to make or investments you undertook before you could contract? (List all the expenses incurred on 
the same. E.g. tubewell, drip irrigation system, spraying machine, preparation of land, a shed for the birds, etc.) 
S.No. (A)Item  (B)How much did it cost? (in Rs.)  (C)How did you finance the investment? If 
borrowed, mention source e.g., SBI, friends, etc.  
1
2
3
314) Since you first began contracting with THE “FIRM”, please give some details about your contracting history . 
Season and Year (A) 
[Investigator: Write Year within 
brackets]
Seeds Provided (in 
kgs) (B) 
Acreage sown 
(in acres) (C) 
Actual Production  
(in kgs.)  (D) 
Sold to the 
Company
(in kgs.) (E) 
1 First Year with THE “FIRM” 
(_______________________)
    
2 Current Season (____________)     
3 The Last Season 
(_____________)
   
15) Since you began contracting, have there been years, when you did not contract with the firm even for one season?  Yes / No 
If YES,  
i. When was the most recent year? ______________________ 
ii. The reason for the break? 
1)  The company did not offer contract
2) Contracted with another firm 
3) Sold in the spot market 
4) Losses with contract crop 
5) Pest issues 
6) Water issues 
7) Other (Specify) ________________________ 
16) Is it a written contract? Yes /No 
If YES 
i.  Do you have a copy? Yes / No 
ii. Is it valid in court? Yes / No 
iii. Have you read it or had it read to you? Yes / No 
17) Who do you have the contract with? 
a) The Firm 
b) An Agent 
c) Another Farmer 
d) Others (Specify) __________________________________ 
 
 
 
18) Do you have contact with other farmers who pursue contract farming, in this crop or in other crops? Yes /  No 
If YES,  
i. Which crops?   
(1) Papaya (2) Gherkins (3) Marigold  (4) Poultry (5) Other (specify)____________________ 
ii. Are these 
a) Relatives /family in your village 
b) Relatives/family in another village 
c) Friends in this village 
d) Friends elsewhere 
e) Acquaintances in this village 
f) Other (Specify)___________ 
 
4C. ELICITING EXPECTATIONS FROM THE CONTRACT FARMER 
19) We would like to learn about your expectations regarding earnings and yield of gherkins. If you were to follow the same set of procedures, with 
the same firm and field officer, under the same contractual terms and assuming the general conditions in your family, village and weather are 
unchanged, out of 20 seasons growing the contract crop in a plot of your choice, which has the same qualities, what is the number of occasions 
you would attain the minimum/ the most likely / the maximum price/yield/net income per acre of the commodity? 
If I give you these 20 tokens and ask you to give the most 
tokens to the number you have said is most likely, the next 
most tokens you think is the next most likely and the least 
tokens to the least likely.  
Variable Unit 
Please note unit 
Rs/kg, quintal./acre 
for yield, etc. 
What is the 
minimum 
value you 
expect?  
What is the 
most likely 
value? 
What is the 
maximum 
value you 
expect? 
Number against 
Minimum 
Value? 
Number against 
the most likely
value? 
Number against  
maximum value?  
Price (unit value) 
[Since gherkins has 
many grade, the focus 
here is on eliciting an 
average unit value as 
“price.”] 
Rs./kg.       
Yield Kg./acre       
Net Income Rs./acre       
[Investigator: Write number of tokens in the boxes. To check for their understanding, (1) they should at least assign a token to each of the three 
outcomes they earlier proposed and (2) the most likely outcome should have the most tokens] 
20) What, in your opinion, are the most important risks and benefits associated with contracting? [Investigator: Please pay careful attention to this set 
of questions. This pertains only to gherkins. To start with do not prompt. Let the farmer mention the risks/benefits first. Once the box has been 
filled out, then read out the options the farmer has not mentioned to verify that they are not considered relevant by the farmer. If the farmer is 
reluctant to answer these set of questions, then try prompting with examples of attributes.] 
Type of Risk/Benefit 
[investigator: The term used differs 
across regions, make sure you find out 
what term to use] 
Is this risk/benefit  present? 
[Investigator: Let the farmer list the 
risks. If the farmer mentions a risk, 
write 1 against it, if not mark 0. 
Then move to the next column]
How important do you think each of 
these risks/benefits is to your well-
being? 
 [Rank on a scale of 0-10 with 0 means 
not important to you at all, 10 means it is 
extremely important to you.] 
What is the probability of the following 
event happening in contracting with 
THE “FIRM” 
[If you contract 10 times how many 
times do you feel this event will 
occur.] 
Yield risk    
Price risk    
Risk of firm not coming back to pick 
up the produce at harvest time. 
   
Risk of delay in payment    
Risk of non-availability of credit    
Risk of non-availability of inputs     
Risk of poor quality inputs    
Risk of wrong technical advice    
Risk of rejection/downgrading of 
produce by the firm, quality 
   
Risk of the firm not coming to 
contract in the future 
   
Risk of losing land    
Others 1 (specify) ______________    
Others 2 (specify) _____________ 
   
BENEFITS 
Inputs provided by the firm on credit    
5Advance provided by firm    
Credit available against contract    
Technical advice available    
Lumpsum payment    
Timely payment    
Price fixed, certainty    
Reduced transaction time    
Assured buyer    
Positive yield risk    
Farm-gate collection    
Others 1 (specify) ______________    
21) If you were not contracting for GHERKINS with the FIRM this season, what would be your next best option?  [Investigator: Read the option aloud 
and get the next best alternative – the name of the company and/or crop.] 
1) Gherkins contract for another company (specify the name of company/agent)_________________________ 
a. If this were not possible, what crop would you grow instead __________________________________ 
2) Another crop instead of gherkins [Inv: Please note which crop the farmer would have cultivated]  _______________________ 
 
[Investigator:The next set of questions focuses on the crop mentioned in 1(a) or 2] 
D. RISK PERCEPTIONS OF ALTERNATIVES (ALTERNATE CROP) 
22) Had you chosen this alternative option for the current season, if you were to follow the same set of procedures, assuming the general conditions in 
your family, village and weather are unchanged, out of 20 seasons growing the contract crop in a plot of your choice, which has the same 
qualities, what is the number of occassions you would attain the minimum/ the most likely / the maximum price/yield/net income per acre of the 
commodity?
If I give you these 20 tokens and ask you to give 
the most tokens to the number you have said is 
most likely, the next most tokens you think is the 
next most likely and the least tokens to the least 
likely.  
Variable Unit 
Please note unit 
Rs/kg,
quintal./acre for 
yield, etc. 
What is the 
minimum 
value you 
expect?
What is the 
most likely 
value?
What is the 
maximum 
value you 
expect?
Number
against
Minimum
Value?
Number
against the 
most likely 
value?
Number
against
maximum 
value
Price expectation        
Yield expectation         
Net Income 
623) What other risks or benefits that you associate with the alternate crop? [Investigator: Same as for the previous risk/benefit table]
Type of Risk/Benefit 
[investigator: The term used differs across regions, 
make sure you find out what term to use] 
(A)
Is this risk 
/benefitpresent? 
[Investigator: Write 1 if 
YES, 0 if NO] 
(B)
How important do you think each of these 
attributes  is to your well-being? 
 [Rank on a scale of 0-10 with 0 means not 
important to you at all, 10 means it is extremely 
important to you] (C) 
How frequently do you face this situation? 
[In 10 seasons, how many times do you feel this 
event will occur? Note for those who are 
contracting for the first time, this is difficult.]
(1)Risk of non-availability of credit   
(2) Risk of non-availability of technical 
advice
   
(3) Risk of poor quality inputs    
(4) Risk of non-availability of inputs    
(5) Non availability of hired labour    
(6) Not finding a buyer    
(7) Delay in payment    
(6)  Rejection of produce    
(7) Weather risk/ yield 
   
(8) Price risk, price drop  
(9) Others _________________ 
   
BENEFITS    
Positive Price Risk, price rise     
Can sell anytime, flexibility    
Quality is not critical    
Known trader in the market    
Positive yield risk    
Others 1 (specify) ______________    
 
7E. COST AND RETURNS FROM CONTRACT CULTIVATION & TRANSACTIONS COST [For this section, data should pertain to the previous 
contracting season.If the farmer is contracting for the first time and the harvest is not yet over, then fill in expected rates where actuals are not available, for e.g., for 
labour costs for harvesting, mentioning “E” for expected alongside the entry.] 
24) Could you give some details of your costs and returns for the last completed season?
Labour Cost     Input/output 
Male(days) Female(days) Labour cost for 
hired  
Operations 
Hired  Family labour 
Hired 
Family 
Male Female 
Machine 
(hr) 
Quantity Unit 
price 
Source 
(1=Purchase
d; 2=Owned: 
3=Company 
Provided 
Variable cost           
1. Land preparation           
2. Seed bed preparation           
3. FYM/Compost           
4. Planting/sowing           
5. Seeds           
6. Seed treatment           
7. Fertilizer application           
8. Micro nutrient 
application
          
9. Interculture operation           
10. Weeding/weedicide
application
          
11. Plant protection 
chemicals
          
12. Irrigation           
13. Harvesting           
14. Equipment repair and 
maintenance
          
TRANSACTIONS COST           
15. Post harvest 
operations
          
16. Packing and Sorting           
17. Transport to the 
Market/Collection 
Center
          
18. Commission on 
transaction
          
19. Interest on working 
capital @7% 
          
Fixed cost           
1. Land rent           
2. Depreciation on farm 
assets
          
3. Interest on fixed capital 
12% 
          
Total cost           
Main product yield           
By product yield           
Gross return           
Net return           
25) What is the volume of product rejected as not meeting quality standards?    ______________ kgs 
26) What is the volume of product that was lost due to spoilage /wastage?    _______________ kgs 
27) How many days did it take for you to receive full payment after completion of the transaction?    _______________days 
8G. ENFORCEMENT 
28) In the last season, have you used the inputs for the contract crop for your other non-contract crops?    Yes  /    No 
If YES, 
a. What is the proportion of inputs that you were given did you use for other non-contract crops ____________ % 
29) In the last season, have you sought or used the firm or agent’s advice for your other crops?   Yes  /    No 
If YES, 
a. Please explain ____________________________________________________________________ 
30) In the last season, has any other company approached you or have you sold the contract crop to any other buyer (local market or another 
company)  Yes  /    No 
If YES, 
a. What proportion of the contract crop did you sell? (in %) __________________% 
b. What are the reasons you sold elsewhere?  __________________________________ 
31) According to you, what proportion of the contract farmers in your village or outside sell their contract crop to other buyers? _________% 
32) How often do you think other contract farmers in your village sell the contracted crop to other buyers? 
 (1) Regularly   (2) Frequently   (3) Not so frequently           (4) Rarely        (5) Never 
33) The last time you contracted or delivered the contracted commodity to the FIRM, was the price offered by other companies, on an average, higher 
or lower than the contract price? [Inv: Circle the relevant option and note down the two prices]. 
a) Contract price was lower 
b) About the same 
c) Contract price was higher 
Contract Price (in Rs/kg.)   Grade 1________Grade 2_______Grade 3___________ Grade 4________ Grade 5_________  
Price of Competing Firm (in Rs./kg) .)   Grade 1________Grade 2_______Grade 3___________ Grade 4________ Grade 5_________ 
34) Would you accept this FIRM’s contract if it offered you a lower price than other FIRMS operating in this region?  Yes /  No /  Unsure
If YES, how much lower can it be before you reject the contract? (Inv.Get the amount for the smallest gherkin – that is the highest value that 
you noted above)
Contract price can be Rs.__________/kg lower                 /             Unsure 
If NO, how much higher would the contract price have to be above the competitor price for you to accept the contract? (Inv.Get the amount for the 
smallest gherkin – that is the highest value that you noted above)
Contract price should be at least Rs. _________/kg higher               /          Unsure 
35) Since you started contracting, have you ever faced a situation where you have been unable to deliver the contracted produce at the required time 
and place?    Yes    /       No 
a. Please describe. 
1. Weather related yield loss/ Natural causes/Water shortage 
2. When I feel my profits might be harmed, or the firm does not give a good price for the output 
3. Would never happen 
4. When I am constrained for cash 
5. Company delayed in coming /delays in payments 
6. Could not meet quality standards 
36) In general, how important do you think it is for you to honour the contract? 
1. Extremely important 
2. Quite important 
3. Important
4. Not so important 
5. Not at all important 
937) If you were to violate the contract, what do you feel would be the consequences? [Investigator: Allow the farmer to articulate his/her thoughts, and 
if appropriate ask the questions below to get specific answers as a follow-up] 
1 Nothing 7 Warn us 
2 They will not pay our dues/ demand that we return the money 8 Take some appropriate action 
3 Will go to court 9 Fight with us 
4 Will approach the police 10 Complain to the village leader 
5 Will tell on us to other companies 11 They will lose faith in us 
6 Stop contracting with us   
 
38) In your experience with this company has there been an occasion when you felt they did not keep up with the terms of the contract?   
Yes    /       No 
a. If YES, please describe what happened and when   _______________________________________________________________ 
39) In general, If the firm does not honour the contract, what would you do? [Circle all valid responses. Multiple answers are allowed.]
a) Nothing, what can I do? Powerless 
b) Depending on the problem, we will decide 
c) Go to court 
d) Approach the police 
e) Complain to the local authorities /police 
f) Stop Contracting with this firm, contract with other firms 
g) Will make a representation to them 
h) Protest won’t harvest the crop 
i) Give up the contract crop 
j) Will not let the firm come into our village 
k) Demand Compensation, Lose faith 
l) Other (please Specify) _______________________________ 
 
40) In general, how much power to voice your opinions do you feel in this relationship with the company? [Investigator: Read out all the options. Circle 
only one. If the farmer elaborates, note his/her response below] 
a) Very powerful 
b) Somewhat powerful 
c) Neither powerful nor powerless 
d) Somewhat powerless/vulnerable 
e) Completely powerless/vulnerable 
41) How many times in the last two weeks did the agent visit your farm?  ___________________________ 
42) Today, how risky do you think contracting with THE FIRM is?   
 [Investigator: Rank on a scale of 0 to 10; 0 means no risk at all, 10 means extremely risky] __________________________ 
43) What, according to you, are the chances that the company stops contracting with you within the next three years? 
(1) Almost certainly  (2) Very likely  (3) Somewhat likely      (4) Unlikely (5) Not at all likely 
44) Would you continue to grow the contract crop if you stopped contracting with this company?   Yes    /       No 
45) What, according to you, are the chances that you will want to stop contracting with this firm within the next three years?  
(1) Almost certainly  (2) Very likely  (3) Somewhat likely       (4) Unlikely (5) Not at all likely 
46) For the next season, do you plan to bring more area under gherkins or less?   
(1) Will increase area     (2) Will maintain the same area     (3) Will decrease the area     (4) Have not decided yet 
47) To what extent has participating in contract farming enhanced the economic well-being of your family? 
(1) To a great extent   
(2) To some extent    
(3) Neither enhanced nor diminished  
(4) Has diminished   
(5) Has diminished a great deal 
[Investigator: Request the farmer to elaborate and offer examples for the above, e.g. start a non-farm business, or buy land, build a house, etc. and 
record them under Investigator Observations at the end of the Questionnaire] 
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48) Taken all together, how would you say things are for you these days: would you say you are:      ______________  
[Inv: 1=Very Happy, 2=Pretty happy, 3=Not too happy] 
 
I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE HOUSEHOLD  
49) What is the age of the head of the household?    _________________years  
50) How many members are there in your nuclear family?    _________________ 
a) Of these, the number of members in the age group 0-15 years of age?   _________________ 
51) What is your social group?
a) SC/St
b) MBC
c) OBC
d) Others (specify)  ____________________________ 
52) What is the education level you have attained? 
1) Illiterate
2) Literate (below primary) 
3) Primary (Class V complete) 
4) Upper Primary Class (Class VIII complete) 
5) Secondary (Class X complete) 
6) High School (Class XII complete) 
7) Others (specify) ________________________ 
53) What is the education level of the most educated member of the household? 
1) Illiterate
2) Literate (below primary) 
3) Primary (Class V complete) 
4) Upper Primary Class (Class VIII complete) 
5) Secondary (Class X complete) 
6) High School (Class XII complete) 
7) Others (specify) ________________________ 
54) We would like to know your asset position. Does the household own any of the following items? [Investigator: Write the number of pieces of the 
object if applicable and 0 if not applicable]  
 ASSET TYPE Currently possesses (write Qty and units) 
a.  Radio  
b.  Telephone Landline 
c.  Mobile 
d.  TV 
e.  Watch  
f.  Pressure cooker  
g.  Bicycle  
h.  Scooter/ Motorcycle 
i.  Livestock  
j.  Poultry 
k. Tractor
55)  What is your main source of light now?    ___ ________  
[Inv.:1=Kerosene; 2=Candle; 3=Electricity; 4=Electricity with inverter; 5=Solar energy; 6=LPG/biogas; 7=Battery (torch); 8=Diesel generator; 
9=Other, specify_____] 
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56) What is your main source of heat for cooking now?     __________ 
[Inv.1=Wood/charcoal; 2=Kerosene; 3=Electricity; 4= LPG/biogas; 5=Crop residues; 6=Other, specify_____] 
57) What is your main source of drinking water?     __________ 
[Inv: 1=River/canal; 2=Public well; 3=Public handpump; 4=Own handpump; 5=Own motorpump or other waterlifting devices; 6=Piped water; 
7=Rainwater; 8=Water filling station; 9=Other, specify:______] 
58) What were your main sources of income in the past one year ?   [Attempt to get the value in Rs. If this is difficult or the farmer is vague 
about it, try to record the percentage of annual income from each source.]
a) Cultivation   ___________________ 
b) Wage labour in Agriculture  _____________________ 
c) Wage labour off farm   ____________________ 
d) Self Employment    __________________ 
e) Transfers and Remittances   ___________________  
59) What proportion of household foodgrain consumption do you buy from outside (e.g. ration shop)?   _____________% 
60) How much of outstanding debt do you have at the moment?  Rs. _____________________ 
J. MEASURING RISK AVERSION AND AMBIGUITY AVERSION 
Risk Aversion 
61) You have the choice of (1) accepting Rs. 150 from us right now for sure. (2) Or alternatively, instead of the Rs. 150, we will toss a coin, if it is 
heads you get Rs.210 and if it is tails, you get Rs.90.  
What would you rather choose to do? (write 1 or 2)  
Write amount ______________________________ 
Ambiguity Aversion 
62) Now, we would like to offer you another chance to win. We would like to offer you Rs.150 through another game 
Bag 1 contains 4 white balls and 6 black balls. You pick a ball. You will win Rs.150 if the ball you pick is white. 
Bag 2 contains 10 balls. Some are white and some are black. I don’t know for sure how many of each there are. You need to name one color. And you 
will win Rs.150 if you pick the ball of the color you name. 
Which bag will you choose? (write 1 or 2)  
Enumerator: Please allow the respondent to pick a ball from his chosen bag 
The reward from this game is   
Lottery Price 
63) Supposing you were offered a lottery ticket, where the prize is decided by a coin flip. You win Rs300  if Heads and 150 if Tails. What is the 
maximum you would be willing to pay for the lottery ticket? 
Rs. ___________________________________ 
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K. INVESTIGATOR OBSERVATIONS 
64) LOCATIONAL ATTRIBUTES 
a. Distance of the farmer’s field from the collection point ____________ metres 
b. Distance of the farmer’s field from the nearest metalled roadhead ____________ metres 
c. Distance of the farmer’s field from the nearest market for contract crop ____________ metres 
d. Distance of the farmer’s field from the nearest market for the alternate crop ____________ metres 
e. Distance of the farmer’s house from the panchayat president’s house ____________ metres 
f. Distance of the farmer’s house from the main village cluster/centre of village ____________ metres 
65) House Type 
1) Kaccha (Odu, mud) 
2) Pacca  (Cement brick) 
 
 
66) How would you rate the economic condition of this household compared to other households in the village?  
1) Among the poorest 20%                      
2) Poorer than average but not among the poorest 20%                                   
3) About Average
4) Better than average but not among the richest 20%                            
5) Among the richest 20% 
6) Unable to observe 
 
MAKE NOTE OF ANY QUOTES, COMMENTS, OR INCIDENTS THAT YOU THINK ARE RELEVANT AND INTERESTING. PLEASE MAKE NOTE 
OF IT IN SOME DETAIL.  
1Schedule 1(B): NON-SAMPLE FIRM, OTHER FIRM FARMER /SPOT MARKET FARMER QUESTIONNAIRE 
[Investigator: Interview the head of the farm household in the list of selected farmers. If the farmer is unavailable, do not interview anyone 
else in the household. Introduce yourself and explain the purpose of the survey. Make sure you convey all the points mentioned in the 
Oral Consent Transcript in the same words. Indicate the approximate time the interview will take. If the farmer has written records
encourage him/her to refer to these, especially if the contract farmer has passbooks. Make sure the farmer has a chance to clarify his/her 
doubts and give consent before you start the interview.] 
Name of the Investigator    Date of Interview 
FARMER ID: (Copy from the Sampling Sheet after verifying identity of the farmer) 
Hamlet     Panchayat             Revenue Village    
Block     Taluk     District 
A. LANDHOLDING, CROPPING PATTERN
1. [Investigator: This is a confirmatory question]  What is the main occupation of your household in the last 1 year or 365 days?
1) Casual Agricultural Labour 
2) Casual Non-Agricultural Labour 
3) Cultivation
4) Other Self-employed 
5) Salaried employment 
6) Other (specify) ___________________________ 
2. How much land does your household currently operate? (a)Owned  _________________  cents / acres / kuzhi 
(b) Leased  _________________ cents /acres /kuzhi 
1) What proportion of your land is irrigated?     ________________ % 
2) What is the main source of irrigation?       
1) Well
2) Tubewell
3) River
4) Canal
5) Rainfed
6) Other (specify) ______________ 
3. Compared to other farmers’ lands in your village, would you say that the agricultural land you own is  
1) More fertile 
2) Equally (or just as) fertile 
3) Less fertile 
4. What has been the cropping pattern this past year? [Investigator: Include land left fallow]
 (A) Crop 
[Investigator: Include tree 
crops as well e.g., 
coconut, banana] 
(B) Month of 
Sowing (for crops 
other than trees).  
(C) Month of 
Harvest (for crops 
other than trees 
(D) Area
(in
acres/centskuzhi) 
Note units 
Quantity 
Produced 
(E)
(Please note 
units) 
Quantity Sold 
(F)
(Please note 
units) 
(G) Marketing Channel 
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
1=Trader, 2=Pre-harvest Contractor, 3= Direct to consumer, 4= Contract (Intermediary), 5=Contract (Firm), 6=Self Consumption 
2B. SELECTION, INITIAL EXPERIENCE 
You mentioned that you contracted Gherkins with THE FIRM in the past season. We would like to know more about your experience. [Here, the 
FIRM refers to the firm the farmer contracts with and not the SUBJECT OR SAMPLE FIRM] 
5. When did you first become aware of the opportunity for contracting?          (Specify month  and year, e.g., June 2006 ) _______          ________ 
6. When was the first time you contracted with THE “FIRM”?   (Specify month  and year, e.g., June 2006 ) _______          ________
7. Had you ever cultivated gherkins before that?            Yes  /  No 
If YES,
1) How many years’ experience did you have cultivating gherkins before you contracted with this FIRM?  ___________ 
years
2) What was the marketing channel you were using then? 
1) Direct selling in the market 
2) Trader / Commission Agent 
3) Company (specify which company)____________________ 
4) Other (specify) _________ 
8. What are the reasons you decided to contract with THE “FIRM”? [Investigator: Circle the appropriate response. Circle ALL that apply]
9. Initially, how much hesitation did you have before going in for contracting with THE “FIRM”? [Investigator: Read out all options]
1) Hesitated a great deal
2) Hesitated a little   
3) Had no hesitation 
10. What were the reasons for feeling the way you did? [Investigator: Circle the appropriate response. Circle ALL that apply] 
11. How did you first establish contact with the company to express willingness to contract with THE “FIRM”? [Investigator: Circle all relevant 
options. Read out options.] 
1) A friend/neighbour/fellow-farmer/relative introduced me / put in a word for me 
2) I contacted the company official /agent on my own 
3) The company official/ agent approached me personally 
4) The company official/agent was canvassing in the village and asked for volunteers 
5) Others (please specify) ___________________________________________________________________ 
12. Were there any eligibility criteria that you know of in order to get selected by the firm?  Yes  / No   /  Unaware 
i. If YES, please list any eligibility criteria. Why do you think you were selected? [Investigator: Circle the appropriate 
response. Circle ALL that apply] 
1 Faith 8 Through a group or through someone I know 
2 Hard work and ability 9 Those who are interested 
3 Reputation 10 Those who will pay the loan and are creditworthy 
4 Those who will comply and obey 11 Under pressure from other villagers 
5 Land 12 Crop experience 
6 Good soil, situated well parcel 13 They take whoever they wish; it is arbitrary 
7 Irrigation Facility 14  
13. What are the kind of preparations you had to make or investments you undertook before you could contract? (List all and the expenses 
incurred on the same. E.g. tubewell, drip irrigation system, spraying machine, preparation of land, a shed for the birds, etc.)
S.No. (A)Item  (B)How much did it cost? (in Rs.)  (C)How did you finance the investment? If 
borrowed, mention source e.g., SBI, friends, etc.  
1
2
3
314. Since you first began contracting with THE “FIRM”, please give some details about your contracting history . 
Season and Year (A) 
[Investigator: Write Year] 
Seeds Provided (in 
kgs) (B) 
Acreage sown 
(in acres) (C) 
Actual Production  
(in kgs.)  (D) 
Sold to the Company 
(in kgs.) (E) 
1 First Year with THE “FIRM” 
(_______________________)
    
2 Current Season (____________)     
3 The Last Season 
(_____________)
   
 
15. Since you began contracting, have there been years, when you did not contract with the firm even for one season?  Yes / No 
If YES,  
i. When was the most recent year? ______________________ 
ii. The reason for the break? 
1)  The company did not offer contract
2) Contracted with another firm 
3) Sold in the spot market 
4) Losses with contract crop 
5) Pest issues 
6) Water issues 
7) Other (Specify) 
16. Is it a written contract? 
If YES 
i.  Do you have a copy? Yes / No 
ii. Is it valid in court? Yes / No 
iii. Have you read it or had it read to you? Yes / No 
17. Who do you have the contract with? 
1) The Firm 
2) An Agent 
3) Another Farmer 
4) Others (Specify) __________________________________ 
18. Do you have contact with other farmers who puruse contract farming, in this crop or in other crops? Yes /  No 
If YES,  
i. Which crops?   
(1) Papaya (2) Gherkins (3) Marigold (4) Poultry (5) Other (specify)____________________ 
ii. Are these 
1) Relatives /family in your village 
2) Relatives/family in another village 
3) Friends in this village 
4) Friends elsewhere 
5) Acquaintances in this village 
6) Other (Specify)___________ 
EXCLUSION MODULE 
19. Did you ever contract with the SAMPLE FIRM? Yes / No 
If YES,
1) Why did you eventually give up? Please elaborate. [Investigator: Allow the farmer to respond circle the appropriate choices.] 
1 The firm stopped contracting in the village 11 Health Issues on account of contract crop 
2 The firm refused to give contract to me, though they were 
contracting in the village 
12 Soil Quality deteriorated 
3 Too much labour required 13 I was unable to deliver as per contract 
4 Losses / Not much profits 14 Inadequate /Improper advice by company 
5 Labour costs too high 15 Input quality was poor 
6 Rain related yield loss 16 Other company was giving gifts, incentives for 
contracting
7 Improper Payment by Firm 17 No advance given by the firm 
8 Low price for output 18 Personal reasons, death in the family, etc. 
9 High cost of cultivation relative to other crops   
10 Pest danger or infestation   
If NO,
42) What are the reasons you did not contract with SAMPLE FIRM?  
1 The firm does not contract in this village 8 Low price for output 
2 The firm did not approach me 9 Don’t Know 
3 I was not interested 10 Did not fulfil their eligibility criteria 
4 They choose their own people 11 Other company was giving gifts, incentives for 
contracting
5 Did not have faith in the company 12 No advance given by the firm 
6 People I know do not contract with SAMPLE FIRM 13 Personal reasons, death in the family, etc. 
7 Improper Payment by SAMPLE FIRM   
20. How risky do you think contracting with THE SAMPLE FIRM  is? [Rank on a scale of 0 to 10; 0=No risk at all, 10=Extremely Risky]
________________
 
C. ELICITING EXPECTATIONS FROM THE CONTRACT FARMER 
21. We would like to learn about your expectations regarding earnings and yield of gherkins. If you were to follow the same set of procedures, with 
the same firm and field officer, under the same contractual terms and assuming the general conditions in your family, village and weather are 
unchanged, out of 20 seasons growing the contract crop in a plot of your choice, which has the same qualities, what is the number of occasions 
you would attain the minimum/ the most likely / the maximum price/yield/net income per acre of the commodity? 
If I give you these 20 tokens and ask you to give the most tokens to 
the number you have said is most likely, the next most tokens you 
think is the next most likely and the least tokens to the least likely.  
Variable Unit 
Please note unit e.g. 
Rs/cent or Rs./acre 
What is the 
minimum 
value you 
expect?  
What is the 
most likely 
value?
What is the 
maximum 
value you 
expect? 
Number against 
Minimum Value?
Number against 
the most likely
value?
Number against  
maximum value
Price (unit value) 
[Since gherkins has 
many grade, the focus 
here is on eliciting an 
average unit value as 
“price.”] 
Rs./kg.       
Yield       
Net Income         
[Investigator: Write number of tokens in the blank. To check for their understanding, (1) they should at least assign a token to each of the three 
outcomes they earlier proposed and (2) the most likely outcome should have the most tokens] 
22. What, in your opinion, are the most important risks/ benefits associated with contracting? [Investigator: Please pay careful attention to this set of 
questions. This pertains only to the gherkins. To start with do not prompt. Let the farmer mention the risks/benefits first.Once the box has 
been filled out, then read out the options the farmer has not mentioned to verify that they are not considered risks by the farmer. If the farmer is 
reluctant to answer these set of questions, then try prompting with examples of attributes.] 
Type of Risk/Benefit 
[investigator: The term used differs 
across regions, make sure you find out 
what term to use] 
Is this risk/benefit present? 
[Investigator: Let the farmer list the 
risks. If the farmer mentions a risk, 
write 1 against it, if not mark 0. 
Then move to the next column]
How important do you think each of 
these risks/beenfits is to your well-
being? 
 [Rank on a scale of 0-10 with 0 means 
not important to you at all, 10 means it is 
extremely important to you.] 
What is the probability of the following 
event happening in contracting with THE 
“FIRM” 
[If you contract 10 times how many 
times do you feel this event will occur.] 
Yield risk    
Price risk    
Risk of firm not coming back to pick 
up the produce at harvest time. 
   
Risk of delay in payment    
Risk of non-availability of credit    
Risk of non-availability of inputs     
Risk of poor quality inputs    
5Risk of wrong technical advice    
Risk of rejection/downgrading of 
produce by the firm, quality 
   
Risk of the firm not coming to 
contract in the future 
   
Risk of losing land    
Others 1 (specify) ______________    
Others 2 (specify) _____________ 
   
BENEFITS
Inputs provided by the firm on credit  
Advance provided by firm    
Credit available against contract    
Technical advice available    
Lumpsum payment    
Timely payment    
Price fixed, certainty    
Reduced transaction time    
Assured buyer    
Positive yield risk    
Farm-gate collection    
Others 1 (specify) ______________    
23. If you were not contracting for GHERKINS with the FIRM this season, what would be your next best option?  [Investigator: Read the option 
aloud and get the next best alternative – the name of the company and/or crop.] 
1) Gherkins contract for another company (specify the name of company/agent)_________________________ 
(a) If this is not an option, what would you grow instead? ______________________________ 
2) Another crop instead of gherkins [Inv: Please note which crop the farmer would have cultivated]  ____________________ 
[Investigator:The next set of questions focuses on the crop mentioned in 1(a) or 2] 
D. RISK PERCEPTIONS OF ALTERNATIVES  
24. Had you chosen this alternative option for the current season, if you were to follow the same set of procedures, assuming the general
conditions in your family, village and weather are unchanged, out of 20 seasons growing the contract crop in a plot of your choice, which has 
the same qualities, what is the number of occasions you would attain the minimum/ the most likely / the maximum price/yield/net income per 
acre of the commodity?  [Investigator: For the next few questions the alternative the farmer has mentioned above as the non-contract option]
If I give you these 20 tokens and ask you to give 
the most tokens to the number you have said is 
most likely, the next most tokens you think is the 
next most likely and the least tokens to the least 
likely.  
Variable Unit 
Please note unit 
Rs/kg,
quintal./acre for 
yield, etc. 
What is the 
minimum 
value you 
expect?
What is the 
most likely 
value?
What is the 
maximum 
value you 
expect?
Number
against
Minimum
Value?
Number
against the 
most likely 
value?
Number
against
maximum 
value
Price       
6Yield        
Net Income 
25. What other risks /benefits do you associate with the alternate crop? [Follow the same procedure as for the previous RISK/BENEFIT TABLE] 
Type of Risk/Benefit 
[investigator: The term used differs across regions, 
make sure you find out what term to use] 
(A)
Is this risk/benefit 
present? 
[Investigator: Write 1 if 
YES, 0 if NO] 
(B)
How important do you think each of these 
risks/benefits is to your well-being? 
 [Rank on a scale of 0-10 with 0 means not 
important to you at all, 10 means it is extremely 
important to you] (C) 
How frequently do you face this situation? 
[In 10 seasons, how many times do you feel this event 
will occur? Note for those who are contracting for the 
first time, this is difficult.]
(1)Risk of non-availability of credit   
(2) Risk of non-availability of technical 
advice
   
(3) Risk of poor quality inputs    
(4) Risk of non-availability of inputs    
(5) Non availability of hired labour    
(6) Not finding a buyer    
(7) Delay in payment    
(6)  Rejection of produce    
(7) Weather risk/ yield 
   
(8) Price risk, price drop  
(9) Others _________________ 
   
BENEFITS    
Positive Price Risk, price rise     
Can sell anytime, flexibility    
Quality is not critical    
Known trader in the market    
Positive yield risk    
Others 1 (specify) ______________    
 
7E. COST AND RETURNS FROM CONTRACT CULTIVATION & TRANSACTIONS COST [For this section, data should pertain to the previous 
contracting season. If the farmer is contracting for the first time and the harvest is not yet over, then fill in expected rates where actuals are not available, for e.g., for 
labour costs for harvesting. Denote with “E” alongside entry if the values are expected, not actual.] 
26. Could you give some details of your costs and returns for the last completed season?
Labour Cost     Input/output 
Male(days) Female(days) Labour cost for 
hired  
Operations 
Hired  Family labour 
Hired 
Family 
Male Female 
Machine 
(hr) 
Quantity Unit 
price 
Source 
(1=Purchased; 
2=Owned: 
3=Company 
Provided 
Variable cost           
1. Land preparation           
2. Seed bed preparation           
3. FYM/Compost           
4. Planting/sowing           
5. Seeds           
6. Seed treatment           
7. Fertilizer application           
8. Micro nutrient 
application
          
9. Interculture operation           
10. Weeding/weedicide
application
          
11. Plant protection 
chemicals
          
12. Irrigation           
13. Harvesting           
14. Equipment repair and 
maintenance
          
TRANSACTIONS COST           
15. Post harvest 
operations
          
16. Packing and Sorting           
17. Transport to the 
Market/Collection 
Center
          
18. Commission on 
transaction
          
19. Interest on working 
capital @7% 
          
Fixed cost           
1. Land rent           
2. Depreciation on farm 
assets
          
3. Interest on fixed capital 
12% 
          
Total cost           
Main product yield           
By product yield           
Gross return           
Net return           
27. What is the volume of product rejected as not meeting quality standards?    ______________ kgs 
28. What is the volume of product that was lost due to spoilage /wastage?    _______________ kgs 
29. How many days did it take for you to receive full payment after completion of the transaction?    _______________days 
G. ENFORCEMENT 
30. In the last season, have you used the inputs for the contract crop for your other non-contract crops?    Yes  /    No 
If YES, 
a. What is the proportion of inputs that you were given did you use for other non-contract crops ____________ % 
831. In the last season, have you sought or used the firm or agent’s advice for your other crops?   Yes  /    No 
If YES, 
a. Please explain ____________________________________________________________________ 
32. In the last season, has any other company approached you or have you sold the contract crop to any other buyer (local market or another 
company)  Yes  /    No 
If YES, 
a. What proportion of the contract crop did you sell? (in %) __________________% 
b. What are the reasons you sold elsewhere?  __________________________________ 
33. According to you, what proportion of the contract farmers in your village or outside sell their contract crop to other buyers? _________% 
34. How often do you think other contract farmers in your village sell the contracted crop to other buyers? 
 (1) Regularly   (2) Frequently   (3) Not so frequently           (4) Rarely        (5) Never 
35. The last time you contracted or delivered the contracted commodity to the FIRM, was the price offered by other companies, on an average, 
higher or lower than the contract price? [Inv: Circle the relevant option and note down the two prices]. 
1) Contract price was lower 
2) About the same 
3) Contract price was higher 
Contract Price (in Rs/kg.)   Grade 1________Grade 2_______Grade 3___________ Grade 4________ Grade 5_________  
Price of Competing Firm (in Rs./kg) .)   Grade 1________Grade 2_______Grade 3___________ Grade 4________ Grade 
5_________
36. Would you accept a this FIRM’s contract if it  offered you a lower price than other FIRMS operating in this region?  Yes /  No /  Unsure 
If YES, how much lower can it be before you reject the contract? (Inv.Get the amount for the smallest gherkin – that is the highest value that 
you noted above)
Contract price can be Rs.__________/kg lower                 /             Unsure 
If NO, how much higher would the contract price have to be above the competitor price for you to accept the contract? (Inv.Get the amount for 
the smallest gherkin – that is the highest value that you noted above)
Contract price should be at least Rs. _________/kg higher               /          Unsure 
37. Since you started contracting, have you ever faced a situation where you have been unable to deliver the contracted produce at the required 
time and place?    Yes    /       No 
a. Please describe. 
1) Weather related yield loss/ Natural causes/Water shortage 
2) When I feel my profits might be harmed, or the firm does not give a good price for the output 
3) Would never happen 
4) When I am constrained for cash 
5) Company delayed in coming /delays in payments 
6) Could not meet quality standards 
38. In general, how important do you think it is for you to honour the contract? 
1) Extremely important 
2) Quite important 
3) Important
4) Not so important 
5) Not at all important 
939. If you were to violate the contract, what do you feel would be the consequences? [Investigator: Allow the farmer to articulate his/her thoughts, 
and if appropriate ask the questions below to get specific answers as a follow-up] 
1 Nothing 7 Warn us 
2 They will not pay our dues/ demand that we return the money 8 Take some appropriate action 
3 Will go to court 9 Fight with us 
4 Will approach the police 10 Complain to the village leader 
5 Will tell on us to other companies 11 They will lose faith in us 
6 Stop contracting with us   
 
40. In your experience with this company has there been an occasion when you felt they did not keep up with the terms of the contract?   
Yes    /       No 
a. If YES, please describe what happened and when 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
41. In general, If the firm does not honour the contract, what would you do? [Circle one, the first response] 
1) Nothing, what can I do? Powerless 
2) Depending on the problem, we will decide 
3) Go to court 
4) Approach the police 
5) Complain to the local authorities /police 
6) Stop Contracting with this firm, contract with other firms 
7) Will make a representation to them 
8) Protest won’t harvest the crop 
9) Give up the contract crop 
10) Will not let the firm come into our village 
11) Demand Compensation, Lose faith 
12) Other (please Specify) _______________________________ 
 
H. RELATIONSHIP  
42. In general, how much power to voice your opinions do you feel in this relationship with the company? [Investigator: Read out all the options. 
Circle only one. If the farmer elaborates, note his/her response below] 
a) Very powerful 
b) Somewhat powerful 
c) Neither powerful nor powerless 
d) Somewhat powerless/vulnerable 
e) Completely powerless/vulnerable 
43. How many times in the last two weeks did the agent visit your farm?  ___________________________ 
44. Today, how risky do you think contracting with is?   
 [Investigator: Rank on a scale of 0 to 10; 0 means no risk at all, 10 means extremely risky] __________________________ 
45. What, according to you, are the chances that the company stops contracting with you within the next three years? 
(1) Almost certainly  (2) Very likely  (3) Somewhat likely      (4) Unlikely (5) Not at all likely 
46. Would you continue to grow the contract crop if you stopped contracting with this company?   Yes    /       No 
47. What, according to you, are the chances that you will want to stop contracting with this firm within the next three years?  
(1) Almost certainly  (2) Very likely  (3) Somewhat likely       (4) Unlikely (5) Not at all likely 
48. For the next season, do you plan to bring more area under gherkins or less?   
(1) Will increase area     (2) Will maintain the same area     (3) Will decrease the area     (4) Have not decided yet 
49. To what extent has participating in contract farming enhanced the economic well-being of your family? 
(1) To a great extent   
(2) To some extent    
(3) Neither enhanced nor diminished  
(4) Has diminished   
(5) Has diminished a great deal 
[Investigator: Request the farmer to elaborate and offer examples for the above,e.g. start a non-farm business, or buy land, build a house, etc. and 
record them under Investigator Observations at the end of the Questionnaire] 
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50. Taken all together, how would you say things are for you these days: would you say you are:      ______________  
[Inv: 1=Very Happy, 2=Pretty happy, 3=Not too happy] 
 
I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE HOUSEHOLD  
51. What is the age of the head of the household?    _________________years  
52. How many members are there in your nuclear family?    _________________ 
1) Of these, the number of members in the age group 0-15 years of age?   _________________ 
53. What is your social group?
1) SC/St
2) MBC
3) OBC
4) Others (specify)  ____________________________ 
54. What is the education level you have attained? 
1) Illiterate
2) Literate (below primary) 
3) Primary (Class V complete) 
4) Upper Primary Class (Class VIII complete) 
5) Secondary (Class X complete) 
6) High School (Class XII complete) 
7) Others (specify) ________________________ 
55. What is the education level of the most educated member of the household? 
1) Illiterate
2) Literate (below primary) 
3) Primary (Class V complete) 
4) Upper Primary Class (Class VIII complete) 
5) Secondary (Class X complete) 
6) High School (Class XII complete) 
7) Others (specify) ________________________ 
56. We would like to know your asset position. Does the household own any of the following items? [Investigator: Write the number of pieces of the 
object if applicable and 0 if not applicable]  
 ASSET TYPE Currently possesses (write Qty and units) 
a.  Radio  
b.  Telephone Landline 
c.  Mobile 
d.  TV 
e.  Watch  
f.  Pressure cooker  
g.  Bicycle  
h.  Scooter/ Motorcycle 
i.  Livestock  
j.  Poultry 
k. Tractor
57.  What is your main source of light now?    ___ ________  
[Inv.:1=Kerosene; 2=Candle; 3=Electricity; 4=Electricity with inverter; 5=Solar energy; 6=LPG/biogas; 7=Battery (torch); 8=Diesel generator; 
9=Other, specify_____] 
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58. What is your main source of heat for cooking now?     __________ 
[Inv.1=Wood/charcoal; 2=Kerosene; 3=Electricity; 4= LPG/biogas; 5=Crop residues; 6=Other, specify_____] 
59. What is your main source of drinking water?     __________ 
[Inv: 1=River/canal; 2=Public well; 3=Public handpump; 4=Own handpump; 5=Own motorpump or other waterlifting devices; 6=Piped water; 
7=Rainwater; 8=Water filling station; 9=Other, specify:______] 
60. What were your main sources of income in the past one year ?  [Attempt to get the value in Rs. If this is difficult or the farmer is vague 
about it, try to record the percentage of annual income from each source.]      
1) Cultivation   ___________________ 
2) Wage labour in Agriculture  _____________________ 
3) Wage labour off farm   ____________________ 
4) Self Employment    __________________ 
5) Transfers and Remittances   ___________________  
61. What proportion of household foodgrain consumption do you buy from outside (e.g. ration shop)?   _____________% 
62. How much of outstanding debt do you have at the moment?  Rs. _____________________ 
 
J. MEASURING RISK AVERSION AND AMBIGUITY AVERSION 
Risk Aversion 
63. You have the choice of (1) accepting Rs. 150 from us right now for sure. (2) Or alternatively, instead of the Rs. 150, we will toss a coin, if it is 
heads you get Rs.210 and if it is tails, you get Rs.90.  
What would you rather choose to do? (write 1 or 2)  
Write amount ______________________________ 
Ambiguity Aversion 
64. Now, we would like to offer you another chance to win. We would like to offer you Rs.150 through another game 
Bag 1 contains 4 white balls and 6 black balls. You pick a ball. You will win Rs.150 if the ball you pick is white. 
Bag 2 contains 10 balls. Some are white and some are black. I don’t know for sure how many of each there are. You need to name one color. And 
you will win Rs.150 if you pick the ball of the color you name. 
Which bag will you choose? (write 1 or 2)  
Enumerator: Please allow the respondent to pick a ball from his chosen bag 
The reward from this game is   
Lottery Price 
65. Supposing you were offered a lottery ticket, where the prize is decided by a coin flip. You win Rs.300  if Heads and 150 if Tails. What is the 
maximum you would be willing to pay for the lottery ticket? 
Rs. ___________________________________ 
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K. INVESTIGATOR OBSERVATIONS 
66. LOCATIONAL ATTRIBUTES 
a. Distance of the farmer’s field from the collection point ____________ metres 
b. Distance of the farmer’s field from the nearest metalled roadhead ____________ metres 
c. Distance of the farmer’s field from the nearest market for contract crop ____________ metres 
d. Distance of the farmer’s field from the nearest market for the alternate crop ____________ metres 
e. Distance of the farmer’s house from the panchayat president’s house ____________ metres 
f. Distance of the farmer’s house from the main village cluster/centre of village ____________ metres 
67. House Type 
1) Kaccha (Odu, mud) 
2) Pacca  (Cement brick) 
 
 
68. How would you rate the economic condition of this household compared to other households in the village?  
1) Among the poorest 20%                      
2) Poorer than average but not among the poorest 20%                                   
3) About Average
4) Better than average but not among the richest 20%                            
5) Among the richest 20% 
6) Unable to observe 
 
MAKE NOTE OF ANY QUOTES, COMMENTS, OR INCIDENTS THAT YOU THINK ARE RELEVANT AND INTERESTING. PLEASE MAKE NOTE 
OF IT IN SOME DETAIL.  
1 
Schedule 1(C): ATTRITION-GHERKINS FARMER QUESTIONNAIRE 
[Investigator: Interview the head of the farm household in the list of selected farmers. If the farmer is unavailable, do not interview anyone 
else in the household. Introduce yourself and explain the purpose of the survey. Make sure you convey all the points mentioned in the 
Oral Consent Transcript in the same words. Indicate the approximate time the interview will take. If the farmer has written records
encourage him/her to refer to these, especially if the contract farmer has passbooks. Make sure the farmer has a chance to clarify his/her 
doubts and give consent before you start the interview.] 
Name of the Investigator    Date of Interview 
FARMER ID: (Copy from the Sampling Sheet after verifying identity of the farmer) 
Hamlet     Panchayat             Revenue Village    
Block     Taluk     District 
A. LANDHOLDING, CROPPING PATTERN
1. [Investigator: This is a confirmatory question]  What is the main occupation of your household in the last 1 year or 365 days?
1) Casual Agricultural Labour 
2) Casual Non-Agricultural Labour 
3) Cultivation
4) Other Self-employed 
5) Salaried employment 
6) Other (specify) ___________________________ 
2. How much land does your household currently operate? (a)Owned  ________________  cents / acres / kuzhi 
(b) Leased  _________________ cents /acres /kuzhi 
1. What proportion of your land is irrigated?     ________________ % 
2. What is the main source of irrigation?       
1) Well
2) Tubewell
3) River
4) Canal
5) Rainfed
6) Other (specify) ______________ 
3. Compared to other farmers’ lands in your village, would you say that the agricultural land you own is  
1) More fertile 
2) Equally (or just as) fertile 
3) Less fertile 
4. What has been the cropping pattern this past year? [Investigator: Include land left fallow]
 (A) Crop 
[Investigator: Include tree 
crops as well e.g., 
coconut, banana] 
(B) Month of 
Sowing (for crops 
other than trees).  
(C) Month of 
Harvest (for crops 
other than trees 
(D) Area
(in
acres/centskuzhi) 
Note units 
Quantity 
Produced 
(E)
(Please note 
units) 
Quantity Sold 
(F)
(Please note 
units) 
(G) Marketing Channel 
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
1=Trader, 2=Pre-harvest Contractor, 3= Direct to consumer, 4= Contract (Intermediary), 5=Contract (Firm), 6=Self Consumption 
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B. PAST EXPERIENCE  You mentioned that you contracted for Gherkins with THE “FIRM” earlier, 
5. When you began contracting, what are the reasons you decided to contract with THE “FIRM”?  
6. Since you first began contracting with THE “FIRM”, please give some details about your contracting history. 
Season and Year (A) 
[Investigator: Write Year within 
brackets]
Seeds Provided (in 
kgs) (B) 
Acreage sown 
(in acres) (C) 
Actual Production  
(in kgs.)  (D) 
Sold to the 
Company
(in kgs.) (E) 
1 First Year with THE “FIRM” 
(_______________________)
    
2 Current Season (____________)     
3 The Last Season 
(_____________)
   
 
7.  Why did you eventually give up? Please elaborate. [Investigator: Allow the farmer to respond circle the appropriate choices.] 
1 The firm stopped contracting in the village 11 Health Issues on account of contract crop 
2 The firm refused to give contract to me, though they were 
contracting in the village 
12 Soil Quality deteriorated 
3 Too much labour required 13 I was unable to deliver as per contract 
4 Losses / Not much profits 14 Inadequate /Improper advice by company 
5 Labour costs too high 15 Input quality was poor 
6 Rain related yield loss 16 Other company was giving gifts, incentives for 
contracting
7 Improper Payment by Firm 17 No advance given by the firm 
8 Low price for output 18 Personal reasons, death in the family, etc. 
9 High cost of cultivation relative to other crops   
10 Pest danger or infestation   
8. Do you have contact with other farmers who pursue contract farming, in this crop or in other crops? Yes /  No 
If YES,  
i. Which crops?   
(1) Papaya (2) Gherkins (3) Marigold (4) Poultry (5) Other (specify)____________________ 
ii. Are these 
1. Relatives /family in your village 
2. Relatives/family in another village 
3. Friends in this village 
4. Friends elsewhere 
5. Acquaintances in this village 
6. Other (Specify)___________ 
9. Today, how risky do you think contracting with THE FIRM  is?   
 [Investigator: Rank on a scale of 0 to 10; 0 means no risk at all, 10 means extremely risky] __________________________ 
10. When you gave up contracting for gherkins what crop did you grow instead? [Investigator: Read the option aloud and get the next best 
alternative – the name of the company and/or crop.]  
i. Another crop instead of gherkins ____________________________ 
ii. Gherkins for another company _________________________ 
3 
C. ELICITING EXPECTATIONS FROM THE FARMER 
11. What are your expectations for the alternate crop you have mentioned? If you were to follow the same set of procedures, and assuming the 
general conditions in your family, village and weather are unchanged, out of 20 seasons growing the contract crop in a plot of your choice, 
which has the same qualities, what is the number of occasions you would attain the minimum/ the most likely / the maximum price/yield/net 
income per acre of the commodity? 
If I give you these 20 tokens and ask you to give the 
most tokens to the number you have said is most 
likely, the next most tokens you think is the next most 
likely and the least tokens to the least likely.  
Variable Unit 
Please note unit 
Rs/kg, quintal./acre 
for yield, etc. 
What is the 
minimum 
value you 
expect?  
What is the 
most likely 
value? 
What is the 
maximum 
value you 
expect? 
Number against 
Minimum 
Value? 
Number against 
the most likely
value? 
Number against  
maximum 
value  
Price 
 
      
Yield  
 
       
Net income         
[Investigator: Write number of tokens in the blank. To check for their understanding, (1) they should at least assign a token to each of the three 
outcomes they earlier proposed and (2) the most likely outcome should have the most tokens] 
12. What are the kinds of risk/benefits you associate with the alternate crop? [Investigator: Please pay careful attention to this set of questions. 
This pertains only to the alternate crop. To start with do not prompt. Let the farmer mention the risks/benefits first. Once the box has been 
filled out, then read out the options the farmer has not mentioned to verify that they are not considered risks by the farmer. If the farmer is 
reluctant to answer these set of questions, then try prompting with examples of attributes.] 
Type of Risk/Benefit 
[investigator: The term used differs across regions, 
make sure you find out what term to use] 
(A)
Is this risk/benefit 
present? 
[Investigator: Write 1 if 
YES, 0 if NO] 
(B)
How important do you think each of these 
risks/benefits is to your well-being? 
 [Rank on a scale of 0-10 with 0 means not 
important to you at all, 10 means it is extremely 
important to you] (C) 
How frequently do you face this situation? 
[In 10 seasons, how many times do you feel this 
event will occur? Note for those who are contracting 
for the first time, this is difficult.]
(1)Risk of non-availability of credit   
(2) Risk of non-availability of technical 
advice
   
(3) Risk of poor quality inputs    
(4) Risk of non-availability of inputs    
(5) Non availability of hired labour    
(6) Not finding a buyer    
(7) Delay in payment    
(6)  Rejection of produce    
(7) Weather risk/ yield 
   
(8) Price risk, price drop  
(9) Others _________________ 
   
4Type of Risk/Benefit 
[investigator: The term used differs across regions, 
make sure you find out what term to use] 
(A)
Is this risk/benefit 
present? 
[Investigator: Write 1 if 
YES, 0 if NO] 
(B)
How important do you think each of these 
risks/benefits is to your well-being? 
 [Rank on a scale of 0-10 with 0 means not 
important to you at all, 10 means it is extremely 
important to you] (C) 
How frequently do you face this situation? 
[In 10 seasons, how many times do you feel this 
event will occur? Note for those who are contracting 
for the first time, this is difficult.]
BENEFITS    
Positive Price Risk, price rise     
Can sell anytime, flexibility    
Quality is not critical    
Known trader in the market    
Positive yield risk    
Others 1 (specify) ______________    
13. Had you been contracting for gherkins instead of this alternative what would your expectations of net earnings be? We would like to learn 
about your expectations regarding earnings and yield of gherkins. If you were to follow the same set of procedures, with the same firm and field 
officer, under the same contractual terms and assuming the general conditions in your family, village and weather are unchanged, out of 20 
seasons growing the contract crop in a plot of your choice, which has the same qualities, what is the number of occasions you would attain the 
minimum/ the most likely / the maximum price/yield/net income per acre of the commodity? 
If I give you these 20 tokens and ask you to give the most 
tokens to the number you have said is most likely, the next 
most tokens you think is the next most likely and the least 
tokens to the least likely.  
Variable Unit 
Please note unit 
Rs/kg, quintal./acre 
for yield, etc. 
What is the 
minimum 
value you 
expect?  
What is the 
most likely 
value? 
What is the 
maximum 
value you 
expect? 
Number against 
Minimum 
Value? 
Number against 
the most likely
value? 
Number against  
maximum value  
Price (unit value) 
[Since gherkins has 
many grade, the focus 
here is on eliciting an 
average unit value as 
“price.”] 
Rs./kg.       
Yield 
Quintals/acre
      
Net income Rs./season       
[Investigator: Write number of tokens in the blank. To check for their understanding, (1) they should at least assign a token to each of the three 
outcomes they earlier proposed and (2) the most likely outcome should have the most tokens] 
514.  You have talked about why you discontinued gherkins. What, in your opinion, are the most important risks/benefits associated with contracting? 
[Investigator: Please pay careful attention to this set of questions. This pertains only to gherkins. To start with do not prompt. Let the farmer 
mention the risks/benefits first.Once the box has been filled out, then read out the options the farmer has not mentioned to verify that they are 
not considered risks/benefits by the farmer. If the farmer is reluctant to answer these set of questions, then try prompting with examples of 
attributes.]
Type of Risk/Benefits 
[investigator: The term used differs 
across regions, make sure you find out 
what term to use] 
Is this risk/benefit present? 
[Investigator: Let the farmer list the 
risks. If the farmer mentions a risk, 
write 1 against it, if not mark 0. 
Then move to the next column]
How important do you think each of 
these risks is to your well-being? 
 [Rank on a scale of 0-10 with 0 means 
not important to you at all, 10 means it is 
extremely important to you.] 
What is the probability of the following 
event happening in contracting with THE 
“FIRM” 
[If you contract 10 times how many 
times do you feel this event will occur.] 
Yield risk    
Price risk    
Risk of firm not coming back to pick 
up the produce at harvest time. 
   
Risk of delay in payment    
Risk of non-availability of credit    
Risk of non-availability of inputs     
Risk of poor quality inputs    
Risk of wrong technical advice    
Risk of rejection/downgrading of 
produce by the firm, quality 
   
Risk of the firm not coming to 
contract in the future 
   
Risk of losing land    
Others 1 (specify) ______________    
Others 2 (specify) _____________ 
   
BENEFITS
Inputs provided by the firm on credit  
Advance provided by firm    
Credit available against contract    
Technical advice available    
Lumpsum payment    
Timely payment    
Price fixed, certainty    
Reduced transaction time    
Assured buyer    
Positive yield risk    
Farm-gate collection    
Others 1 (specify) ______________    
6E. COST AND RETURNS FROM ALTERNATE CROP CULTIVATION & TRANSACTIONS COST [For this section, data should pertain to the 
previous COMPLETED SEASON..] 
15. Could you give some details of your costs and returns for the last completed season?
Labour Cost     Input/output 
Male(days) Female(days) Labour cost for 
hired  
Operations 
Hired  Family labour 
Hired 
Family 
Male Female 
Machine 
(hr) 
Quantity Unit 
price 
Source 
(1=Purchased; 
2=Owned: 
3=Company 
Provided 
Variable cost           
1. Land preparation           
2. Seed bed preparation           
3. FYM/Compost           
4. Planting/sowing           
5. Seeds           
6. Seed treatment           
7. Fertilizer application           
8. Micro nutrient 
application
          
9. Interculture operation           
10. Weeding/weedicide
application
          
11. Plant protection 
chemicals
          
12. Irrigation           
13. Harvesting           
14. Equipment repair and 
maintenance
          
TRANSACTIONS COST           
15. Post harvest 
operations
          
16. Packing and Sorting           
17. Transport to the 
Market/Collection 
Center
          
18. Commission on 
transaction
          
19. Interest on working 
capital @7% 
          
Fixed cost           
1. Land rent           
2. Depreciation on farm 
assets
          
3. Interest on fixed capital 
12% 
          
Total cost           
Main product yield           
By product yield           
Gross return           
Net return           
16. What is the volume of product rejected as not meeting quality standards?    ______________ kgs 
17. What is the volume of product that was lost due to spoilage /wastage?    _______________ kgs 
18. How many days did it take for you to receive full payment after completion of the transaction?    _______________days 
 
ENFORCEMENT 
19. In the last season you contracted, did you use the inputs for the contract crop for your other non-contract crops?    Yes  /    No 
If YES, 
a. What is the proportion of inputs that you were given did you use for other non-contract crops ____________ % 
720. In the last season you contracted, did you seek or use the firm or agent’s advice for your other crops?   Yes  /    No 
If YES, 
a. Please explain ____________________________________________________________________ 
21. In the last season you contracted, did any other company approached you or have you sold the contract crop to any other buyer (local market 
or another company)  Yes  /    No 
If YES, 
a. What proportion of the contract crop did you sell? (in %) __________________% 
b. What are the reasons you sold elsewhere?  __________________________________ 
22. According to you, what proportion of the contract farmers in your village or outside sell their contract crop to other buyers? _________% 
23. How often do you think other contract farmers in your village sell the contracted crop to other buyers? 
 (1) Regularly   (2) Frequently   (3) Not so frequently           (4) Rarely        (5) Never 
24. The last time you contracted or delivered the contracted commodity to the FIRM, was the price offered by other companies, on an average, 
higher or lower than the contract price? [Inv: Circle the relevant option and note down the two prices]. 
1. Contract price was lower 
2. About the same 
3. Contract price was higher 
Contract Price (in Rs/kg.)   Grade 1________Grade 2_______Grade 3___________ Grade 4________ Grade 5_________  
Price of Competing Firm (in Rs./kg) .)   Grade 1________Grade 2_______Grade 3___________ Grade 4________ Grade 5_________ 
25. Would you accept this FIRM’s contract if it  offered you a lower price than other FIRMS operating in this region?  Yes /  No /  Unsure 
If YES, how much lower can it be before you reject the contract? (Inv.Get the amount for the smallest gherkin – that is the highest value that 
you noted above)
Contract price can be Rs.__________/kg lower                 /             Unsure 
If NO, how much higher would the contract price have to be above the competitor price for you to accept the contract? (Inv.Get the amount for 
the smallest gherkin – that is the highest value that you noted above)
Contract price should be at least Rs. _________/kg higher               /          Unsure 
26. When you contracted, did you ever face a situation where you have been unable to deliver the contracted produce at the required time and 
place?    Yes    /       No 
a. Please describe. 
1. Weather related yield loss/ Natural causes/Water shortage 
2. When I feel my profits might be harmed, or the firm does not give a good price for the output 
3. Would never happen 
4. When I am constrained for cash 
5. Company delayed in coming /delays in payments 
6. Could not meet quality standards 
27. In general, how important did you think it is for you to honour the contract? 
1. Extremely important 
2. Quite important 
3. Important
4. Not so important 
5. Not at all important 
828. What do you feel the company does when as contract farmer you do not keep up the terms of contract? [Investigator: Allow the farmer to 
articulate his/her thoughts, and if appropriate ask the questions below to get specific answers as a follow-up] 
1 Nothing 7 Warn us 
2 They will not pay our dues/ demand that we return the money 8 Take some appropriate action 
3 Will go to court 9 Fight with us 
4 Will approach the police 10 Complain to the village leader 
5 Will tell on us to other companies 11 They will lose faith in us 
6 Stop contracting with us   
 
29. In general, If the firm does not honour the contract, what would you do? [Circle one, the first response] 
1. Nothing, what can I do? Powerless 
2. Depending on the problem, we will decide 
3. Go to court 
4. Approach the police 
5. Complain to the local authorities /police 
6. Stop Contracting with this firm, contract with other firms 
7. Will make a representation to them 
8. Protest won’t harvest the crop 
9. Give up the contract crop 
10. Will not let the firm come into our village 
11. Demand Compensation, Lose faith 
12. Other (please Specify) _______________________________ 
  
30. In general, how much power to voice your opinions do you feel in this relationship with the company? [Investigator: Read out all the options. 
Circle only one. If the farmer elaborates, note his/her response below] 
1. Very powerful 
2. Somewhat powerful 
3. Neither powerful nor powerless 
4. Somewhat powerless/vulnerable 
5. Completely powerless/vulnerable 
31. Today, how risky do you think contracting with FIRM is?   
 [Investigator: Rank on a scale of 0 to 10; 0 means no risk at all, 10 means extremely risky] __________________________ 
32. What, according to you, are the chances that the company resumes contracting with you within the next three years? 
(1) Almost certainly  (2) Very likely  (3) Somewhat likely      (4) Unlikely (5) Not at all likely 
33. What, according to you, are the chances that you will want to resume contracting with this firm within the next three years?  
(1) Almost certainly  (2) Very likely  (3) Somewhat likely       (4) Unlikely (5) Not at all likely 
34. For the next season, do you plan to bring more area under gherkins or less?   
(1) Will increase area     (2) Will maintain the same area     (3) Will decrease the area     (4) Have not decided yet 
35. To what extent did participating in contract farming enhanced the economic well-being of your family? 
(1) To a great extent   
(2) To some extent    
(3) Neither enhanced nor diminished  
(4) Has diminished   
(5) Has diminished a great deal 
[Investigator: Request the farmer to elaborate and perhaps offer examples for the above and record them under Investigator Observations at the end 
of the Questionnaire] 
36. Taken all together, how would you say things are for you these days: would you say you are:      ______________  
[Inv: 1=Very Happy, 2=Pretty happy, 3=Not too happy] 
 
9I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE HOUSEHOLD  
37. What is the age of the head of the household?    _________________years  
38. How many members are there in your nuclear family?    _________________ 
1. Of these, the number of members in the age group 0-15 years of age?   _________________ 
39. What is your social group?
1. SC/ST
2. MBC
3. OBC
4. Others (specify)  ____________________________ 
40. What is the education level you have attained? 
1) Illiterate
2) Literate (below primary) 
3) Primary (Class V complete) 
4) Upper Primary Class (Class VIII complete) 
5) Secondary (Class X complete) 
6) High School (Class XII complete) 
7) Others (specify) ________________________ 
41. What is the education level of the most educated member of the household? 
1) Illiterate
2) Literate (below primary) 
3) Primary (Class V complete) 
4) Upper Primary Class (Class VIII complete) 
5) Secondary (Class X complete) 
6) High School (Class XII complete) 
7) Others (specify) ________________________ 
42. We would like to know your asset position. Does the household own any of the following items? [Investigator: Write the number of pieces of the 
object if applicable and 0 if not applicable]  
 ASSET TYPE Currently possesses (write Qty and units) 
a.  Radio  
b.  Telephone Landline 
c.  Mobile 
d.  TV 
e.  Watch  
f.  Pressure cooker  
g.  Bicycle  
h.  Scooter/ Motorcycle 
i.  Livestock  
j.  Poultry 
k. Tractor
43.  What is your main source of light now?    ___ ________  
[Inv.:1=Kerosene; 2=Candle; 3=Electricity; 4=Electricity with inverter; 5=Solar energy; 6=LPG/biogas; 7=Battery (torch); 8=Diesel generator; 
9=Other, specify_____] 
44. What is your main source of heat for cooking now?     __________ 
[Inv.1=Wood/charcoal; 2=Kerosene; 3=Electricity; 4= LPG/biogas; 5=Crop residues; 6=Other, specify_____] 
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45. What is your main source of drinking water?     __________ 
[Inv: 1=River/canal; 2=Public well; 3=Public handpump; 4=Own handpump; 5=Own motorpump or other waterlifting devices; 6=Piped water; 
7=Rainwater; 8=Water filling station; 9=Other, specify:______] 
46. What were your main sources of income in the past one year ?  [Attempt to get the value in Rs. If this is difficult or the farmer is vague 
about it, try to record the percentage of annual income from each source.]
1. Cultivation   ___________________ 
2. Wage labour in Agriculture  _____________________ 
3. Wage labour off farm   ____________________ 
4. Self Employment    __________________ 
5. Transfers and Remittances   ___________________  
47. What proportion of household foodgrain consumption do you buy from outside (e.g. ration shop)?   _____________% 
48. How much of outstanding debt do you have at the moment?  Rs. _____________________ 
J. MEASURING RISK AVERSION AND AMBIGUITY AVERSION 
Risk Aversion 
49. You have the choice of (1) accepting Rs. 150 from us right now for sure. (2) Or alternatively, instead of the Rs. 150, we will toss a coin, if it is 
heads you get Rs.210 and if it is tails, you get Rs.90.  
What would you rather choose to do? (write 1 or 2)  
Write amount ______________________________ 
Ambiguity Aversion 
50. Now, we would like to offer you another chance to win. We would like to offer you Rs.150 through another game 
Bag 1 contains 4 white balls and 6 black balls. You pick a ball. You will win Rs.150 if the ball you pick is white. 
Bag 2 contains 10 balls. Some are white and some are black. I don’t know for sure how many of each there are. You need to name one color. And 
you will win Rs.150 if you pick the ball of the color you name. 
Which bag will you choose? (write 1 or 2)  
Enumerator: Please allow the respondent to pick a ball from his chosen bag 
The reward from this game is   
Lottery Price 
51. Supposing you were offered a lottery ticket, where the prize is decided by a coin flip. You win Rs300  if Heads and 150 if Tails. What is the 
maximum you would be willing to pay for the lottery ticket? 
Rs. ___________________________________ 
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K. INVESTIGATOR OBSERVATIONS 
52. LOCATIONAL ATTRIBUTES 
a. Distance of the farmer’s field from the collection point ____________ metres 
b. Distance of the farmer’s field from the nearest metalled roadhead ____________ metres 
c. Distance of the farmer’s field from the nearest market for contract crop ____________ metres 
d. Distance of the farmer’s field from the nearest market for the alternate crop ____________ metres 
e. Distance of the farmer’s house from the panchayat president’s house ____________ metres 
f. Distance of the farmer’s house from the main village cluster/centre of village ____________ metres 
53. House Type 
1) Kaccha (Odu, mud) 
2) Pacca  (Cement brick) 
 
 
54. How would you rate the economic condition of this household compared to other households in the village?  
1) Among the poorest 20%                      
2) Poorer than average but not among the poorest 20%                                   
3) About Average
4) Better than average but not among the richest 20%                            
5) Among the richest 20% 
6) Unable to observe 
 
MAKE NOTE OF ANY QUOTES, COMMENTS, OR INCIDENTS THAT YOU THINK ARE RELEVANT AND INTERESTING. PLEASE MAKE NOTE 
OF IT IN SOME DETAIL.  
1 
Schedule 1(D): NEVER-GHERKINS FARMER QUESTIONNAIRE 
[Investigator: Interview the head of the farm household in the list of selected farmers. If the farmer is unavailable, do not interview anyone 
else in the household. Introduce yourself and explain the purpose of the survey. Make sure you convey all the points mentioned in the Oral 
Consent Transcript in the same words. Indicate the approximate time the interview will take. If the farmer has written records encourage
him/her to refer to these, especially if the contract farmer has passbooks. Make sure the farmer has a chance to clarify his/her doubts and 
give consent before you start the interview.] 
Name of the Investigator    Date of Interview 
FARMER ID: (Copy from the Sampling Sheet after verifying identity of the farmer) 
Hamlet     Panchayat             Revenue Village    
Block     Taluk     District 
A.LANDHOLDING AND CROPPING PATTERN 
1. [Investigator: This is a confirmatory question]  What is the main occupation of your household in the last 1 year or 365 days?  
1) Casual Agricultural Labour 
2) Casual Non-Agricultural Labour 
3) Cultivation 
4) Other Self-employed 
5) Salaried employment 
6) Other (specify) ___________________________ 
 
2. How much land does your household currently operate? (a)Owned _________________  cents / acres / kuzhi 
(b) Leased _________________ cents /acres /kuzhi 
 
1. What proportion of your land is irrigated?     ________________ % 
2. What is the main source of irrigation?       
1) Well 
2) Tubewell 
3) River 
4) Canal 
5) Rainfed 
6) Other (specify) ______________ 
 
3. Compared to other farmers’ lands in your village, would you say that the agricultural land you own is  
1) More fertile 
2) Equally (or just as) fertile 
3) Less fertile 
 
4. What has been the cropping pattern this past year? [Investigator: Include land left fallow] 
1=Trader, 2=Pre-harvest Contractor, 3= Direct to consumer, 4= Contract (Intermediary), 5=Contract (Firm), 6=Self Consumption 
 (A) Crop 
[Investigator: Include tree 
crops as well e.g., 
coconut, banana] 
(B) Month of 
Sowing (for crops 
other than trees).  
(C) Month of 
Harvest (for crops 
other than trees 
(D) Area  
(in 
acres/centskuzhi) 
Note units 
 
Quantity 
Produced 
(E) 
(Please note 
units) 
Quantity Sold 
(F) 
(Please note 
units) 
(G) Marketing Channel 
1  
 
      
2  
 
      
3  
 
      
4  
 
      
5  
 
      
6  
 
      
 
 
 
 
2 
5. Do you have contact with other farmers who pursue contract farming, in this crop or in other crops? Yes /  No 
If YES,  
i. Which crops?   
(1) Papaya (2) Gherkins (3) Marigold (4) Poultry (5) Other (specify)____________________ 
 
ii. Are these 
1. Relatives /family in your village 
2. Relatives/family in another village 
3. Friends in this village 
4. Friends elsewhere 
5. Acquaintances in this village 
6. Other (Specify)___________ 
 
6. Have you ever wanted to grow gherkins in the past? 
1) No, never wanted to grow gherkins 
2) Wanted to grow gherkins, but did not  
 
Investigator: If the response is (1)  go to SECTION 1, If the response is (2) proceed to SECTION (2) 
 
SECTION 1 
7. What are the reasons you have never wanted to grow gherkins? 
1 Too much labour, family small 10 No profits 
2 Labour cost is too high 11 No land, not enough, fragmented 
3 Hired Labour availability is a problem 12 Time consuming 
4 New crop, no experience with the crop 13 Soil conditions not suited 
5 Ruins Health 14 Too much risk 
6 Soil deterioration 15 Too poor, unable to make the necessary investments 
7 No irrigation facility 16 Will not be able to deliver the crop as they require 
8 No faith /trust in the companies  17 Family Constraints, e.g. death in the family, etc. 
9 Not Aware of the crop   
 
SECTION 2: 
8. Have you ever been approached or by THE FIRM or approached THE FIRM in order to contract? 
1) Yes 
2) N0 
 
 (1) If YES, why do you think you were unable to contract? 
1 Too much labour, family small 10 No profits 
2 Labour cost is too high 11 No land, not enough, fragmented 
3 Hired Labour availability is a problem 12 Time consuming 
4 New crop, no experience with the crop 13 Soil conditions not suited 
5 Ruins Health 14 Too much risk 
6 Soil deterioration 15 Too poor, unable to make the necessary investments 
7 No irrigation facility 16 The firm only chooses people they know /have contact already 
8 No faith /trust in the companies  17 Will not be able to deliver the crop as they require 
9 Not Aware of the crop 18 Family Constraints,e.g. death in the family, etc. 
 (2) If NO, why was it the case? 
1 Too much labour, family small 10 No profits 
2 Labour cost is too high 11 No land, not enough, fragmented 
3 Hired Labour availability is a problem 12 Time consuming 
4 New crop, no experience with the crop 13 Soil conditions not suited 
5 Ruins Health 14 Too much risk 
6 Soil deterioration 15 Too poor, unable to make the necessary investments 
7 No irrigation facility 16 The firm only chooses people they know /have contact already 
8 No faith /trust in the companies  17 Will not be able to deliver the crop as they require 
9 Not Aware of the crop 18 Family Constraints,e.g. death in the family, etc. 
 
 
9. Supposing you were to decide to grow gherkins today what crop would you give up? (specify)_____________________________ 
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[Investigator: The farmer might have difficulty in answering this question. The key is to ascertain the closest substitute to the contract crop, according to 
the farmer – i.e., the next best alternative.] 
 
C.ELICITING EXPECTATIONS FROM THE FARMER 
10. What are your expectations from growing that crop? If you were to follow the same set of procedures, and assuming the general conditions in your 
family, village and weather are unchanged, out of 20 seasons growing the contract crop in a plot of your choice, which has the same qualities, 
what is the number of occasions you would attain the minimum/ the most likely / the maximum price/yield/net income per acre of the commodity? 
If I give you these 20 tokens and ask you to give the 
most tokens to the number you have said is most 
likely, the next most tokens you think is the next most 
likely and the least tokens to the least likely.  
 
Variable Unit 
Please note unit 
Rs/kg, quintal./acre 
for yield, etc. 
What is the 
minimum 
value you 
expect?  
What is the 
most likely 
value? 
What is the 
maximum 
value you 
expect? 
Number against 
Minimum 
Value? 
Number against 
the most likely 
value? 
Number against  
maximum 
value  
Price expectation 
 
 
 
 
      
Yield expectation  
 
 
       
Net Income  
 
       
[Investigator: Write number of tokens in the blank. To check for their understanding, (1) they should at least assign a token to each of the three 
outcomes they earlier proposed and (2) the most likely outcome should have the most tokens] 
 
11. What other risks/benefits that you associate with the alternate crop? [Investigator: Please pay careful attention to this set of questions. This 
pertains only to the alternate crop. To start with do not prompt. Let the farmer mention the risks/benefits first. Once the box has been filled out, 
then read out the options the farmer has not mentioned to verify that they are not considered risks/benefits by the farmer. If the farmer is reluctant 
to answer these set of questions, then try prompting with examples of risks/benefits.] 
 
Type of Risk/Benefit 
[investigator: The term used differs across regions, 
make sure you find out what term to use] 
(A) 
Is this risk/benefit 
present? 
[Investigator: Write 1 if 
YES, 0 if NO] 
(B) 
 
How important do you think each of these 
risks/benefits is to your well-being? 
 [Rank on a scale of 0-10 with 0 means not 
important to you at all, 10 means it is extremely 
important to you] (C) 
How frequently do you face this situation? 
[In 10 seasons, how many times do you feel this 
event will occur? Note for those who are 
contracting for the first time, this is difficult.] 
(1)Risk of non-availability of credit   
 
 
(2) Risk of non-availability of technical 
advice 
   
 
(3) Risk of poor quality inputs 
 
   
 
(4) Risk of non-availability of inputs    
 
(5) Non availability of hired labour 
 
   
 
(6) Not finding a buyer    
 
(7) Delay in payment    
 
(6)  Rejection of produce    
 
 
(7) Weather risk/ yield 
   
(8) Price risk, price drop  
 
  
 
(9) Others _________________ 
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BENEFITS 
 
   
Positive Price Risk, price rise  
 
   
Can sell anytime, flexibility 
 
   
Quality is not critical 
 
   
Known trader in the market    
 
Positive yield risk    
 
Others 1 (specify) ______________ 
 
   
 
12. What are your expectations regarding earnings and yield of gherkins if you were to sow it this season? We would like to learn about your 
expectations regarding earnings and yield of gherkins. If you were to follow the same set of procedures, with the same firm and field officer, under 
the same contractual terms and assuming the general conditions in your family, village and weather are unchanged, out of 20 seasons growing 
the contract crop in a plot of your choice, which has the same qualities, what is the number of occasions you would attain the minimum/ the most 
likely / the maximum price/yield/net income per acre of the commodity? 
If I give you these 20 tokens and ask you to give 
the most tokens to the number you have said is 
most likely, the next most tokens you think is the 
next most likely and the least tokens to the least 
likely.  
 
Variable Unit 
Please note unit 
Rs/kg, 
quintal./acre for 
yield, etc. 
What is the 
minimum 
value you 
expect?  
What is the 
most likely 
value? 
What is the 
maximum 
value you 
expect? 
Number 
against 
Minimum 
Value? 
Number against  
the most likely 
value? 
Number against  
maximum 
value  
Price (unit value) 
[Since gherkins has many grade, 
the focus here is on eliciting an 
average unit value as “price.”] 
Rs./kg.       
Yield   
 
      
Net Income  
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13. What, in your opinion, are the most important risks/benefits associated with contracting? [Investigator: Please pay careful attention to this set of 
questions. This pertains only to the gherkins. To start with do not prompt. Let the farmer mention the risks/benefits first. Once the box has been 
filled out, then read out the options the farmer has not mentioned to verify that they are not considered risks/benefits by the farmer. If the farmer is 
reluctant to answer these set of questions, then try prompting with examples of risks/benefits.] 
Type of Risk/Benefit 
[investigator: The term used differs 
across regions, make sure you find out 
what term to use] 
Is this risk/benefit present? 
[Investigator: Let the farmer list the 
risks. DO NOT PROMPT. If the 
farmer mentions a risk, write 1 
against it, if not mark 0. Then 
move to the next column] 
How important do you think each of 
these risks/benefits is to your well-
being? 
 [Rank on a scale of 0-10 with 0 means 
not important to you at all, 10 means it is 
extremely important to you.] 
What is the probability of the 
following event happening in 
contracting with THE “FIRM” 
[If you contract 10 times how many 
times do you feel this event will 
occur.] 
Yield risk  
 
   
Price risk 
 
   
Risk of firm not coming back to pick 
up the produce at harvest time. 
   
Risk of delay in payment    
 
Risk of non-availability of credit    
 
Risk of non-availability of inputs     
 
Risk of poor quality inputs    
 
Risk of wrong technical advice    
 
Risk of rejection/downgrading of 
produce by the firm, quality 
   
 
Risk of the firm not coming to 
contract in the future 
   
Risk of losing land    
 
Others 1 (specify) ______________ 
 
   
 
Others 2 (specify) _____________ 
   
BENEFITS
Inputs provided by the firm on credit  
 
  
Advance provided by firm 
 
   
Credit available against contract 
 
   
Technical advice available 
 
   
Lumpsum payment    
 
Timely payment    
 
Price fixed, certainty    
 
Reduced transaction time    
 
Assured buyer    
 
Positive yield risk    
 
Farm-gate collection 
 
   
Others 1 (specify) ______________ 
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E.COST AND RETURNS FROM NON-CONTRACT CROP  [For this section, data should pertain to the previous COMPLETED season.] 
14. Could you give some details of your cultivation this past season?  
 
Labour Cost     Input/output 
Male(days) Female(days) Labour cost for 
hired  
Operations 
Hired  Family labour 
Hired 
Family 
Male Female 
Machine 
(hr) 
Quantity Unit 
price 
Source 
(1=Purchased; 
2=Owned: 
3=Company 
Provided 
Variable cost           
1. Land preparation           
2. Seed bed preparation           
3. FYM/Compost           
4. Planting/sowing           
5. Seeds           
6. Seed treatment           
7. Fertilizer application           
8. Micro nutrient 
application 
          
9. Interculture operation           
10. Weeding/weedicide 
application 
          
11. Plant protection 
chemicals 
          
12. Irrigation           
13. Harvesting           
14. Equipment repair and 
maintenance 
          
TRANSACTIONS COST           
15. Post harvest 
operations 
          
16. Packing and Sorting           
17. Transport to the 
Market/Collection 
Center 
          
18. Commission on 
transaction 
          
19. Interest on working 
capital @7% 
          
Fixed cost           
1. Land rent           
2. Depreciation on farm 
assets 
          
3. Interest on fixed capital 
12% 
          
Total cost           
Main product yield           
By product yield           
Gross return           
Net return           
 
15. What is the volume of product rejected as not meeting quality standards?    ______________ kgs 
16. What is the volume of product that was lost due to spoilage /wastage?    _______________ kgs 
17. How many days did it take for you to receive full payment after completion of the transaction?    _______________days 
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 MODULE ON AWARENESS AND PERCEPTIONS 
18. In general, how much power to voice your opinions do you feel farmers have in this relationship with the company? [Investigator: Read out all the 
options. Circle only one. If the farmer elaborates, note his/her response below] 
1) Very powerful 
2) Somewhat powerful 
3) Neither powerful nor powerless 
4) Somewhat powerless/vulnerable 
5) Completely powerless/vulnerable 
19. Today, how risky do you think contracting with THE FIRM  is?   
 [Investigator: Rank on a scale of 0 to 10; 0 means no risk at all, 10 means extremely risky] __________________________ 
 
20. What, according to you, are the chances that the company will want to start contracting with you within the next three years?  
(1) Almost certainly  (2) Very likely  (3) Somewhat likely (4) Unlikely (5) Not at all likely 
 
21. What, according to you, are the chances that you will want to start contracting  with this firm within the next three years?  
(1) Almost certainly  (2) Very likely  (3) Somewhat likely (4) Unlikely (5) Not at all likely 
 
22. For the next season, do you plan to go in for gherkins cultivation?   
(1) Yes  (2) No  (3) Have not decided yet / Unable to say 
23. Taken all together, how would you say things are for you these days: would you say you are:      ______________  
[Inv: 1=Very Happy, 2=Pretty happy, 3=Not too happy] 
 
 
I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE HOUSEHOLD  
24. What is the age of the head of the household?    _________________years  
 
25. How many members are there in your nuclear family?    _________________ 
 
1. Of these, the number of members in the age group 0-15 years of age?   _________________ 
 
26. What is your social group?  
1. SC/ST 
2. MBC 
3. OBC 
4. Others (specify)  ____________________________ 
 
 
 
27. What is the education level you have attained? 
1) Illiterate 
2) Literate (below primary) 
3) Primary (Class V complete) 
4) Upper Primary Class (Class VIII complete) 
5) Secondary (Class X complete) 
6) High School (Class XII complete) 
7) Others (specify) ________________________ 
28. What is the education level of the most educated member of the household? 
1) Illiterate 
2) Literate (below primary) 
3) Primary (Class V complete) 
4) Upper Primary Class (Class VIII complete) 
5) Secondary (Class X complete) 
6) High School (Class XII complete) 
7) Others (specify) ________________________ 
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29. We would like to know your asset position. Does the household own any of the following items? [Investigator: Write the number of pieces of the 
object if applicable and 0 if not applicable]  
 ASSET TYPE Currently possesses (write Qty and units) 
a.  Radio   
b.  Telephone Landline  
c.  Mobile  
d.  TV  
e.  Watch   
f.  Pressure cooker   
g.  Bicycle   
h.  Scooter/ Motorcycle  
i.  Livestock   
j.  Poultry  
k.  
 
Tractor  
 
 
 
 
30.  What is your main source of light now?    ___ ________  
[Inv.:1=Kerosene; 2=Candle; 3=Electricity; 4=Electricity with inverter; 5=Solar energy; 6=LPG/biogas; 7=Battery (torch); 8=Diesel generator; 
9=Other, specify_____] 
 
 
31. What is your main source of heat for cooking now?     __________ 
[Inv.1=Wood/charcoal; 2=Kerosene; 3=Electricity; 4= LPG/biogas; 5=Crop residues; 6=Other, specify_____] 
 
32. What is your main source of drinking water?     __________ 
[Inv: 1=River/canal; 2=Public well; 3=Public handpump; 4=Own handpump; 5=Own motorpump or other waterlifting devices; 6=Piped water; 
7=Rainwater; 8=Water filling station; 9=Other, specify:______] 
 
 
33. What were your main sources of income in the past one year ?  [Attempt to get the value in Rs. If this is difficult or the farmer is vague 
about it, try to record the percentage of annual income from each source.]      
 
1. Cultivation   ___________________ 
2. Wage labour in Agriculture  _____________________ 
3. Wage labour off farm   ____________________ 
4. Self Employment    __________________ 
5. Transfers and Remittances   ___________________  
34. What proportion of household foodgrain consumption do you buy from outside (e.g. ration shop)?   _____________% 
35. How much of outstanding debt do you have at the moment?  Rs. _____________________ 
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J. MEASURING RISK AVERSION AND AMBIGUITY AVERSION 
Risk Aversion 
36. You have the choice of (1) accepting Rs. 150 from us right now for sure. (2) Or alternatively, instead of the Rs. 150, we will toss a coin, if it is 
heads you get Rs.210 and if it is tails, you get Rs.90.  
 
What would you rather choose to do? (write 1 or 2)  
Write amount ______________________________ 
 
Ambiguity Aversion 
37. Now, we would like to offer you another chance to win. We would like to offer you Rs.150 through another game 
Bag 1 contains 4 white balls and 6 black balls. You pick a ball. You will win Rs.150 if the ball you pick is white. 
Bag 2 contains 10 balls. Some are white and some are black. I don’t know for sure how many of each there are. You need to name one color. And you 
will win Rs.150 if you pick the ball of the color you name. 
 
Which bag will you choose? (write 1 or 2)  
Enumerator: Please allow the respondent to pick a ball from his chosen bag 
The reward from this game is   
 
 
Lottery Price 
38. Supposing you were offered a lottery ticket, where the prize is decided by a coin flip. You win Rs. 300  if Heads and 150 if Tails. What is the 
maximum you would be willing to pay for the lottery ticket? 
 
 Rs. ___________________________________ 
K. INVESTIGATOR OBSERVATIONS 
39. LOCATIONAL ATTRIBUTES 
a. Distance of the farmer’s field from the collection point ____________ metres 
b. Distance of the farmer’s field from the nearest metalled roadhead ____________ metres 
c. Distance of the farmer’s field from the nearest market for contract crop ____________ metres 
d. Distance of the farmer’s field from the nearest market for the alternate crop ____________ metres 
e. Distance of the farmer’s house from the panchayat president’s house ____________ metres 
f. Distance of the farmer’s house from the main village cluster/centre of village ____________ metres 
40. House Type 
1) Kaccha (Odu, mud) 
2) Pacca  (Cement brick) 
 
 
41. How would you rate the economic condition of this household compared to other households in the village?  
1) Among the poorest 20%                      
2) Poorer than average but not among the poorest 20%                                   
3) About Average                                     
4) Better than average but not among the richest 20%                            
5) Among the richest 20% 
6) Unable to observe 
 
 
MAKE NOTE OF ANY QUOTES, COMMENTS, OR INCIDENTS THAT YOU THINK ARE RELEVANT AND INTERESTING. PLEASE MAKE NOTE 
OF IT IN SOME DETAIL. 
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Schedule 2(B): OTHER MARIGOLD FARMER QUESTIONNAIRE 
[Investigator: The farmer MUST be growing marigold and never contracted..  Interview the head of the farm household in the list of selected 
farmers. If the farmer is unavailable, do not interview anyone else in the household. Introduce yourself and explain the purpose of the 
survey. Make sure you convey all the points mentioned in the Oral Consent Transcript in the same words. Indicate the approximate time the 
interview will take. If the farmer has written records encourage him/her to refer to these, especially if the contract farmer has passbooks. 
Make sure the farmer has a chance to clarify his/her doubts and give consent before you start the interview.] 
Name of the Investigator    Date of Interview 
FARMER ID: (Copy from the Sampling Sheet after verifying identity of the farmer) 
Hamlet     Panchayat             Revenue Village    
Block     Taluk     District 
A.OCCUPATION & LANDHOLDING
1. [Investigator: This is a confirmatory question]  What is the main occupation of your household in the last 1 year or 365 days?
1) Casual Agricultural Labour 
2) Casual Non-Agricultural Labour 
3) Cultivation
4) Other Self-employed 
5) Salaried employment 
6) Other (specify) ___________________________ 
2. How much land does your household currently operate? (a)Owned  _________________  cents / acres / kuzhi 
(b) Leased  _________________ cents /acres /kuzhi 
1. What proportion of your land is irrigated?     ________________ % 
2. What is the main source of irrigation?       
1) Well
2) Tubewell
3) River
4) Canal
5) Rainfed
6) Other (specify) ______________ 
3. Compared to other farmers’ lands in your village, would you say that the agricultural land you own is  
1) More fertile 
2) Equally (or just as) fertile 
3) Less fertile 
What has been the cropping pattern this past year? [Investigator: Include land left fallow]
 (A) Crop 
[Investigator: Include tree 
crops as well e.g., 
coconut, banana] 
(B) Month of 
Sowing (for crops 
other than trees).  
(C) Month of 
Harvest (for crops 
other than trees 
(D) Area
(in
acres/centskuzhi) 
Note units 
Quantity 
Produced 
(E)
(Please note 
units) 
Quantity Sold 
(F)
(Please note 
units) 
(G) Marketing Channel 
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
1=Trader, 2=Pre-harvest Contractor, 3= Direct to consumer, 4= Contract (Intermediary), 5=Contract (Firm), 6=Self Consumption 
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4. How many years’ experience do you have cultivating marigold, prior to this season?   ___________ years  
 
5. Do you have contact with other farmers who pursue contract farming, in this crop or in other crops? Yes /  No 
If YES,  
i. Which crops?   
(1) Papaya (2) Gherkins (3) Marigold (4) Poultry (5) Other (specify)____________________ 
 
ii. Are these 
1. Relatives /family in your village 
2. Relatives/family in another village 
3. Friends in this village 
4. Friends elsewhere 
5. Acquaintances in this village 
6. Other (Specify)___________ 
6. Have you ever been approached or by THE FIRM or approached THE FIRM in order to contract? 
1) Yes
2) N0
7. Have you ever wanted to contract for marigold in the past? 
1) No, never
2) Wanted to contract, but did not 
 
8. What are the reasons you did not contract with FIRM?  
1 The firm does not contract in this village 8 Low price for output 
2 The firm did not approach me 9 Don’t Know 
3 I was not interested 10 Did not fulfil their eligibility criteria 
4 They choose their own people 11 Other company was giving gifts, incentives for 
contracting
5 Did not have faith in the company 12 No advance given by the firm 
6 People I know do not contract with FIRM 13 Personal reasons, death in the family, etc. 
7 Improper Payment by FIRM   
9. How risky do you think contracting with FIRM is? [Rank on a scale of 0 to 10; 0=No risk at all, 10=Extremely Risky] ________________
C. ELICITING EXPECTATIONS  
10. We would like to learn about your expectations regarding earnings and yield of marigold. If you were to follow the same set of procedures, with the 
same firm and field officer, under the same contractual terms and assuming the general conditions in your family, village and weather are 
unchanged, out of 20 seasons growing the contract crop in a plot of your choice, which has the same qualities, what is the number of occasions 
you would attain the minimum/ the most likely / the maximum price/yield/net income per acre of the commodity? 
If I give you these 20 tokens and ask you to give the 
most tokens to the number you have said is most 
likely, the next most tokens you think is the next most 
likely and the least tokens to the least likely.  
Variable Unit 
Please note unit 
Rs/kg, quintal./acre 
for yield, etc. 
What is the 
minimum 
value you 
expect?  
What is the 
most likely 
value? 
What is the 
maximum 
value you 
expect? 
Number against 
Minimum 
Value? 
Number against 
the most likely
value? 
Number against  
maximum 
value  
Price expectation       
Yield expectation         
Net Income         
[Investigator: Write number of tokens in the blank. To check for their understanding, (1) they should at least assign a token to each of the three 
outcomes they earlier proposed and (2) the most likely outcome should have the most tokens] 
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11. What, in your opinion, are the most important risks/benefits associated with the open market? [Investigator: Please pay careful attention to this set 
of questions. This pertains only to the marigold. To start with do not prompt. Let the farmer mention the risks/benefits first. Once the box has 
been filled out, then read out the options the farmer has not mentioned to verify that they are not considered risks/benefits by the farmer. If the 
farmer is reluctant to answer these set of questions, then try prompting with examples of risks/benefits.] 
Type of Risk/Benefit 
[investigator: The term used differs across regions, 
make sure you find out what term to use] 
(A)
Is this risk / benefit 
present? 
[Investigator: Write 1 if 
YES, 0 if NO] 
(B)
How important do you think each of these risks 
/benefitsis to your well-being? 
 [Rank on a scale of 0-10 with 0 means not 
important to you at all, 10 means it is extremely 
important to you] (C) 
How frequently do you face this situation? 
[In 10 seasons, how many times do you feel this event 
will occur? Note for those who are contracting for the 
first time, this is difficult.]
(1)Risk of non-availability of credit   
(2) Risk of non-availability of technical 
advice
   
(3) Risk of poor quality inputs    
(4) Risk of non-availability of inputs    
(5) Non availability of hired labour    
(6) Not finding a buyer    
(7) Delay in payment    
(6)  Rejection of produce    
(7) Weather risk/ yield 
   
(8) Price risk, price drop  
(9) Others _________________ 
   
BENEFITS    
Positive Price Risk, price rise     
Can sell anytime, flexibility    
Quality is not critical    
Known trader in the market    
Positive yield risk    
Others 1 (specify) ______________    
Others 2 (specify) _____________ 
   
 
 
12. If you were not contracting for MARIGOLD with the FIRM this season, what would be your next best option?  [Investigator: Read the option aloud 
and get the next best alternative – the name of the company and/or crop.] 
1) Marigold contracting for company (specify the name of company/agent)_________________________ 
a. If this option were not available _________________________________________________ 
2) Another crop instead of marigold [Inv: Please note which crop you would have cultivated]  _______________________ 
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D. RISK PERCEPTIONS OF ALTERNATIVES [Choose MARIGOLD CONTRACTING as the relevant alternative] 
13. Supposing you had opted to contract for marigold this season, if you were to follow the same set of procedures, assuming the general conditions 
in your family, village and weather are unchanged, out of 20 seasons growing the contract crop in a plot of your choice, which has the same 
qualities, what is the number of occasions you would attain the minimum/ the most likely / the maximum price/yield/net income per acre of the 
commodity?  [Investigator: For the next few questions the alternative the farmer has mentioned above as the non-contract option]
14.
If I give you these 20 tokens and ask you to give 
the most tokens to the number you have said is 
most likely, the next most tokens you think is the 
next most likely and the least tokens to the least 
likely.  
Variable Unit 
Please note unit 
Rs/kg,
quintal./acre for 
yield, etc. 
What is the 
minimum 
value you 
expect?  
What is the 
most likely 
value? 
What is the 
maximum 
value you 
expect? 
Number 
against 
Minimum 
Value? 
Number against 
the most likely 
value? 
Number against  
maximum 
value  
Price expectation        
Yield expectation         
Net Income 
15. What other risks/benefits that you associate with marigold contracting? Follow the same procedure as for the previous RISK/BENEFIT TABLE] 
Type of Risk/Benefit 
[investigator: The term used differs 
across regions, make sure you find out 
what term to use] 
Is this risk/benefit present? 
[Investigator: Let the farmer list the 
risks.. If the farmer mentions a risk, 
write 1 against it, if not mark 0. 
Then move to the next column and 
retrace the intensity of feeling]
How important do you think each of 
these risks/benefits is to your well-
being? 
 [Rank on a scale of 0-10 with 0 means 
not important to you at all, 10 means it is 
extremely important to you. Write NA if it 
is not applicable,e.g. Group contracting] 
What is the probability of the following 
event happening in contracting with THE 
“FIRM” 
[If you contract 10 times how many 
times do you feel this event will occur? 
Note for those who are contracting for 
the first time, this is difficult.] 
Yield risk    
Price risk    
Risk of firm not coming back to pick 
up the produce at harvest time or 
“incomplete procurement’ 
   
Risk of delay in payment    
Risk of non-availability of credit    
Risk of non-availability of inputs     
Risk of poor quality inputs    
Risk of wrong technical advice    
Risk of exploitation by intermediary    
Risk of rejection/downgrading of 
produce by the firm, quality 
   
Risk of the firm not coming to 
contract in the future 
   
Risk of losing land    
Others 1 (specify) ______________    
Others 2 (specify) _____________ 
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Type of Risk/Benefit 
[investigator: The term used differs 
across regions, make sure you find out 
what term to use] 
Is this risk/benefit present? 
[Investigator: Let the farmer list the 
risks.. If the farmer mentions a risk, 
write 1 against it, if not mark 0. 
Then move to the next column and 
retrace the intensity of feeling]
How important do you think each of 
these risks/benefits is to your well-
being? 
 [Rank on a scale of 0-10 with 0 means 
not important to you at all, 10 means it is 
extremely important to you. Write NA if it 
is not applicable,e.g. Group contracting] 
What is the probability of the following 
event happening in contracting with THE 
“FIRM” 
[If you contract 10 times how many 
times do you feel this event will occur? 
Note for those who are contracting for 
the first time, this is difficult.] 
BENEFIT 
Inputs provided by the firm on credit  
Advance provided by firm    
Credit available against contract    
Technical advice available    
Lumpsum payment    
Timely payment    
Price fixed, certainty    
Reduced transaction time    
Assured buyer    
Positive yield risk    
Farm-gate collection    
Others 1 (specify) ______________    
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E. COST AND RETURNS FROM MARIGOLD CULTIVATION FOR OPEN MARKET [For this section, data should pertain to the previous completed 
season.] 
16. Could you give some details of your cultivation this past season?
Labour Cost     Input/output 
Male(days) Female(days) Labour cost for 
hired  
Operations 
Hired  Family labour 
Hired 
Family 
Male Female 
Machine 
(hr) 
Quantity Unit 
price 
Source 
(1=Purchased; 
2=Owned: 
3=Company 
Provided 
Variable cost           
1. Land preparation           
2. Seed bed preparation           
3. FYM/Compost           
4. Planting/sowing           
5. Seeds           
6. Seed treatment           
7. Fertilizer application           
8. Micro nutrient 
application
          
9. Interculture operation           
10. Weeding/weedicide
application
          
11. Plant protection 
chemicals
          
12. Irrigation           
13. Harvesting           
14. Equipment repair and 
maintenance
          
TRANSACTIONS COST           
15. Post harvest 
operations
          
16. Packing and Sorting           
17. Transport to the 
Market/Collection 
Center
          
18. Commission on 
transaction
          
19. Interest on working 
capital @7% 
          
Fixed cost           
1. Land rent           
2. Depreciation on farm 
assets
          
3. Interest on fixed capital 
12% 
          
Total cost           
Main product yield           
By product yield           
Gross return           
Net return           
17. What is the volume of product rejected as not meeting quality standards?    ______________ kgs 
18. What is the volume of product that was lost due to spoilage /wastage?    _______________ kgs 
19. How many days did it take for you to receive full payment after completion of the transaction?    _______________days 
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G. RELATIONSHIP INTENSITY & TRUST 
20. In general, how much power to voice opinions do you feel contract farmers have in their relationship with the company? [Investigator: Read out all 
the options. Circle only one. If the farmer elaborates, note his/her response below] 
a) Very powerful 
b) Somewhat powerful 
c) Neither powerful nor powerless 
d) Somewhat powerless/vulnerable 
e) Completely powerless/vulnerable 
21. What, according to you, are the chances that the company starts contracting with you within the next three years? 
(1) Almost certainly  (2) Very likely  (3) Somewhat likely      (4) Unlikely (5) Not at all likely 
22. What, according to you, are the chances that you will want to start contracting with this firm within the next three years?  
(1) Almost certainly  (2) Very likely  (3) Somewhat likely       (4) Unlikely (5) Not at all likely 
23. The last time sold marigold in the local market, was the local market price, on an average, higher or lower than the contract price?
1. Contract price was lower 
2. About the same 
3. Contract price was higher 
Contract Price (in Rs/kg.)_______________ Market Price (in Rs./kg)__________________ 
24. Would you accept a contract that offered you a lower price than the market price?  Yes /  No /  Unsure 
If YES, how much lower can it be before you reject the contract? 
If the market price is Rs.10/kgm Contract price can be Rs.__________/kg               /             Unsure 
If the market price is Rs.6/kgm Contract price can be Rs.__________/kg                /             Unsure 
If the market price is Rs.2/kgm Contract price can be Rs.__________/kg                /             Unsure 
If NO, how much higher would the contract price have to be above the market price for you to accept the contract? 
If the market price is Rs.10/kgm Contract price should be at least Rs. _________/kg               /          Unsure 
If the market price is Rs. 6/kgm Contract price should be at least Rs. _________/kg               /          Unsure 
If the market price is Rs.2/kgm Contract price should be at least Rs. _________/kg               /          Unsure 
25. For the next season, do you plan to bring more area under marigold or less?   
(1) Will increase area     (2) Will maintain the same area     (3) Will decrease the area     (4) Have not decided yet 
26. Taken all together, how would you say things are for you these days: would you say you are:     ______________  
[Inv: 1=Very Happy, 2=Pretty happy, 3=Not too happy] 
 
I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE HOUSEHOLD  
27. What is the age of the head of the household?    _________________years  
28. How many members are there in your nuclear family?    _________________ 
1. Of these, the number of members in the age group 0-15 years of age?   _________________ 
29. What is your social group?
1. SC/ST
2. MBC
3. OBC
4. Others (specify)  ____________________________ 
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30. What is the education level you have attained? 
1) Illiterate
2) Literate (below primary) 
3) Primary (Class V complete) 
4) Upper Primary Class (Class VIII complete) 
5) Secondary (Class X complete) 
6) High School (Class XII complete) 
7) Others (specify) ________________________ 
31. What is the education level of the most educated member of the household? 
1) Illiterate
2) Literate (below primary) 
3) Primary (Class V complete) 
4) Upper Primary Class (Class VIII complete) 
5) Secondary (Class X complete) 
6) High School (Class XII complete) 
7) Others (specify) ________________________ 
32. We would like to know your asset position. Does the household own any of the following items? [Investigator: Write the number of pieces of the 
object if applicable and 0 if not applicable]  
 ASSET TYPE Currently possesses (write Qty and units) 
a.  Radio  
b.  Telephone Landline 
c.  Mobile 
d.  TV 
e.  Watch  
f.  Pressure cooker  
g.  Bicycle  
h.  Scooter/ Motorcycle 
i.  Livestock  
j.  Poultry 
k. Tractor
33.  What is your main source of light now?    ___ ________  
[Inv.:1=Kerosene; 2=Candle; 3=Electricity; 4=Electricity with inverter; 5=Solar energy; 6=LPG/biogas; 7=Battery (torch); 8=Diesel generator; 
9=Other, specify_____] 
34. What is your main source of heat for cooking now?     __________ 
[Inv.1=Wood/charcoal; 2=Kerosene; 3=Electricity; 4= LPG/biogas; 5=Crop residues; 6=Other, specify_____] 
35. What is your main source of drinking water?     __________ 
[Inv: 1=River/canal; 2=Public well; 3=Public handpump; 4=Own handpump; 5=Own motorpump or other waterlifting devices; 6=Piped water; 
7=Rainwater; 8=Water filling station; 9=Other, specify:______] 
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36. What were your main sources of income in the past one year ?   [Attempt to get the value in Rs. If this is difficult or the farmer is vague 
about it, try to record the percentage of annual income from each source.]          
1. Cultivation   ___________________ 
2. Wage labour in Agriculture  _____________________ 
3. Wage labour off farm   ____________________ 
4. Self Employment    __________________ 
5. Transfers and Remittances   ___________________  
37. What proportion of household foodgrain consumption do you buy from outside (e.g. ration shop)?   _____________% 
38. How much of outstanding debt do you have at the moment?  Rs. _____________________ 
J. MEASURING RISK AVERSION AND AMBIGUITY AVERSION 
Risk Aversion 
39. You have the choice of (1) accepting Rs. 50 from us right now for sure. (2) Or alternatively, instead of the Rs. 50, we will toss a coin, if it is heads 
you get Rs.70 and if it is tails, you get Rs.30.  
What would you rather choose to do? (write 1 or 2)  
Hand over Rs. 50 to the farmer or toss the coin and pay out Rs. 70 if Heads and Rs.30 if Tails. Write amount ______________________________
Ambiguity Aversion 
40. Now, we would like to offer you another chance to win. We would like to offer you Rs.50 through another game 
Bag 1 contains 4 white balls and 6 black balls. You pick a ball. You will win Rs.50 if the ball you pick is white. 
Bag 2 contains 10 balls. Some are white and some are black. I don’t know for sure how many of each there are. You need to name one color. And you 
will win Rs.50 if you pick the ball of the color you name. 
Which bag will you choose? (write 1 or 2)  
Enumerator: Please allow the respondent to pick a ball from his chosen bag 
The reward from this game is  
Lottery Price 
41. Supposing you were offered a lottery ticket, where the prize is decided by a coin flip. You win Rs.100 if Heads and 50 if Tails. How much would 
you be willing to pay for the ticket? [Investigator: Suggest lottery prices of Rs. 25, Rs.50, Rs. 75 and so on to get this figure.]
Rs. ___________________________________ 
K. INVESTIGATOR OBSERVATIONS 
42. LOCATIONAL ATTRIBUTES 
a. Distance of the farmer’s field from the collection point ____________ metres 
b. Distance of the farmer’s field from the nearest metalled roadhead ____________ metres 
c. Distance of the farmer’s field from the nearest market for contract crop ____________ metres 
d. Distance of the farmer’s field from the nearest market for the alternate crop ____________ metres 
e. Distance of the farmer’s house from the panchayat president’s house ____________ metres 
f. Distance of the farmer’s house from the main village cluster/centre of village ____________ metres 
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43. House Type 
1) Kaccha (Odu, mud) 
2) Pacca  (Cement brick) 
 
 
44. How would you rate the economic condition of this household compared to other households in the village?  
1) Among the poorest 20%                      
2) Poorer than average but not among the poorest 20%                                   
3) About Average
4) Better than average but not among the richest 20%                            
5) Among the richest 20% 
6) Unable to observe 
 
MAKE NOTE OF ANY QUOTES, COMMENTS, OR INCIDENTS THAT YOU THINK ARE RELEVANT AND INTERESTING. PLEASE MAKE NOTE 
OF IT IN SOME DETAIL.  
